Palestine and Israel 4.0 – a ‘Reboot’ for a New Path Forward
4 June 2024
Amid a bloody war and the tragic course that began on October 7th, Israelis and Palestinians require a profound process of introspection, asking some difficult questions about an alternate future that may still be built. Can this tragedy be turned into a positive path forward for both people? An Israeli and a Palestinian outline how this could be achieved.
We write during one of the darkest moments in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict set against the backdrop of another tragic war in Gaza. The war, that began after the unprecedented October 7th terror attack has quickly emerged as the lowest point in the history of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The unprecedented devastation toll and a tally of Palestinian casualties higher than the combined Palestinian death toll of the past 75 years. As individuals who have been involved in the painstaking bridge building work, we find ourselves both, devastated, sad and angry as we face the difficult horrors of war. Nevertheless, we also see an opportunity to turn this tragedy into a new path of hope.
In recent years - and until October 7th - the region was moving toward a robust path of progress and connectivity, much buoyed by the Abraham Accords. But now, it once again finds itself consumed by the familiar, destructive dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that are again discussed in the corridors of the UN and the Hague. Whie fighting continues in Gaza, the conflagration already reached Lebanon, Yemen, Iran and the Red Sea while creating title wave of hate, antisemitism and anger around the world.
Israel has endured the largest massacre of its people since the Holocaust and now grapples with the aftermath of an intelligence failure of catastrophic proportions. While the first months of this war brought the Israelis together, 7 months later the country is again divided as it debates its own political future.
At the same time, Palestinians – caught in the crossfire in Gaza amid Israeli bombings and internal Hamas strife - are now confronted with an imperative for decisive action, although with little leverage as their options are constrained by Hamas’s relentless persistence in Gaza and Abu Mazen’s diminishing influence in Ramallah.
The Arab nations, torn between sympathy for the cause and fear of further escalation, are once again summoned to assume a mediating role, provide aid, and contribute to cover the bill of reconstruction.
On all sides, a new operating system is very much needed.
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Israel 1.0 was conceived in 1948. The Jews settled the land and began to construct state infrastructure that came to fruition after the conclusion of the British mandate and after a war of independence with the Arabs, who refused to accept a partition plan for a two-state solution. With barely 600,000 Jews in 1948, Israel was a small nation often perceived as David among the colossal Goliaths surrounding it. Marked by a socialist orientation and grappling with the trauma of the Holocaust, Israel was finding its way, seeking refuge behind the major powers at the time. The young country had made its first steps in the international arena and worked to create relations with the non-Arab allies in the region with Turkey and Iran becoming its most trusted allies.
Israel 2.0 was born in 1967. In six days of war, Israel almost tripled its territory and prevailed over three Arab armies. Gaza was taken from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan and the Golan from Syria. Israeli generals became the heroes of the moment both in Israel and abroad. Israelis and Jews had gained their pride – but this came at a price. Israel had tripled its land but also added over 1,000,000 Palestinians to its midst. Hubris and a sense of invincibility eventually led to Israel’s most difficult moment, the war of 1973, which commenced as a coordinated surprise attack during Israel’s Day of Atonement, the most significant religious holiday of the year. After a bloody war, Israel prevailed. Yet it underwent a profound process of introspection that resulted from the realization that a their own perceptions blinded the leadership of the time. The 1973 war and its aftermath resulted in a deep process of introspection. A Commission of Inquiry explored the failures and forced a process of accountability.
This led to a fundamental change in the country’s politics and leadership. Israel upgraded its operating system, and Israel 3.0 was born. Soon after the war, Israel changed its leadership, sending the Labor Party and the Socialists home for the very first time in Israel’s history. Israel discovered that it was not alone in the world, and a new era of peace began with Egypt in 1979. Jordan followed, and so did the Palestinians (although not with much success) and eventually the Arab world with the Abraham Accords. Israel continued to innovate and became a “start-up nation,” creating the strongest economy in the region. With all the surrounding progress, many in Israel thought that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would become obsolete and could be pushed to the side. They were wrong.
Precisely fifty years after the 1973 war, Israel experienced another surprise attack that was related to hubris. At a time of deep division, preoccupied with internal strife, Israeli leadership has again failed to understand the threats upon its borders and failed to listen to those who saw the looming danger. Similarly to 1973, it is already clear that many of the signs were already apparent and that some at the helm had decided not to heed those who raised the alarm bells. And similarity to 1973, some of these leaders will have to step down as Israel 4.0 emerges.
Palestine 1.0 was also conceived in 1948, after the United Nations adopted the original two-state solution framework. The Arabs were given a state, but the leadership decided to reject the agreement and pursue the War of Independence, called the Nakba (“catastrophe”). For most Palestinians, the Nakba represents a traumatic period marked by forced displacement, and the loss of homes, lands, and livelihoods. The Palestinians found themselves dispersed between Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria, and it took a while for new leadership to emerge.
