WILL THE REAL ANC STAND UP; PROS AND CONS OF THE NEW POLITICS

Introduction

In my experience most Western journalists find it very difficult to make predictions about South African politics. Government corruption and poor service delivery were used by these journalists to predict at every election after 1994 that the ANC would fare worse. Since 1994 the ANC has fared much better in every election and these journalists' predictions were proven wrong every time.

The same goes for opposition parties, such as the DA's predictions. In the 2000 local government elections, the DA had 22% of the support. They predicted that they would hold 25% or 100 seats in Parliament after the 2004 National elections. After the 2004 elections, the ANC had 70% and the DA had 12%. Ryan Coetzee, the DA's chief strategist predicted that the DA would obtain 5% of the black vote in 2004. Statistics show it to be less than 1%.

These journalists' predictions were wrong because they projected Europe's voting patterns and models on the ANC and on South Africa. In South Africa, many forces and factors work together for which those models do not make provision.

For one, the ANC does not see itself as a normal political party but still talk and think in terms of a freedom movement which is busy with the conclusion of a National Democratic Revolution. That is why within the ANC you find convinced communists and capitalists; socialists and Africanists and various intermediary combinations thereof. The cement which to date has kept them together was their joint struggle history rather than a common ideology and policy.

The good news is that the ANC and South African opposition politics will, following the creation of a new political party from the membership of the ANC, never be the same again. The establishment of a new party out of the existing ANC, is not the end of the ANC, but is definitely the beginning of the end of the ANC as we have come to know it since 1912.

The ANC splits - how did we get here?

What happened in the ANC that has brought us to this point?

I give my summation of events which have lead to the current situation.

In 1994 President Mandela did not want Mr. Thabo Mbeki as his deputy president. His choice was Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa. One of Mr. Mandela's reasons was that it should not appear that a Xhosa clique existed in a country which is very sensitive about its ethnicity. Messrs. Mbeki and Mandela are both Xhosas.

Mr. Mbeki is very good with lobby-politics in the inner circles. With lobby-politics he succeeded in getting Ms. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela of the Women's League, Mr. Peter Mokaba of the ANC Youth and Mr. Jacob Zuma as prominent Zulu ANC Member to support him. With this pressure on Mandela, he appointed Mr. Mbeki as deputy president. Mr. Ramaphosa was offered the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs. He saw this as an insult and eventually exchanged the political world for the business world.

Mr. Mbeki thereafter created the climate within the ANC that the deputy president of the ANC automatically succeeds the president. When Mr. Mandela retired as president after only one term, Mr. Mbeki was elected unopposed at the ANC's 1997 conference in Mafeking as president of the ANC and so also the next president of South Africa.

The question was now, who has to become the deputy president in Mr. Mbeki's place? Mr. Mbeki wanted to avoid already appointing his successor. Mr. Jacob Zuma was a harmless and loyal ANC member who, according to the opinion of the Mbeki grouping, could never be president. The solution was to appoint Zuma as deputy president. In so doing, the real struggle for Mr. Mbeki's successor was postponed till later.

Thereafter Mr. Mbeki goes overseas as usual while Mr. Zuma does his work as deputy president. Mr. Zuma attends all the ANC funerals with Ms. Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and he addresses stadium crowds in the absence of Mr. Mbeki. When Mr. Mbeki returned from one of his many overseas visits, he discovers that ANC supporters accept that Mr. Zuma would be his successor in the same way that Mbeki had created the climate that he would automatically become Mr. Mandela's successor. That was unacceptable for Mr. Mbeki. Where he as president should have gotten rid of poor ministers such as Mrs. Msimang of Health, he did not fire any minister. At the first possible opportunity (June 2005) he does however fire Mr. Zuma as deputy president and so believes that he solved the problem.

(It is noticeable that on the day of Mr. Zuma's firing, Mr. Lekota was making jokes with us as the opposition about it from across the Assembly floor, while the other ministers were upset, despondent and sad. As number three in the ANC behind Mr. Zuma, Mr. Lekota most certainly had done the math and had seen himself as the strongest pretender to replace Mr. Mbeki.)

