Extracts from the record of British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's tour of four Commonwealth Countries in Africa, January to February 1960 circulated to Cabinet April 5 1960:

 SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

Printed for the Cabinet. April 1960

C. (60) 66 Copy No. 5 0

12th April, 1960

CABINET

PRIME MINISTER'8 AFRICAN TOUR

NOTE BY THE SECRETARY OF THE CABINET

By direction of the Prime Minister I circulate, for the information of the Cabinet, the attached record of the tour which he made in January-February of this year to four Commonwealth countries in Africa.

This print is circulated mainly for purposes of record. But, in addition to the notes of meetings and discussions, it also contains some material of more general interest, viz.,

(i) A general introduction (pp. 3-5).

(ii) Commentaries on the particular countries visited and a despatch from the High Commissioner in each-

Ghana (pp. 7-8 and 27-29).

Nigeria (pp. 30-31 and 58-59).

Federation (pp. 60-61 and 125-128).

South Africa (pp. 129-130 and 159-165).

(iii) The full text of the main policy speech made by the Prime Minister in each of the countries visited-

Accra (pp. 24-27).

Lagos (pp. 55-57).

Salisbury (pp. 120-125).

Cape Town (pp. 153-158).

(Signed) NORMAN BROOK.

Cabinet Office, S.W. 1,

5th April, 1960.

...

PART V UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA COMMENTARY

By far the most important event of the Prime Minister's visit to South Africa was his speech in Cape Town on 3rd February. The text itself contained nothing which would be considered startling or even novel in the United Kingdom-indeed one of the most effective passages was a quotation from a speech made five months earlier by the Foreign Secretary at the United Nations. What caused the sensation was that the Prime Minister should make any reference at all to racial problems in a speech delivered to the two Houses of the South African Parliament and that he should have chosen this occasion to make a clear and firm statement of British policy in the territories for which the United Kingdom is responsible.

Inevitably, all of the visit that went before seemed in retrospect mere preparation, and the reverberations of the speech deprived of all interest the events of the remaining few days which the Prime Minister spent in the Union. It soon became clear that the Cape Town speech was the culmination of the whole African tour.

From the point of view of climate and of scenery, South Africa was the most attractive of the four countries visited. On the other hand it was impossible to escape from an oppressive realisation of the many unsolved and apparently insoluble problems darkening the relations between the races. The visit fell naturally into two stages. In the first, based on Pretoria, the Prime Minister travelled widely. He visited the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the Northern Transvaal, the Rand, Swaziland, Durban, Bloemfontein and Basutoland. He was accompanied on these travels by Mr. Eric Louw and, from time to time, by other Nationalist Ministers. At the same time he met a good many representatives of different points of view. He was able, for example, to meet prominent industrialists from the Rand, men with open minds and with experience not limited to South Africa. He was able to hear the liberal opinions of such people as Sir' Harry Oppenheimer and Mr. Flather, Editor of the Star. When he moved to Cape Town, by contrast, his time was almost entirely taken up with discussions with the Nationalist Government and under the predominating influence of the Nationalist philosophy of life, though he also met a number of leaders of Cape liberal opinion.

Dr. Verwoerd made arrangements for the Prime Minister to see the leaders of those Opposition Parties which were represented in Parliament, i.e., the United and Progressive Parties. His readiness to meet the leaders of the African National Congress, who had asked for an interview, as had also certain minor European groups, was opposed by Dr. Verwoerd and his colleagues. They were not moved by the fact that the Prime Minister had, in the other countries visited, shown himself ready to meet all shades of Opposition opinion. He therefore felt obliged to fall in with the wishes of his hosts. He did have a fairly long talk with Senator Mrs. Ballinger, representing African interests, and met the Council for Coloured Affairs, a Government-sponsored body; but this was the first country in Africa in which he was denied the opportunity of discussions with African political leaders.

The Prime Minister was impressed by the contrast between the ability, enterprise and open-mindedness of the business men and intelligentsia of the Transvaal and the doctrinaire and obscurantist attitude of Nationalist Ministers.

The Government, who arranged the programme, were plainly anxious, not only to show hospitality, but also to convince the Prime Minister that their native policy was both morally sound and practically reasonable. The visit to the Northern Transvaal Bantu Chiefs, who are pensioners of the Union Government, was designed to persuade him that apartheid was welcome to Africans also. It was not convincing enough to be successful. On the other hand, by contrast with what was found in the other territories visited, the general impression which he formed of African attitudes was of a people content with little and politically almost inactive. Such demonstrations as took place were on a minor scale, consisting of no more than a few people, usually women, displaying placards.

The business talks were in a low key and there was no real meeting of sympathies. It was plain that on the South African side there was a genuine desire to be understood but no comprehension of how South Africa's fixed attitudes are regarded by the outside world. A significant example of this was that the Union Government apparently believed their unpopularity in Africa to derive, not from their own policies, but from the cold attitude shown towards them by the United Kingdom and the United States. Mr. Louw seemed to be convinced that South Africa could form an effective bridge between the Western Powers and the uncommitted African States if only the former, and particularly the United Kingdom, would show greater sympathy with their policies and objectives.

The question of the High Commission Territories was raised; but Dr. Verwoerd made it clear that he did not intend to press at present for transfer. What moved him more was the question of the change-over to a republican form of Government while retaining, at least at the outset, membership of the Commonwealth; and he endeavoured to extract from the Prime Minister some expression of view which he could use with advantage in the referendum campaign. Similar efforts were made by representatives of Nationalist newspapers at the Press conference at Cape Town. The Prime Minister refused to lend himself to this and said nothing which could be used to suggest that Britain was indifferent to the question whether South Africa would become a republic.

The Prime Minister's address to the two Houses of Parliament came in the middle of the talks with Ministers. Although Dr. Verwoerd had been given an idea of its main outlines beforehand, it was plainly a surprise to him and to his supporters. Indeed, he was so struck by the likely effects of the criticism contained in it, though mild and merely implied, that he found it necessary to make an immediate reply-putting the case, as he expressed it, for justice for the white man. The Cape Town Nationalist paper, the Burger, took an even stronger line and for a week and more after the speech devoted at least one leader to it daily.

