Testing times for democracy in South Africa: Assessing the results of a July 2008 MarkData political opinion survey

Background thoughts on democracy

Most South Africans can, or should, agree that the country's still relatively new democracy is a vast improvement on apartheid. They should not, however, deceive themselves into thinking that because South Africa at long last has "majority rule", that it is firmly on the road to the kind of democracies that have proved or are proving their worth as regards average quality of life and peace in the developed world, India, and more recently, large parts of Latin America. Our democracy it not yet working as it should to spur effective governance and the integration of a deeply divided society. Giovanni Sartori, the internationally respected constitutional expert and Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities at Columbia University gives a reason that should be obvious: "In any and all democracy, the majority principle... has to be affirmed as follow: ... the will of the majority is entitled to prevail within the limits of the respect for minority rights. ... majoritarianism is always limited or constrained ... otherwise it is democracy itself that self-destructs".¹

Democracy, as it is universally understood, inevitably involves the determination of what may be loosely described as "majority choice" of political leadership in regular elections. There are significant variations in the criteria applicable to majorities in different systems but in some shape or form all democratic political systems involve the counting of preferences. There must be "winners" of some kind for democracy to be as "representative" as possible.

This essential concept of popular choice, of "winners", however, does not necessarily mean that there have to be stark "losers". In fact where a formally democratic system robs the losers of all or most leverage and rights, it negates itself as a democracy. Democracy as understood does not entitle popular winners to become elected dictators. Similarly, losers should not be losers in all spheres of power or in perpetuity. Permanent or comprehensive losers will tend to lose faith and interest in the political system and if they cannot emigrate, they often resort to violence or extra legal means to protect their interests.

Therefore democracy cannot simply be a numerical popularity contest. Democracy is assumed to be "... responsive to all its citizens" ², which rules out or makes problematic any permanent majority. Donald Horowitz of Yale University points out that "Democracy is defined as a "system of rule by ‘temporary majorities' ... permanent exclusion of minorities is a disqualifying condition"³. He elaborates by saying that if an electoral majority or minority is significantly defined by racial or ethnic voting patterns, then the outcome is "ascriptive", not essentially representative. "There are two kinds of majority rule. Democratic theory demands that they be distinguished from each other. Ascriptive majority rule, with few if any floating voters, is one kind ... tantamount to a census, and it locks out the minority from any significant political power"⁴.

In evolved practice, therefore, most broadly effective and peaceful democracies in the world avoid perpetual alienation of minorities through a variety of processes. These range from constitutional or legislative protection of individual or minority interests, special voting formulae that counterbalance the power of majority choices, the decentralisation of power in federal arrangements, the break up of consolidated interests by increasing social complexity and socio - economic development or even by established political conventions and values that encourage respect for dissent and the accommodation of minority views.

As Horowitz notes, however, among the most effective balancing mechanisms in healthy democracy is competitive opposition that can hold government to account and challenge for power. Where this feature exists minority interests are unlikely to feel permanently excluded from effective participation. Unstable democracies on the other hand can often be those in which a religious, racial, or socio-economic class majority renders minorities to be akin to second-class citizens for long periods of time.

Democracy, therefore, is much more than periodic elections and parliamentary processes and rituals. The quality and inclusiveness of the system is at least as important. There are many so-called "democracies" in the world today that fail almost all the tests of democratic responsiveness except holding periodic elections, one tragic example of which is located on our northern border. Carl Gershman, Director of the US National Endowment for Democracy has described a "cynical form of ‘virtual democracy'"⁵ in which electoral formalities and parliamentary institutions provide false legitimacy to power hungry, dictatorial, inept or sectional regimes that perfect the art of manipulating voters and electoral outcomes in their favour. In all these phoney democracies, effective opposition is subtly or brutally sidelined.

The quality of democracy in South Africa: questions arising

South Africa today is a mixed case. One the one hand there is massive imbalance in the socio-economic, ethnic and racial composition of the voting population and opposition has been and still is numerically weak. At the moment the political system is a form of "one-party domination". The ANC, broadly representing a racial majority of black citizens, has increased its share of the vote in every successive election since the launching of the new democracy in 1994, to the point that many constitutional provisions can be changed or overruled by a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The degree of decentralisation of power is also weak and the ruling party, the ANC, from time to time proudly defines itself as a "centralist democracy" (one of the few remaining parties in the world to use this outmoded concept). On the other hand, however, minorities have not (yet) been seriously victimised, they enjoy considerable constitutional and institutional protection and they have shared the benefits of improved economic growth over the past decade.