To better understand Mbeki's end as president, we should quickly give attention to an important sideshow in 2001. Five years after Mbeki was elected as ANC president in 1997, various top positions had to be filled again at the ANC's national conference in 2002. Cyril Ramaphosa, Matthews Phosa and Tokyo Sexwale, are some of the names which are mentioned as possible successors to Mbeki. It is important that they should start stepping forward.

Out of the blue, a year before the ANC's national conference, Minister Steve Tshwete, the Minister of Safety and Security, alleges in 2001 that there is a plot against Mr. Mbeki which threatens his life. Coincidentally, he drops the names of Cyril Ramaphosa, Matthews Phosa and Tokyo Sexwale on television as those who are involved in the plot. The police investigate the issue and at the end of that year Minister Tshwete apologises to the three after nothing could be proven. The allegations however does so much damage to these three's public image that they are effectively knocked out of any successor-race and find themselves outside of politics in the cold.

During these plot allegations I could not but think of former President Mandela's words when he congratulated Mr. Mbeki with his unanimous appointment as president in 1997 at the Mafikeng ANC conference. Mr. Mandela said at the time to the congress: "One of the temptations of a leader who has been elected unopposed (as Mr Mbeki) is that he may use his powerful position to settle scores with his detractors, marginalise them, and in certain cases, get rid of them and surround himself with yes-men and -women...A leader must keep the forces together, but you can't do that unless you allow dissent...people should even be able to criticise the leader without fear or favour..." (Gevisser p. 698) It is interesting that Mandela`s speech on the ANC's website has been edited to excise these comments.

When Mr. Zuma was thereafter kicked out by Mr. Mbeki, he found outside in the political cold an alliance of aggrieved parties who welcomed him with open arms. The SACP and Cosatu were already out in the cold and upset with Mbeki because he increasingly cut them out of policy decisions and announced economic policy adjustments such as GEAR without knowing them in that beforehand. Ramaphosa, Sexwale and Phosa are also out in the cold with their own grievances against Mr. Mbeki. Zuma is welcomed by them because he, with his popularity with ordinary ANC members, is an ideal candidate to push in front in their struggle against Mbeki.

This struggle reached its peak in a clash at the ANC's 2007 conference in Polokwane. Polokwane was actually the ANC's first true democratic leadership election since 1994. Mbeki made the mistake of his life to make himself available for a third term.

Any sensitive political observer could already at the start of the ANC's Polokwane conference in December 2007 see how the wind was blowing and that Mr. Zuma would defeat Mr. Mbeki for the position of president. Many political journalists and commentators, including Mr. Muleleki George, Mr. Mbeki's chief organizer, had up to the end predicted that Mr. Mbeki would easily win.

Mr. Mbeki's supporters arrived at the conference in BMW's, Mercedeses and other expensive luxury cars. Except for the Xhosa supporters from the Eastern Cape, the majority of President Mbeki's supporters were the new wealthy middle class. There numbers were however few in comparison to Mr. Zuma's supporters.

The Zuma supporters arrived in old busses which drove for nine hours from the far corners of the country. Where Mbeki's supporters wore neat Italian shoes and European suits, the Zuma supporters wore T-shirts and sang popular Zuma songs such as the "Umshini Wam" song.

Mbeki supporters sat in the front of the hall and every time there had been cheers, stuck three fingers in the air. That indicated a third term for Mr. Mbeki.

The Zuma supporters sat in the back of the hall. When Mr. Lekota as chairperson or any other person whom they did not like appeared on the stage, they loudly showed their disapproval by making a rolling movement with their hands. That is the sign which soccer enthusiasts use when they think it is time to substitute a poor player with a better one.

It was quite clear that there were many more rolling movements as the three finger delegates in the hall!

After Mr. Zuma's victory, he indicated that Mr. Mbeki should stay on as president until the 2009 election. It would ensure economic stability, but from Mr. Zuma's point of view, would also ensure ANC unity until the elections were held.

Former President PW Botha followed the unwritten political rule that you do not stomp on a political opponent who had been damaged politically, with the understanding that he lies quietly.

