All Power to the Party

The ANC’s programme to eliminate the distinction between party and state and extend its hegemony over civil society 

Democratic Party discussion document

March 2000

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The separation of party and state is absolutely central to the proper functioning of a liberal democracy. On a number of occasions over the last five years the DP and others have accused the ANC of blurring the distinction between party and state. We have criticised the appointment of senior ANC politicians to head up institutions that are supposed to be independent of the government and the ruling party; we have expressed our concern at the re-politicisation of the public service; we have drawn attention to the ANC’s desire to interfere in every sphere of South African life.

In response to our criticisms the ANC and others have argued that the government needed to get rid of a disloyal “old guard”; that the public service had to be transformed to be representative of the population of South Africa; that in practise ANC members were the only competent black candidates for senior positions; and that the Constitution provides sufficient protection against a remerging of party and state.  

However, what this document shows for the first time is that over the past three years the ANC has adopted and implemented a Cadre Policy with the stated intention of seizing control over the “state machinery” and extending hegemony over civil society. In terms of this policy:

- The National Working Committee of the ANC was mandated to deploy ANC cadres to all state institutions, including the public service, local government administration, statutory bodies, parastatals, the security forces, the central bank, the public broadcaster and so on.

- Control over deployments was centralised in the hands of the National Working Committee.

- Under the policy ANC cadres have been deployed to senior positions in almost all state institutions including those supposed to be independent of government.

- Hand in hand with deployment the ANC has established structures to ensure that the cadres remain informed by and accountable to the NWC.

- Under the official ANC policy of democratic centralism ANC cadres in whatever sphere of state or society are bound to defend and implement the will of the party leadership with “maximum political discipline” prevailing.

Taken together, these developments show beyond doubt that the ANC is systematically eliminating the distinction between party and state. In doing so the ANC is white-anting the Constitution and eroding the foundations of the liberal-democratic state.

Background

In the run-up to the 1994 election and afterwards the ANC committed itself to the idea of an independent civil service. ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus stated that under an ANC government people would be appointed on the basis of ability to avoid political patronage. President Mandela stated that the ANC members being integrated into the state structures were former cadres now entering non-partisan service in government. Despite these assurances the ANC started appointing members to the upper echelons of the civil service from the moment it came to power. By 1997 about half of the various national Heads of Departments were ANC members. Some of these appointments were able and performed their functions without fear or favour, others less so. There were, however, various factors mitigating against party control:

- Since each minister appointed his or her own people there was no centralised party control over appointments.

- There were no formal structures in place to ensure accountability to the party after appointment.

- These appointees were not formally bound by party discipline.

- Institutions such as the Reserve Bank, Attorney General’s Office, the Police, the Judiciary and the South African Revenue Service (SARS) were generally outside the scope of such appointments.

The ANC Cadre Policy

1997 saw a marked shift in ANC rhetoric and policy. At the beginning of the year the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) angrily exhorted ANC members in the public service to show more loyalty to the party: “You are not ANC cadres only ‘after hours’.” In the run-up to the 50^th National Conference of the party in December that year, the ANC published various documents motivating for a drastic centralisation of power within the Party, and for a massive extension of party control over the state and civil society. ANC cadres would be deployed to all “centres of power” in the state and society in order to ensure that power “is truly in the hands of the people.”

In order to give effect to this desire for greater control the ANC adopted various resolutions and constitutional amendments to enable the party to centralise power:

- The ANC constitution was amended to place all ANC structures—including ANC caucuses in the legislatures—under the supervision and direction of the party leadership. The National Working Committee (NWC) was given responsibility for ensuring that all ANC structures carried out the decisions of the NEC.

- The party resurrected and reaffirmed the principle of democratic centralism in a Conference resolution. ANC members would henceforth be bound by “maximum political discipline” and would have to “defend and implement” the decisions of the party leadership “irrespective of the many and varied sectors” in which they were deployed.

- The Conference adopted a Cadre resolution which mandated the NWC to: deploy cadres to the key centres of power identified by the NWC; establish committees at national, provincial and local level to oversee deployment; and draw up a comprehensive Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy.

Armed with a proper mandate from the party the ANC’s NWC set about implementing the policy. The NWC identified the key centres of power within the state as “the army, the police, the bureaucracy, intelligence structures, the judiciary, parastatals, and agencies such as regulatory bodies, the public broadcaster, the central bank and so on.” The NWC proceeded to deploy cadres to head up institutions such as the SARS, the GCIS, the Reserve Bank and the SANDF. In December of 1998 the ANC adopted a comprehensive Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy and established a National Deployment Committee (NDC) headed up by Jacob Zuma (the deputy president of the ANC.) Other Deployment Committees were subsequently established at provincial and local government level.

Role of Deployment Committees

The Deployment Committees were established as party structures parallel “to those of government in all spheres” which would oversee all deployments and ensure that cadres remained “informed by and accountable” to the party leadership. All deployments (other than those made by Mbeki as president) would now go through these Committees. Announcing the establishment of the National Deployment Committee, an ANC spokesman stated, “The time for self-deployment is over. Every deployment will now go through the committee, be it in national, provincial or local government.”

The Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy

The Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy committed the party to a continued consolidation and extension of ANC power. In institutions where the ANC was already in control (such as the civil service and the legislatures) the policy called for a strengthening of ANC “supervisory structures” and the consolidation of political and administrative control.

The policy also called for a further strengthening of ANC leadership in “all parastatals and statutory bodies in order of importance” and over civil society (“all other sectors of social activity”) including sport, the economy and the media.

The centralisation of power

ANC cadres are bound to implement the decisions of the party leadership under the doctrine of democratic centralism. However, the practical means by which the NWC ensures control is through reserving senior positions in the state for members of the party.

The overlapping powers of the ANC as a party and the ANC in government mean that the NWC has (directly or indirectly) massive and far-reaching control over appointments. For instance, the President of the ANC appoints the premier of each ANC controlled province. The Premiers act under the direction of the NWC. The premiers appoint the heads of provincial government departments. The NWC has used its powers to appoint ANC members to key positions from national to local government administration. All security and intelligence departments are headed up by former ANC exiles close to President Thabo Mbeki. Where the government does not have statutory control over a state institution (such as the Reserve Bank), the NWC can use deployment and party discipline to ensure control.

Consequences for democracy

Through its Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy the ANC has managed to create a dual authority: ostensible authority continues to lie in the Constitution and Parliament; real authority lies within the ANC’s national executive:

- ANC Members of Parliament under the “supervision and direction” of the NWC are unable to execute their constitutional obligations to hold the executive to account.

- ANC MPs are not answerable and accountable to the voters who elected them, but to the party leadership which appointed them and controls their careers.

- Within the civil service the formal hierarchical lines of accountability are bypassed, with ANC cadres informed by and answerable to party structures parallel to those of the state.

- The constitutional obligation on ANC members in independent statutory bodies to perform their duties without “fear or favour” subject only to the Constitution and the law is overridden by the “maximum political discipline” demanded by the party leadership.

One of the major checks on any party seeking to erode the distinction between party and state is the prospect of an alternation in government at the next election. The possibility of the opposition turning the tables upon coming to power is crucial in keeping the government of the day honest.

In the South African context a realistic possibility of a change in government (at least in the short term) is quite clearly lacking. With an overwhelming (and stable) majority most ruling parties would be prone to slowly and incrementally blurring the lines between party and state. In South Africa, though, the ANC has set about purposefully and systematically eliminating these distinctions. The underlying reason for this undue haste is an inability to distinguish between the ANC and “the people” (i.e. the black majority.) This conflation of party and people is best seen in the ANC claim that critics of the ruling party are implicitly attacking the black majority.

The ANC Cadre Policy risks pushing South Africa into a downward spiral towards authoritarianism. The ANC is creating a nomenklatura which is not only loyal to the party, but whose power and position is dependent on the ANC remaining in power. They consequently have a vested interest in ensuring that there is no change of government. Party control over the GCIS and the public broadcaster means that an overtly ANC point of view is conveyed to the voters and critical or dissenting voices are marginalised or ignored. Opposition voters find themselves having to vote against the entire party-state structure and not just the governing party of the day. There is consequently a diminishing prospect of any real alternation in government, which in turn means the ANC can further entrench its control over the state machinery.

In implementing the Cadre Policy the immediate priority of the ANC was extending party control over the state machinery. However, the ambitions of the ANC were never confined to control over the state. ANC documents have repeatedly advocated extending “hegemony” over civil society and particularly the media. The “centres of power” identified by ANC intellectuals for cadre deployment included the “economy” and the “public debate.” The greater the control the party has over the state, the fewer the constraints it operates under, and the more it is able to undermine the autonomy of institutions in civil society.

The DP response

The road down which the ANC has chosen to travel is by no means at an end. Outlined in this document is an overview of the beginnings of a journey that the ANC must not be allowed to complete.

Put simply, what is at stake here is the difference between real democracy and a centralised one-party dominated state that acts in the interests of a tiny elite as it single-mindedly pursues power and privilege.

The Democratic Party’s position is clearly summed up in our vision for South Africa, contained in section 2 of the party Constitution. Section 2.9 states that “…we promote a state that acts equally in the interests of all and not in the interests of the ruling party or any other part of civil society.”

Furthermore, Section 2.11 of the DP constitution states, “An independent civil society is essential to the establishment and preservation of an Open Opportunity Society. Civil society acts as a bulwark against the tendency of the state to encroach into the private realm – it is an antidote to any attempt to wrap society in a smothering hegemony of thought and truth. The Democratic Party promotes a vibrant, independent civil society free from the dictates of the state.”

Against this vision, the ANC has quietly and deviously implemented its alternative: a policy designed to give it hegemony over the state and society and in so doing to degrade the freedom, equality and dignity of South Africa’s people.

As South Africa’s only liberal-democratic party, the DP will vigorously oppose the ANC’s hegemonic tendencies, which are grounded in the arrogance of power and inspired by the totalitarian desire for absolute control.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The 1998 US State Department’s Human Rights report states that the People’s Republic of China “is an authoritarian state in which the Chinese Communist Party is the paramount source of power. At the national and regional levels, party members hold almost all top government, police and military positions. Ultimate authority rests with members of the politburo.”[1]

In late 1999 an ANC delegation was invited to China to learn about internal party organisation from the Communist Party there. On their return from a week-long trip the delegation was asked what they had learnt, and what they would be recommending to the party leadership. The delegation responded that since the ANC had already put in place a policy of cadreship there was not much left to recommend besides a slightly longer period for the ideological training of ANC leaders.[2]

This Cadre Policy referred to had been adopted by the ANC at its 50^th National Conference in 1997 in the form of a broad, enabling resolution. (A later more detailed policy was adopted in November 1998.) Buried among turgid political resolutions on the National Question, Strengthening Branches, Women’s Movement, Gender Institutions etc. this one and a half-page document is easily passed over. It is, however, absolutely crucial in understanding what happened subsequently.

In 1998 the ANC started appointing senior members to state institutions whose independence is guaranteed by the Constitution. Examples are the Attorney General’s Office and the Reserve Bank. At the same time ANC loyalists were increasingly appointed to senior positions in the public service, parastatals and various statutory bodies such as Denel, the South African Revenue Service (SARS) and the Lottery Board. The ANC dominated Judicial Services Commission (JSC) started appointing junior judges to top positions in the judiciary. One ANC document that year openly talked about extending party control over “all the levers of power” in the state—from the judiciary to the civil service.