The general line was that South Africa was now left without supporters in the world and would have to rely on its own efforts. This was accompanied by a good deal of self-pity and resentment against Britain. The United Party were pleased at what they considered a blow to their Nationalist opponents, although such criticism as there was in the speech could be applied almost equally well to their own views on race relations. Liberal opinion was immensely fortified.

Above all, the impact of the speech caused a marked quickening of interest in politics on the part of those elements hitherto mainly apathetic. This stirring of opinion is expected to have important political results, v/hich may possibly affect the outcome of the referendum.

The tour involved a great deal of travelling and some of the daily programmes were extremely strenuous. On the other hand, there was none of that shifting of base which had characterised the visits to Nigeria and the Federation; the Prime Minister's time was divided between five nights in Pretoria and four nights in Cape Town.

Except for Durban and Cape Town, there were few large crowds to welcome him. There would have been, without any doubt, a great turn-out in Johannesburg, but the Union authorities insisted on keeping his time of arrival and route secret, and as a result few people had assembled to greet him. When told of the reason by the Mayor of Johannesburg, the Prime Minister remarked that the security precautions seemed excessive. The Mayor later made a statement about this to the Press, which led Mr. Louw to make a counter-statement in which he took it upon himself to apologise for the Mayor's behaviour. It is a fact, however, that the Mayor had unsuccessfully tried to persuade the security authorities to let the route be known in advance. As it was, many hundreds of people guessed correctly the route by which he left Johannesburg for Pretoria and he was enthusiastically cheered.

This was only one of the facts which contributed to the general impression that the Union authorities were not anxious to allow too much enthusiasm to be publicly shown. A great deal of this enthusiasm was indeed a display of feeling by the English-speaking element. This was naturally marked in Durban, where very large crowds stood along the whole route from the airport to the King's House.

The farewell in Cape Town was most affecting, both on the route to the docks and on the quayside.

The Prime Minister particularly enjoyed his visits to the High Commission Territories. The arrangements made were excellent and the programmes went off without a hitch. Popular enthusiasm was immense, and the people of the three territories were glad to renew their expressions of loyalty to the Queen and attachment to their United Kingdom connexion.

...

Record of a Discussion held at Groote Schuur, Cape Town, on Tuesday, 2nd February, 1960, at 10 a.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM       SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. Harold Macmillan    Dr. Verwoerd

Sir Norman Brook         Mr. Louw

Sir John Maud               Mr. Jooste

1. Antarctic

Dr. Verwoerd said that he would like to take this opportunity of expressing the gratitude of the Union Government for the assistance which they had had from the United Kingdom Government in relation to the Antarctic.

2. Uranium

Dr. Verwoerd said that, in view of new discoveries, the world demand for South Africa's uranium would in future be less than had been expected hitherto.

In these circumstances it would be in the common interest of both producers and consumers if the existing contracts, which were due to expire in 1965 or 1966, could be spread out over a rather longer period.

Mr. Jooste said that exploratory discussions would shortly be opened, between officials of the United Kingdom and Union Governments, to look into the possibility of such an arrangement. The Union Government would welcome it in principle, even if it would involve some sacrifice of revenue in the next few years. He hoped that these discussions would be conducted in the friendly atmosphere which had characterised earlier negotiations about uranium contracts.

Dr. Verwoerd said that he hoped that the United Kingdom representatives in these discussions would take a sympathetic view of the difficulties which this situation created for the Union Government.

3. Commonwealth Relations: Departmental Responsibilities

Mr. Louw suggested that the United Kingdom Government should consider adjusting Departmental responsibilities in London so that other Commonwealth Governments would be able to deal directly with the Foreign Office on foreign affairs. In principle it seemed desirable that other Commonwealth Governments should receive information and advice on these matters directly from the Foreign Office, instead of through the Commonwealth Relations Office, at second-hand;

and also that they should be able to put their views and representations directly to the Foreign Office. He had in the past discussed this question of organisation with the Foreign Ministers of Canada and Australia, and believed that they would both favour such a change. He also had some reason to believe that Mr. Selwyn Lloyd would not be opposed to it.

Mr. Louw went on to cite, in support of his suggestion, three instances in which he believed that the interests of the Union Government had been overlooked by the Commonwealth Relations Office. First, in 1956, the Union Government had received no advance information of the Anglo-French decision to undertake military operations against Egypt. Secondly, the United Kingdom Government had been represented at an international conference in Lisbon which considered a number of matters relating to Africa which were of close concern to the Union Government: he had obtained (not from United Kingdom or Portuguese sources) a full report of the proceedings at this conference; and he had been surprised to find that the United Kingdom representative had resisted a suggestion that, when a further conference of this kind was held, the Union Government should be represented: at it; Thirdly, he had learned that officials of the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada had recently met in Washington to consider African problems: he thought it strange that the Union Government should not have been invited to participate and even stranger that the Canadians (who had no direct interest in,Africa) should have been asked to send representatives. .

Mr. Macmillan said that in independent Commonwealth countries other than the United Kingdom there was usually a single Department of External Affairs and a single Foreign Service covering both Commonwealth countries and foreign countries. In theory it would be possible to adopt the same form of Departmental organisation in London; but this would have the practical disadvantage that there would be no single Minister in the United Kingdom Cabinet with the duty of seeing that Commonwealth interests were not overlooked. The interests of the other Commonwealth countries would not be better served if they were lumped together with all the foreign countries with which the Foreign Secretary was concerned. It was not to be assumed that, because messages came in a Commonwealth Relations Office cypher, their content had been settled by that Department. The material for these telegrams, and the advice which they contained, was provided by the Department concerned with the subject matter- whether Foreign Office, Treasury, Board of Trade or other Department in Whitehall. In this sense the Commonwealth Relations Office was a Post Office for conveying the views and advice of specialist Departments. The advice sent to other Commonwealth Governments on foreign affairs certainly came from the Foreign Office. Moreover, on matters of major importance, much business was transacted by messages from Prime Minister to Prime Minister. Finally, in London, Commonwealth High Commissioners were not required to do business solely through the Commonwealth Relations Office, but were encouraged to go directly to the Foreign Office and other Whitehall Departments for information and advice.

Dr. Verwoerd said that the Union Government did not wish to appear to be telling the United Kingdom Government how to organise their Departmental business. Nor were they suggesting that the Commonwealth Relations Office should be abolished. From their angle, however, they would prefer that the Foreign Office should handle relations with other Commonwealth Governments on foreign affairs and that the Commonwealth Relations Office should deal only with Commonwealth business.

