The composition of the long-awaited Government of National Unity (GNU) is at last known. Much will still be written about its composition, the balance between the various parties and which parties benefited more from having this or that position. In the light of the roller coaster of the past weeks, ordinary South Africans are asking themselves: how will it ever succeed and will it be sustainable?

To offer an answer, it is necessary again to note the work of the Harvard professor Roger Fisher in the 1970’s and later. He was involved in the negotiations of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel at Camp David in 1978. Millions of copies of his book “Getting to Yes” have been sold around the world. He visited South Africa before the start of the 1991 negotiations and he and his team gave a short course to most of the bigger parties in negotiations strategy. It had a considerable impact on the success of the process.

Today the question is: How will the GNU work in practice? How will the participating parties arrive at agreements – at leadership level, at cabinet level? Between ministers and deputy ministers and directors-general within the same portfolio, but from different parties, and in parliamentary portfolio committees? The answer is that they will have to negotiate – on many issues, but especially on those that they differ on.

Ordinary people negotiate all the time: with my spouse, my parents, my children, my employer and my employees. Often, we tend to lapse into mere bargaining, which is not the most effective way to reach a sustainable agreement. Sometimes we think the best way to negotiate is to pull a “fast one” the other person, but that is never sustainable and worsens the situation. And often we think that merely having a strong view is a good negotiation strategy.

Fisher proposed a different approach, calling it “principled negotiation”. He summarised it in seven elements.

The first of these is to separate the people from the problem, by building good relations. The first Fisher lesson to the new executive is therefore to get to know each other as human beings – outside of politics. The cabinet lekgotla envisaged by the Declaration of Intent is probably a good start, especially during the social interaction after hours. But this is not only important in the bigger group, but also between a minister, a deputy minister and a director-general. And it is as important amongst the multi-party members of portfolio committees.

The second element is to focus on interests and not positions. A party’s position often masks what that party’s actual interest is in holding that position. If one can identify the interests behind the positions, you may find that those interests are very similar to your own party’s. For instance, the number one priority for ordinary South Africans is to have a meaningful income – this should clearly be in the interest of all political parties.

The ANC’s (ideological) position has been that this can only (or largely) be achieved by racial transformation of large companies, black economic empowerment and affirmative action. The DA’s position has been that this can only be achieved if the country can attract more foreign direct investment and by growing the economy. The positions differ, but the interest is the same. If this can be embraced, a compromise is possible.

That brings us to the third element, namely to seek and invite options for mutual gain. Mutual gain must be foremost in the mind of all GNU members, because their political future depends on it. If the GNU failed, all partners would be penalised at the polls in 2026 and 2029. The other aspect of this element is to seek and invent new solutions – “out of the box”. The greater diversity of the new cabinet can contribute to that. It is time for new solutions to old problems.

Fourthly, Fisher pointed out the importance to use objective criteria for sustainable agreements. In the constitutional negotiations of the nineties, the government and National Party proposed that a 75% majority should be necessary to change the Constitution. The ANC on the other hand, wanted 50% plus 1.

When it became clear that the international (objective) best practice is 66.6%, both sides accepted it (although 75% was maintained for changing chapter 1 of the Constitution). Obviously, it is not always easy to define what “objective” is. A case in point is that in the negotiations of cabinet positions, the ANC and the DA differed on what “proportionality” meant – and this almost sunk the process.

The above may create the perception that negotiations will always be successful and agreements will always be reached. Fisher sounded a realistic warning that parties to negotiations must consider before engaging what their best alternative to a negotiated agreement (BATNA) is. They must therefore identify under which circumstances they will withdraw from negotiations.

Secondly, they must know what they will do when negotiations reach a deadlock. In the case of the present GNU there are stipulations on how decisions will be taken in cabinet, namely by consensus. If consensus cannot be reached, the main fall-back position is that a decision will be deemed to have sufficient consensus if parties representing 60% support in the national assembly agree. For all practical purposes this means that if the ANC and the DA agree, there will be sufficient consensus.

The sixth element is that parties must ensure that if they do reach agreements, those must be well formulated and executable – and not consist of empty word and clichés. In this regard Fisher championed the “one-page proposal”. This means that a party (or if relevant an intermediary) should formulate a proposal on one page and present it to the other party, with the request that they consider it and indicate in writing what changes they would like to be made, in order for them to accept it. The changed proposal then goes back to the first party, who considers it and make further changes (if necessary). This process of to and fro continues until a well formulated and executable agreement on one page is reached.

The seventh and last element is that negotiating partners must, while negotiations are taking place and after agreements have been reached, communicate in a constructive manner to their constituencies what was meant and achieved. This means that it is not optimal (to say the least) to negotiate in public, to spread rumours or to leak correspondence and documents of your political opponents. The country has seen to much of that during recent weeks, especially from the ruling party. If future negotiations and resolving of differences between members of the GNU are to be successful, this will have to cease.

Fisher therefore proposed a negotiations strategy that is based on mutual trust, that focuses on interests and not positions, that actively seeks and invents new options for mutual gain. Agreements should be based on objective criteria, and must be well formulated and executable. Constructive communication to constituencies is always important, but parties should also consider what their BATNA is.

One of Fisher’s well-known concepts was that to negotiate effectively, one must “change the game”. This is especially true for South Africa’s present GNU. The voters spoke loudly and clearly. President Cyril Matamela Ramaphosa and his multi-party executive must literally and figuratively change the political game – in the interest of all South Africans.

Theuns Eloff is an independent commentator.

This article first appeared on Netwerk24. 

This article was first published on Netwerk24.