But this constitutional protection is absolute only until the interests of minorities bump up against special constitutional provisions and what has become a national norm that qualify individual rights to allow for the eradication or compensation of the effects of apartheid in the past. Then individual rights and hence various minority interests can be overruled or least have to be weighed against the principle of restitution. In recent times there have been notable examples of the government moving to challenge or dilute constitutional principles, particularly in respect of property rights and media freedom.

What is the danger of entrenched major party domination to become further consolidated and entrenched in the coming 2009 elections? Conversely, what are the prospects for opposition growth to counterbalance the strength of the dominant party?

"Voters ditch ANC". This leading headline in the Sunday Times of July 20 is part of a rash of current speculation in political circles over the prospects of significant ANC losses in the 2009 elections. The logical grounds for these fears, or hopes, are obvious.

The new leader of the party is facing serious corruption charges after previously being unsuccessfully charged with sexual misdemeanour. The super-dominant ruling party has for some time been almost splintered by internal dissent and is now in the throes of a difficult and controversial re-consolidation. The government's reputation for service provision and growth policy is highly contradictory. Expectations have been raised by its notable successes but there is spreading criticism of current government performance.

On the one hand there has been a significant expansion of basic service provision and grant-based welfare support to poorer communities. As already said the country has enjoyed an extended cycle of above average growth, macro-economic management of the economy has been competent, infrastructure development has proceeded and commodity exports and inflows of equity capital have been healthy.

On the other hand, the successes contrast with relative failures of key policies in education and training, crime control, public housing, manufacturing and business development, job creation, local government, public health, unrecorded immigration control, land reform, poverty alleviation and most recently, electricity and energy provision. Many of these failures are openly acknowledged in government itself. Discontent among the poorest 30%-40% of the population is rife and just recently has found outlet in murderous violence against foreigners. Income inequality has widened dramatically. Every day the news is peppered with accounts of corruption in both the public and private sectors, and large sections of both local and provincial government are manifestly dysfunctional.

One of the aspects of government performance that is highly controversial is the fact that despite a crippling shortage of skills in the economy generally, large vacancy rates in the public service and serious losses of white, Indian and now also coloured skills through emigration, the government has continued until very recently to intensify its insistence on racially preferential policies of "employment equity" and black economic empowerment in business ownership and senior appointments. Needless to say attempts by the government to extend its powers to expropriate land and property, without necessarily offering market-related compensation are equally controversial, especially when South Africa, like many other emerging economies, enjoys rather brittle economic confidence. In other words there are discomforting signs of the arrogance of power.

All these effects and stresses are currently being magnified by rising inflation and a sharp economic slowdown after years of rapid growth in lower to upper middle class incomes and spending. To many observers it would be well nigh inexplicable if the ruling party were to retain its overwhelming current majority of well over two thirds in the coming elections. If South Africa's democracy is functioning as effectively as it should be, then the ANC, while not losing its majority, should suffer a significant electoral setback

All this notwithstanding, the speculation that the ANC will suffer sharp losses may be hopelessly premature. As argued above, the expectation that all formal democracies hold governments accountable for their performance and punish their failures is idealistic or naïve. Is this the case in South Africa?

Insights from recent empirical research

Some insights relevant to the questions raised above are provided by a July 2008 political survey on voter reactions to current issues.⁶ Findings of this survey are compared with results of comparable earlier surveys by the same MarkData survey team, the results of which were very close to the 2004 general election outcome (see footnote 6 for details of the methodology).

Firstly, what may be expected to happen to shares of the vote and the ANC's massive existing majority in the 2009 election? Estimated outcomes are provided in table 1 overleaf.

What these findings suggest is that, all else being equal, the ANC may well lose up to 8% of the majority it would have had in a 2007 election. Nonetheless, it is likely to retain its unassailable position as a dominant party. It will probably still be comfortably clear of a two-thirds majority.