When it appeared that Mr. Mbeki did not want to lie still and it appeared that he was actively encouraging the prosecution of Mr. Zuma, the radicals on the side of Mr. Zuma demanded that they should get rid of Mr. Mbeki - he was a danger that could prevent a Zuma Presidency. Mr. Zuma tried to prevent this by indicating that one does not keep on hitting a dead snake. The radicals answered that the snake was clearly not dead. Its head had to be chopped off and the snake had to be buried permanently!

This leads to the decision of the ANC's National Executive Committee (NEC) to ask Mr. Mbeki to resign (20/09/2008). The objective was however to only cut the cherry on-top of the organisation (Mr. Mbeki) or was it a mole according to some - out without damaging the rest of the ANC's body.

After Mr. Mbeki had resigned, Mr. Zuma immediately called the Cabinet together and requested that nobody tenders their resignations. A few days later (23/09/2008) a large number of ministers did however resign. That was when Minister Manuel's resignation had lead to a drastic fall in the markets for a short while.

There were however two types of resignations. Ministers such as Pahad, Lekota and Mufamadi, from Mr. Mbeki's inner circle, announced that they were not prepared to continue as Ministers in a Zuma ANC. Most other Ministers, such as Minister Trevor Manuel, indicated that they were immediately available for appointment to the Cabinet. (Ministers such as Msimang and Van Schalkwyk did of course not take the chance to resign!)

In order to prevent any further split, Mr. Zuma allowed President Kgalema Motlanthe to once again appoint all the Mbeki Minister's, even Mrs. Msimang.

After the Mbeki group were kicked out of the majority of posts at the Polokwane conference, it was clear that it was not the end of the struggle. On the evening of December 18, 2007 shortly after Jacob Zuma was elected president of the ANC, Mr Mluleki George addressed an impromptu gathering of the wounded Mbeki supporters and declared: "The battle continues, comrades!"

These events irrevocably leads to first Mr. Lekota and thereafter Mr. Shilowa (29/09/2008) announcing that they are not interested to go on with the new ANC leadership and that the divorce papers have been served. The Sandton Convention (1/11/2008) follows on this and the creation of a new party on 16 December this year.

Will the real ANC please stand up

Is Mr. Zuma's ANC or Mr. Lekota's ANC the real ANC? If a product like Omo in the advertising world does not sell that well anymore, the advertising people develop a New Whiter Omo. In the same way we had the NP and thereafter the NNP (New NP) in the political world.

A more appropriate comparison with what is at present happening in the ANC, would be the NP split in the late sixties, when the Herstigte Nasionale Party (Reformed National Party) came into existence. Both fought to indicate that they were the true NP, its policy and history. The HNP only added Herstigte (Reformed) in front of the name. Both honoured Verwoerd as its leader but thereafter one had to choose between Vorster and Albert Hertzog and Jaap Marais.

The ANC's struggle is at present exactly the same. We have an ANC and a Herstigte (Reformed) ANC. Both are fighting to indicate that they are the true standard bearer of the ANC, its policy, the Freedom Charter and the historical apartheid struggle. From there the struggle to have the word "Congress", which refers to the 1955 Congress, retained in the new party's name. Both honour Mandela as leader but thereafter you have to choose between Zuma and Lekota and Shilowa.

Because individuals in the ANC represent such diverse economic policy directions, it has for a long time been predicted that the ANC will split. The prediction is that the one group will be more Marxist-Socialist and will form a type of Labour Party with Cosatu and the SACP playing a prominent role in it. The other grouping will be more market orientated and social democratic with leaders such as Trevor Manuel and Cyril Ramaphosa playing a more prominent role.

The current split in the ANC is not this split. This split will still be taking place in the future. The current split is taking place more around grievances than it is around ideological differences. One can prove this by only looking at the leaders of the two groupings.

The trade union Cosatu have leaders in both groupings. Mr. Zwelinsima Vavi is on the side of Mr. Zuma and Mr. Willie Madisha on the side of Lekota.