Each one of these appointments was buried beneath obfuscation. The ANC claimed they were merely forwarding transformation and promoting representivity. Critics were labelled racist. Each appointee would assure the press with a straight face that they would be independent and exercise their duties without “fear or favour” as the Constitution required. The ANC claimed that the document that talked about seizing control over the “levers of power” was merely a “discussion document” and not official policy. Generally, the press accepted these assurances at face value. (Usually a few newspapers dissented on each appointment, but press opposition never reached that critical mass that could have put a break on this policy.)

However, if these appointments are placed in the context of the Cadre Policy, and the various documents which spell out the intentions behind the Policy, it is clear that these appointments represented a systematic attempt to seize party political control over the state; that the statement that the ANC wanted to “seize all levers of power” was in fact official ANC policy; and, that contrary to all the assurances, these appointees would remain “informed by and accountable” to the ANC’s national executive.

Implementation proceeded rapidly and by 1999 party members held almost all the top government, police and military positions at national level. Supreme authority in South Africa seemed increasingly to lie less with the Constitution and more with the ANC’s national executive. Since the public had generally been kept in the dark about this policy, this rapid extension of party political control over the “state machinery” seemed to appear out of nowhere, like a poisonous mushroom.

The ANC’s pre-1997 approach

Shortly before the 1994 election, ANC spokesman Carl Niehaus stated that under an ANC government, a multiparty body to oversee the appointment of civil servants would be set up to ensure the independence of the civil service. There would be a strict code of conduct whereby people would be appointed on the basis of ability in order to avoid political patronage.[3]

Thus it was clear that at least some in the ANC understood that the advent of a democratically elected government represented an opportunity for South Africa to fundamentally change the way in which the public service operated. Whereas before it had been used and abused on behalf of the ruling National Party, now it could become a service that worked on behalf of all, free from the dictates of the ruling party and driven by an ethos of professionalism and loyalty to the constitutional order rather than the ruling party.

Yet from the moment it came to power the ANC discarded these promises and started appointing members of the party to the upper echelons of the state. However, the ANC continued to make assurances that once appointed (or integrated into the state) ANC members would be independent and non-partisan. For example, President Mandela, in his opening address to the ANC’s 49^th National Conference in 1994 congratulated “the former cadres of Umkhonto we Sizwe and our Intelligence and Security Services who are now entering non-partisan service in government. We are confident that they will acquit themselves in this new role with even more commitment and distinction.”[4]

As career civil servants (the so-called “old guard”) reached retirement or took severance packages they were invariably replaced by ANC members or veterans of the struggle.

By 1997 government departments such as those of Agriculture, Arts, Science, Culture & Technology, Communications, Finance, Labour, Housing, Transport, Intelligence and Trade and Industry were headed up by ANC members.[5]

Although the ANC was making numerous political appointments, attempts to extend party control over the state were offset by a number of factors:

Firstly, there was no centralised party control over these appointments. There was no central, coordinated plan. Each Minister would make his or her own appointments on an ad-hoc basis (usually of close colleagues from the struggle.) A 1998 ANC policy document complained that following 1994 “there was no comprehensive and coordinated plan to deploy cadres to critical centres.” This had led to a situation “where individuals deploy themselves, thus undermining the collective mandate.”[6]

Secondly, these appointments reflected the “broad church” of the ANC of the time and encompassed liberals, leftists and returned exiles. While some of the appointees believed in adhering to party discipline others believed in the independence of the civil service. There were no formal structures to ensure that party members remained accountable to the party after their appointment.

Thirdly, the fact that the ANC (in public pronouncements at least) paid lip service to the idea of an independent civil service, meant that these appointees were given the political space to exercise their duties as civil servants without fear or favour.

A shift in policy: The ANC National Conference of 1997

In 1997 there was a marked shift in ANC rhetoric. The lip service paid to an independent civil service was abandoned in favour of an uncompromising demand for party loyalty.

In their January 8^th Statement[7] of 1997 entitled Consolidating the NDR: A Year for Re-Affirming the ANC cadre, the ANC’s NEC complained that ANC members in local government and the civil service were not being sufficiently loyal to the party. The statement exhorted ANC members in management structures to assume full responsibility for their new powers: “You are not ANC cadres only ‘after hours’.”

This shift can be explained by the ascension to de-facto power in the ANC by Thabo Mbeki (by 1997 he was the annointed heir to Mandela) and the consequent triumph of the exile tradition over the more democratic and pluralistic UDF tradition within the ANC.

Between 1994 and 1996 the ANC was primarily concerned with facilitating the transition away from white minority rule. By 1997 this process was over: as the threat of what the ANC called “counter-revolution” subsided the ANC could stop assuaging the fears of minorities with assurances of non-racialism and liberal democracy and put in place its own vision for the future of South Africa. So at the 50^th National Conference in December 1997 the ANC put in place a blueprint for a post-apartheid South African state uncompromised by the needs of the transition.[8]

The framework the ANC put in place provided for an aggressive extension and consolidation of power of the party over the state. Non-racialism, which had been so important for diffusing minority opposition during the transition, was replaced by an increasingly aggressive racialism, which, as shall be shown, now became the primary instrument through which the ANC extended control.

ANC Structures and decision-making

One of the ways the ANC has diffused opposition to its elimination of the distinction between party and state is to deny that a particular document or action represents official ANC policy. An ANC politician will claim that a particularly authoritarian document is merely there to “encourage debate and discussion.” Thus, before turning to the Cadre Policy itself it is necessary to briefly deal with the decision-making structure of the ANC as set out by the ANC’s Constitution.

The highest policy-making body of the ANC is the National Conference. It convenes at least every five years. It elects the ANC’s National Executive Committee (NEC), amends and adopts the ANC Constitution, passes resolutions which constitute official ANC policy, and adopts a Strategy and Tactics document which guides the ANC in between the conferences. The ANC Constitution states that the National Conference is the “supreme ruling and controlling body of the ANC.”

In between conferences the ANC’s NEC is the “highest organ” of the ANC. It meets every three months or so and determines policy within the framework of the “decisions and instruction of the National Conference” (these take the form of the National Conference resolutions, and the Strategy and Tactics document adopted at the Conference.)

The NEC has the power to “issue documents and other policy directives as and when it sees fit.” However, although the NEC has a broad policy-making and oversight role, real power within the ANC resides in that organisation’s politburo—the National Working Committee (NWC).

The NWC is elected from the ranks of the NEC, and including ex-officio members comprises 26 members. (Senior office-bearers such as the President, Deputy President, Secretary General, Deputy Secretary General and Treasurer are automatically members of both bodies.) The NWC meets between two and four times a month and is responsible for the day-to-day running of the ANC.[1]

The NWC is also required to carry out the instructions of the National Conference and National Executive and is responsible for ensuring that all ANC structures “such as parliamentary caucuses” carry out the decisions of the ANC. The NEC can delegate to the NWC whatever functions “it considers necessary.”

The only time ordinary ANC members have a formal say over party policy and leadership is at the National Conference. In between Conferences all decisions are made by the National Executive according to the Leninist principle of “democratic centralism.” This means that once the ANC NEC has reached a decision and sent out a policy directive, all ANC structures are required to implement that decision. These decisions are binding on all members “irrespective of the many and varied sectors in which cadres are deployed.”[9]

Although “debate and discussion” is permitted before the NEC reaches its decision, once it has done so, all ANC members are required to execute that decision. “Even if an individual has motivated or voted for a different position, that individual will have a responsibility to implement and defend the decision that has been taken.”[10] (As any number of Communist regimes illustrate, the centralism aspect invariably overrides the democratic one.[2])

CHAPTER TWO: THE CADRE POLICY

Introduction

It is probable that the ANC’s NWC had decided on a policy of centralising power within the party, and extending party control over the state, as early as 1996. Certainly, from that time the ANC NWC began deploying ANC MP’s to senior positions in parastatals (such as Denel) and the civil service (such as the National Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee.) However, the ability of the NWC to pursue such a policy was curtailed by the lack of a clear mandate from the party.

At the ANC’s 49^th National Conference President Mandela had given assurances of a non-partisan civil service; there was no mention of democratic centralism or seizing the levers of power in the Conference Resolutions; and the ANC members in the legislatures were not, according to the ANC Constitution, explicitly under the direction of the national executive.

Thus, in order to acquire a mandate for centralising power within the party and extending party control over the state, the ANC leadership had to do three things: It had to get resolutions passed (and a Strategy and Tactics document adopted) giving it an official mandate to execute such a policy; the principle of democratic centralism had to be resurrected and reaffirmed by the Conference; and the ANC Constitution needed to be changed to place “all ANC structures” under the direction and control of the National Working Committee.

Transforming the party

At Mafikeng the ANC altered its Constitution to place all ANC structures, including parliamentary caucuses, under the direction and control of the NWC. The National Conference also passed a resolution making democratic centralism, once again, a guiding organisational principle of the ANC.

Since the ANC had only recently come to power, that party’s 1994 Constitution did not explicitly refer to the new ANC structures created by the ANC’s accession to power. Consequently, the NEC and NWC lacked explicit constitutional powers over parliamentary caucuses and the growing corps of ANC members in state structures.

The 1994 ANC Constitution stated that the NEC must “Supervise and direct the work of the ANC and all its organs generally.” It was not clear whether this referred to internal party structures (such as branch and provincial committees) or bodies such as the ANC caucuses in the legislatures. The ANC Constitution was amended at Mafikeng to place parliamentary caucuses under the overt direction of the NEC by adding “including national, provincial and local government caucuses” to the 1994 clause (Section 11.2)

The 1994 Constitution stated that the ANC NWC must “ensure that provinces and branches carry out the decisions of the ANC.” This meant that constitutionally the NWC was responsible only for internal party structures. Section 12.6 of the ANC Constitution was altered in 1997 to give the NWC extensive powers over all ANC structures. It states that the NWC is responsible for ensuring that “provinces, regions, branches and all other ANC structures such as parliamentary caucuses carry out the decisions of the ANC.”

Because the 49^th National Conference resolutions made no overt reference to democratic centralism this principle lacked the status of official ANC policy. Consequently, the 50^th National Conference passed a resolution under the heading Organisational democracy and discipline which reaffirmed democratic centralism as a guiding principle of the movement, and demanded “maximum political discipline” from all ANC cadres, members and structures.

At Mafikeng President Mandela also discarded his previous commitment to a non-partisan civil service. In his report to the Party he stated that it was important to ensure a “proper balance” when deploying ANC cadres to “the local provincial and national legislatures and governments, the ANC structures at all these levels, the public service and the economy.” Mandela stated that what was needed were “battalions of (ANC) revolutionaries” to “discharge [the] revolutionary tasks ahead of us.”[3]

Adoption of the Cadre resolution

The doctrine of democratic centralism as practiced by the Communist Party in the Soviet Union involved both the concentration of all power in the central party organisation (with “iron discipline” prevailing among members); as well as the extension of party control over all institutions—from schools to police forces.[11]

Having reaffirmed the principle of democratic centralism, the National Conference proceeded to pass a resolution on “Cadre Policy” which sought to give effect to both aspects of the doctrine. The Cadre Policy resolution was an enabling policy: It provided the ANC’s NWC with a broad mandate to (further) centralise control over the party, and to extend party control over the state and society.[4]

The NWC was mandated by the resolution to: identify “key centres of power” within the state and society; deploy cadres to those centres; draw up a comprehensive cadre policy and deployment strategy; and establish various structures to oversee the deployment process and to ensure that cadres remained loyal to the party.