The DA is the only opposition party that is likely to make significant gains, and stands a fighting chance of winning the Western Cape and possibly the Northern Cape as well. The ANC, however, can still count on an easy national victory and control of the other seven provinces. The modest relative loss of support for the ANC is less than might have been expected in the light of an increase in general voter dissatisfaction with government performance. The 2008 opinion survey yielded the following results on voter satisfaction compared with responses to an identical question in the 2004 survey: see table 2

What may be seen in table 2 is that the levels of overall dissatisfaction with government performance have increased since 2004 by the following proportions:

Dissatisfaction with government performance 2004-2008

• Black voters: Up 31%
• Coloured voters: Up 4%
• Indian voters: Up 21%
• White Afrikaans voters: Up 9%
• White English-speaking voters: Up 23%
• All voters: Up 26%

Given that the increase in voter dissatisfaction is greatest among black voters, who make up 93%- 94% of the support base of the ANC, the estimated decline in support for the ANC appears to be very modest indeed. Clearly factors other than perceived government performance play a significant role in stabilising and maintaining the massive support that the ANC enjoys, particularly among black voters. What are these other factors, and to what extent do they reflect weaknesses in the way South Africa's democracy functions?

Is the entrenched majority racially based - a periodic ethnic census?

Simplistic explanations for the apparently entrenched majority of the ANC abound, but one persuasive argument is that voting is racial - that the ANC as the premier black party enjoys entrenched racially based loyalty among the population majority - a loyalty reinforced by memories of the racial exclusiveness of the previous apartheid regime. This certainly appears to be the most obvious answer. Survey results, however, add depth and nuance to what is often assumed to be a simple matter of racial arithmetic.

On the one hand, the presence of racial or racially focused voter motivations are quite easily established in attitude questions. The results below are given for black voters only simply because the majority at issue happens to be black.

In the 2004 survey, for example, the following results were obtained, with the attitude questions used given in italics:

Black voter attitudes on voting: Agreement levels vs. disagreement:

• "The present government policy of Affirmative Action and Black Empowerment is absolutely essential or very necessary": Agreement: 82%
• " Present government policy of transformation to get rid of all effects of apartheid is absolutely essential or very necessary": Agreement: 78%
• "Present government policies to compensate victims of apartheid are absolutely essential or very necessary": agreement: 71%
• "I will never be able to support a political party that was supported by white people before 1994": strong or partial agreement: 51%
• " People of my race and culture should preferably all support the same political party: strong or partial agreement: 51%
• " I would find it difficult to support a party with leaders not of my own group" strong and partial agreement: 47%

It seems manifestly evident that racial or racially structured underpinnings of black voter motivation are pervasive, and that they are not remotely likely to have changed significantly since 2004. At the same time, however, it is also evident in the results just above that as the items move from addressing the consequences of apartheid, which are inescapably racial by definition, to more general or intrinsic racial motivations, the proportions fall from between 70% to 80% to around 50% -- significant reductions but very large proportions nonetheless.

When, however, very direct questions were posed in the 2008 survey on race as a motivating issue in comparison with other motivations, a very different picture emerges, as can be seen in the following results:

• " What kind of political party would you most like to vote for?" Out of six options giving possible features of political parties, the following proportions chose:

• "A party representing people pf my race group": 4%

• "A party representing people of my language and culture": 3%

Notwithstanding the endorsement of affirmative action above, when asked whether or not government should appoint " the most able people on merit irrespective of race", the proportion of blacks firmly endorsing non-racial merit appointments was no less than 83%.

When in later questions on a hypothetical coalition of parties that the black respondents would support or approve of, a question on candidate selection was posed with various options, the responses were as follows:

• "The majority should not be white": 10%

• " Broad quotas of different groups": 33%
• " Majority should be people best knowledge and experience irrespective of race": 53%
• Not sure: 4%

Hence when responding to their status as victims of apartheid, the black respondents are more or less trapped into adopting postures of racial entitlement. When it comes to choices between expertise and race, however, the emphasis on race falls away among rank-and-file voters. Other research has also shown that enthusiasm for black entitlement over merit in any general context is rather weak among ordinary black voters. The picture among ambitious small elites may well be different⁷.

It would seem then that if the entrenched majority of the ANC is a racial phenomenon it is only so to the extent that the party, by virtue of being seen as the liberation party for blacks, cannot escape a racial identity. In a less historically charged context, however, rank-and-file black voters seem to be non-racial in their values.