Mr. Gwede Mantashe is one of the prominent SACP members on the side of Mr. Zuma and Mr. Phillip Dexter, former treasurer of the Communist Party is on the side of Lekota.

"The new party is anti-socialist and only free-market orientated," a journalist reasoned with me. As proof he refers to Mr. Mbhazima Shilowa, former premier of Gauteng, who is a multi-millionaire as well as is the case with Lekota. If the journalists division is correct, Mr. Cyril Ramaphosa and Mathews Phosa would also be on the side of Mr. Lekota. They are however enthusiastic supporters of Mr. Zuma. So too, Mr. Manuel.

Before the new party has not spelled out its economic policy, there is no indication that this is the truly expected ANC split on the grounds of economic policy differences. I would like to predict that we will have little clarity about this before the election.

The same goes for the Zuma ANC. After the election, Mr. Zuma will be under pressure from the SACP and Cosatu to bring about certain economic policy changes. The question is whether he and Mr. Trevor Manuel will resist this pressure and be prepared to, in the interest of South Africa, make the right but unpopular economic decisions? Then only will we know who the real ANC is and where we stand with the two parties.

Pros and cons of the new politics

I only have time to focus on the electoral system.

There is at present arguments in favour of a return to the constituency system which we had prior to 1994. With constituencies voters have a parliamentary member which has to report to them and the party bosses have less say. If president Mbeki had been elected directly by the voters, the ANC would also not have been able to get rid of him so easily, is a further argument.

Proponents of such a change forget that Mugabe has been elected as president for 28 years already directly by the voters. Such a president is also not untouchable and in South Africa's case the ANC with their majority in Parliament would easily have gotten rid of Mbeki.

A disadvantage of a constituency system in South Africa is that it, without a doubt, would lead to the ANC in the next election obtaining 80% of all the seats. A rough projection can be made if the results of the local ward elections in 2006 are used. (In the 2006 local government elections there were 3895 wards. Of these the ANC won 3035 wards - that is 79%!) That, while all indications show that the ANC, under a proportional electoral system, will receive less than 66% in the next elections and will most probably in the 2014 elections get less than 50%.

The constituency system lends itself to reducing the chances of opposition parties winning, through manipulated border demarcations and with loaded constituencies. Ask the old Progs how they got many votes nationally, but in the whole of South Africa, only in the Houghton constituency could Helen Suzman win.

The FF Plus specially made a study of the proportional electoral system in Germany, the Netherlands and Israel after this electoral system was chosen in 1994. Part of it included that I attend an election in the Netherlands.

The proportional electoral system, without a doubt leads to a more representative parliament than the constituency/ward system. The problem until now was that the proportional system did not work in South Africa completely because the ANC had 70% of the support and had won all nine provinces.

In those countries which we studied, the strongest party hardly gets 40%. Such a strongest party can after an election only govern by entering into coalitions with other parties. Through this, the electoral system forms another constitutional check and balance to prevent the abuse of power by the strongest party.

With the split of the ANC, the advantages of a proportional system will for the first time after 1994 become clear in South Africa as different provinces will after the election be governed by coalition governments with the ANC in opposition.

The Cape Metro Council is presently the only example that we have in South Africa where such a coalition of political parties forced the ANC into opposition.

I believe that the current proportional electoral system's advantages in a country such as South Africa, far outweighs the disadvantages.

What do we do now?

Following the firing of President Mbeki and the forming of the new Lekota party, it is possible for the first time since 1994 to reduce the big majority of the ANC and to prevent that the ANC govern in all nine provinces.

To get the support for the ANC in the next election under two thirds (66%) it is very important that opposition voters turn out in large numbers to register and to vote. Opposition voters who do not go and vote out of protest or recklessness, however only once again increase the ANC's support.

With simple math it can be explained why opposition voters who do not vote in our proportional electoral system, increase the ANC's support. For the sake of the example, we accept that only ten voters had cast their votes. The percentage of parliamentary members which each party receives is then calculated out of ten votes. If the ANC had obtained six votes and the opposition parties together four, the ANC will get 60% of the parliamentary members in Cape Town or in a provincial legislature and the opposition parties get 40%.