In further discussion Mr. Jooste confirmed, from his own experience as High Commissioner in London, that Commonwealth High Commissioners were free to deal directly with the Foreign Office on foreign affairs-though they were expected to keep the Commonwealth Relations Office informed of these exchanges.

There was, however, no direct link between the Foreign Secretary in London and the Minister for External Affairs in another Commonwealth country.

Mr. Macmillan said that he saw no reason of principle why Ministers for External Affairs in other Commonwealth countries should not conduct personal correspondence, when required, with the Foreign Secretary-just as other Commonwealth Prime Ministers conducted personal correspondence with him.

He would consider this possibility. On the wider question he thought that the aim should be to have a form of Departmental organisation in London which would produce the result that Commonwealth countries had better facilities than foreign countries for consultation, information and advice. He would consider this question of organisation further, in the light of this discussion. It might be found convenient to have some talk about it at the forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London.

4. The Position of the Union Government in Africa

Dr. Verwoerd said that important changes were taking place in Africa, and the Union Government were anxious to play their full part in guiding these in directions which would be helpful to the West. It was right that the Union should play this part; for it was, as it were, the resident representative of European civilisation in Africa. It was in a good position to assist the development of other African States, and was in fact already doing so. It was playing its full part in the Commission pour la Co-operation Technique en Afrique (C.C.T.A.) and in the Foundation pour 1'Assistance Mutuelle en Afrique (F.A.M.A.); and, outside the work of these international organisations, it was also giving a good deal of help and advice in relation to agriculture, broadcasting, scientific development and administration. Unhappily, however, its influence with the other African States was being seriously impaired by lack of support from the United Kingdom and the United States. This was doubtless due to disapproval of the internal policies of the Union-a matter which he would discuss privately with Mr. Macmillan.

But it was unfortunate that this should prevent those countries from appreciating the desire of the Union Government to assist in the development of the African States and the extent to which they were already doing so. South Africa was devoted to the Western cause, from conviction not from self-interest: her whole outlook was bound up with that of the West and she would remain firmly in the Western camp, however much her motives might be misunderstood. She was the one solid foundation in Africa on which the West could build. Yet the West were losing these opportunities because of their dislike of the internal policies of the Union Government. If the United Kingdom and the United States could show greater confidence in what the Union Government were trying to do to further the Western cause throughout Africa, they would thereby increase the influence which the Union could bring to bear on other African States.

Mr. Louw said that he would like to make the same point in its political context. The main need of the emergent States in Africa was for economic aid;

and there was at present something like a competition to gain the influence which the grant of aid could bring. Some of the countries offering aid had ulterior motives: he was not sure that the Americans might not have commercial motives, and it was evident that Russia and Egypt had ideological motives. If we wished the new African States to work with the West, we must provide them with a link.

The Union, as a white Government in Africa, could provide this link, if only the prejudices against the Union in the new African States could be overcome. At present those prejudices were being fed by statements made by the Press and by political leaders in the United Kingdom and the United States. The attitude of public opinion in those countries was frustrating the attempts of the Union Government to help the other African States and to bind them more closely to the Western cause.

The Union Government themselves were doing what they could to overcome these prejudices-for example, special arrangements had been made to enable next year's conference of trie C.C.T.A. to be held in South Africa. The Union Government looked to the United Kingdom Government to help in overcoming these prejudices. The United Kingdom Governments support for South Africa, in her difficulties in the United Nations, had been helpful. Mr. Macmillan could also help by telling the British public, from his personal experience, what was being done for Africans in the Union-they were not in fact " having it so bad ".

Dr. Verwoerd said that extreme expressions of sympathy for the African would make the task of the Union Government impossible. They were to-day in the same position as the United Kingdom had been in recent years in carrying out their Colonial policy under a heavy fire of criticism of " Colonialism ". When the United Kingdom were under this criticism, they had received sympathy and support from the Union. It would be helpful if the United Kingdom could now show a more sympathetic understanding of the motives and intentions of the Union Government in Africa.

Mr. Macmillan said that, after the secession of the North American Colonies, British Colonialism had been concerned mainly with territories in which British people had never had any intention of settling. In most of our Colonies we had reluctantly accepted the responsibility of administration as a consequence of our desire to trade; and our intention had always been to transfer that responsibility to the inhabitants as soon as they were fit to undertake it. Sometimes we might have done so. too quickly; the two wars of the twentieth century had forced the pace.

But, whatever might be said on the question of timing, he had no doubt that, in countries where there was a homogeneous population, our policy should be to concede self-government and independence as soon as the inhabitants were ready for it. There were, however, within the Colonial Empire a few territories where this policy could not be followed because the population was not homogeneous. For us, this problem was most acute in Central and East Africa, where there were many European settlers who had no other home. Here we were confronted with the same problem, on a smaller scale, as that which existed in the Union.

There were two possible approaches to this problem. The Union Government had chosen to follow the policy of separate development. The United -Kingdom; Government, on the other hand, had thought it right to work for the creation of a non-racial State, in which all the communities would have a share in the government. It was too early to say whether this could succeed; but the Government of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland still believed that it was the right solution. It might also be relevant to recall the nearest foreign comparison-Algeria, a white country in North Africa, with about a million French settlers.

It now began to look as though the French had lost their struggle in Algeria. If they had, it was certainly not for lack of courage or for lack of material strength and expenditure. If the experiment did fail, its failure would be due to the fact that they had tried to hold down an indigenous population by force. Mr. Macmillan said that on this question the Governments of the Union and of the United Kingdom took a quite different view. He feared that they would not be able to find a basis for agreement about it. What they could do, however, was to try to remove the bitterness from the controversy. Matters would become worse if each side imputed dishonourable motives to the other. If they could not agree on the substance, they could at least agree to discuss it coolly and objectively.

The countries of the West were, after all, in great danger. Apart from the immediate threat from the Soviet Union, there loomed beyond it a possibly greater danger from China, which would have a population of 800 millions by 1970. The countries of the West, if they were to survive, would be well advised to try to understand one another's difficulties and hold together despite differences of opinion on particular issues.