These results show that the racial factor in voting remains very important in the sense that it is structured into the perceived role and agenda of a party that presents itself as the vehicle of black liberation. Whether they like it or not, most black voters are trapped in a racially structured definition of their situation as far as party politics are concerned. At the same time, however, the results also show that between some 20% of black voters or more are not so intensively motivated by racial or racially structured interests that they cannot consider alternatives to the ANC. Racial or racist motivations to exclude non-blacks from opportunity are remarkably absent.

Is it political culture?

Seldom is a single factor the cause of complex social or political behaviour and one has to consider other factors. One of the assumptions that are frequently made is that in new democracies, political culture and values are less likely to be in tune with the implications of democratic institutions than they are in the case of long-established democracies.

The survey evidence here again offers some insights. The following are a few relevant responses patterns:

• Unconditional party loyalty: In the 2004 investigation 50% of black voters agreed with the statement: "I will support my political party and its leaders even if I am unhappy with its policies and actions" In a 2007 MarkData survey undertaken for other purposes, the same statement was fielded and the responses were virtually identical. Even in the province with the most sophisticated voters, Gauteng, 38% endorsed the statement.
• Anxiety over political dissent: In the 2004 study 44% of black voters agreed with the statement: "One must be careful about criticising government (versus everyone is free to criticise government if they wish)". (It must be noted however that the population minorities were equally wary of criticising government, white English -speakers least of all, namely 37%)
• Community pressure for political conformity: In the 2004 study, in response to the question "How easy or difficult is it for you to have political opinions different to those of the people around you?" some 34% of black voters said it was difficult or impossible. Surprisingly in the 2008 study this proportion had risen to 45%, a significant increase.
• Also on community pressure, in the 2004 study rather fewer black voters but fairly substantial proportions nonetheless agreed with the following statements: "People in my community who do not support the most popular political party feel frightened or worried (23%), and " I feel pressure to vote for a party that I do not actually support" (21%).

One aspect of political culture among party supporters is the extent to which they have underlying trust in the party of their choice and give it the benefit of the doubt in respect of failures in performance. An indicator of such political trust is seen in the responses to the following item in the 2008 survey:

• "Some people say that despite problems, the present government tries its best to improve the lives of people like myself". The proportions of voters that agreed strongly or partly with the statement were as follows:
• Blacks 67%
• Coloureds 53%
• Indians 42%
• White Afrikaans 20%
• White English 24%

Black voters seem clearly more inclined than other voters to assume the sincerity of the dominant party. Roughly half or more of the minority voters have less trust in the sincerity of the ANC.

Attitudes to opposition

Perhaps the most obvious and direct test of respect for democratic principles lies in attitudes to opposition as an institution, without which the accountability of a majority party is fundamentally weakened primarily because it need not fear that its supporters will be enticed away by competing opposition parties. As the well-known political analyst and director of the Centre for the Study of Democracy, Steven Friedman has correctly observed, " If there is a swing away from the ANC at the polls, accountable government would receive its strongest boost yet ... nothing makes politicians listen to people better than a shock at the polls"⁸.

In the 2008 and the 2004 studies an item was fielded on the type of opposition that voters preferred. This was followed by the response alternatives in table 3 below, with the 2008 and 2004 responses for comparison:

Quite remarkably, the support for a critical and vigilant opposition has fallen since the 2004 survey results, and this over the very period when dissatisfaction with government performance has risen. The level of support for a critical opposition among voters in minority groups is significantly higher. In the 2008 survey, as opposed to the 35% among black voters, the proportions endorsing a strongly critical opposition were as follows: Indians 64%, coloured voters 48%, white Afrikaans voters 57%, white English-speaking voters 80%.

It is necessary to emphasise once again that the same sample design and field teams were used in the 2008, 2007 and 2004 studies. In part, the drop in black approval of a critical opposition could have occurred because a more popular party leader in the person of Jacob Zuma has replaced a relatively less popular Mr. Thabo Mbeki. It might also have occurred because since 2004, the issuing of welfare grants of various kinds has increased significantly. There must be other reasons as well, but whatever the reason might be, the comparison over time reflects a rather unstable attitude to a very basic and arguably the most important democratic institution.

Another item in the 2008 study also reflects a surprising lack of enthusiasm among not only black voters but among all voters for the principle of opposition - see table 4.