If one opposition voter stays away, the ANC has still obtained six votes while the opposition parties now only have three votes. The calculation is then done out of nine and no longer ten. The ANC has six out of nine votes or 66%. Without the ANC obtaining more votes, the ANC suddenly has 6% more parliamentary members in Cape Town or in a provincial legislature. The stay-away-voter therefore caused the ANC to improve its performance!

A second step is to prevent the ANC of governing in all nine provinces. For this meaningful cooperation between opposition parties are needed. The prerequisite for successful cooperation is that the model on which the opposition parties cooperate has to be such that it will draw the biggest possible number of opposition voters to the ballot boxes to vote against the ANC.

Mrs. Helen Zille as DA leader's cooperation model proposes one party, with one candidates list to obtain this. She predicts that the DA can beat the ANC and win the election in 2014 on its own. Research at present and the future will prove this prediction totally wrong. This propaganda approach hampers responsible cooperation between opposition parties. What is more irresponsible is that this cooperation model will mobilise less opposition votes against the ANC than the proposal of the other opposition parties.

The other cooperation model proposes that each opposition party participates in the election under their own party names and so try and draw the maximum number of votes against the ANC from their individual niche markets.

Where the ANC, for example in a province such as the Western Cape may obtain less than 50% of the votes, the opposition parties, before the elections, give an undertaking to the voters, to cooperate after the elections and form a provincial government with the ANC being in the opposition. The model includes an undertaking to not fight each other during the election but to focus on the ANC.

Why will this model get more opposition votes at the ballot box?

Because of the unique variety and composition of the South African electorate. This unique composition appears from the fact that of the 30% of opposition votes in the previous election, the DA obtained 12%. That means that less than half, 47 of the 107, opposition parliamentary members are at present DA members.

Dr. Buthelezi for example obtains votes against the ANC and for the IFP from traditional Zulu Chiefs from the outstretched rural areas of KwaZulu-Natal. These voters will rather stay away than to vote if the IFP is not on the ballot paper.

General Holomisa at present obtains the votes for the UDM and against the ANC in the Eastern Cape. If the UDM is not on the ballot paper, these voters will not vote.

Municipal by-elections show that Patricia de Lille is at present getting the votes on the Cape Flats and in the Northern Cape which Helen Zille and the DA can never get. According to these voters, the DA has an image of "rich and exalted" while Patricia is "one of us".

The FF Plus is at present getting the votes of Afrikaans voters who seriously differ from the DA about many issues. They write letters to explain that the DA constitution has no reference to Christianity and that they would rather stay away than to vote for a DA type of party.

This problem can be solved by allowing opposition parties to get the maximum support from their own niche market. In this way the total number of opposition votes following the elections will be considerably more than where voters had to vote for only one party with a DA image. After the elections these parties cooperate intelligently with each other against the ANC.

With exactly this cooperation model Cape Town was kept out of the hands of the ANC following the previous local government elections. Repeating this model can in future keep the Western Cape, the Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng, the Cape Metro Council as well as the Tshwane Metro Council out of the hands of the ANC.

In the light of the crisis in the country, a decision on a realistic cooperation model has to be taken as soon as possible. In this regard it is meaningful that no other opposition party supports the cooperation model of the DA.

Conclusion

The FF Plus continuously engages with various opposition parties and would continue to do so in an effort to obtain the goals set out above. 

I started with the statement that the establishment of a new party out of the existing ANC, is not the end of the ANC, but is definitely the beginning of the end of the ANC as we have come to know it since 1912. The ANC and South African opposition politics will never be the same again.

I remember the picture in 2004 on television where Mr. Mbeki and Mr. Zuma, with their hands intertwined triumphantly held above their heads, announced the ANC's 70% victory. Mr. Lekota as the number three in the ANC appeared on television with them. No political commentator could predict then that the situation in 2008, only four years later, would have changed so drastically between these three top ANC leaders. If it can change in four years so much, what could South Africa not look like in another four years from now?

Issued by the Freedom Front Plus November 13 2008

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