Dr. Verwoerd said that he could not believe that a non-racial State was a practicable solution in a multi-racial community. If the French failed in Algeria, it would be because they had aimed at creating a non-racial State. Once you set foot on that road, you had to travel it to the end-which, in Africa, meant domination by Africans. That was why the Union preferred the alternative of enabling the two communities to live together as neighbours, not as one family.

However, all that lay in the future. The immediate problem was to find means of preventing the new African States from falling under Communist influence.

The Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States could best contribute to this by showing confidence in the good faith of the Union Government and the genuineness of their desire to assist in the development of the other emergent States in Africa.

5. United Nations

(a) Security Council

Mr. Louw, after describing the history of the Union's candidature for the Commonwealth seat on the Security Council, said that the Union Government, while they had hitherto been content that this seat should be held by one of the other Commonwealth countries, were now determined to secure it for themselves in 1961.

They recognised, however, that if the Commonwealth vote were split this might destroy the convention that one of the non-permanent seats was always held by a Commonwealth country; and they were anxious to have the support of the United Kingdom Government in avoiding that situation.

After discussion it was agreed that the United Kingdom Government should now approach the Governments of the older Commonwealth countries and seek to secure their agreement to support the Union's candidature in 1961. If their support could be secured, the Prime Ministers of the other Commonwealth countries could be consulted when they were in London for the Commonwealth meeting in May.

These latter consultations would be carried out informally: it would not be expedient that the matter should be raised formally at a plenary session of the meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers. If at that time Mr. Nehru agreed that India would support the Union's candidature, he might be willing to persuade Dr. Nkrumah to withdraw Ghana's application so as to avoid a split in the Commonwealth vote.

Dr. Verwoerd said that he would like to assure Mr. Macmillan that, if the Union became a Republic and did not remain within the Commonwealth, the Union Government would at once vacate the Commonwealth seat on the Security Council.

(b) South-West Africa

Mr. Louw described the dealings which the Union Government had had with the Good Offices Committee appointed by the United Nations to seek a way out of the difficulties which had arisen between the Union and the United Nations in respect of South-West Africa. The Union Government would have been ready to consider the possibility of a partition, by which one part of the territory would be incorporated in the Union and the other placed under United Nations trusteeship.

The United Nations had, however, been unwilling to consider such a solution; and the second report of the Good Offices Committee contemplated an arrangement by which the whole of the territory would be placed under United Nations supervision. The Union Government were not prepared to accept that situation. As a result, the Afro-Asian group were now canvassing in the United Nations the possibility of applying sanctions against the Union.

These might take the form of a boycott of South African goods, or withdrawal of diplomatic representatives from the Union, or restrictions on the use of international airports by South African aircraft. If any such proposal were made at the Security Council, the Union Government hoped that it would be vetoed by the United Kingdom and France. But it was possible that the matter might be brought to the Assembly under the " uniting for peace " Resolution and, in that event, it might obtain a two-thirds majority.

Dr. Verwoerd said that this was a matter of vital importance to the Union Government, who were not prepared to accept United Nations supervision over the whole of South-West Africa.

Mr. Macmillan said that, as he understood it, the International Court had given an advisory opinion against the view taken by the Union Government on the legal issue.

Mr. Jooste said that, while this was so, the opinion was somewhat obscure.

While the Court had taken the view that the Union Government was accountable to the United Nations in respect of South-West Africa, they had not found that the Union was under a legal obligation to put the territory under trusteeship.

And the Union Government had in fact been willing to consider placing part of the territory under trusteeship. They had also offered to submit information about the territory to members of the old League of Nations.

Mr. Macmillan asked whether there was not some risk that the International Court would be asked to give a definitive judgment on this issue.

Mr. Louw said that there was a risk of this, for the Union had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. In that event, however, he hoped that the judgment would give supervision, not to the United Nations, but to some former member of the old League of Nations.

(c) Internal Policies

Mr. Macmillan said that the United Kingdom Government, while continuing to adhere to the principle of Article 2 (7) of the Charter, were finding it increasingly difficult to vote against the inscription on the Assembly agenda of items relating to the internal policies of the Union Government.

None of the other Commonwealth Governments now supported us in voting against the inscription of such items: we were now alone in doing so: and he thought it right to warn the Union Government that we might not be able to continue to do so. We might find it necessary, on future occasions, merely to obstain from voting on this question.

Mr. Jooste said that it would be preferable if the United Kingdom Government could declare that they would not participate in the discussion, with an explanation of their reasons for non-participation.

Mr. Macmillan said that the Complexities of United Nations procedure might offer the possibility of some way out; but he doubted whether the United Kingdom Government could again register a positive vote against the inscription of this item.

Dr. Verwoerd said that the Union Government, while they had preferred hitherto to stand on the principle of Article 2 (7), had prepared a damaging case against other countries (including the United States) in which racial discrimination was practised. If they found themselves alone in the United Nations, they might be forced to change their tactics and go over to the offensive on the substance of this question.

Mr. Louw added that some countries were now arguing that Articles 55 and 57 of the Charter, which dealt with human rights, contained an implied authority for the United Nations to discuss the internal affairs of a member country. He had, however, looked up the records of the San Francisco Conference and had verified his recollection that, when these Articles were discussed in draft, Mr. Foster Dulles had made it plain that they could not be used as a means of getting round the prohibition in Article 2 (7).

6. Procedure

(a) Future Meetings

It was agreed that a further meeting should be held on the evening of 3rd February to discuss: (i) The High Commission Territories.

(ii) The world situation.

The two Prime Ministers would meet alone on the morning of 4th February to discuss: (iii) The Republic issue and the Commonwealth.

(iv) Representation of South Africa at the next meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

(b) Press

Dr. Verwoerd said that he assumed that there would be no public disclosure of the substance of the conversations which he was holding with Mr. Macmillan.

Even disclosure of the subjects discussed would be embarrassing to the Union Government.

Mr. Macmillan said that he had no intention of disclosing publicly what had passed in these private discussions. If he were asked about them at the Press conference which he was holding on 5th February, or at any other time, he would take the line that these were private discussions and that he had nothing to say about them.

Record of a Discussion held at Groote Schuur, Cape Town, on Wednesday, 3rd February, 1960, at 8 50 p.m.

Present:

UNITED KINGDOM 

Mr. Harold Macmillan

Sir John Maud

Sir Norman Brook

SOUTH AFRICA

Dr. Verwoerd

Mr. Louw

Mr. Jooste

1. World Situation

At Dr. Verwoerd's request Mr. Macmillan gave a review of the state of relations between East and West, with special reference to the problem of Germany.