Only the white English-speakers give opposition the acknowledgement that is remotely appropriate. Black voters are not alone in their wishful thinking about the sincerity of politicians, but they are the category of voters that attach most credence to the promises of political parties anxious to maximise their electoral support - the very promises that so many of them feel have not been kept.

Variations in underlying attitudes among ANC voters and what they indicate

All items in the 2008 survey were inter-correlated to identify associations in the data. Among ANC voters of all races the following associations were identified:

• Dissatisfaction with government performance is associated with:
• Both the 18-24 year age group and the 45-54 year age group
• Mildly with Xhosa and Eastern Cape identity and residence
• Strongly with Zulu and KwaZulu-Natal identity and residence
• Rural-traditional, shack and farming areas
• Poverty
• Strongly with unemployment
• Low education
• Dependence on government pensions
• Support for greater knowledge, expertise and experience in government among political candidates is associated with:
• Unemployment
• Informal sector employment
• Rural-traditional and farming areas
• KwaZulu-Natal and Limpopo residence
• Zulu, Tsonga and Tswana identity
• Catholicism and slightly with Pentecostalism and African Independent Church adherence
• Middle levels of school education
• Principled support for a strong and critical opposition is associated with:
• Middle levels of education, not post-school education
• Newspaper readership
• Unemployment
• Middle occupational levels
• Zulu/Swazi identity
• KwaZulu, Mpumulanga and Gauteng residence
• Urban township residence
• Catholic and African Independent Church adherence
• In addition, endorsement of strong and critical opposition is associated with the following attitudinal tendencies:
• Dissatisfaction with government performance
• The belief that government does not try its best to improve lives
• A belief that the country is headed in the wrong direction
• A fairly strong desire for more knowledge and experience in government
• The need to combat growing income inequality
• Somewhat less emphasis on "transformation" and more on investment, job creation and anti-corruption measures
• The endorsement or approval of a coalition of opposition parties, partly to strengthen opposition, including the DA, the ID, the UDM and the PAC
• Support for candidates that will work hard to improve lives of people
• However, only qualified support for a code of conduct for candidates (often popular candidates are exempted)
• Support for a leader that exudes sympathy and caring rather than charisma or brilliance
• Rather negative attitudes towards President Mbeki but no particular tendency with respect to other political leaders

Summing up

Levels of dissatisfaction with government performance both within the ANC and among the electorate at large have increased significantly over the past two years or more. Hence while there is strong possibility that black support for the ANC in the 2009 election will be reduced, it is unlikely to fall very significantly, and the ANC will still be the clearly dominant party.

The first reason is that, while intense, dissatisfaction with government performance embraces less than 40% of ANC supporters. Hence a majority of the government's support base is still reasonably complacent and therefore secure.

Second, a great deal of the dissatisfaction with government performance seems to be concentrated among poor and non-urban Zulu-speaking ANC supporters, and the ascendancy of Mr. Jacob Zuma, himself a culturally embedded Zulu-speaker, will assuage some of this dissatisfaction, at least until beyond the 2009 election. If as a result of the Mr. Zuma's corruption trial he is not elected to take over the Presidency, part of the Zulu-speaking support base of the ANC might well be alienated but it is too soon to tell.

Third, for reasons set out in the review of the survey findings, a very large proportion of the ANC's black support base, whether satisfied with government performance or not, is strongly bonded to the ANC. While this is not mainly due to any intrinsic racially based affinity (ordinary black voters are remarkably non-racial in outlook) it might as well be that, because over and above its performance in government or lack of it, the ANC is still seen as the vehicle or agency of racial transformation in South Africa. Hence it gets most of the credit for the enhanced status of black people today. Bluntly put, the ANC still benefits hugely from its aura as the liberation party. Liberals both here and abroad may well be justified in feeling that their role in the anti-apartheid struggle is overlooked, but the ANC's promotion of this image has been so muscular that it has successfully claimed ownership of "liberation". Normally this image would have begun to dim by now but it is reinforced by the new school history syllabus and by constantly recurring celebrations of this role on various public holidays and at funerals of deceased struggle heroes. The ANC's constantly repeated underlying message to black people in South Africa is "you owe us!"

This is very similar to the situation of the National Party after 1948, which was able to claim ownership of a "new" South Africa stripped of its British imperial character and anti-Afrikaans cultural bias.

