The Polokwane revolution and its aftermath has been one of those political events which, as the saying goes, "changed everything, except the way we think." Initially, the defeated elite, including President Thabo Mbeki, seemed to continue on autopilot - as if the loss of real power would in no way interrupt the completion of their term of office.
Meanwhile, one of the main lessons drawn by the victorious faction from the Mbeki-era was that they could act as they saw fit, and need not fear any internal repercussions or electoral consequences. Hence, moral and political capital was squandered on setting about dissolving the Scorpions and trying to prevent the Jacob Zuma case coming to trial. The efforts to repair internal party unity were also desultory.
The immediate question thrown up by the breakaway party being led by Terror Lekota and Mbhazima Shilowa is whether it is going to catalyse a fundamental change in our politics. Have the splitters embarked upon an enterprise where much effort will have little effect - like trying to empty a bathtub by removing water with a teaspoon? Or is the breakaway going to pull the plug on the ANC's electoral dominance?
Shilowa has recently been talking up the prospects of the new party. He told the Sunday Independent that "We will fare very nicely in next year's polls." He pointed to the Western Cape where the new movement enjoyed the support of most branches in the Dullar Omar region, and to a similar situation in Amathole in the Eastern Cape.
On the other side Jacob Zuma's public statements do not betray much concern. In a speech in Washington DC this week the ANC President predicted that, despite the split, "the ANC will govern South Africa for many decades to come. That is because no other organisation has put forward policies that convincingly counter those of our movement." Many commentators too seem to think that the certainties born of the experience of fifteen years of ANC rule will continue to apply. The belief that present trends will tend to continue means, as George Orwell noted, "Whoever is winning at the moment will always seem to be invincible."
The question of whether the split constitutes a fundamental change can only (partially) be answered by understanding something of the system that has prevailed up until now. Although post-apartheid South African politics was very different to that which applied in the Western democracies it was not dissimilar to the politics of the ‘new nations' that emerged after the end of the age of empire.
The American political scientist, Lucian Pye, noted that in such systems the communal (or group based) nature of political support means that ideas or policies struggle to command influence in themselves. This is something which also "sharply limits freedom in altering political allegiances."
Because people vote out of a sense of identification with the group, rather than for particular policies, "So long as the leaders appear to be working in the interests of the group as a whole, they usually do not have to be concerned that the loyalties of the members will be tested by current decisions... [For as] long as harmonious relations exist within the group, it is generally possible for the leaders to make drastic changes in strategy."
In the 2004 election the ANC was able to increase its share of the vote despite Mbeki's idiosyncratic views on AIDS, growing evidence of corruption in the arms deal, and his marginalisation of popular party leaders. The ANC only announced its candidates for Premier, in the provincial elections, after the electorate had voted. In order to win an increased majority the party did have to show its concern "for the group as a whole" by belatedly agreeing to a roll-out of anti-retroviral drugs for AIDS sufferers and massively expanding child-support grants.
Quite clearly the ANC breakaway is the materialisation of a complete breakdown of "harmonious relations" within the group. A large section of the old leadership no longer identifies with the new ANC - and the outstanding question is to what degree this attitude will be shared by party activists and supporters. Has ANC dominance then been dependent upon the maintenance of internal party unity? It is perhaps significant that while the Mbeki-ites vilified, smeared, and marginalised their opponents within the movement they always drew back from pushing them into outright opposition.
Assuming that politics in South Africa has indeed changed, it is those actors who first recognise and grasp its nature who will be best able to exploit the resultant opportunities and avoid any new dangers. In a more competitive - and less communally based - electoral environment the ANC is going to have to pay more attention to the popularity of its leaders, and external perceptions of its policies and actions. This is unless it decides to try and shore up its position through undemocratic means or racial populism.
Through the first decade of ANC dominance the leadership could behave largely as it wanted, and it could get away with it. In a more responsive democracy the margin for error is going to be much narrower. For instance, the ANC is going to have to learn that whatever ones personal feelings may be, publicly insulting and vilifying defectors is generally counter-productive in a democratic context.
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