The DA is losing legitimacy, here is why: A look at the DA electoral performance over the last 20 years, in terms of votes won, and by party leader, with a view to some of the fundamental problems facing that party, and which PR won’t solve.

Here is the total number of votes the DA won in every election since 2004:

2004: 1,931,201 (Leon)
2006: 1,608,154 (Leon)
2009: 2,945,829 (Zille)
2011: 3,216,006 (Zille)
2014: 4,091,584 (Zille)
2016: 4,028,765 (Maimane)
2019: 3,621,188 (Maimane)
2021: 2,543,764 (Steenhuisen)

You cannot compare national and local government elections, however. Turnout differs dramatically. So, in the next two tweets, I have differentiated the DA national election results from the DA local government election results.

Here are the total number of votes won by the DA in only national and provincial elections (National ballot):

2004: 1,931,201 (Leon)
2009: 2,945,829 (Zille) (+1,014,628)
2014: 4,091,584 (Zille) (+1,145,755)
2019: 3,621,188 (Maimane) (-470,396)

Here are the total number of votes won by the DA in only local government elections (PR ballot):

2006: 1,608,154 (Leon)
2011: 3,216,006 (Zille) (+1,607,852)
2016: 4,028,765 (Maimane) (+812,759)
2021: 2,543,764 (Steenhuisen) (-1,485,001)

A few observations. 1. The DA vote share peaked in 2014 (national) and 2016 (local) at around 4m votes. 2. The DA vote share has declined since then - down to 3.6m votes in 2019 (national) and 2.5m in 2021 (local).

It is problematic to assign any growth or regression to the leader alone. There are many factors at play, but their role is by no means insignificant and should be carefully considered as part of the equation.

The DA has thus had two big losses. The biggest (a decline of 1.4m votes) was between the 2016 (Maimane in charge) and 2021 (Steenhuisen) local government elections. The second largest was -470k votes between the 2014 (Zille) and 2019 (Maimane) national elections.

The question everyone is asking, then, is what will the 2024 national elections bring on this front? Will the DA go up or down from the 3.6m votes it secured in the 2019 national elections?

The DA PR machine deals largely in percentages. And it is not immune from comparing local and national elections to also help muddy the waters. In turn, it uses other comparative measures - like the ANC and its decline - to measure its success.

For example, in response to the 2021 local government elections results, Steenhuisen said the following:

“What these trends tell us - when you add 2019’s results to the graph - is that two of the big three parties are heading down, while one hit its low in 2019 and is heading back up again. Of all the big parties with a truly national footprint, only the DA has shown growth since 2019. And this bodes very well for 2024 - for our party, but more importantly for our country - as the DA will form the core of a new majority that will unseat the ANC nationally.”

In fact, Steenhuisen did not just use the 2019 national elections as the measure of the DA’s success, he dismissed as “superficial” any comparison with 2016:

“While a superficial analysis might conclude merely that the DA’s support dropped from 2016, a deeper look reveals that our party has indeed stopped its free-fall and is heading in the right direction again, and at a critical time for our country. Once we have finalised our coalition negotiations, all our attention will turn to the next national and provincial elections in two and a half years’ time.”

As far as political propaganda goes, this is perhaps understandable. The DA’s goal, in PR terms was to suggest the ship had been stabilised and a corner turned. Comparing the 2021 result to the 2019 result in percentage terms was the only way it could do that.

But absolute votes matter. They represent the number of people willing to vote for you. Turnout can drop to the point where just 1m votes represents 25%, but that is just as bad a situation for democracy as it is for the DA’s legitimacy.

Steenhuisen was elected interim leader in November 2019 and leader proper in November 2020. Three years is not much time to turn a party round, but it is not insignificant either.

It is remarkable that the DA’s decline of 1.4m, in terms of absolute votes, from the 2016 to 2021 local election has not translated into a more damning assessment of his leadership, especially considering a decline of -470k votes was enough to end Maimane’s leadership.

A tribute to the DA’s PR. But that is perhaps all water under the bridge now. What is done is done and, if the DA can improve on the 3.6m votes it got in 2019, come 2024, it will all be redundant anyway. Certainly, that is what the DA is banking on.

2024 will bring all the usual comparisons from the DA: an emphasis on the ANC’s decline (and the 50% threshold), a focus on the possibility of coalitions, and percentage-based relativity.

When all is said and done, at some point soon, the DA must start to grow its actual vote share again. It can get 25% and some ostensible growth in the next election but, like the ANC, it will rest on shakier and shakier democratic ground if fewer and fewer people vote for it.

The problem with Maimane was not the actual loss in 2019. 470k votes is a relatively small number. It was the direction things were headed, if the decline was not arrested. In absolute terms, it hasn’t been yet, it has continued. That is the 2024 test for the DA’s long-term viability.

In the short term, politics is all about perception and momentum, imagined or not. By that measure, the DA is doing a good job of creating the perception that everything is on track. But relativity will be the death of any party, long term. Reality itself will catch up with you.

The DA’s electoral foundation, in terms of absolute votes, is weak and, it appears, weakening. It is no use getting power if you do not have significant support among the electorate. You can’t govern like that. It will end in tears.

2024 will not only be a substantive test of Steenhuisen’s leadership and the narrative that the tide has turned, it will be a test watershed, for all parties, in terms of democratic legitimacy.

The real danger to SA’s future is not coalitions and their stability, or the ANC’s performance, or the size of the opposition in percentage terms, it is a government that represents 30% of the voting population.

This article is based upon an extended Twitter thread that first appeared here.