The Conference resolution stated that the NWC must:

- Put in place a deployment strategy “which focuses on the short, medium and long term challenges, identifying the key centres of power, our strategy to transform these centres and the attributes and skills we require to do so effectively.”[12]

- Establish “deployment committees” at all levels of government to oversee the deployment of “comrades to areas of work on behalf of the movement, including the public service, parastatals, structures of the movement and the private sector.” These Committees would oversee the deployment process and ensure that cadres remained accountable to the party leadership. The ANC’s NEC would have the final say over decisions on deployment.[13]

The aims of the policy

The Cadre Resolution adopted by the Mafikeng Conference did not spell out the aims of the policy beyond noting the “importance” of having an “army of conscious, committed and properly deployed cadres” and “the need” to deploy cadres to “various organs of state, including the public service and to other centres of power in society.”[14]

However, in the run-up the Mafikeng Conference the ANC released various documents (Challenges of Leadership in the Current Phase; Organisational Democracy and Discipline in the Movement; Draft Strategy and Tactics; a discussion document for the Commission on Governance) which motivated for the resolution. Read in conjunction with the Cadre Resolution and other policy decisions at Mafikeng they clearly spell out the intentions of the party leadership. These were:

- To centralise control within the ANC in hands of the central party organisation, namely the NWC.

- To make sure that all ANC cadres, in whatever sector, remained informed by and accountable to the central party structures.

- To extend party control over all state institutions including the civil service, local government administration, parastatals and statutory bodies.

- To increase the hegemony of the ANC over civil society.[5]

Ensuring centralised control over the party

For a party seeking to extend its control over the state and society it is clearly insufficient to appoint members to various positions and then hope they will remain loyal to the party. Extending control has two components: the first is to place your cadres in each centre of power, the second is to ensure that they remain loyal and accountable to the party leadership.

Under the principle of democratic centralism, once the ANC’s national executive reaches a decision, ANC members in whatever sector—the civil service, statutory bodies, the media, the legislatures etc.— are obliged to defend and implement that decision. The NWC committee is responsible for ensuring that those decisions are carried out.

The Challenges of Leadership document states that a deployment strategy was needed to ensure that ANC members remained loyal to the party hierarchy. “It is not individuals as such who are in government, but ANC members deployed to fulfil a function. The parameters within which they carry out their functions are defined by the ANC and they should account to it.”[15]

The ANC Strategy and Tactics document clearly states that the party should exercise “maximum discipline among its members” and ensure that once decisions have been taken, “all its structures and members pursue the same goal.” Later on it states, “in all centres of power, particularly in parliament and the executive, ANC representatives must fulfil the mandate of the organisation. They should account to the ANC and seek its broad guidance.”[16]

The Commission on Governance recommended that the ANC establish political structures “which are parallel to those of government in all spheres with cadres informed by and accountable to the ANC” in order to ensure the “primacy of political structures.”[17]

The Cadre resolution gave effect to this recommendation by mandating the establishment of “deployment committees” at all levels of the state—from national to local government. Instead of individual party members “deploying” themselves to positions in the state, all deployments would have to go through these committees.

This gave the party hierarchy an extremely powerful instrument of control. Since the NWC would control all appointments within the party, and deployments outside of it, loyalty could be rewarded by further and higher promotion. Independence and disloyalty punished by redeployment or (potentially) exclusion from any position in the state. The deployment committees were tasked not only with overseeing deployments but also with supervising ANC cadres after deployment and making sure that they remained informed by and accountable to the party leadership.  

Extending control over the state

The Cadre Resolution gave official sanction to the NWC to make political appointments to all state structures (and not just the upper echelons of the civil service) including constitutionally protected state institutions.

- The document Challenges of Leadership in the Current Phase prepared for Mafikeng states that the ANC should use cadre deployment as a means of ensuring that such “centres of power” as “all sectors of government”, the economy, and the “ideological arena” were “truly in the hands of the people.”[18]

- The ANC Strategy and Tactics document stated that the ANC must “continuously improve its capacity and skill to wield and transform the instruments of power. This includes... a cadre policy ensuring that the ANC plays a leading role in all centres of power.”[19]

- The Commission on Governance stated, “Political appointments at senior levels of the public service need to be extended to local government administration.”[20]

Increasing hegemony over civil society

Extending control over the “state machinery” was a priority of the ANC. Since the ANC had direct control over these appointments, party cadres could be appointed to positions in the state as the previous incumbents retired or took severance packages. An aggressive use of the race card enabled the ANC to make such appointments to nominally independent institutions such as the Reserve Bank. Since the press offered only token resistance (and often lauded these appointments) this part of the strategy was easily implemented.

However, the ANC’s ambitions were never limited to the state. The state machinery was among a number of “centres of power” that the ANC had earmarked for party control (others included the media and the economy.) Thus, the Cadre resolution also mandated the NWC to deploy members to the private sector to work on behalf of the movement. (Although, since the ANC lacks direct control over such appointments, it is obviously much harder for the ANC to “deploy” members to institutions in civil society.)

The Commission on Governance at Mafikeng stated that in order to increase the “hegemony” of the ANC, the party needed to have a “conscious strategy” to deploy cadres to institutions in civil society, such as the media and business.[21]

Conclusion

The various resolutions on Cadre Policy and Democratic Centralism received very little press coverage at the time. It is possible that political commentators dismissed these various documents as being little more than a ritual banging on the drum for the party faithful. Indeed, since the Cadre Policy was derived from such an obsolete ideology (Communism) these various resolutions and statements may have appeared more quaint than threatening.

However, these resolutions were not mere rhetorical flourishes—they constituted official ANC policy. Under the ANC’s Constitution the NEC and NWC are obliged to implement the policies and resolutions decided on at the National Conference. The fact was that the ANC’s NWC had already decided on a course of action, and these resolutions provided an official mandate to push ahead with that policy.

The aim of the Cadre Policy was not merely to place cadres in all “centres of power” but to ensure that they remained accountable to the ANC. Placing the various ANC caucuses under the control of the ANC’s NWC was an important initial concern of the party leadership.

Once the ANC’s NWC received this mandate they set about systematically implementing the policy. Yet because the actual policy had not been reported on at the time, the ANC was able to wrap each individual deployment up in a veil of fake assurances— that these appointments would not compromise the independence of these institutions. And that these cadres would remain answerable to South Africa’s Constitution.

CHAPTER THREE: IMPLEMENTATION

Introduction

Because the ANC NEC and NWC do not publish the minutes of their meetings it is difficult to track the implementation of the Cadre Policy. However, ripples on the surface do give a fairly good indication of the current beneath. Below is a timeline which sets out the adoption and implementation of the Cadre Policy culled from press statements and various ANC documents and press releases. It puts in context the various political appointments to the state that the ANC made from 1998 onwards.

Timeline: the formulation, adoption and implementation of the ANC’s cadre policy 1996-1999

Adoption of the Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy by the NWC

As the timeline shows, once the Cadre Resolution was adopted as official policy, implementation proceeded rapidly. In addition, on the 30^th November 1998 the NWC adopted its Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy and established the National Deployment Committee, headed up by Jacob Zuma. From then on, all decisions on deployment (apart from those made by Thabo Mbeki himself) would go through the committee.

The Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy document restated that the extension of ANC hegemony over civil society was a goal of the Cadre Policy. It stated that the ANC must “strengthen our leadership in all other sectors of social activity [outside of the state] including:- the economy; education, science and technology; sports, recreation, arts and culture; mass popular organisation; and, mass communication.”[22]

It is important to note that strategic deployment went hand in hand with putting in place structures to ensure that ANC cadres remained accountable to the NWC. Thus the Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy states that the ANC must put in place a “system of supervision and decision-direction... to ensure that our army of cadres discharges their responsibilities in accordance with decisions which the movement has made.”[23]

Accordingly, the Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy called for a further strengthening of “political and administrative control and supervisory structures of the ANC” in the legislatures, local government and the civil service; as well as a strengthening of ANC leadership in “all parastatals and statutory bodies”.[24]

Thus by the end of 1998 the ANC had put in place various structures and policies to ensure central control over cadres deployed to various institutions:

- Deployment Committees were established at the national, provincial and local level.

- The president of the ANC appointed the party’s premier candidate in each province, and the ANC Provincial Executive Committees appointed the various MEC’s (under the direction of the NWC.)

- The Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy charged the National Deployment Committee with establishing “guidelines on accountability, supervision and co-ordination for cadreship deployed to different centres.”

- The Cadres were, in turn, charged with briefing the ANC leadership on “the key issues in their sectors and sensitise it when its policy or tactical positions with regards that sector may need re-examination.” They are also responsible for recruiting members within the centers where they are deployed.[25]

- ANC election lists were vetted by the National List Committee.

- After the 1999 elections the NWC “appointed and deployed the senior leadership of caucus (Speakers, whips, etc) as well as portfolio committee chairpersons.”[26]

- The National Deployment Committee, in consultation with the Provincial Deployment Committees, will appoint ANC executive mayors and chairpersons of district councils following the local government elections.[27]

- ANC candidates for the local government election in 2000 will be subject to confirmation by the National Deployment Committee.[28]

It is interesting and informative to note the similarities between the approach of the Polish Communist Party to “deployment of cadres” and the ANC’s use of “deployment committees”.

Timothy Garton Ash wrote that in Communist Poland supreme authority was concentrated in “the Party’s Politburo, a body with ten to twenty members, chaired by the Party leader...The Politburo’s decisions are transmitted to society through two linked pyramids of political bureaucracy, the Party and the state administration, the latter being in practice subordinate.”

The Party not only controls the appointment of its own officials, “but also all the most important appointments in almost every walk of life: central and local government officials, managers in industry and commerce, publishers, newspaper editors, senior army officers, judges, trades union leaders, university rectors, headmasters, leaders of youth and women’s organisations, bankers, fire brigade commanders.”

In order to make appointments to the state, the Communist Party’s “central, regional and local committees maintain lists of positions, and the people judged fit to fill them. The Soviet term for these lists, nomenklatura, has come to be applied by extension to the class of people holding such positions.”[29]

The ANC approach has obvious similarities to this model. The ANC has also established committees at the “central, regional and local” level to oversee party appointments to the state. The Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy states that the ANC must conduct a “skills audit of our cadreship” and establish a database of ANC cadres and their relevant skills; as well as conduct an “audit of all positions available in different centres.”[30] In other words, it is ANC policy to draw up and maintain lists of positions in the state and of the people judged fit to fill them.

Evaluating implementation

The immediate priority of the ANC after Mafikeng was to extend party control over the levers of power. Armed with a proper mandate from the party conference the NWC accelerated its programme of strategic deployment. The ANC MP, Pravin Gordhan, was appointed deputy commissioner of the SARS at Mafikeng. The ANC ideologue and NWC member Joel Netshitenzhe was appointed to head up the GCIS shortly afterwards. From then on almost every appointment to head up a state institution would be of an ANC cadre. The October 1998 appointments of the JSC for instance proved that the ANC had a majority on the commission.[31] (See timeline above.)

