Critics of the "new" ANC come in three flavours. There are those who view it as fundamentally racist, absolutist, corrupt and power-hungry. Those who offer a more benign assessment of the way it is implementing its "liberation theology". And those who like to have it both ways.

Anthony Butler, professor of political science at Witwatersrand University, is in the third category. Writing in Business Day, he tells us - and presumably his students too - that "Critics sometimes argue that political uncertainty has been created by a new fluidity in ANC politics" (see article).

Jacob Zuma "is supposedly pulled this way and that by members of the unruly Polokwane coalition that elected him...collisions of complex and unfathomable forces leave us with no real basis for prediction Such ideas have resulted in refreshingly exciting political reportage. It is questionable, however, whether institutional and political realities have changed much."

The "new fluidity" at Polokwane in December 2007 was "refreshingly exciting." For those at the receiving end, as well as those who created it? For those who suffered the trauma of defeat? For the 40 percent who supported the loser, Thabo Mbeki? "Refreshingly exciting" are not sensitive words.

The most important of the "institutional and political realities" that Butler seems to have overlooked is that Jacob Zuma is now the ANC's and South Africa's president - and Thabo Mbeki is not. And other events followed, like the appointment of Zuma's first cabinet, the hysteria it evoked among the Left, the changes Zuma had to make (real or tactical), the attempted crucifixion of Trevor Manuel, etc.?

Butler says Zuma "supposedly" was pulled "this way and that". There was nothing "supposed" about the way Cosatu secretary general Zwelinzima Vavi brushed Zuma aside as no "messiah," making it plain that he did not speak for the ANC?

Butler advises readers to "adjust to the diversity of voices that is necessary in a democratic society". How do they do this when Zuma's two principal backers, the ANCYL and SACP, are trading blows with each other?

Does the ANCYL now support those who think the SACP is making a take-over bid for the ANC leadership, and that it should be cut off at the knees? Is the SACP, with its small membership, still needed now that Zuma is installed as president? Do loyal "ANC" members (whatever that means today) take sides, or look the other way? How do they "adjust to diversity"?

Also, by diversity of voices, Butler cannot avoid including the stinging exchange between the ANCYL, led by Julius Malema, and the SACP's deputy general secretary, Jeremy Cronin. Malema calls Cronin no "white messiah", the SACP retorts that Malema is "racist", and the ANCYL counter-responds by labelling Cronin as "reactionary."

Meanwhile, Malema practices ethnic cleansing (in the name of "diversity") by putting the "minorities" (whites, coloureds, Indians) in Zuma's first cabinet in their place. They are on notice that all blacks are equal, but Africans are more equal than others - and should have those ministerial jobs.

Butler explains that "diversity" was Zuma's fault.  Zuma's "laissez-faire approach has encouraged an explosion of ideological and racial background noise" with the result that "The politics of the ‘new' ANC may look more tumultuous than they really are". What many of us see as fierce infighting, Butler looks on as "refreshingly exciting."

So Butler stumbles from one contradiction to another: Zuma has delivered on his promise of a "collective leadership," but because of his greater tolerance for dissension than Mbeki's, he has created confusing  "background noise". Also, although Butler questions whether "Institutional and political realities have changed much", nevertheless "realities are closing in rapidly on a liberation movement that has found it hard to modernise its ideas and energise its political and organisational systems."

What this means is that although nothing much of importance has changed, change is fast approaching, and the ANC is not up to dealing with it. Butler would have us believe that the ANC's weakness is due to "a fast-changing  external environment including growing unemployment. deindustrialisation, water and electricity system crises, community protest and soaring AIDS deaths...".

The ANC's real problem, says Butler, is not the ideological infighting, divisions and disputes that some critics suggest, but "a sort of paralysis of action because the ANC finds it hard to modernise its ideas and energise its political and organisational systems". Butler appears to be suggesting here that the "paralysis" is taking place within a common ideology - that the ideology itself is not under acute strain.

Now comes Butler's real clanger: "Once we recognise the background noise for what it is, it is no longer credible to claim that a radical and interventionist state is emerging".

In other words, the years spent by Cosatu and the SACP, and the hundreds of thousands of words they have spoken and written demanding an interventionist state, were not only wasted, but irrelevant? The clamour for an interventionist state is at a peak now. Scarcely a day passes without a leading member of Cosatu, SACP, ANCYL or YCL, or a document issued by of them, or an affiliated trade union, demanding exactly what Butler scoffs at: an interventionist state.

As far as Butler is concerned, it seems the battle for interventionism has been lost already.  Finished and klaar, as Jackie Selebei would say. All that is left is just "background noise"? Butler is right when he says much of ANC politics is "noise," but beyond the "noise," at the heart of the new battle for control of South Africa, is the interventionist state. Will it be won, lost or mediated? Casually to proclaim the battle as lost already is an analysis too far.

We have not come across a single South African analyst (and there are some very perceptive ones among them, particularly black analysts, who are at the rock face) who can tell at this stage who (when the bells ring) will support Zuma; who constitute his biggest threat and why? What would their threat/appeal be to a) Luthuli House and b) the rank and file or the majority of ANC decision-makers? Could it be Zulu versus Xhosa? Or radicals versus conservatives/traditionalists?

How can it be just "background noise" when Zuma appoints his cabinet and overnight, under pressure from the Left, immediately has to reshuffle portfolios? When Trevor Manuel and his National Planning Commission are moved around like chess pawns?  When Cosatu secretary general Zwelinzima Vavi sings the praises of the SACP as the "vanguard" of a socialist future? When the president of the YCL clashes with the president of the ANCYL over whether or not Thabo Mbeki should be charged with genocide? When "policing cronies" shout "shoot-to-kill" are only having "hysterics," despite what happened at Kennedy Road in Durban? When ANCYL "attack poodle" Julius Malema "has barked up the tree of mine nationalization"? (The quotations are Butler's words).

If the Democratic Alliance, which daily chronicles the ups and downs of ANC "realities" (an invaluable service), can analyse Manuel's Green Paper as effectively as it did and pinpoint the real motives behind and implications of Manuel's proposed centralized planning power, do all analysts share Butler's view that "complex and unfathomable forces leave us with no real basis for prediction"?

What the Green Paper implies is that the ANC, as a political party, ultimately is seeking absolute power over the state and its citizens, and over both the private and public sectors. The ANC's ultimate achievement then would be absolute power over "deployment" and that would make a mockery of parliamentary government, of accountability of the legislature, independence of the judiciary, freedom of the press, not to mention the right of citizens to vote the ANC or anyone else out of office (is this Manuel's compromise to keep his job?).

Butler predicts that "it is no longer credible to claim that a radical and interventionist state is emerging". Yet he also says "a complex of unfathomable forces leaves us with no real basis for prediction."

But is there a single activist in any of the ANC factions who does not subscribe to the Green Paper's one over-riding objective? Is this not the one bond common to the whole package of ANC factions: pursuit of power? This is the one aim that cuts across almost all differences, infighting, personal abuse. This is the factor that makes political prediction difficult, not the "explosion of ideological and racial background noise" that took place at Polokwane.

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