The Multiparty Charter is the start of a process to get rid of the ANC within 6 years

4 September 2023

The signing of the Multiparty Charter (MPC) a while ago in Kempton Park (on the old Codesa site) is an important development in South African politics. The leaders of the MPC agreed that they want to dethrone the ANC and keep the EFF out of a governing coalition. There is, however, some scepticism amongst commentators and the media about whether they will achieve it.

If, however, one takes the full political picture into account, and even the mess around local government coalitions, it becomes clear that the MPC brings quite a number of positive issues to the fore.

It is for instance significant that the seven leaders decided to appoint a permanent non-partisan chairman for the process. Prof William Gumede is a respected academic and is familiar with politics. He accepted the appointment, even if it means that he will have to endure bitter criticism from ANC ranks and even friends.

He has had a calming influence even during the first meeting. His objectivity also played a role in the leaders changing the name for the DA’s “Moonshot Pact” to the Multiparty Charter. This strengthened the relationships amongst the participants and increased the buy-in and ownership of the process. The August meeting has been the first of many.

The specific and shared priorities of the MPC (including a growing economy and job creation, the ending of load shedding, law and order, service delivery and quality health care) are admittedly not new and could even be found in an ANC manifesto. The difference probably lies in the way those priorities will be executed.

In terms of the governance principles of the MPC there are a few unique ones, specifically the decentralisation of power, an open market economy and redressing the unjust past with the promotion of non-racialism and unity in our diversity. These three principles distinguish the MPC and its signatories clearly from the ANC and the EFF.

The MPC also distinguishes itself by putting forward some principles for coalitions – some of which are new and fresh. Amongst these are the principles of power sharing and co-governance (rather than an X-led coalition), proportional representation in the executive, merit-based appointments, life style audits for any proposed officials and a fundamental review of the ministerial handbook.

Having said all this, what are the chances that these seven parties (and a few more that can still join, such as the ACDP) could get 50% plus one in the 2024 election? Cynical commentators will say “slight to zero”. And if one is realistic, the chances of a result of 50% plus one for the opposition (excluding the EFF and other ANC hangers-on) are indeed improbable. To happen, it would mean that the ANC should get less than 40% of the national vote (if the EFF gets 8% and the hangers-on maintain their collective 2%)

But this argument misses the point. As with all good things in life, this is a process. One can understand that members of the MPC must work actively for a 50% plus one result. Their supporters would not expect anything less. But viewed objectively, this scenario has the smallest chance to succeed.

Does this mean that all is in vain and that the formation of the MPC is a futile exercise? Not at all.

Considering the present and expected support of the opposition parties (excluding the EEF and hangers-on), it is clear that only three of the participants in the MPC at present have national representation. The DA’s 21%, the IFP’s 3.5% and the FF+’s 2.5% (with the ACDP’s 1%) brings its support to 28%.

If one accepts that the DA could perform as well as its support base justifies, it could grow to 25%; with the provincial gains of the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal, it could stand at 7%; the FF+ could, within its constrained power base, grow to 3.5%; if the ACDP stays at 1%, the total moderate opposition vote could be at 37.5%.

The other parties in the MPC that do not yet have support at national level, will struggle collectively to get more than 1% - although their participation in the MPC could boost their support. The one exception may be Action SA, who gained 1% of the total vote in the 2021 elections.

This could increase to 2% in 2024. If this would happen, the support of the moderate opposition could be around 40%. The one important condition is that the 2019 voters should stay away in even greater numbers. The other condition is that the youth should register and vote in large numbers. But the chance that especially young black voters would vote for the MPC in substantial numbers is remote.

There are, however, three parties who are at present not part of the MPC, and who are showing signs that they could do moderately well in their first national election. Build One SA (BOSA) of Musi Maimane cooperated with independent candidates in the 2021 election, and indications are that the same will happen in 2024. BOSA is targeting disgruntled ANC voters and African youth voters – and could get as much as 2%.

The second party is Rise Mzanzi, led by Songezo Zibi. They are also targeting disgruntled ANC voters and the African youth. Zibi has been holding workshops in townships and rural areas for the last year, and believes that he stands a chance to make inroads into the larger pool of non-MPC voters. This is the main reason he has not joined the MPC, although he probably agrees with most of the MPC principles. Rise Manzi could also get around 2%.

The third party outside the MPC (for the moment at least) is the Patriotic Alliance (PA) of Gayton McKenzie. McKenzie does not have a positive public profile and is engaged in a bitter war of words with the DA. He has, however, stated in public that he would like to join the MPC, and his almost 1% support in the 2019 elections can (with a focus on the Eastern Cape, Gauteng and the Northern Cape) grow to 2% in 2024.

These three parties – even though not participating in the MPC – are part of the political centre. They would, after the 2024 election, probably support the MPC on an ad hoc basis and even on principle.

What does this all mean? If the MPC takes into account the bigger picture (and notwithstanding trying to secure 50% plus 1 in 2024), it can with the help of other centrist parties get even more than 40% in 2024. It will therefore be beneficial for the MPC to help build this centre – and at the least not to alienate potential partners.

The most likely scenario is that the ANC gets around 48% of the national votes and that it forms a coalition government with its hangers-on (and not the EFF, as some think). In such a scenario both Gauteng and KZN could go to the moderate opposition. If this is to happen in Gauteng, the DA’s bad relationships with the PA will have to be normalized – and Prof Gumede may have his hands full to solve this problem.

But it means that a weakening and imploding ANC could start its new term without controlling the three most powerful economic provinces in South Africa. And what is more, it could, two years after 2024 when the next local government elections will be held, decisively lose all the metros in these provinces and even in the country.

This will weaken ANC provincial structures (like what happened in the Western Cape after the DA won the province), as they will be without any patronage to dispense. The present centrist opposition parties (which could by then include BOSA, Rise Mzanzi and the PA) will be in an extremely good position to get rid of the ANC in the 2029 national elections.

In addition to the fact that this seems to be the most probable scenario at present, this process has one more benefit. Many South Africans are concerned that, if the ANC should lose the 2024 national election decisively, the majority of its supporters may not accept it, and that this could lead to political instability and even violence.

If, however, the next six years consists of a three phase transition, it can guarantee greater political stability. Phase One would be the loss of Gauteng and KZN. Phase Two would be the loss of almost all metros in the 2026 local government elections – which would in essence relegate the ANC to a rural-based party. The third phase of the transition would then be a national drubbing in 2029.

Another positive is that millions of disgruntled ANC voters, who at present can’t get themselves to vote for another party, but who are part of the centre, might later in the three phase transition be more open to consider alternatives. Thus would strengthen the centre even more.

For many this time frame may be too long, and if it could be shorter, all the better. But with what the MPC has started, and with the help of other centrist parties, the end goal is in sight: to take the country back from corrupt, incompetent and criminal people. Therefore the political centre should be strengthened across all racial lines, and the transition should preferably be in phases. The forming of the MPC is the first step in this process. It should be a beacon of hope for all moderate South Africans.

Finally, all parties that are part of or near the political centre, should actively seek the support of all civil society formations that also view themselves as part of the centre. The passivity amongst minorities during previous national elections must make way for a realization that your vote can, this time, really make a difference. It is part of the process finally to get rid of the ANC in 2029.

Theuns Eloff is an independent commentator. This article was first published on netwerk24.