By 1999 almost every single state institution was headed up by ANC cadres answerable and accountable to the NWC, and obliged to defend and execute the will of the national executive.

By the end of that year ANC cadres headed up (or held the key strategic positions in) the following government departments, parastatals and supposedly independent state institutions: Agriculture; Arts, Science, Culture & Technology; Communications; Constitutional Development; DBSA; the Defence Secretariat; Denel; Education; Environmental Affairs & Tourism; Finance; Foreign Affairs; the Government Communications & Information Service; Health; Home Affairs; Housing; IDC; Justice; Labour; the Municipal Demarcation Board; Mineral & Energy Affairs; the National Intelligence Agency; National Directorate of Public Prosecutions; NEDLAC; Office of the President; Office of the Public Service Commission; Public Service & Administration; Public Works; the Reserve Bank; South African Broadcasting Corporation News Department; South African Revenue Service; South African Management Development Institute; South African National Defence Force; South African Police Service; South African Secret Service; Trade & Industry; Transnet; Transport.[32] A full list of these appointments is attached as Appendix 1.

Except for the odd perfunctory press statement, the NEC and NWC carry out their functions in secret. The minutes, policy directives and reports of these two bodies are not released to the public. Policy documents adopted by the national executive are usually released into the public domain as “discussion documents” to allow the party leadership some degree of plausible deniability if they prove too controversial.

Thus, a full evaluation of the extent to which the ANC has implemented this policy would only be possible if the minutes of the meetings of the NWC and the various policy directives issued by the national executive were published. It remains an open question, for example, precisely what structures the ANC has established in the civil service and legislatures to ensure party control, and the full extent of “cadre deployment” to institutions in the state and civil society.

Having extended control over the state machinery, there are indications that the ANC is turning its attentions to extending hegemony over civil society and particularly the media. Almost every single ANC document from 1996 to the present has mentioned the media as a “centre of power” that needs to be “transformed” and placed under party control. A recent ANC document states that extending ANC hegemony over the media and public debate is “critical.” There is a disturbing confluence of interest between the HRC hearings into “racism” in the media, and the stated desire of the ANC to extend hegemony over the press.

Research institutes such as the SAIRR and Helen Suzman Foundation have been outspoken and critical of the ruling party. The latest ANC documents, such as Assessing the Balance of Forces, suggest that the party should start turning its hegemonic attentions to these institutions.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE CADRE POLICY, PARLIAMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION

Introduction

In early 1998 the ANC had set about trying to extend party control over state institutions such as; the Judiciary, the Reserve Bank and the Attorney General’s Office. The fact that the Constitution guaranteed the independence of these institutions placed a large obstacle in the path of their “transformation.” It was the desire to extend control which caused Kgalema Motlanthe to threaten a “review” of the constitutional independence of these institutions if his party received a two-thirds majority in the 1999 election. In the event such constitutional change proved unnecessary—The constitutional protections proved ineffective and the ANC was able to deploy cadres to head up the Reserve Bank and Super-Attorney General’s Office. By December that year an ANC spokesman said that his party did not need a two-thirds majority to transform the judiciary and the Office of the Auditor General.

Thus, the ANC did not have to alter the Constitution in order to take control of these institutions. But although the glorious facade of the Constitution has been retained, the Cadre Policy remains a massive subversion by the ANC of its spirit and underlying principles.

The Cadre Policy and Parliament

In his report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability Hugh Corder states, “A condition of the exercise of [executive] power in a constitutional democracy is that the administration or executive is checked by being held accountable to an organ of government distinct from it. This notion is inherent in the concept of the separation of powers.”

Thus Parliament is supposed to hold the executive arm of government to account, as well as to scrutinise and oversee its actions.

According to the Corder report the “essential functions” of Parliament are summed up by Section 42 (3) of the Constitution which states:

“The National Assembly is elected to represent the people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution. It does this by choosing the president, by providing a national forum for public consideration of issues, by passing legislation and by scrutinizing and overseeing executive action.”

The ANC’s Cadre Policy turns this clause of the Constitution on its head:

- The ANC Constitution states that the party’s National Executive Committee shall “supervise and direct” the ANC caucus in Parliament.

- The NWC is given the task of ensuring that ANC MPs “carry out the decisions of the ANC.”

The NWC is dominated by members of the Executive: Of its 21 members (excluding ex-officio members) 13 are members of Cabinet, one is allegedly a civil servant, another is head of a parastatal, and four hold positions in the ANC head office. The Speaker of Parliament and her deputy hold the last two positions. More importantly the NWC is completely dominated by Mbeki loyalists. (It is also unrepresentative—Frene Ginwala is the only non-black member.)

Thus, under ANC policy, it is not Parliament which oversees executive action and holds the executive arm of government to account, but rather the NWC which supervises, directs, and holds Parliament to account (or at least the two-thirds of it constituted by the ANC.)

- As one member of the NWC wrote “It is not individuals as such who are in government, but ANC members deployed to fulfill a function. The parameters within which they carry out their functions are defined by the ANC and they should account to it.”

- The Strategy and Tactics document reiterated this view. It stated that ANC representatives in the legislatures “must fulfill the mandate of the organisation. They should account to the ANC and seek its broad guidance.”

Section 55(2) of the (South African) Constitution states that the National Assembly “must provide for mechanisms” to “ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to it.”

The ANC in Parliament has conspicuously failed to implement this section of the Constitution. In fact, it is on the brink of watering down the mechanisms it had inherited by nobbling the institution of question time and abolishing interpellations. (According to the Mail & Guardian these proposals had been approved by the NWC before being tabled in the Chief Whips Committee.) The reason is that the ANC National Executive has established various mechanisms to ensure that the ANC caucus in the legislature is answerable and accountable to it.

The consequence is that ANC MPs do not represent the people who elected them, but rather the ANC leadership which appoints them and controls their career-paths. While Parliament provides a “national forum for the public consideration of issues” the real “consideration of issues” occurs behind the closed doors of the ANC’s executive. While Parliament continues to pass laws, this is under the “direction” of the NWC.

To reiterate, under the principle of democratic centralism, ANC MPs are obliged to defend and implement a decision made by the ANC’s national executive even if they personally disagree with that decision. This is in direct conflict with their constitutional obligation to scrutinise and oversee executive action.  

Instead of Parliament holding the executive to account, it is the ANC leadership which, through various supervisory and administrative structures, has almost total control over the ANC caucus in Parliament.

The judiciary, constitutional watchdogs and the civil service

Various provisions of the Constitution guarantee the independence of certain state institutions. They require these institutions to be independent and require the individuals in these institutions to exercise their functions “without fear, favour or prejudice” subject only to the Constitution and the law.

The ANC has however identified the judiciary, the Reserve Bank, and the Attorney General’s Office as “levers of power” to be controlled and wielded by the party leadership.

Although the ANC has not changed the provisions of the Constitution, the usually successful attempts to appoint cadres to these institutions run completely against the spirit of the Constitution.

For ANC members the obligations imposed by democratic centralism (to defend and implement the decisions of the party) run completely against the obligations imposed by the Constitution (to exercise their functions without fear, favour or prejudice subject only to the Constitution and the law.)

Furthermore, the ANC has established various structures and mechanisms to ensure that ANC cadres “in all structures” continue to operate under the “direction” of the NWC.

Since loyalty to the party generally prevails over loyalty to the Constitution, ANC cadres continue to operate under the direction of the NWC after appointment.

(It is particularly disingenuous for the ANC to defend its Cadre Policy by claiming that the ANC deployment committees would identify people “committed to the ideals of the new Constitution and who have the necessary skills for particular positions.”)

Conclusion

The various liberal-democratic checks and balances enshrined in the Constitution are dependent on watchdog bodies exercising their constitutional obligations. However, these bodies cannot exercise these constitutional duties “without fear or favour” if their primary loyalty is to the ANC NWC.

It has been argued that once ANC members have been deployed to supposedly independent bodies these constitutional provisions will act like a magic wand and transform these loyal party cadres into vigorous protectors of institutional independence. This view is not credible for a number of reasons:

Firstly, the ANC is deploying cadres to the state under a policy designed to extend party control over these institutions. Cadres are appointed on the basis of their loyalty to the party and are expected to remain loyal after their appointment. It would be a totally unexpected consequence and a serious misjudgment of character on the part of the ANC leadership if someone were appointed who turned out to be vigorously independent. Cadres will undoubtedly be allowed scope to indulge in inconsequential action to maintain the veneer of independence. However, the difficult and unpopular choices on which independence must ultimately be judged will be evaded and compromise will be the order of the day.

Secondly, ANC cadres such as Joel Netshitenzhe, Bulelani Ngcuka, Tito Mboweni and Gill Marcus were all part of an ANC leadership which approved a policy of seizing control over all state institutions. They were then deployed to give effect to that policy. Although these individuals have at times provided fuzzy assurances, ANC policy starkly spells out the real intention behind the appointments.

Thirdly, James Madison pointed out that the fine words of a Constitution are mere “parchment barriers” against the encroaching spirit of power. In order for the separation of powers to function the interest of the individual in an institution must be tied to protecting the constitutional rights of the place, “ambition must counteract ambition.” Yet the NWC has managed to accumulate massive powers over appointment and promotion. In consequence, the ambitions of ANC members are tied up with pleasing the party hierarchy rather than defending the independence of the institution they have been deployed to—the careers of ANC members become dependent on the further extension and consolidation of ANC power.

Finally, ANC cadres are often unqualified for the positions to which they are appointed. They cannot be expected to maintain the reputation, integrity and independence of an institution when, by merely accepting such an appointment (over more able and qualified candidates) they undermine such values.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE ANC’S UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE, PARTY AND SOCIETY

Introduction

Democratic centralism is one of the key doctrines informing the internal organisation of the ANC and the approach of that party to the state and society. Yet this is not a lonesome doctrine which somehow managed to survive the collapse of Communism, and slip into the new South Africa unscathed. The ideology informing the ANC’s approach to state and society – though not the economy – is heavily derived from Communism, as are the actual provisions of the policy. It is not surprising then that the party-state structure put in place by the ANC has a certain resemblance to the Soviet model.

The Ideological Basis of the Cadre Policy

In the early 1990s the conventional wisdom was that the great contribution of the SACP (in fact the redeeming feature of that party) was that its emphasis on class over race had been decisive in moulding the non-racial character of the ANC.

Yet South Africa’s experience over the past few years, as well as a careful reading of ANC discussion and policy documents, suggests that the contribution of the SACP (and all those years ANC cadres spent in Eastern Europe) was precisely the opposite. For what ANC intellectuals have managed to do is create a hybrid out of the two ideologies of racialism and Communism. Leninist ideology (particularly with regard to the relationship between the party and the state) provides a programme of action and a driving motive. Race provides a moral content and emotional force that class lacks in the South African context.

Although the ANC’s approach to state and society is derived from Leninist ideology it has been refracted through a racial prism. Thus, although the ANC has discarded nationalisation as a policy and now follows (racially constricted) free market policies, the ANC approach to party, state and society remains heavily influenced by Leninist ideology.