The fourth reason is the absence of a large independent black middle class. As Horowitz points out in the introduction, it is the better-educated new middle class that begins to break with identity-based allegiance to political parties to vote on the basis of economic and occupational interests. There is, however, little evidence for this in the findings reviewed among black ANC supporters. This is because the new black middle class is largely a state-dependent class. Most of its members either work for government or owe their rapid rise in the private sector to official policies of affirmative action and black empowerment. Hence identity and interests still coincide.

Readers will recall that it is a less well-educated lower middle and service class among which the greatest acknowledgement of the importance of opposition is to be found. These people may well be ready to leave the ANC but their political preferences are not yet sufficiently crystallised for them to pick a new party to champion their interests. Many of the disaffected ANC supporters therefore, would love to have honest and hard-working opposition politicians join the ANC, but to support them as opposition is a bridge too far at this point. A long hard road of mobilisation awaits the opposition parties.

Lastly, notwithstanding a plethora of specific grievances among disaffected ANC supporters, they still have sufficient trust in the ANC to feel that the party "tries its best" to meet their needs. This leads its supporters to value the promises made by political leaders - they believe them or want to believe them despite perceived failures by government to honour election commitments. A significant amount of community pressure for political conformity also encourages unconditional support for the ANC.

The ANC, therefore, is very substantially insulated from competition from opposition parties. Debate and dissent within the dominant ANC will continue to more than rival the democratically more appropriate competition between parties as a basis for accountability. Put bluntly, democratic multi-party contestation will for some time be eclipsed by the excitement of high stakes factional rivalry within the dominant ANC. Whatever the levels of dissatisfaction among ANC supporters, shifts of black support to opposition parties will be a process of slow accretion rather than any marked "swing" by a floating vote.

One is forced, therefore, to be rather pessimistic about the current capacity of South Africa's much vaunted new democracy to deliver more accountable government and to harness the best political talents and resources from all segments of the population.

The future

One source of cautious optimism, however, is that the process of slow accretion of black support has started. For example, the survey results show that admiration for the leader of the largest opposition party, the DA, has grown slowly but steadily.

In 2004, 9% of African voters and 15% of all voters "admired" the major opposition leader [then Tony Leon], and by 2008 these percentages shifted up to 14% and 26%. If 26% of the whole electorate admires the leader of the opposition today [Helen Zille] it indicates a base of sympathy that is larger than that of any opposition leader since Mr. FW de Klerk for a short period just after 1994.

In terms of numbers of voters by population group, it means that of every 100 political admirers of the DA leader:

• 40 are Africans
• 16 are coloured
• 5 are Indians
• 26 are white Afrikaans speakers
• 13 are white English speakers

This profile is of course due to the very large absolute size of the black population, which means that even a small proportion of black voters can constitute a significant gain for an opposition party.

Although government activists will reject the idea that an opposition party can be more inclusive than their own party, the DA today, in terms of its support base, is probably the most multi-racial party that South Africa has ever known. The party leader has a more racially diverse base of admirers than that of any other party leader.

The accretion of black support for opposition can be accelerated. The survey results reviewed isolate issues that are particularly important to current ANC supporters that see the value of opposition. These issues, in particular, are combating unemployment, and corruption and the need for greater efficiency and expertise in government, on merit and irrespective of race. In their approach to black voters, opposition parties should almost single-mindedly prioritise these goals (especially unemployment) and promote attention-grabbing strategies for their attainment.

Voters of all persuasions also find the idea of political cooperation and coalitions between opposition parties very appealing. In the 2008 opinion survey, for example, no fewer than 37%-38% of ANC supporters said that they would at least seriously consider voting for a broadly based coalition of opposition parties. Although many of these people will in the end revert to supporting the ANC, if opposition parties are able to cooperate it will attract some support, and their collective leverage will undoubtedly be strengthened.

On the basis of its history, its stated priorities and its affinity with the aspirations of masses of people, the ANC deserves the electoral majorities it achieves. Democracy, however, definitely does not need such overwhelming majorities and the ANC itself is being damaged by its surfeit of electoral power. The slow stream of black support into opposition party ranks can be strengthened. With no offence to the ANC, such accretion will do much to improve the quality and accountability of South African democracy.

This article by Lawrence Schlemmer, Executive Director of MarkData, first appeared on http://www.markdata.co.za/

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