The Soviet pronouncement of November 1958 had been in effect an ultimatum and had created a very dangerous situation. There was then a serious risk that the world might drift into war, as it had done in 1914. It was on this account that he had taken the initiative of making his visit to Moscow. Since then a year had been spent in visits and discussions between leading statesmen of East and West. These discussions had not perhaps gone very deep, but they had at least bought time and averted conflict.

Berlin was the symptom, rather than the cause, of tension in Europe, but it might easily provide the spark to touch off a general conflagration. The Western countries were not in a strong position to defy the Soviet Government over Berlin.

For, in the last resort, Mr. Khrushchev could make a peace treaty with Eastern Germany and invite us to deal with the East Germans on all matters relating to our rights of passage through their territory to Berlin. In such circumstances, though our juridical position might be strong, our practical position would be weak; for the British public would certainly not be willing to risk a world war over the question whether a German official or a Soviet official stamped the documents carried by a convoy passing through East German territory to Berlin.

This was not the sort of issue on which a democracy. could be persuaded to go to war. We had therefore done our best to negotiate some temporary arrangement about Berlin, and agreement had very nearly been reached at the meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1958. These negotiations had eventually broken down in a somewhat legalistic debate as to what the position would be at the end of the temporary period. It was hard to know what value Mr. Khrushchev put upon this point: it might be that he was determined that a final decision should be reserved for a Summit meeting.

In all this the fundamental difficulty lay in differences of view about the reunification of Germany. Dr. Adenauer, though he realised that reunification could not come for many years, was determined that nothing should be done to prejudice the possibility. The Russians, on the other hand, were determined to keep Germany divided for ever-for their main fear now was the threat which a reunited Germany would present to their security. Their aim was to get Eastern Germany recognised as an independent State, like Poland. For the present at any rate we must resist this, for it might tend to detach Western Germany from the Western alliance. Dr. Adenauer and General de Gaulle were inclined to think that, if we stood firm, the Russians would accept some temporary arrangement about Berlin.

The United Kingdom and United States Governments, on the other hand, realised that the Western position in Berlin was highly vulnerable and could easily be undermined without the use of force: they were therefore very conscious of the dangers involved in following what was in effect a policy of bluff. If the bluff were called, the West would suffer a humiliating diplomatic defeat. It might therefore be wiser to be ready to make small concessions in order to get some temporary arrangement. Meanwhile, time had been gained, and tempers had cooled, as a result of the negotiations over the past year.

In discussion the following points were made.

(a) Would the situation become easier as the Russians became more apprehensive about China? Mr. Macmillan said that Mr. Khrushchev was probably a little apprehensive already about the Chinese, who were inclined to follow reckless policies which might interfere with his plans-e.g., for securing a measure of disarmament. But it would probably be some years before China's strength imposed any substantial restraint on Soviet policy.

(b) Would it not be preferable to accept a permanent division of Germany and to recognise East Germany on the basis of some readjustment of boundaries which would deal with the problem of Berlin? Mr. Macmillan said that Dr. Adenauer could not hope to sustain his political position unless he continued to affirm his faith in the ultimate reunification of Germany. It was in our interest that Western Germany should be retained in the Western camp; and, if the West Germans felt that their interests had been abandoned by the West, their morale might break and they might yield to the temptation of buying unification at the cost of a neutrality which would leave them at the mercy of the Soviet bloc. As regards the adjustment of boundaries, it must be remembered that Berlin was about 150 miles east of the boundary and could not be brought within Western Germany without something in the nature of a Danzig corridor, which would be a source of continuing friction and danger.

(c) Must it not be assumed, from youth parades and other evidence, that the younger generation in Eastern Germany had been fully converted to Communism? Mr. Macmillan said that he doubted whether this was so. If it were, the Russians would not be so completely unwilling to contemplate the possibility of free elections. , . 1 (d) Would the Western Powers be able to make any:concessions about West Berlin without fatally weakening their position there? Mr. Macmillan said that, if we took the alternative course of refusing to try to reach any accommodation, the Russians could make our position in Berlin entirely untenable whenever they chose. 2.

High Commission Territories

(i) General

Dr. Verwoerd said that for the last 50 years it had been understood that the High Commission Territories would eventually be incorporated within the Union, The United Kingdom Government had always held that the transfer could not take place until the inhabitants had been consulted and the Parliament at Westminster had expressed its views. Before the war it had been agreed that the Union Government would be given an opportunity to explain the position to the inhabitants, so that they would be aware of what was involved before anything in the nature of a plebiscite was held. Since the war, however, successive Governments in the United Kingdom had adopted a wholly negative attitude on this question.

Moreover, a new development was now beginning; for measures of constitutional advance were being introduced in the Territories without any consultation with the Union Government. It was possible that this might have the result that it would become even more difficult to arrange for the Territories to be incorporated within the Union. The Union Government therefore found it a matter for regret that they had not been consulted before these constitutional changes were introduced. Dr. Verwoerd thought it his duty to register a protest over this and to ask that no further constitutional changes should take place within the Territories without prior consultation with the Union Government's In discussion the following points were made.

(a) Sir John Maud said that the Act of 1909 did not itself include anyundertaking that the Territories would be incorporated within the Union.

Dr. Verwoerd said that this might be so; but the negotiations held in 1937-39 between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union had clearly contemplated that responsibility for the Territories would ultimately be transferred to the Union.

Mr. Macmillan said that much had happened since then. In particular, domestic legislation enacted in the Union had affected the attitude of public opinion, in the United Kingdom and throughout the world, on the question whether further African populations should be brought within the responsibility of the Union Government.

Dr. Verwoerd said that if one party to an agreement wished to pursue a course of policy inconsistent with that agreement, the other party had a right to expect that at least it would be consulted.

Mr. Macmillan replied that the Union Government had not consulted the United Kingdom Government before introducing the legislation to which he had referred.

(b) Mr. Macmillan asked whether the Union Government had any particular objection to the constitutional changes recently introduced in Basutoland.

Dr. Verwoerd said that he was not taking any particular point on the detail of these changes. He was making the general point that they should not have been introduced without prior consultation with the Union Government.

