The following is an extract from Eschel Rhoodie's book, The Real Information Scandal (Pretoria: Orbis SA, 1983), where he explains how and why his government tried to secretly buy control of South African Associated Newspapers:
"The Department of Information spent some R2 500 000 of taxpayers money between 1965 and 1975 to bring thousands of opinion formers from all over the world to South Africa. Almost all of them were left rather bewildered at the contrast between what they saw and what they read in the hostile English morning press [in South Africa].
It was not a critical press, but hostile and negative, trying everything in its power to push the white nation as rapidly as possible into the melting pot of political integration. Surely, the visitors said, almost to a man, there must be at least one or two English morning newspapers which accepted the reality of the plural structure of South African society and which did not always condemn, with the faintest of praise, the many positive things the Government was doing to uplift the diverse developing population groups?
"We were in the embarrassing position," I later told friends "of not being able to suggest even one English morning or Sunday newspaper to serve as balance to the slanted or distorted pictures presented by The Rand Daily Mail, The Cape Times and The Sunday Times. Many visitors wanted, at all costs, to subscribe to a newspaper in South Africa. In the end, I suggested The Pretoria News or The Star because they are, in my opinion, the most responsible English newspapers in South Africa with The Pretoria News, because of its consistent moderation and balance, perhaps the best newspaper in South Africa. I don't know whether they ever took out subscriptions. Those are both afternoon, not morning papers."
When Van Zyl Alberts in 1975 brought to Vorster, Mulder and my own attention the fact that South African Associated Newspapers were in trouble and that the shares could be picked up cheaply, it was therefore seen as a golden opportunity to rectify this state of affairs. In August 1975 Dr Mulder, General Van den Bergh, Les de Villiers, Van Zyl Alberts and I sat down at a dinner in my house in Menlo Park alone. Not even my wife or the maid was present I did the serving myself. We then agreed to try and buy the shares.
Dr Mulder and I went to see Mr Vorster the next day to discuss the SAAN situation and other matters but we simply did not have time to fully cover the SAAN proposal Dr Muller approved, however, that I could contact the Prime Minister directly as soon as we knew whether we would be able to raise enough money to buy the shares outright. At that stage only about R3 million was required.
General Van den Bergh's budget (and at whose farm Van Zyl Alberts first broached the SAAN matter) and my own budget, collectively, had enough money available, so with the General's consent I went to see Mr Vorster. I outlined the situation to him, the costs involved and explained that General Van den Bergh and Mr Van Zyl Alberts would work through Mr Louis Luyt, to whom the General had already spoken, as their front man. Mr Vorster agreed that the General and I could pool our resources and soon afterwards I transferred R2 million to Louis Luyt.
Within days Vorster called me from a meeting with staff in my office to come and see him immediately. He had heard rumours that the bid was being made but that somehow news had leaked out. The powers behind SAAN were regrouping to try and save the group from a Luyt take-over. While I sat outside Mr Vorster's office waiting to be admitted, a banker from Hill Samuel, Tony Botha, left his office and I guessed that he was Vorster's source of information.
During our talk Vorster was in a very jovial mood and he listened with undisguised pleasure when I told him that a state of near panic existed among the editors and senior journalists of the SAAN group. He urged me to be extremely careful, but to go ahead and see if we can still pull it off. It was at that occasion I told Mr Vorster that if the SAAN take-over failed, we wished him to approve for us to go ahead and establish an independent objective non-party daily newspaper to fight The Rand Daily Mail's influence.
I knew for more than 30 years that the Afrikaners wanted to take such a step. I knew the enormity of the deed and the risks, but I was still elated when Vorster said that if our budget could stand it, we could try in the next year. It was therefore only when the government failed though its straw man, Mr Louis Luyt, to obtain control over SAAN that the second-phase was set in motion.
Mr Vorster, who later vehemently denied knowledge, had been briefed by me on the details of the SAAN take-over right from the start, I also kept both Dr Mulder and General Van den Bergh fully informed of my talks with the Prime Minister. I told them that the Prime Minister was particularly enthusiastic when he learned Sir De Villiers Graaff, former leader of the United Party and Leader of the Opposition in Parliament who had retired a few years earlier, was keen enough to invest up to R1-million in the SAAN take-over, together with Luyt.
I also told them Mr Vorster had approved the take-over of SAAN and knew that if the take-over failed, Luyt would be asked by us to begin an English speaking daily newspaper with state funds. It was planned, or estimated, that it would take the newspaper anything between two to three years to reach a break-even point after which a start would be made on a new Sunday newspaper to counter the influence of The Sunday Times and neutralise, possibly knock out completely, the ailing Sunday Express.
When the SAAN take-over did not materialise, I went to see Mr Vorster in the Union Buildings and obtained approval for the second phase to be put into operation. The appointment was at 12h15 on November 3, 1975. It was a relaxed meeting before we talked business, Mr Vorster showed me various coins which he collected and kept in a right hand drawer of his massive desk. Vorster's only warning was that all possible efforts should be made to maintain secrecy and "julle moet oppas dat julie nie julle jas in die deur vasdraai nie", (Be careful you do not get your coattails in the revolving door.)
It was a phrase Vorster sometimes used to warn people to beware of being found out.
I returned from the Union Buildings and immediately informed General Van den Bergh of the Pnme Minister's decision that we could proceed with the plan. Later that afternoon Mulder returned to Pretoña from Cape Town and I went to his office to inform him of my talk with the Prime Minister and that Vorster had said: "Nou maar goed. Gaan voort" (Very well, you may proceed.)"