In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization was established under the leadership of Yasser Arafat with the goal of representing the Palestinian people and their national aspirations. The 1967 Six-Day War also brought substantial territorial changes, as Israel gained control of Gaza and the West Bank, which were previously administered by Egypt and Jordan, respectively. Two decades later, the first Intifada began, resulting in a process of negotiation with Israel to reestablish Palestine.
In 1993, a new chapter in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict unfolded with the emergence of Palestine 2.0. This era was marked by significant developments, primarily driven by the Oslo Accords and Arafat’s return to Gaza after 27 years of exile, symbolizing a potential shift toward peace. However, the path towards peace proved to be challenging, with agreements encountering difficulties in implementation.
The region experienced a renewed wave of violence, shattering hopes for a stable resolution to the longstanding conflict. Amidst these challenges, a significant turning point occurred in 2006 when Hamas, a Palestinian political and militant group, won the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in Gaza. This victory came shortly after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from the region, adding complexity to the evolving political landscape. The year following witnessed a dramatic escalation as internal tensions between Fatah, the political party associated with the PA, and Hamas reached a boiling point.
There are different perspectives regarding the circumstances that led to this internal strife, but the situation culminated in what is often described as Hamas’s takeover of Gaza by force. While the events surrounding Hamas’s control of Gaza in 2007 remain a subject of contention, all can agree that the consequences of Hamas’s takeover of Gaza were profound, establishing a new political reality that we will characterize as Palestine 3.0.
Palestine 3.0, was envisioned as a more independent Palestinian entity, free from “occupation” and from both, settlers and soldiers. Despite the initial aspirations for increased autonomy and sovereignty, the desired outcomes did not materialize, and Hamas’s rule presented fewer advancements for Palestinians. As clearly demonstrated on October 7th, Hamas focused its energy and resources on building its capabilities in the axis of resistance without attempting to bring prosperity to the people of Gaza. Meanwhile, in the West Bank, the PA has deteriorated, after losing the support of its constituents.
Against the backdrop of mounting frustration, a lack of visible political progress, and a leadership perceived as weak and divided, a recent survey revealed intriguing insights into Palestinian sentiments. Over 70% of respondents expressed a desire for alternative avenues of representation, endorsing the formation of independent groups in the West Bank distinct from the Palestinian Authority.
And that was all before October 7th, a watershed event that already captured much of the region, threatening a regional conflagration and extending its influence to global capitals. Following over 200 days of war, it is clear that this conflict is threatening to hold again the entire region captured by Israeli-Palestinian dynamics.
As we begin to look forward – especially for those of us who refuse to lose hope in the Middle East – it is essential to think about a “day after” reality that will change the course of events between Israelis and Palestinians. This low point is perhaps the moment for Israelis and Palestinians to both create a new ‘operating system’ that will function shortly after this war subsides.
Israel has already begun to form its 4.0 version. Recognizing its own government’s failures, the start-up nation has already produced an alternate civilian network that is busy challenging of politicians and generals who are seen as responsible for what was already dubbed as Israel’s most significant intelligence and security failure to date. Hope remains that a new Israeli government, brave enough to alter its course in various policy areas, may emerge soon, once the war-mode shifts back to politics.
However, it appears that substantive change in Israeli policies remains elusive as long as the entrenched 3.0 version of Palestine continues to dictate the operational landscape. An Israeli consensus exists around the lack of Palestinian leadership that could offer a meaningful partnership for the future and this coclusion is shard with many of its partners in the Arab world.
It has become clear that neither Hamas nor the PA were able to advance the Palestinian agenda. Hamas took over the very first independent Palestinian land and established a Palestinian polity that should have been a Singapore – not an Afghanistan. Despite significant international aid, Gaza produces a GDP of $5,000, with the majority of investment going to military and arm structures rather than to the benefit of the population. The situation in the West Bank is equally challenging, with a proliferation of militant groups, able to grow in a reality of leadership failure and amidst persistent violence imposed by settlers and the Israeli army.
The international community has indicated hesitations in investing in rebuilding efforts without a sustainable resolution that prevents the recurrence of conflict. The reluctance stems from the concern that investing in reconstruction might be futile if the region remains susceptible to future disputes. Hence, the imperative for a comprehensive solution—Israel and Palestine 4.0—that addresses the root causes of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and seeks to build a stable foundation for reconstruction, development, and lasting peace is clear.
How do we get there?