(c) Dr. Verwoerd said that he would be glad to know what the present intentions of the United Kingdom Government were in respect of the High Commission Territories. If all thought of incorporation within the Union had been abandoned, was it intended that they should become independent States? So long as the policy of the United Kingdom Government remained obscure, this would be a bone of contention between the Union and the United Kingdom and would be a continuing source of friction.

Mr. Macmillan concluded this part of the discussion by saying that he took note of Dr. Verwoerd's protest that constitutional changes had been introduced within the Territories without prior consultation with the Union Government.: ' (ii) Economic Situation Dr. Verwoerd said that it was the general desire of the Union Government to help the emergent African States. They were already, in a sense, the economic guardians of the inhabitants of the High Commission Territories which, naturally, were economically interdependent with the Union. They were, however, concerned at the development of European industries within the Territories; for this, if continued, would produce a situation inconsistent with the policy of separate development which was being pursued within the Union and was bound on that account to lay up trouble for the future.

Another difficulty facing the Union Government was that they could not continue indefinitely to provide employment for the surplus population of the Territories at a time when the African population Within the Union was increasing. In the Union their solution for this problem was to create industries on the borders of the areas reserved for Africans so as to provide employment for the growing population. This solution could not however be applied in respect of the Territories unless there were closer co-ordination of the economic and social policies followed in the Union and in the Territories respectively. The Union Government could make these Territories viable economically if they were able to guide their economic development and harmonise it with that of the Union itself.

Mr. Macmillan said that he would take note of what Dr. Verwoerd had said on the economic aspects of this problem.

(iii) Future Policy

Dr. Verwoerd said that he recognised the strength of the prejudices held, in the Parliament at Westminster, and by world opinion at large, against the internal policies of the Union Government. This being so, he recognised that the United Kingdom Government, even if they wished to do so, would not be able at present to transfer to the Union Government the responsibility for the High Commission Territories. He was not therefore asking for early transfer. For the present he would go no further than to ask that the Union Government should be free to tell the inhabitants of those Territories what their position would be if they were incorporated within the Union-what political and social systems would be introduced, and what prospects of economic development there would be. The Union Government could, if they chose, conduct a campaign of propaganda for this purpose without the consent of the United Kingdom Government. They did not wish to take that course. They would prefer to proceed in co-operation with the United Kingdom authorities. But they did feel strongly that they ought not to be denied the opportunity to put the facts plainly before the inhabitants of the Territories so that they would be able, when the time came, to make an informed choice. In short, the plea of the Union Government for 1960 was, not incorporation, but co-operation.

: Mr. Macmillan said that Dr. Verwoerd would not expect him to give an immediate answer to this request. He would however consider it with his Cabinet colleagues after his return to London.

Record of a Discussion between the Prime Minister and Dr. Verwoerd at Groote Schuur, Cape Town, on Thursday, 4th February, 1960, at 10 a.m.

1. High Commission Territories

Dr. Verwoerd began by reiterating the points he had made in the earlier discussion of 3rd February. He said that the Union was the economic guardian of the Territories and we were the political guardian. He still thought the time had come for us to- hand over the political guardianship. He recognised, however, that the British Parliament and public opinion might not be able to swallow this. He therefore made a strong plea that we should consult together and that any steps which we took on the political side should be taken in consultation, and if possible in agreement with the Union Government.

He went on to say, and he repeated all this at the end of the conversation which ranged over a wide field, that if we used the Colonial Development Fund to set up European-controlled industries in the Territories which would lead to competition, the Union would have to take measures to protect their industries. I referred to existing imports from Hong Kong, and reminded him that he was bound by GATT and the Ottawa Agreements. He said that he realised this but that the Union would act to defend herself if necessary. He said again and again that, if we would only realise that his whole policy was to benefit the African population while protecting the European, we would be able to co-operate. He wished.to avoid unpleasantness in the future but warned me that unpleasantness would grow.

2. The Republic He spoke about the Republic. I said that this was nothing to do with me. It was for him to tender advice to The Queen as Her Prime Minister of South Africa. He seemed rather nettled about this. I said again that it was nothing to do with me, and I assumed that he had consulted The Queen. He said that he had not done so, and he gave me a copy of his speech of 3rd December and said that it was hypothetical only. I said that it might be hypothetical but I understood that the plebiscite was likely to take place in August, and everybody was registering for it. He seemed upset. He said it was all hypothetical and he would act correctly when the time came. He then went into a long discourse, with his usual fluency and high level of argument, to prove that if only the final question between Afrikaans and British tradition could be resolved it would remove all unpleasantness and allow the country to go forward as a single nation. That was his purpose. He believed that many industrialists and others of British descent would welcome the settlement of this matter. I said that this might be so, but he could not expect me as The Queen's first Minister of the United Kingdom to be enthusiastic about the end of the Monarchy in South Africa. He then adopted a rather hurt attitude and said we quite misunderstood him. His only aim was to make concessions all round and to reach a peaceful settlement of a long-standing dispute. I again said that this was nothing to do with me as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and that all I could do was to take note of what he had said.

3. The Republic and the Commonwealth Dr. Verwoerd said that he thought it would ease things very much if at the time that the plebiscite was held, whenever that might be, it was indicated that it was the wish of South Africa to stay in the Commonwealth. Five-sixths of his own Party would favour this, although one-sixth would be hostile. But, apart from other matters, he wanted to know whether we really wanted South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth. I replied that everything I had said since I had been in Africa made it clear that I regarded the Commonwealth as of permanent value-not as the setting sun of British imperialism, but as the dawn of an entirely new concept-and I hoped that South Africa would play her full part in it. I had made it clear that our partnership within the Commonwealth might continue for many years when other questions had been resolved in one way or another.,'s He took all this quite well. I think it is likely that he will say that he wants to stay in the Commonwealth, if only to get a good vote in the plebiscite.

4. Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference Dr. Verwoerd said that it would be very difficult for him to come to the next meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers because of his other commitments. He could only come if he could tell his people that the subjects he would discuss were so important that he could not be represented by a substitute. He asked me whether I thought it would be wise for him to raise the Republican issue in May. Since the meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers took place only about every two years, and on the assumption that the Republic came into being between two meetings, would it be wise to raise the question informally and hypothetically in order to test the opinion of the other members on the question whether South Africa, should she become a Republic, could continue within the Commonwealth? I felt that there might be a catch in this and said I would think about it and let him know my view.