The ANC approach to the state

Lenin defined the dictatorship of the proletariat as the “organisation of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors.” The state machinery must be placed under control of the party (as the vanguard of the working classes), strengthened, and used to eliminate opposition from the privileged classes.

According to ANC ideology the state machinery has to be placed under the control of the party (as the vanguard of the black majority), strengthened, and used to eliminate opposition from the privileged classes, or rather, the white minority. This approach, which has informed the ANC approach to both state and society, is born out of an intense race consciousness combined with a Leninist worldview.

Strategy and Tactics states that for the “democratic state” to emerge, the state must be transformed and the “motive forces of the revolution” placed at “the helm of the state, as the classes and strata which wield real power.” The “motive forces” are not the working class, but rather the black majority. Strategy and Tactics states that these “motive forces of the struggle” are “the African majority and blacks in general.”

The ANC is in turn the vanguard of the black majority. According to one party document the ANC “is a multi-class organisation representing... black workers, the black middle strata, black business in its various ramifications, the rural poor and others.” Or as Strategy and Tactics puts it, the ANC is “the vanguard of [the] motive forces of the NDR, the leader of the broad movement for transformation.”

The ANC does not represent a class interest but a racial interest. It’s role is to organise and lead the black population, and to divine and express its collective will. In 1999 Thabo Mbeki stated that the ANC was “the only political instrument the masses of our people have in their hands.” Without a strong ANC the black majority would be helpless, “the ordinary masses of our people would have no political organisation to advance their cause and protect their interests.”

Beneath the idea of vanguardism lies a fundamental distrust of the ability of black people to discern their own interests correctly. For this reason, the will of the “black nation” is interpreted by the ANC leadership and then transmitted downwards to society through the state and the legislatures.

At the same time, any attempt to undermine the vanguard role of the ANC by weakening the ANC or trying to win over black votes to the opposition is seen as fundamentally counter-revolutionary. Strategy and Tactics warns, “Uppermost in the objectives of these counter-revolutionary forces is to disorganise, weaken and destroy the ANC, the vanguard of the NDR... It is in the interests of these elements that the masses of the people should be left leaderless and rudderless, and thus open to manipulation against their own interests.”

It is important to note that the ANC push for “representivity” in the state is informed by this racial Leninism rather than by an Americanised view of redress. One ANC document states that in order to ensure that the state reflects “the social classes and strata that pursue social transformation” it must reflect in its composition “the demographics of the country.”[33] Because the ANC conflates the party with the people, the push for “representivity” is bound up with the extension of ANC control. As Smuts Ngonyama succinctly put it, "When you talk about the ANC, you talk about black people."[34]

Or as the Challenges of Leadership document states, the ANC should deploy its cadres to all sectors of government, the economy and the media in order to ensure that power “is truly in the hands of the people.”

Once the state machinery has been transformed into an instrument of the party, the party must use it to “transform” society, advance the interests of the black majority (as decided on by the ANC leadership), and suppress the “privileged classes.”

Strategy and Tactics states that the “democratic state” must be placed “at the centre of the transformation of SA’s political, economic and societal relations.” According to the ANC “the state is not a neutral, non-partisan entity, but is an instrument that is used to pursue the interests of a class or group of classes.” (The “group of classes” being a reference to the black majority.)

The role of the “privileged classes”

The Leninist view that the “privileged classes” will resist transformation, and must be suppressed by the “democratic state” is (once again) refracted through the ANC’s racial prism—the “privileged classes” becoming conflated with South Africa’s white population.

Thus, the entire white population (of whatever age or class) is subsumed into the “white and privileged section of the population” irreversibly tainted by its association with apartheid. Strategy and Tactics states that the “forces that benefited from apartheid” are constituted by “those elements which collectively constituted the white ruling bloc and its black appendages.” Thus, poor and rich whites, whites who opposed apartheid and those who supported it, are all placed into the same morally tainted category.

These “political forces” will, according to the ANC (and Leninist ideology) be motivated solely by an attempt to defend their privileges. Strategy and Tactics states that the “overriding aim” of the white minority will be to “derail and reverse changes so as to end up with a system in which the social privileges of apartheid are retained in a somewhat modified form.”

According to Strategy and Tactics “the majority of public servants, especially at senior level, the captains of industry, and editorial rooms in most of the media shared the perspectives of the former government or its white opposition, including racial and gender stereotypes—all of them strategically placed to influence the agenda in favour of the privileged classes.”[35]

Because white institutions are, according to the ANC, motivated solely be a desire to defend privilege, the ANC must use various means to break the independence of those institutions.

The two means of achieving this end are the demand for “demographic representivity” and cadre deployment. As the ANC commission on governance states, cadre deployment to the media, business and civil society was necessary for these areas are “still largely dominated... by the wealthy, former ruling minority.”[36]

In the ANC worldview, the struggle between the ANC and (independent) “white” institutions is a zero-sum game. A weakening of the (ANC controlled) “democratic state” would result in a strengthening of “the wide variety of important centres of power which, thanks to the Apartheid inheritance, are decisively controlled by the white and privileged section of the population.”[37]

Since, under the vanguard principle, the ANC regards making an institution “representative” as synonymous with placing it under ANC control, both are essentially a means to the same end. Party control over a functioning institution is the ideal. If, however, the party is unable to exert direct control, it is better for that institution to be undermined than for it to remain “white dominated” (and independent).

Although the intolerance of the ANC to opposition is well known it remains unclear how far the ANC will go. In a 1996 document Thabo Mbeki talked about the “oscillation” within the ANC between the objective of establishing a “democratic state” [which necessitated some compromise with minorities] and the “wish to establish a state whose distinctive feature would be the total defeat and suppression of both the national and the class forces responsible for the system of national oppression and class super-exploitation epitomised by Apartheid.”[38]

The ANC claims that the opposition desires only to “protect white privilege” are not based upon an objective analysis of the transition, or the public platforms of the opposition, but because according to the ANC’s racial-Leninism, it was inevitable that they would. The ANC mindset is well illustrated by the ANC document The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation. It states, “If we are correct in characterising the state as an important terrain for the expression of class dynamics within society; and if the assessment that we have not as yet attained all levers of power is accurate, so should it follow that those who serve the interests of the old order will resist both from within and outside the state.”[39] Thus, the ANC determined that (non-ANC) whites in the civil service were “disloyal” not through an objective analysis of the transition but by studying Marxist-Leninist theory.

In the ANC world-view the entire white minority, with the exception of those who accept the vanguard role of the ANC, are seen as “opposed to change”, hostile to transformation, and hence as enemies of the ANC. This intolerance applies as much to the grey-shoed civil servant of the old order, as an (independent minded) journalist who opposed apartheid. They were all, according to the ANC, members of the “white ruling bloc.”

The ideological justification the ANC used for seizing control over the state machinery applies as much to the media as it did to the civil service. Thus the ANC annual report for 1999 states, “On the media front, after five years of democracy little has changed in the media environment. The ANC is still faced with a primarily hostile press corps as media is still primarily owned and controlled by antagonistic forces with minority interests. The result has been a continuous onslaught of negative reporting on the ANC and the ANC-led government.”

The only difference between the state and the media is that the ANC is unable to appoint cadres directly to positions in the press, and hence extending party control is far more difficult. Although the ANC has yet to resort to overt censorship, newspapers can be subjected to what one journalist described as “intolerable informal pressures.”[40]

On a less ideological level, press criticism of the ruling party is a threat for it undermines the notion of an infallible ANC leadership able to correctly interpret the collective will of the people.

CHAPTER SIX: THE EFFECT OF THE CADRE POLICY ON THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Introduction

In order to justify the seizure of control over the state machinery (or other institutions) the ANC has claimed that the incumbents are “racist”, “obstacles to transformation”, “defenders of white privilege”; apartheid-era dinosaurs or “disloyal to the new South Africa.” This form of propaganda is both insidious and effective: If someone is accused of being an enemy often enough they will eventually be perceived to be disloyal, and the government will be seen as perfectly entitled to replace or remove them. This form of propaganda was employed from 1997 onwards as the ANC sought to strengthen its grip on the state machinery. However, earlier ANC statements belie the claim that white civil servants were inherently “disloyal”.

Before the 1994 election Nelson Mandela emphasised that an ANC government would be heavily dependent on white skills in making South Africa work. “We attach a great deal of importance to whites. In spite of all the criticism we have made about Apartheid, the reality is that whites have had opportunities we have not had. They have had education, they have knowledge, skills and expertise. We want that knowledge and expertise now that we are building our country. That is why I have appealed to them repeatedly not to leave the country at this particular moment, and even to ask those who have left to come back—because we are going to need them, we are going to rely on them.”[41]

President Mandela’s emphasis on reconciliation was generally reciprocated by the civil service. On coming to power in 1994, the ANC was met with a civil service that was cooperative. As Thabo Mbeki conceded at the time, although the ANC was “truly concerned about the attitude of established state institutions... by and large [they have all] co-operated with the new government.”[42]

Clearly with the accession to power by the ANC some mechanism was needed to allow those who did not want to serve under an ANC government a way out. These people constituted a relatively small minority and generally left as soon as they could. The majority of civil servants, however, wanted to continue with their careers and were quite willing to serve the government of the day. Strategy and Tactics states that the “state machinery” which the ANC took over was “intact, orderly within its own rules, and with the majority resolved to continue in their positions.”[43]

However, the original and legitimate desire of the ANC to see hostile elements leave the public service eventually mutated into a blanket ban on any (non-ANC) white advancement and the aggressive promotion of ANC cadres.

The ANC employed two means of “transforming” the civil service into an instrument of the party—voluntary severance packages and the policy of “representivity.” Although these policies facilitated the rapid politicisation of the civil service, they severely eroded the capacity of the state to deliver.

The carrot: the voluntary severance scheme

Under the terms of the negotiated settlement the positions of incumbent civil servants were guaranteed for five years after the ANC came to power. In order to bypass these “sunset clauses” the ANC put in place a voluntary severance scheme. The ostensible purpose of this exercise was to “right-size” the public service. The real purpose was to allow the ANC to remove hostile bureaucrats and establish some sort of control.

Rather than removing supernumeraries and inefficient bureaucrats from the public service, the provisions of the scheme proved most attractive to experienced and highly qualified civil servants.

A Business Day editorial noted at the time that the scheme was attracting the “public service’s most skilled and competent members—those who would have little difficulty establishing themselves in the private sector, often at superior conditions of service.” The result of this approach was, the editorial noted, “a still costly public service providing services of an ever-declining quality as critical skills and experience are lost.”[44]

The Minister of Public Service and Administration at the time conceded, “the best people are leaving the service and you are left with the ones you wish would go.”[45]

The following year another Business Day editorial took up this theme again. The editorial noted that the “transformation” of the public service had “led to mass departures, including the most competent of the old guard members who would have been quite adaptable to the new. This has resulted in a dearth of skills in critical areas from tax collection to teaching. Just as it has become increasingly difficult to find National Party cabinet minister who supported apartheid, it is no longer easy to find ANC ministers who supported the generous, voluntary public sector lay-off scheme that lies at the root of the government’s delivery crisis.”[46]

In hindsight it is clear that the purpose of the scheme was not to reduce the size of the civil service, but rather to lop off the upper echelons of the state so that ANC members could then be deployed to those positions. Ministers were not obliged to grant severance packages to civil servants deemed indispensable but they invariably did.

