The South African government's policy of ‘quiet diplomacy' towards Zimbabwe has had to reconcile two basic objectives. The main goal of the ANC of Mbeki was to do all that was necessary to prevent ‘regime change' in Zimbabwe and keep ZANU-PF in power. In 2000, and after, President Thabo Mbeki gave crucial moral and political support to ZANU-PF's coup d'état against democracy in that country.

However, the presidency recognised that this policy was likely to have severe repercussions. So a supplementary goal was to try and shield Mbeki from the inevitable political fall-out. This was mainly done by claiming that Mbeki was actually working - albeit in mysterious ways - towards the restoration of democracy and the rule of law in Zimbabwe.

At one level, these two goals were mutually contradictory. ‘Quiet diplomacy' required that the ANC convey its support for ZANU-PF to a Zimbabwean audience; while trying to disguise this fact from Western and (certain) South African audiences. At another level, they complemented each other, for the intention of the second objective was to minimise the political cost of the first, and thereby ensure its sustainability.

Viewed in this light ‘quiet diplomacy' has been a not inconsiderable success. Eight years on the ZANU-PF regime remains afloat in Zimbabwe, despite the sinking of the economy and its popular support. And Mbeki has, thus far, avoided a proper accounting for his Zimbabwe policy. The worst he is accused of in the South African press is "ineffectiveness" or a "failure to act."

The extra ordinary SADC summit held in Tanzania in March this year provided a useful case study in how ‘quiet diplomacy' works in practice. It was convened after the brutal beating of MDC leader, Morgan Tsvangirai, by government thugs had brought the ZANU-PF regime to yet another crisis point.

Yet, it proved to be a crucial political and propaganda victory for President Robert Mugabe. The communiqué issued after the summit endorsed Mugabe's democratic legitimacy by claiming that the rigged elections which returned him to the presidency in 2002 were in fact "free, fair and democratic." It also appealed for "the lifting of all forms of sanctions against Zimbabwe."

On his return to Harare (March 30) Mugabe said that Mbeki had told SADC leaders that they should all stand by ZANU-PF or else the liberation movements would fall one-by-one to the machinations of the Western powers.

According to the minutes of a ZANU-PF politburo meeting held shortly after the summit Mugabe "gave a detailed brief of President Mbeki's contribution [at the SADC meeting] which he said was blunt in condemning the MDC and Tsvangirai." Zimbabwe's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Simbarashe Mumbengegwi, also "highlighted that President Mbeki had explained in detail the Western agenda of targeting all former liberation movements in government for regime change."

However, officials within the Union Buildings told journalists that Mugabe had been isolated at the summit. The Weekender (March 31) fell for this and led with a story headlined: "SADC tells Mugabe to reform or retire." Citing unnamed and unidentified sources it claimed that Mugabe was "a desperate and lonely figure" who had been humiliated and rejected by SADC, and been told "his time was over."

Thus, although Mbeki had played a crucial role, behind-the-scenes, in rallying support for Mugabe at the summit, his spin-doctors so confused the issue that he managed to escape any sort of condemnation for doing so.

The summit mandated Mbeki to "continue to facilitate dialogue" between ZANU-PF and the two factions of the MDC. The MDC were successfully drawn into this mediation effort, and the pressure for SADC to act on Zimbabwe was effectively dissipated for several months. 

Yet it seems the recent Lusaka summit of SADC heads of government may have signalled the start of the unravelling of ‘quiet diplomacy.' The applause with which delegates greeted Mugabe's arrival at the summit exposed the claims about his isolation at the last one as the disinformation it always was. ZANU-PF's brazen rejection of any meaningful electoral reforms also dashed the hopes that many had invested in the mediation process.

Last week The Zimbabwean led its front-page with the heading: "Mbeki afraid of Mugabe? Talks nothing but smoke and mirrors." The article noted that "for months Zimbabweans have placed their hopes for economic and political salvation in South African President Thabo Mbeki as mediator between the ruling Zanu (PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change."

But, it then stated, "the mediation process is little more than a smoke and mirrors display as Mbeki unwaveringly supports Mugabe." Mbeki, it added bluntly, "like other leaders from founding nationalist organizations, has no plans to see the impasse in Zimbabwe being solved and is actually negotiating in bad faith."

 (The independent Zimbabwean media has also begun to speculate as to why Mbeki continues to back Mugabe.)

In his weekly letter in ANC Today on Friday Mbeki did little to contradict this view. He endorsed the claim, as set out in a report by the SADC secretariat, that much of the blame for Zimbabwe's economic distress was due to Western sanctions. Mbeki quoted it as saying:

 "SADC should do all it can to help Zimbabwe address the issue of sanctions, which is not only hurting the economy through failure to get [Balance of Payments] support and lines of credit, but also through reduced markets for its products. Sanctions also damage the image of Zimbabwe, causing a severe blow to her tourist sector."

He also made clear that South Africa would not intervene to support the removal of ZANU-PF from power. "At no point will SADC and its member states act as a super-power that has the right to expropriate the people of Zimbabwe of their right to self-determination, as imperial Britain did."

Further evidence for the ANC's continuing support for ZANU-PF was provided by a draft resolution on international relations prepared for the national conference later this year, and recently published on the party website.

It states that further strengthening relations with other liberation movements, like ZANU-PF, remains a priority for the ANC. It states: "Party-to-Party relations amongst former liberation movements must be prioritized by the ANC (SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO, ZANU-PF, PAIGC, CCM, SPLMA, etc) and pursue the meetings and structured support of the former liberation movements in the region."

The paradox of ‘quiet diplomacy' is that the ANC of Mbeki has been able to sustain its support for ZANU-PF for so long, only because local and Western opinion has failed to face up to this discomforting reality. It has simply been easier to believe that Mbeki has been working (however ineptly) towards a benevolent outcome in Zimbabwe. Yet as Thomas Mann wrote, "In the long run, a harmful truth is better than a useful lie."