The point he made was that, if it was settled more or less informally, then when the time came no more would be needed to complete the formalities than an exchange of correspondence. He had noticed that Ghana had already notified the Commonwealth Prime Ministers of their intention to become a Republic. I simply said I would consider this and let him have my advice. The catch in this is, I think, that he means to get us all to agree that a Republican South Africa could stay in the Commonwealth, use this for his plebiscite campaign, and leave himself free at any time to find new difficulties.

My conclusion is that he wants me to press him very hard to come to the May meeting on the understanding that we will (a) discuss the Commonwealth Republic problem, and (b) make some further agreement with him about the Territories. He will make the excuse that these two matters would enable him to miss some ceremonies in the Union, but 1 think it is his usual method of bringing pressure.

did observe to him that, if all the 11 Prime Ministers had to find some special reason why they should come to London for a Commonwealth meeting, things would become rather difficult. He turned this off with a laugh and said that this was a special year for South Africa. In any event they had always made it clear that meetings in the first half of the year were very difficult for them.

5. The Queen's Position as Head of the Commonwealth

Dr. Verwoerd said that there was still a strong feeling in South Africa against recognising The Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. I said I was rather amazed at this. It seemed to me that, if he really believed in reconciliation, it was pretty ungenerous to the 45 per cent, of British people in South Africa, to whom the end of the Monarchy would be a serious blow, if he now tried to avoid recognising The Queen as Head of the Commonwealth. If he wanted reconciliation, here was a gesture which would do exactly what he said he wished. He hummed and ha-ed a bit at this and said there was still a great feeling in South Africa against the Monarchy and it would be a help for future relations if this could be removed. He then began to talk about Ireland. I pointed out that this was not relevant: Mr. De Valera had accepted the Queen as Head of the Commonwealth and Ireland had left the Commonwealth for different reasons under Mr. Costello. He then talked about Cyprus. I said that I thought Cyprus was another matter. The question there was whether a country whose policy was more or less under the protection of two foreign Powers could be regarded as fully independent and qualified for Commonwealth membership. He acquiesced in this and said no more, but expressed his pleasure at getting my view frankly.

Note on Suggested Meetings with Representatives of African National Congress and other Parties not Represented in Union Parliament

Before he arrived in the Union, Mr. Macmillan had been asked to receive deputations from the African National Congress, the Liberal Party and a number Of other organisations not represented in the Union Parliament. The fact that he had received these requests was widely known among newspaper correspondents, and it was evident that, if he did not see representatives of any of these organisations, there was likely to be criticism in Parliament and in the Press. The United Kingdom High Commissioner in the Union was aware, from conversations which he had already had with Mr. Louw, that the Union Government would be unwilling that Mr. Macmillan should see these people-and would try, if they could, to leave him with the odium of refusing. The High Commissioner felt very strongly that they ought to be seen or, alternatively, that the Union Government should take public responsibility for the decision that Mr. Macmillan should not see them.

The Prime Minister had a brief conversation about this with Mr. Louw on 27th January. Mr. Louw was unhelpful and evasive. Therefore, on 28th January, the Prime Minister sent him a letter in the following terms: " When we had a word yesterday about the possibility of my seeing someone from the Liberal Party and the A.N.C. during my visit, you said you thought that if I wished to pursue this it was something I would need to discuss with Dr. Verwoerd.

Since our conversation I have been thinking further about this matter and I thought it would be courteous to let you know that I do feel I ought to discuss it with the Prime Minister as soon as conveniently possible after we reach Cape Town. It may be that you would like to let him know this.

Perhaps it would be helpful if I put my position very briefly like this.

There can of course be no question of my receiving from any quarter any petition regarding matters which are the domestic concern of the Union '' Government: if any such petition were addressed to me (and I understand you have reason to think that the A.N.C. are considering the submission of something of the kind) I should have it returned at once to the sender, as being none of my business. But letting people come and see me is quite another matter. Dr. Verwoerd has kindly arranged for me to meet leaders of the Parliamentary Opposition Parties, which I very much appreciate. But it is generally known (and was mentioned in questions-which I evaded-at my Press Conference in Pretoria yesterday) that the Liberal Party and the A.N.C. have both said they would like to meet me. As I understand it, both of them are legal political associations: and I have had opportunities to meet what might be regarded as their equivalents in all the other African countries I have visited on this tour. I feel therefore it would be quite impossible for me to say that I was for my part unwilling to see them-though of course I would not see them without Dr. Verwoerd's agreement.

I am Dr. Verwoerd's guest and I am in his hands. My difficulty is that if he should feel it impossible to agree that I should see anyone from those Parties I fear I should eventually have to indicate when questioned in Parliament or by the Press that this was the reason. I would of course do so as tactfully as I could, consonantly with making my own position clear: but I am moved by an awareness of how much credit would accrue to South Africa in the United Kingdom if it were possible for me to say that I had seen these people with the approval of the Union Government, to suggest that it would be valuable if Dr. Verwoerd and I could discuss the matter before any final decisions are taken ".

On 30th January, during an aircraft journey from Durban to Pretoria, Mr. Louw told the High Commissioner that he was most reluctant to forward this letter to Dr. Verwoerd. It would be a great shock to him and would affect the spirit in which Dr. Verwoerd would meet the Prime Minister at Cape Town.

Dr. Verwoerd would, he knew, be strongly opposed to the suggestion that Mr. Macmillan should meet the representatives of the African National Congress.

It was, in his opinion, a subversive organisation and many of its leaders had Communist leanings. It was closely akin to the Congress Parties which had been banned in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and elsewhere. It position would be greatly strengthened if the Prime Minister saw its representatives. It would be much better if the Prime Minister would content himself with seeing representatives of the non-Government Parties in the Union Parliament. This was the line which the Union Government had taken in arranging the programme: it was a defensible line: and Mr. Louw hoped very much that the Prime Minister would fall in with it. In these circumstances he hoped that the Prime Minister would agree to withdraw his letter of 28th January.

The gist of this conversation was reported to the Prime Minister in the aircraft.

He said that he was unwilling to withdraw his letter, but would be ready to-discuss the matter with Mr. Louw on the following day.