The stick: blocking promotion

Although tens of thousands of high-level civil servants, teachers, soldiers, policemen etc. left the public service, the experience of those that remained is illuminating. Although willing to serve under an ANC government they found their careers blocked and inexperienced or less qualified individuals promoted over them on the basis of race or political affiliation. The ANC policy of “representivity” effectively placed a block on any (non-ANC) white advancement within the civil service. This policy managed to replicate in the public service all the damaging effects of apartheid-era job reservation on economic efficiency.

The great South African economist, W.H. Hutt, wrote that job reservation policies had “forced the employment of unsuitable people in the protected fields. They have entailed an enormous waste of potential talent of the non-Whites... They have vitiated the efficiency of the non-Whites by destroying incentives for self-improvement and training ... And they have weakened incentives to efficiency on the part of Whites who have been feather-bedded.”[47]

In order to understand how discriminatory (on the individual level) the ANC policy of “representivity” actually is, it is useful to compare the skills profile of the population with the demographic composition of the population. On the one hand, according to the 1996 Census the South African population was made up of 76.7%, 11% whites, 2.6% Asian and 8.9% Coloureds. On the other hand, in 1996 white South Africans had 62.1% of university degrees, black South Africans 28.97%, Coloureds 3.7% and Asians 5.39%.

Since some sort of tertiary education was still required for promotion through the upper echelons of the state the effect of implementing demographic quotas was to drastically restrict the pool of talent from which appointments were made.[6]

Similarly, approximately 20% of the legal profession is black (in the broader sense.) Yet the government wants to make the judiciary and prosecuting service 80% black at all levels and in the shortest possible time.[48] Within the judiciary this means that vacancies in the appellate division are kept open rather than capable white judges employed. Thus these race-based policies result in appointments being made from one fifth of the legal profession.

Thus, within the civil service, the ANC racial policies led to unsuitable people being promoted, capable individuals sidelined and incentives for performance undermined as race, and political connections, became the overriding criteria for appointment and promotion.

A senior advocate in the Attorney General’s office described the effect of affirmative action on his department as follows, "The department is supposed to render a service, and the best service is supposed to be the criterion [for promotion.] What now happens is that promotion does not depend on performance but on race. The result is that whites are too demoralised to perform because there's nothing in it for them-- no incentive. Conversely, there is no incentive for people of colour to perform because promotion is not dependent on performance."[49]

Since representivity is race-based it does not matter whether you are an obdurate, incompetent white civil servant or an competent hard working individual committed to the profession. A civil servant described his experience in a letter to Die Beeld newspaper:

Ek is 'n middeljarige wit man (wat nog nooit 'n Nasionalis of lid van enige geheime organisasie was nie) met 'n nagraadse kwalifikasie en beklee 'n redelike senior en sleutelpos in 'n staatsdepartement.
Ek het sowat dertig jaar diens en het al op universiteit besluit om 'n loopbaan in die staatsdiens te volg. Met die transformasie van die departement vanjaar moes ek vir die eerste keer weer besin oor 'n voortgesette loopbaan in die staatsdiens. Ek het besluit om te bly en veel harder as voorheen te werk om (so het ek gedink) te wys dat ek amper onmisbaar is en aktief mee te werk aan die transformasieproses. Nou blyk dit dat ek in 'n gekkeparadys was. Ek is intussen (ondanks my harde werk en goeie bedoelings) op 'n syspoor geparkeer en word geïgnoreer. By navraag het die departementshoof my meegedeel dat ek nie welkom is nie omdat ek die vorige regime verteenwoordig en dat ek nie vertrou word nie. Voorts is ek meegedeel dat meriete ondergeskik is aan aanvaarbaarheid.

A further illustration of the dishonesty of the ANC accusation of disloyalty and “resistance to change” are the individuals who have been passed over for promotion by the ANC government. These include the following:

- John Myburgh, the Judge President of the Labour Court, resigned after being passed over for appointment to the position of Judge President of the Transvaal. Although the Judicial Services Commission commended Judge Myburgh for establishing the Labour Court, and making it one of the most representative and highly regarded courts in the country, Judge Bernard Ngoepe, a person with only three years experience as a judge, was appointed instead.

- In turn, Ray Zondo was appointed head of the Labour Court over the Deputy-Judge President Johan Froneman. Zondo was not even a High Court judge (a requirement for the position) when his appointment was first mooted. The JSC first made him a judge of the Transvaal High Court, and then shortly afterwards, head of the Labour Court.

- Robbie Hartslief, a man of 25 years experience, described as one of the best qualified soldiers in the SANDF, and the commander of Operation Boleas in Lesotho, resigned after being passed over for promotion.[50]

- Jan D’Oliviera, the Attorney General in Pretoria, and the person who brought many apartheid-era criminals, such as Eugene De Kock, to justice, was passed over for appointment to the post of National Director of Public Prosecutions. The senior ANC politician and close associate of Thabo Mbeki, Bulelani Ngcuka, was appointed instead.

- Michael Kennedy, the deputy Director-General in the National Intelligence Agency resigned after Thabo Mbeki appointed his speechwriter and advisor, Vusi Mavimbela, to head up the NIA. Kennedy, highly regarded by international intelligence agencies, played an instrumental role in bringing “Dr Death” Wouter Basson to book.

- Shortly before the election Business Day alleged that Thabo Mbeki’s office had intervened to block the appointment of Judge Edwin Cameron to a position on the Constitutional Court. Cameron is widely regarded as having one of South Africa’s finest legal minds.[51] (Cameron is now serving on the Court in an acting capacity.)

Conclusion

According to ANC ideology, once the state had been “transformed” it would be able to “transform” society. In theory a state structured according to the principle of democratic centralism would be highly efficient. A directive would go out from the ANC national executive and all ANC members would implement that decision. In reality, however, the methods the ANC has used to place institutions under party control have severely undermined the ability of the state to deliver to the population as a whole.

The implementation of “representivity” has led to many experienced and capable people leaving the state and resulted in an undermining of incentives to perform for those that remain. They were not removed or passed over because of any residual loyalty to the previous regime as the ANC claimed, but rather because they were the wrong colour and independent of ANC structures.

The pool of talent from which appointments are now made has been drastically reduced. According to the ANC 1999 annual report, the party currently has 361 185 paid up members. This means that ANC members constitute just under 0.9% of the population. Approximately 9 out of 10 appointments to senior state positions are of ANC members. This is hardly representative of the population as a whole.

Timothy Garton Ash writes that in Communist Poland promotion through the state was subject to a continual process of ‘negative selection.’ “Qualities of unquestioning obedience and loyalty to the Party were rewarded, while individual obedience and loyalty to the party were rewarded, while individual initiative, innovation and spontaneity were generally discouraged.”[52]

A similar process is evident in the latest appointments to the upper echelons of the South African state. While the Afrikaans “old guard” civil servants have had their careers terminated, it is now the more independent minded of the “white-Left” who are taking involuntary severance packages and leaving the state.[7] As one officer in the SANDF commented when Hartslief resigned, “Op die ou end bly net die jabroers oor, wat nie een bereid sal wees om to se die koning is kaal nie.”[53] [“Eventually only yes-men and bootlickers will remain, and neither will be prepared to come out and say the emperor isn't wearing any clothes.”] As the Helena Dolny affair illustrated a loyal and obedient ex-Bantustan civil servant is preferable to an independent-minded ANC member with impeccable liberation credentials.

In a review of two recent books analysing the decay and criminalisation of the African state, The Economist states, “both seem to imply that the colonial inheritance of an independent class of public servants who could detach themselves from their ethnic or religious roots and serve the nation offered Africa its best chance of developing. But until that happens Africa can’t work.”

The ANC’s “transformation” of the state is a great lost opportunity. The state machinery that the ANC inherited could have formed the basis for a highly professional and independent civil service. The claim that these bureaucrats were still loyal to the National Party three years after the 1994 election does not hold water. At the time of the transition, many ANC politicians ridiculed the eagerness of the old civil servants to please their new political bosses. (The claim that the civil service was guilty of “opposition to change” was propaganda used to justify ANC policies of racialisation and politicisation.)

Instead, ANC policies have, at the cost of billions of rands in pay-outs, severely eroded the capacity of the state. As in many other African states there is a process of centralisation and decay—as power is centralised and appointments made on the basis of personal and political loyalty the capacity and reach of the state is steadily eroded.[8]

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION

As the chaos of the transition subsides and the debris of transformation and representivity are cleared away, it is apparent that what has emerged in South Africa out of our negotiated revolution is not the liberal democratic state that we hoped for but, to use the words of de Tocqueville, an “immense central power.”

Thabo Mbeki and the ANC NWC now control (directly and indirectly) all key appointments to the civil service, security and intelligence structures, parastatals, the foreign service, local government administration; institutions whose independence is constitutionally protected, as well as the key positions in Parliament such as Speakerships and the Heads of Committees. The only real constraint on the ANC deployment programme within the state is the limited number of ANC cadres available.

Within the ANC the NWC has the final say over election lists at national, provincial and local level. The party leadership appoints the premiers and will appoint the executive mayors of each ANC controlled megacity and municipality. The premiers and provincial executive committees, acting under the direction of the NWC, appoint the provincial MECs and the provincial heads of departments. They appoint the ANC whips in the legislatures. The National Deployment Committee has even abrogated to itself the right to deploy non-ANC members to various centres of power. If non-ANC members are appointed by ANC structures they are likely to remain loyal to the body that appointed them.[9]

The national executive of the ANC requires “maximum political discipline” from these cadres. Under the guiding principle of democratic centralism once the party leadership has reached a decision ANC members are obliged to defend and implement that decision.

There are two essential methods by which the ANC is securing control over party, state and society: The first is through the centralised party structure; the emphasis on democratic centralism, the “directing role” of the NWC and the vanguard role of the party in state and society. The second, more practical method the ANC uses to secure control is through the power the NWC exercises (directly or through proxies) over appointments to positions within party and state.  

The ANC has also established committees at national, provincial and local government to oversee the deployment of cadres to various positions in the state. These committees are tasked with ensuring that these cadres remain “informed by and accountable to” the ANC politburo.

The placing of a cadreship (loyal and answerable to the party leadership) in key centres of power and the creation of party structures parallel to the state has resulted in the creation of a dual authority. Ostensible authority continues to lie in the (unchanged) Constitution, real authority lies with the ANC’s national executive.

But while the press can report on Parliament, the ANC’s national executive goes about its business behind closed doors. Parliament may hold debates but the real decision-making is happening elsewhere in the darker recesses of the party. The consequence is a severe erosion of transparency and democratic accountability—most South Africans are probably unaware that the NWC exists let alone that it has such huge powers.

The Cadre Policy rests on an understanding that all the constraints (and checks and balances) imposed by a Constitution can be bypassed if you are able to place loyal people in all the key strategic positions. (Similarly, the independence of an institution can be broken by applying pressure and removing individuals of independence and integrity.)

The fact that the glittering facade of the Constitution remains untouched creates the worst of both possible worlds. The ANC’s NWC is allowed to play its “directing role” behind the scenes, without having to explain or account for its decisions and its actions. Positions in the state or judiciary are scrupulously advertised and procedures followed. However, who will fill these positions is decided by the ANC months in advance. Thus, the ANC is able to make politically inspired appointments, but is able to evade responsibility for such appointments by hiding behind the nominal independence of institutions.