While efforts to create a Cease Fire continues, it is becoming clear that a much larger objective can be pursued, with the help and involvement of partners in the region and beyond. While in Israel, the process of introspection has already began with the resignation of some of those responsible for the failure of October 7th, a similar objective much be pursued on the Palestinian side. Support from the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and other nations is crucial to endorse an independent Palestinian leadership team that could revive a different and constructive political process. This leadership will play a pivotal role toward the beginning of a transitional period. Notably, the alternative leadership will come outside of existing structures such as Hamas, the PA or the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), aiming for independence and detachment from previously unsuccessful frameworks.
In the second phase, we call for establishing a trusteeship or a capacity-building Arab-Palestinian commission that will function as a transitional authority. This commission will be vital in coordinating international efforts aimed at reconstructing civilian life in the Gaza Strip. A thorough review of the progress achieved by the commission should be conducted within a five-year timeframe, at which point the involved stakeholders can decide whether to extend its mission for an additional term.
In the third phase – predicated on the success of the new Palestinian governing structure and polity – negotiations will resume so that such a polity could exist peacefully alongside Israel and other regional neighbors. This phase will also address the advancement of more constructive and peaceful relations between Israel and the future Palestine.
Central to this strategy is the phased establishment of a new Palestinian leadership independent of existing structures. Initiatives are underway, with prominent Palestinians engaging in discussions with Gulf partners and international stakeholders, signaling a concerted effort to foster meaningful change from within Palestinian society.
Gaza, a Tragic Opportunity for a Pilot
The carnage and devastation in Gaza provide a tragic – but nevertheless, still – an opportunity to enable a needed first step in the build-up of a Palestinian political alternative. The leadership vacuum in Gaza, the Israeli security concerns and the visible weakness of the PA – all call for an arrangement in where an external team, backed by regional and international partners, will play a significant role in the post-war period in Gaza.
Following a desperately needed ceasefire to address the current humanitarian crisis, the Palestinians in Gaza will need a governance team that will enable them to break away from the destructive path of conflict that had led Gaza since the rise of Hamas in 2006. Israel, who paid its own steep price for this war, will not relinquish control easily.
However, it will likely be open to exploring scenarios that could serve as an alternative to taking full responsibility for civilian life in Gaza. Israel’s lack of trust in the PA, along with the opportunity to create further normalization in the region, furthers the push for a formula in which a ‘team of experts’ or an ‘external commission’ will be appointed to help manage the Day After project in Gaza.
Such an approach could align with Israeli interests by providing perhaps with the only feasible alternative to the reality of a full-scale Israeli occupation in Gaza. While Israel will not agree to give up security control, it will likely be more open to accepting a more significant involvement of others in civilian affairs and, overall, in the broader restructuring process. Successful progress in these areas could help plant the needed seeds for a future Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian polity.
On the flip side, this approach could also align with Palestinian interests, as it becomes increasingly evident that there is currently no Palestinian structure capable of gaining legitimacy and effectively implementing a successful 'Day After' project. Moreover, the imperative for regional and international support is paramount in facilitating the implementation of any such plan.
Stakeholders within the region and beyond, who are eager to halt the ongoing conflict and chart an alternative political course, recognize the necessity of establishing a mechanism that can satisfy both Israelis and Palestinians. Many of these stakeholders acknowledge that the Palestinian Authority (PA) lacks the capacity to lead such a process, and that Israel is unlikely to relinquish its de facto occupation of Gaza without a viable alternative path supported by its allies.
These realities heighten the prospects of establishing an external mechanism, which would leverage the increasing involvement of certain regional partners in the Palestinian issue. Such an external team, independent of the PA's leadership, could provide the necessary environment for the emergence and empowerment of alternative Palestinian leadership at the local level, gradually garnering legitimacy within Palestinian society and the broader region, as well as vis-à-vis Israel.
The ultimate goal is to create a sustainable framework that sets the stage for peaceful negotiations and coexistence between a reimagined Palestine and Israel, contingent on the success of the new governing structure. This comprehensive strategy aims to instill hope and foster stability in the region while tackling the longstanding challenges of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Though envisioning a positive future amidst the current bleak circumstances may seem daunting, we firmly believe these ideas warrant consideration. Embracing new leadership that challenges existing Palestinian institutions is undoubtedly a bold step, yet we maintain it is the sole viable option to catalyze positive change in the region going forward.
Three decades have passed since the Oslo Accords, yielding primarily conflict, deprivation, and failed Palestinian leadership, resulting in a fractured Palestinian community and the tragic situation in Gaza. It is imperative to discard this outdated model and distance ourselves from those who have perpetuated it. Now is the time for a fresh start, benefiting Palestinians and Israelis alike.
Sarah Aweidah is a Palestinian activist based in Ramallah and a member of the Executive Committee of MENA 2050. Dr. Nir Boms is the Manager of the Program for Regional Cooperation at the Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University
