The Downfall of Botha or the Demise of the National Party?
During February 1982 the long awaited split in the National Party finally occurred. Dr Andries Treurnicht had objected to the interpretation of party policy which held that there could be only one government in the country and that Whites, ‘Coloured' people and Indians could be brought together in a form of ‘healthy power- sharing'. In the weekly caucus Dr Treurnicht and twenty-one followers voted against a motion of confidence in Mr Botha. On 27 February the central committee of the National Party of the Transvaal, comprising more than two hundred office-bearers, met. At stake was whether the Transyaal branch of the party would support the leadership of Dr Treurnicht or that of Mr Botha. Apart from the first two paragraphs, the following article appeared in The Cape Times of27 February, 1982.
For sheer political drama the meeting on 27 February of the central committee of the Transvaal National Party can hardly be surpassed. On the day before the meeting the Treurnicht supporters were confident that victory would be theirs and that control of the Transvaal National Party would pass into their hands. The cabinet ministers from the Transvaal who supported the party leadership did not put their majority higher than twenty. But at the end of the meeting victory went to the party leadership, paving the way for the expulsion from the party of Treurnicht and his followers.
Three things tipped the scales. Firstly Botha arrived unexpectedly from Windhoek and made a powerful speech in which he outlined the security situation and policy alternatives. Secondly Treurnicht's speech was unconvincing. Thirdly a strong centrist faction emerged under the leadership of Mr F. W. de Klerk, who on 6 March was chosen as Treurnicht's successor as Transvaal leader. André du Toit has argued elsewhere (in The Argus of 6 March 1982) that victory at the meeting did not in fact go to Mr Botha and his reformist group but to the rising centrist group under Mr F. W. de Klerk, who is asserting a different line altogether: the overriding importance of party unity.
Unlike the Treurnicht verkramptes, who remain committed to the Verwoerdian framework of separate development, or the reformists, who are to some extent guided by the perceived needs for reform and may even be prepared to take some risks to party unity in pursuing it, the centrist or main-line nationalists give absolute primacy to party unity. For the reformists they will be a considerably harder nut to crack than the Treurnicht verkramptes.
If this interpretation is correct-and I believe it is-what will be the consequences of the National Party split? The following alternatives seem to me to be likely: either it could mean the end of Mr Botha's career as party leader, or it could mean that the days of the National Party as a predominantly Afrikaner party are over. Of course it could mean both, but it is my feeling that the survival of the party will be at the cost of its present leader or vice versa.
The split in the party has been so long coming and the self- sealing capacity of the party so great that many observers refuse to believe that something irrevocable has happened. And yet it is true. We suddenly have a completely new set of circumstances in South African politics.
What is now happening in the party is not a mere afsplintering or uitsuiwering as was the case in the late sixties when Dr Albert Hertzog and his followers were driven out. This is a party split in the fullest sense of the word and all the attempts at reconciliation will be to no avail.
The ethnic glue of Afrikanerdom has finally dissolved. The National Party can no longer continue to function as a loose coalition of conflicting interests and ideologies within Afrikanerdom. Mr Botha is suddenly finding himself in a position where it is doubtful whether he and his party enjoy a clear majority among Afrikaners. Already in the last election nearly 40 per cent of the Afrikaners who went to the polls voted against the National Party; Dr Treurnicht and his men may well push it further 10 per cent over the brink. Soon we shall have a situation where the Afrikaner right wing will become institutionalised as the official opposition. Its leader will be someone who can lay as legitimate a claim as Mr Botha to all the symbols and history of Afrikaner nationalism. If this is not a volkskeuring nothing is.
Who will in the end survive this week's split, Mr Botha or the National Party? The answer to this question depends on another question. Why did the men in control of the party finally allow a split to happen? There are two possible interpretations.
The first is that the split was enforced with control of the party and the interpretation of its policies as the main goal. According to this interpretation the election of 1981 was called to stem the right-wing drift among Afrikaners. Thereafter Mr Botha waited for the moment when he could force Dr Treurnicht either to accept something ideologically objectionable (and lose all credibility) or to leave the party. With Dr Treumicht out of the party, Mr Botha can now revert to his 1979 style in which he again can hold out the promise of verligte reform, keeping everything vaguely open- ended without however actually implementing structural reforms which would spark off a further wave of defections. In practical terms this means that when Mr Botha speaks of ‘healthy power- sharing' he has in mind two or three ‘Coloured' ministers in cabinet and perhaps one Asian, but leaving the National Party in full control of parliament which probably will have three chambers or ethnic block-voting in one chamber.
The other interpretation is that Mr Botha has split the party in order to embark on a programme of serious reform. This means that he will make significant moves towards racial reconciliation (e.g. abolition of the Immorality Act and allowing grey areas in the cities in order to soften the effect of the Group Areas Act), extend the base of political representation by bringing the ‘Coloureds' and Asians into parliament without any qualifications and open negotiations on the constitutional position of blacks.
If the first interpretation is correct the party in its present shape can survive but not Mr Botha. The Afrikaner electorate would surely want to know why it was necessary to drive Dr Treurnicht out if Mr Botha did not do it with some major purpose in mind. People would suspect that Mr Botha and his followers are really guided by the desire to exercise power for its own sake and are not moving forward towards definite goals.
The National Party would in this case continue to lose support both to the left and to the right. If there is a settlement in Namibia and a left-wing black government takes power, the right-wing opposition in the South African parliament could win fifty seats over the next five years. This could mean that the National Party would be unable to muster an overall majority in Parliament. Then the pressure would become irresistible to find a new leader who would be able to effect some reconciliation in Afrikaner ranks. In such a context Mr F. W. de Klerk and Dr Gerrit Viljoen would be the best-placed candidates.
If the second interpretation is correct then it is all over with the National Party as we know it at present. It would be compelled to attract increasing numbers of English voters and transform itself. from an ethnic party into a middle-class party. Such a party would have to put an end to talk about white identity identity and white sovereignty. Big business would exercise far more influence in on the government than is currently the case. Free enterprise would become the dominant ideology.
In 1978, when Dr Treurnicht became leader of the Transvaal National Party, Mr Botha was faced with two options: either he could move ahead purposefully on the road of reform or stand still and allow Dr Treurnicht to become the real number two in the party. In 1981 the latter possibility to a large extent came about. Now that a spilt has been forced Mr Botha is again faced with two options: either he can stand still and bring about his own political downfall, or he can move ahead and preside over the demise of the National Party. Both options may be too ghastly for him to contemplate.
This article by Hermann Giliomee is from The parting of the ways: South African politics 1976-1982, (Cape Town: David Philip, 1982) pp. 158-161
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