To give a hypothetical example: The ANC NWC may direct the head of a supposedly independent body to launch a campaign against an important institution in civil society. Foreign individuals or institutions may request the party or the party’s leader to stop this intrusion into the autonomy of civil society. The leader can then protest that if he intervened it would undermine the constitutional independence of that institution.

Because this document is an outsider’s analysis of the ANC, it has focused on formal ANC structures and policy. It does not deal with the informal networks that operate. For example, because of the propensity of lawyers to gossip, senior (ANC aligned) members of the JSC will disclose the names of those who have been anointed to take up senior positions in the Judiciary months before nominations close. The JSC will then go through the whole rigmarole of advertising positions, interviewing candidates and making appointments. At the end of the process it is the political anointees who are appointed. The fact that the ANC makes these appointments indirectly means that they do not have to account for their actions.

The fact that informal networks operate along with the more formal ones of party control does not contradict the main thesis. As Milovan Djilas noted of the Communists, “meetings of party forums, conferences of the government and assemblies, serve no purpose but to make declarations and put in an appearance. They are only convened to confirm what has previously been cooked up in intimate kitchens.”[54] Similarly, even the most monolithic state organisations are subject to rifts and squabbles as individuals battle for position. These tactical differences should not be confused with signs of independence for these ANC members never question the leading role of the party on which their position ultimately depends.[10]

It is fallacious to think that the ANC is following an “American model” and confining political appointments to the upper echelons of the state. Within government departments ANC members are generally deployed through the ranks. The career path of a number of ANC cadres appointed to the position of director-general is the following: They were appointed special advisors to their Ministers in 1994. They were integrated into the Departments in 1995 or 1996 and then promoted through the ranks to the top position. Although the priority of the ANC is to place cadres in the key positions in an institution this does not mean that the ambitions of the ANC are confined to those positions. One ANC document asks the (rhetorical) question: “what have we done to train and deploy personnel in strategic areas within the state—positions in the security forces and the bureaucracy such as pilots, air controllers, immigration officials, finance management and information technology!”[55]

Race and power

The party-state structure of Communism was completely discredited in 1990. Yet the ANC has put in place a policy which seeks to replicate that model in many respects. In doing so the ANC has provoked minimal opposition locally or internationally. This is a quite extraordinary achievement considering the context of a world order in which history has allegedly ended and liberal democratic values triumphed.

One of the reasons the success of the ANC has been its ability to exploit South Africa’s racial fault lines in implementing this policy. Since the ANC sees no distinction between the party and “the people” (i.e. the black majority), the interests of the ANC and the black majority are viewed as indistinguishable. A state dominated by the black majority and one controlled by the ANC are seen as the same thing.

A number of research surveys have shown that the vast majority of South Africans (of all colours) support appointments based on merit, whether it is to the civil service or national sports teams. The ANC on the other hand has stated that making every institution in society, at every level, “demographically representative” is an “imperative”, “non-negotiable” and a test of loyalty to the new South Africa.

This divide between the party and the people was further illustrated by the ANC’s own election manifesto. In the ANC manifesto the term “representivity” was not mentioned, and affirmative action was only referred to once. (The ANC making the disingenuous claim that the government had used it to create “equal opportunities.”) This is in marked contrast to an ANC in government which is infatuated by racial quotas.

Yet despite the fact that “representivity” is not particularly popular among ordinary people, alienates minorities, and leads to the erosion of the capacity of the public service, the ANC leadership has pushed on with this policy oblivious to its destructive consequences.

The primary reason is that the tiny elite that happens to benefit from policies of “representivity” and “black empowerment” is completely intertwined with the leadership of the ruling party. Because of its proximity to political power the demands of this group for special privileges have become overriding priorities of the ANC government.

- The demand for “representivity” was used by the ANC nomenklatura as an instrument to aggressively advance their careers within the civil service.

- The abolition of merit as the overriding criterion for the appointment of civil servants greatly facilitated the appointment of ANC cadres.

- Party political appointments to positions in independent state bodies were defended on racial grounds, and many in the press refrained from criticising such appointments because of a misplaced sense of racial solidarity or from a fear of being labelled racist.

- The claimed “transformation” has been used to justify government legislation which seeks to interfere in every sphere of life and activity.

- The ANC has also used racial propaganda—including accusations of racism and anti-transformationist tendencies—to attack the legitimacy of institutions such as the press and the judiciary which are independent of the ruling party.

- The remedy for this alleged lack of legitimacy –namely the implementation of “representivity”—provides a cover for cadre deployment or (where that is not possible) to make appointments based on racial patronage.

- In institutions such as the judiciary where the ANC is unable to make overt political appointments race is used as a cover to promote junior but “loyal” judges henceforth beholden to the ruling party, or as an excuse to pass over independent-minded judges for promotion.

- Representivity is also a self-sustaining justification for those who accept appointments over individuals more capable than themselves.

To adopt an ANC term, the “motive forces” of re-racialisation are the nomenklatura, and the various ANC aligned organisations which seek to gain special privileges from the party. This New Class is made up of the cadreship, the families of the liberation aristocracy, the exclusively black organisations, ANC-aligned organisations, cronies and family members of the cadreship, “The Network”, Thabo Mbeki’s Consultative Committee and so on.

This New Class is (to paraphrase Djilas) a body of ideologically disinterested men and women, who get their ideas from above, but who unanimously and aggressively use the race-card to defend their power and unquestionable privilege. The power and privilege of this New Class rests upon the continued hegemony of the ANC over the black population.

The New Class are thus the ANC’s most vocal defenders and supporters. They are extremely sensitive to any exposure of privilege or corruption within their ranks, for this undermines their moral claim to be the vanguard of the black majority. When popular sentiment eventually turns against the ANC, this group will remain the most loyal and steadfast supporters of the party.

Consequences for democracy

One of the major checks on any party seeking to erode the distinction between party and state is the prospect of a possible alternation in government at the next election. The possibility of the opposition turning the tables upon coming to power is usually enough to keep the government of the day honest. In the South African context a realistic possibility of a change in government (at least in the short term) was quite clearly lacking. With an overwhelming (and stable) majority most ruling parties would be prone to slowly and incrementally blurring the lines between party and state. In South Africa though, the ANC has set about purposefully and systematically eliminating those distinctions. The underlying reason for this undue haste is an inability to distinguish between the ANC and “the people”. This conflation of party and people is best seen in the ANC claim that critics of the ruling party are implicitly attacking the black majority.

This elimination of the distinction between party and state risks pushing South Africa into a downward spiral towards authoritarianism. The ANC is creating a nomenklatura which is not only loyal to the party, but whose power and position is dependent on the ANC remaining in power. They consequently have a vested interest in ensuring that there is no change of government.

Party control over the GCIS and the public broadcaster means that an overtly ANC point of view is conveyed to the voters and critical or dissenting voices are marginalised or ignored. Opposition voters find themselves having to vote against the entire party-state structure and not just the governing party of the day. There is consequently a diminishing prospect of any real alternation in government, which in turn means the ANC can further entrench its control over the state machinery.

In implementing the Cadre Policy the immediate priority of the ANC was to extend party control over the state machinery. However, the ambitions of the ANC were never confined to control over the state. ANC documents have repeatedly advocated extending “hegemony” over civil society and particularly the media. The “centres of power” identified by ANC intellectuals for cadre deployment included the “economy” and the “public debate.”

The greater the control the party has over the state, the fewer the constraints it operates under, and the more it is able to undermine the autonomy of institutions in civil society.

The DP response

The road down which the ANC has chosen to travel is by no means at an end. Outlined in this document is an overview of the beginnings of a journey that the ANC must not be allowed to complete.

Put simply, what is at stake here is the difference between real democracy and a centralised one-party dominated state that acts in the interests of a tiny elite as they single-mindedly pursue power and enrichment.

The Democratic Party’s position is clearly summed up in our vision for South Africa, contained in section 2 of the party constitution. Section 2.9 states that “…we promote a state that acts equally in the interests of all and not in the interests of the ruling party or any other part of civil society.”

Furthermore, Section 2.11 of the DP Constitution states that “An independent civil society is essential to the establishment and preservation of an Open Opportunity Society. Civil society acts as a bulwark against the tendency of the state to encroach into the private realm – it is an antidote to any attempt to wrap society in a smothering hegemony of thought and truth. The Democratic Party promotes a vibrant, independent civil society free from the dictates of the state.”

Against this vision, the ANC has quietly and deviously implemented its alternative: a policy designed to give it hegemony over the state and society and in so doing to degrade the freedom, equality and dignity of South Africa’s people.

As the party of real democracy and as South Africa’s only liberal democratic party, the DP will vigorously oppose the ANC’s attempt at hegemony which is inspired by the totalitarian impulse to absolute control and grounded in the arrogance of the dangerously authoritarian.

APPENDIX ONE 

Footnotes 1:

[1] In the first six months of 1999 (in the run up to the election) the NWC met weekly. During the second half of the year the NWC met once every two weeks. (ANC Annual Report 1999)

[2] Roger Scruton argues that in practice true centralism conflicts with, and overrides true democracy (in the sense of answerability to popular sentiment), “candidates at all levels being subject to confirmation by the ruling elite.” (A Dictionary of Political Thought, The Macmillan Press, London, 1983, pg 117) Similarly, in the South African case, the positions of all ANC members in the state, the legislatures and local government are appointed by, or subject to confirmation by, the party leadership. Real “debate and discussion” is curtailed for any criticism of a policy proposed by the leadership would prejudice that members position and career.

[3] The full quote is: “Our starting points as we tackle the task of further strengthening the ANC must be based on the recognition of the fact that the fundamental social transformation of our country cannot happen without the people who understand and are committed to bringing this transformation about.

In other words, to discharge this revolutionary tasks ahead of us, we need battalions of revolutionaries who are as ready to serve the people as have been the generations of cadres that preceded them.” (Report by the President of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, to the 50^th National Conference of the ANC, 16 December 1997)

[4] The ANC was either given full responsibility to implement the Cadre policy at Mafikeng, or by the NEC shortly afterwards.

[5] The ANC’s Commission on Governance was instrumental in putting in place the various components of this policy at Mafikeng. A “discussion document” prepared for the Commission stated that three principles underlay the ANC’s “management and co-ordination of the legislature, executive and judiciary”:

I.               I.     I.            -       “There is only one ANC irrespective of areas of operation”. Under this principle all ANC members, (in whatever institution or sphere of government) remain subject to decisions of the central party structure;

II.                   II.   II.           -       “The ANC and its structures are central to the management and co-ordination of all processes of governance” This meant that ANC structures must be in control of all institutions where political influence arises; in the state and (as other ANC documents show) civil society. And;

III.                 III.  III.         -       “The ANC must be transformed to enable it to meet the demands of governance.” In other words, the ANC needs to be reorganised to meet these two objectives.

