The decision taken by the NEC of the ANC to recall Mr Thabo Mbeki from office has created the possibility of a split within the ANC. This is unlikely to happen soon but if it were to happen the new ANC faction could perhaps garner significant support.
Thabo Mbeki's resignation last Sunday evening has changed the face of politics in South Africa. Mr Mbeki commanded significant support in at least two of South Africa's provinces - the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape. In other provinces the popularity gap between himself and Mr Jacob Zuma is too close to call.
He perhaps also commands the support of the middle classes. If his resignation prompts his supporters within the ANC to split from the party to form an independent faction, that faction could stand to win a substantial portion of the vote in next year's general election. The ANC may therefore come to rue its hasty decision to dismiss its former leader.
It had previously been assumed that such a split would see the leftists within the party hive off to start a new movement. If a split were to occur it will more likely be Mr Mbeki's centrist support base that will start a new movement - a moderate ANC up against the increasingly reckless politicking of Mr Zuma's ANC.
It is possible that Mr Mbeki could still retain the support of the 40% of the 4000 ANC branch members who voted for him at the December 2007 Polokwane conference. At Polokwane he was able to secure more votes than Mr Zuma in four out of the nine provinces including the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, North West, and Western Cape, while Mr Zuma led the pack in the remaining five provinces. The ANC Youth League and the ANC Women's League also threw their weight behind Mr Zuma.
Out of the 11 voting blocs in the ANC Mr Zuma therefore commanded the support of seven and Mbeki four. The impression that Mr Jacob Zuma commands an outright majority in the current ANC is therefore not correct. Opinion poll figures give further credence to this view.
Based on the Polokwane results a moderate Mbeki faction in the ANC could still command majority support among ANC branches in the Eastern Cape, Limpopo, North West, and the Western Cape.
According to research conducted in June 2008 by a market research company, TNS Research Surveys, sampling 2000 South African adults from the seven major metropolitan areas, Mr Mbeki's approval rating as president of South Africa has declined from 37% in April 2008 to 32% in June 2008. This was his lowest approval ranking since mid 2002.
The impression given by the media is that Mr Zuma commands significantly more popularity than Mr Mbeki. But again as is the case with the Polokwane voting statistics, opinion polls do not support this view. His June approval rating was 37% - only five percentage points higher than Mr Mbeki. Furthermore 44% of the adults sampled disapproved of Mr Zuma while 19% were undecided.
Mr Zuma's support base hails mostly from Durban where he achieved a 46% approval rating. In the inland areas such as the East Rand, Mr Zuma achieved a 51% approval rating, in Bloemfontein 50%, in the West Rand 49%, in Soweto 46%, in the Vaal Triangle and the South Rand 45%, and in Johannesburg 40%.
In Durban, Mr Mbeki received an approval rating of 18%. In the inland areas such as the East Rand, Mr Mbeki achieved a 36% approval rating, in Bloemfontein 65%, in the West Rand 33%, in Soweto 30%, in the Vaal Triangle and the South Rand 48%, and in Johannesburg 36%.
Mr Zuma's approval numbers in Cape Town, the Eastern Cape, Port Elizabeth, and East London did not even reach above 20%.
Mr Mbeki commanded significant support in East London with a 76% approval rating. Unlike Mr Zuma, Mr Mbeki's approval ratings in Cape Town, Eastern Cape, and Port Elizabeth were above 30%; with 37%, 49%, and 37% respectively.
Based on these approval rankings an Mbeki faction of the ANC could be expected to win elections in the Western Cape, the Free State, and the Eastern Cape. In Gauteng the province would probably be too close to call. Read in conjunction with the Polokwane results, an Mbeki faction of the ANC would almost certainly win elections in the Eastern Cape and the in the Western Cape.
The polls also indicate that Mr Mbeki commands majority support among Xhosa and Tswana speakers and equal support to Mr. Zuma among Sotho speakers.
It is conceivable too that a break-away faction could garner significant support from the middle class, while Mr Zuma's support would come from the working class.
During the general election in 2004, the ANC received 10.9 million votes, and the DA 1.9 million votes. The remaining 2.8 million votes were spread out among the other parties. If the breakaway faction were to take 2 million votes from the ANC, and another 1 million despondent ANC supporters decided not to vote, that would leave the ANC with 8 million votes against the combined 3.9 million votes of the moderate ANC and the DA. Adding the 2.8 million votes spread among other opposition parties, would give a final result of 8 million votes for the ANC versus 5.7 million for all other opposition parties combined.
It is not possible to say whether the current turmoil in the ANC will result in a breakaway faction before next year's election. Certainly Kgalema Motlanthe's appointment as President has done much to mitigate the risks. But were such a breakaway to occur it has the potential to win at least two of the nine provinces. For the ANC the loss of the Western Cape would be a heavy blow after regaining control of the province from the DA.
The loss of the Eastern Cape would be a far more devastating setback. That province is the home of Mr Nelson Mandela and Mr Mbeki and is seen by many South Africans as the home of the leadership of the ANC. The current ANC leadership under Mr Zuma has erred in creating feuds so early into his tenure as party leader. It remains to be seen whether any of those now finding themselves outside of the ANC tent will have the stamina and courage to exploit the fissures created around the axing of Mr Mbeki. If they do, they could be handsomely rewarded.
This article first appeared in SAIRR Today the weekly online newsletter of the Institute of Race Relations, September 26 2008
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