The Prime Minister saw Mr. Louw at Libertas, Pretoria, at 10 a.m. on Sunday. 31st January. In this discussion Mr. Louw repeated the arguments which he had deployed to the High Commissioner on the previous evening. He went on to argue that it would be inappropriate for Mr. Macmillan to concern himself, during this visit, with the internal politics of the Union. If Mr. Macmillan were visiting a foreign country, he would not think it his duty to see all the political leaders outside the Government who asked to see him. It would be a reflection on the independence of the Union if he took a: different line there merely because South Africa was a member of the Commonwealth.

The Prime Minister said that he could not accept this argument. Moreover, he was doubtful whether the Union Government would be wise, in their own interest, to appear to be preventing him from hearing the views of their political opponents. This was likely to become a matter of public controversy, certainly in the United Kingdom; and, if he were questioned about it on his return, it would be difficult for him to avoid implying that, in declining these requests, he had been deferring to the wishes of the Union Government. For these reasons he thought that this was a matter which he must discuss with Dr. Verwoerd himself; and, that being so, he saw no reason to withdraw his letter of 28th January.

After his arrival in Cape Town, Mr. Macmillan had a private talk about this with Dr. Verwoerd. From this it appeared that Dr. Verwoerd felt very strongly that Mr. Macmillan should not meet representatives of the African National Congress and that it would be both more logical, and more convenient for the Union Government, if he confined himself to seeing leaders of the Opposition Parties represented in the Union Parliament. It was also evident that Dr. Verwoerd would be much upset if Mr. Macmillan implied, in any public statement, that he would have liked to see these people but had been prevented from doing so by the Union Government.

Dr. Verwoerd felt very strongly that the distinction between Parties which were represented in the Union Parliament and those which were not was a logical distinction on which both he and Mr. Macmillan could jointly take their stand. He offered to arrange for Mr. Macmillan to see, not only the leaders of the United and Progressive Parties, but also Mr. Bloomberg (a Cape Coloured Member) and Mrs. Ballinger (the "Native" representative in Parliament).

On reflection Mr. Macmillan decided that this matter was less important than the content of his Cape Town speech. He intended, in that speech, to make a plain statement of the policy followed by the United Kingdom Government on race relations in territories for which they were responsible, and to imply that the United Kingdom Government could not endorse the racial policy of the Union Government. He thought it more important, from the point of view of public opinion at home, that he should be uncompromising about this in his speech than that he should persist in seeing representatives of the African National Congress against the wishes of the Union Government.

He thought it inexpedient to risk giving serious offence to the Union Government on both points, while he was their guest; and he came to the conclusion that it would he wiser to defer to their wishes in respect of the proposed deputation from the African National Congress. He deferred his decision on the precise terms of his reply until he had been able to judge the reception of his speech.

On 4th February Mr. Macmillan wrote to the Secretary-General of the African National Congress in the following terms:

"I have read with interest the letter which you addressed to me on 25th January. I am obliged to you for giving me a statement of the views of your Party, but I regret I am not able to accede to your request that I should receive a deputation.

I have received a number of requests from different groups who wished to put their views to me in person. The arrangements which have been made for my brief visit to South Africa have not, however, enabled me to receive any deputations from organisations not represented in Parliament.

As you will be aware from reports of my speech in Cape Town on 3rd February, I have already expressed my views at length on some of the matters you raise in your letter ".

Letters in similar terms were sent to the representatives of other Parties, not represented in the Union Parliament, which had asked him to receive deputations.

On 3rd February, Mr. Macmillan had seen the leaders of the United Party and the Progressive Party. Records of these two discussions are included in this print. He had also taken the opportunity, at the High Commissioner's garden party on 2nd February, to have talks with Mrs. Ballinger who sits in the Union Parliament as the " Native " representative, Mr. Patrick Duncan, the Editor of Contact and a well-known Liberal, and the Most Rev. Joost de Blank, Archbishop of Cape Town.

Finally, on 5th February, he had a brief formal meeting with members of the Government-appointed Cape Coloured Board. A record of that meeting is also included in this print.

Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting

In their private discussion on 4th February, Dr. Verwoerd asked Mr. Macmillan to advise him whether he should raise, on a hypothetical basis, at the May meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, the question whether South Africa could remain within the Commonwealth if she became a republic. Mr. Macmillan decided, on reflection, that it would be easier to give advice on this point orally than to deal with it by telegram after he left the Union. He therefore spoke to Dr. Verwoerd about it in a further private conversation which he had with him on the morning of 5th February. In this talk he took the line that, as a matter of procedure, it would be in accordance with precedent that this question should be raised with the other Commonwealth Prime Ministers at a meeting, on a hypothetical basis, before the constitutional change had been introduced in the Union. And he put this as a special reason why Dr. Verwoerd should attend the May meeting.

At the end of their talk Dr. Verwoerd said that he would be grateful if he could have this advice in writing. After the civic luncheon on 5th February, immediately before he left Groote Schuur, Mr. Macmillan handed to Dr. Verwoerd a letter marked " private and confidential" in the following terms:

"I promised to try to put into writing what I said to you this morning about the procedural questions relating to the Union's remaining within the Commonwealth if it becomes a republic.

All other countries which have remained within the Commonwealth as republics have asked, before taking the formal step of constituting a republic, whether the other members would be content that they should remain thereafter in the Commonwealth. If therefore it is likely that the Union will become a republic within, say, the next two years, it would be in accordance with precedent if the matter were raised at the May meeting on a hypothetical basis. I realise that in your case there is in a sense a double hypothesis, first that the country will vote for a republic and secondly that having become a republic it will desire to remain in the Commonwealth. Nevertheless there would be advantage in raising the matter in May, when it can be done orally rather than leaving it to be settled by correspondence at a later date.

I venture to repeat that this is an additional reason why I hope that you will be able to come in person. But in any event this will be an important meeting, (a) politically, because it will immediately precede the Summit meeting; and (b) constitutionally, because it will decide whether Ghana should remain in the Commonwealth after becoming a republic and whether Nigeria should be admitted to full Commonwealth membership on attaining independence.

Moreover, as I told you, I would feel it would be a great advantage if at such a meeting you and I and, say, Menzies and Diefenbaker and Nash could have informal talks together about all these problems. I am sure we will all gain.

I shall be glad if you will regard this as a private and confidential letter.

It would be a great inconvenience if what I have said were made known in any way, either directly or indirectly."

Source: UK National Archives

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