[6] The absurdity of appointing individuals on the basis of demographically determined racial outcomes (rather than the pool of qualified individuals) can be illustrated by two examples: Firstly, it is generally accepted that the Census massively undercounted the white population. According to the 1996 Census there are half a million fewer white South Africans than there were in 1991. This massive drop in population is not supported by emigration figures. According to Whiteford (1999) the 1996 Census undercounted the white population by 810 000 people, which means that the white population constituted 12.6% of the total population rather than the 10.9% claimed by the 1996 Census. According to figures from the Department of Public Service and Administration (PSA) there were 1100421 people in public service employ in June 1999. If “demographic representivity” was fully and exactly implemented the undercounting of the 1996 Census (and accepting that the Whiteford estimates are more accurate) would result in 18707 fewer public service jobs for white South Africans. Secondly, according to the same PSA figures Indians constitute 5.38% of the 311 676 public servants employed in national departments, while coloureds make up 6.8%. Since Indians are “overrepresented” and coloureds “underrepresented” the logic of demographic representivity demands that fewer Indian individuals and more coloureds would have to be employed until their numbers in the national departments came to reflect the population composition of the country as a whole. However a careful reading of the figures shows that someone inputted the wrong figures into the PSA’s racial database. The 10 311 coloured members of the SANDF were inputted as Asians, and the 980 Indian members of the SANDF were inputted as coloureds. If these figures are changed around, the percentage of Indians in the employ of national departments drops back down to 2.36% and the percentage of coloureds rises to 9.8%

[7] Examples include Geoff Budlender at Land Affairs and Helena Dolny at the Land Bank. It is one of the great ironies of the transition that these left wingers should be purged from the ltate, through the same voluntary severance packages they had dreamt up to get rid of conservative Afrikaans civil servants.

[8] ANC policies of racialising and politicising the state have not only severely eroded the capacity of the state—they also risk dissolving the glue that holds South Africa together as a nation. This is particularly true of ANC attempts to racialise and politicise the judiciary. One of the less noticed but more significant reasons for South Africa’s peaceful transition away from minority rule was the presence of an independent judiciary and the rule of law. As Michael Ignatieff has commented, “Interethnic accomodation anywhere depends on an equilibrium of forces. An ethnic minority can live in peace with an ethnic majority as long as that majority does not use its preponderance to turn the institutions of state into an instrument of ethnic favouritism or ethnic justice.”[8] Ingnatieff points out in the context of Yugoslavia, that ethnic or nationalist sentiment among ordinary people is usually a “secondary consequence of political disintegration, a response to the collapse of state order and the interethnic accommodation that it made possible.”[8] Thus, the emergence of ethnic conflict in most African states can be explained by the collapse of an overarching state rather than by the pre-existence of primordial ethnic identities. As the colonial state was undermined, criminalised, or made into an instrument of ethnic favouritism, individuals, out of a Hobbesian fear, turned to their ethnic group for protection. If you destroy the state then people will withdraw into the next highest available political structure. It is not ethnicity which destroys the state, but the destruction of the state which leads to an upsurge in ethnicity. It is no coincidence that Botswana, one of the most prosperous and peaceful African states, did not seek to Africanise the state immediately after independence, but instead retained the old civil service. The composition of the state was changed incrementally. By doing so Botswana managed to retain that ethos of an independent civil service not beholden to any one party or particular ethnic group.

ANC policies could result in an upsurge of racial conflict, or just as probably, in an upsurgence of ethnicity within the black population. If the ANC manages to turn the judiciary into an instrument of the party, one of the major contributors to interethnic accommodation in our deeply divided society will be removed.

[9] The Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy states that the “immediate priorities” for deployment are: First, “those who serve in elected public positions during this term of office and those nominated to serve in such positions through our list processs,” then “those from the broad democratic movement [i.e. previously deployed ANC cadres] who are already placed in managerial positions in various areas of social activity;” the “experienced and loyal cadres... demobilised from active struggle”; then last and least, “those falling outside these categories, but are members, supporters and [apolitical but democratically minded] fellow nationals.”

[10] Garton Ash writes of Communist Poland that the basic structure of the party-state was “simple, totalitarian and monolithic; but its day-to-day politics are fraught with internal tensions and contradictions.” The Polish Revolution, pg 8

Footnotes 2:

[1] U.S. Department of State, China Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, February 26, 1999

[2] Sapa report, 23 November 1999

[3] Sowetan 20 January 1994

[4] Opening Address to the 49^th National Conference of the ANC, 17 December 1994

[5] Appendix 1

[6] Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy, Umrabulo No. 6, 1^st Quarter 1999

[7] The statements are usually written by Thabo Mbeki

[8] It was not white resistance to change that provoked Mandela’s outburst at Mafikeng, but in fact precisely the opposite. Because whites no longer were seen as any threat, the ANC could abandon its rhetoric of reconciliation, and instead embark on a rapid and aggressive consolidation of its own power.

[9] “8. The Character of the ANC” Strategy and Tactics Document, as amended at the 50^th National Conference, December 1997

[10] Organisational Democracy and Discipline in the Movement, ANC discussion document, July 1997

[11] Roger Scruton, A Dictionary of Political Thought, Macmillan, London, 1983

[12] Ibid

[13] Ibid

[14] 50^th National Conference Resolution on Cadre Policy, December 1997

[15] Joel Netshitenzhe Challenges of Leadership in the Current Phase, ANC discussion document, July 1997

[16] “8. The Character of the ANC” Strategy and Tactics Document, as amended at the 50^th National Conference, December 1997

[17] i.e. To avoid any misconception arising among party members that public service should take precedence over party service Discussion Document fo Commission on Governance, ANC 50^th National Conference, 1997

[18] Joel Netshitenzhe Challenges of Leadership in the Current Phase, ANC discussion document, July 1997

[19] “8. The Character of the ANC” Strategy and Tactics Document, as amended at the 50^th National Conference, December 1997

[20] Discussion Document For: Commission on Governance, 50^th National Conference Dec 1997, section 8

[21] Section 10: Governance Beyond the State Discussion Document for Commission on Governance, 50^th National Conference 1997

[22] Section 2.5 Challenges and Tasks Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy

[23] Section 2.1, Challenges and Tasks, Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy

[24] Challenges and Tasks, Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy

[25] Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy, December 1998

[26] Review of National Working Committee, ANC Annual Report 1999, published February 2000

[27] ANC statement on the NEC meeting, 21 February 2000

[28] Sunday Times 20 February 2000

[29] Timoth Garton Ash The Polish Revolution: Solidarity, Penguin Books, pp 8-9

[30] Implementing Our Deployment Strategy, Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy, Umrabulo No. 6, 1^st Quarter 1999

[31]Under the interim Constitution the Judicial Services Commission consisted of 19 members, 10 of whom were politicians or political appointees and 9 of whom were representatives of the judiciary and legal profession. There was thus a fairly even balance between the legal profession and political appointees. Under the 1996 Constitution the JSC was expanded to 25 members 16 of whom were now politicians or political appointees and 9 of whom represented the legal profession. The President was given additional powers over the appointment of the representatives from the Attorney and Advocate professions. Consequently the concerns of the (ANC) politicians began to outweigh the concerns of the legal profession. The October appointments that year had shown that the ANC caucus in the JSC could (with some manoeuvring) appoint whomever they wished to the top positions in the Judiciary under the guise of racial transformation. In November 1998 outgoing Transvaal Judge President Frikkie Eloff criticised the composition of the Judicial Services Commission, saying it needed "more lawyers and fewer politicians". (Business Day 2 November 1998).   In May 1999 Constitutional Court Judge President Arthur Chaskalson acknowledged that four CC judges—Zac Yacoob, Pius Langa, Kate O’Regan and Albie Sachs—had all been members of the ANC when appointed. They had severed their all ties after their appointment. (Sapa 4 May 1999) Sachs was a member of the ANC in exile, while Yacoob (appointed in 1997) was a member of the ANC underground during the 1980s. Chaskalson did not mention that Yvonne Makgoro was also an ANC member who had served on various ANC structures before her appointment.

Usually, because it is difficult to make overt political deployments to positions in the judiciary, the ANC has generally fallen back on using racial criteria. However, in a few instances the ANC has appointed underqualified members of the party to positions in the judiciary. One example is the appointment of Essa Moosa to the Cape High Court. Moosa was a member of the ANC’s Western Cape Provincial Executive Committee between 1994 and 1996. He had been deployed to a position within the Justice Department in 1996. In 1998 he was appointed an Acting Judge in the Free State and in 1999 was appointed an Acting Judge in the Cape. Under the previous dispensation candidates for judicial appointment had to be Senior Council and to have an LLB degree. Moosa was an attorney with a law diploma. Moosa was appointed to the Bench over the strenuous objections of the Bar Council—who pointed to the numerous basic mistakes Moosa had made as an Acting Judge. On a number of occasions in the JSC interview Johnny De Lange, ANC MP, rescued Moosa from intense cross-examination on his record by asking sweetheart and leading questions. Despite having his explanations for his numerous mistakes described as “somewhat unconvincing” by the JP of the Free State, Moosa was appointed anyway. (This information is derived from Moosa’s application to the JSC and the transcripts of the hearing.)

[32] View Appendix 1 for full details. If certain institutions are omitted this is not because the heads of those institutions are not ANC members, merely that ANC membership (or past political involvement) could not be confirmed. There are other informal networks that operate and although a person may be extremely close to the ruling party they may not be ANC members (or their membership is not on the public record.) The Public Protector and head of the SAHRC were both ANC members at the time of their appointment, as were five of the eleven Constitutional Court judges. However, most of these appointments were made before the adoption of the cadre policy so they are not listed.

[33] “Transforming the State Apparatus—Increasing the Power of the NLM.” The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation, Umrabulo No. 5 3^rd Quarter 1998

[34] Financial Mail 10 March 2000

[35] “4. Victory over Apartheid” Strategy and Tactics, December 1997

[36] Section 10: Governance Beyond the State Discussion Document for Commission on Governance, 50^th National Conference 1997

[37] Section 4.11.1.3 The State and Social Transformation

[38]Section 5.2 The State and Social Transformation, November 1996

[39] The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation, October 1998, pg 43

[40] Drew Forrest, Business Day 9 March 2000. Forest writes that the state and official bodies are able to exert such pressure through various methods. They can “withdraw government appointment advertising... sabotage newsgathering by refusing to deal with offending publications. [They can also] use high profile political forums to harass editors and whip up hostility to their publications, particularly on matters where popular feeling runs high. Emotionally charged “label libels”, which are vague and difficult to rebut, such as “communist” and “unpatriotic”, are a typical feature of such campaigns.”

[41] Argus 26 April 1994

[42] Business Day 22 August 1994

[43] “4. Victory over Apartheid” Strategy and Tactics,—as amended by 50^th National Conference, December 1997

[44] Business Day 12 February 1997

[45] Financial Mail 11 April 1997

[46] Business Day 18 March 1998

[47] W.H. Hutt The Economics of the Colour Bar, Andre Deutsch, London, 1964: pg 79

[48] According to Business Day (12 January 1999) there are an estimated 1550 white advocates (84%) in South Africa and only 300 black advocates (16%). With the Cape there are 19 black advocates and 300 white advocates.

[49] Cape Times 1999

[50] Beeld 13 March 1999

[51] 1 June Business Day 1999

[52] Timothy Garton Ash The Polish Revolution, pg 9

[53] Beeld 15 March 1999

[54] Milovan Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System, Thames and Hudson, London, pp 82-83

[55] The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation, October 1998, pg 43

ENDS