Using the occasion of the oration he gave at the state funeral of the late Judge President of the Land Claims Court, Fikile Bam, the new Chief Justice, Mogoeng Mogoeng, took a swipe at those he called "vicious" critics of the judiciary and sitting judges. Singling out retired judges for special mention, and threatening those whose criticisms are not "collegial and constructive" with disciplinary measures in terms of the Judicial Code of Conduct, he let it be known in no uncertain terms that he disapproves of certain unspecified but published criticisms of the judiciary he leads. It is important to identify those to whom he refers and to ascertain exactly why these "vicious" critics were lambasted by him in his speech.
These unprecedented remarks, available in full on the website of the Witness (see report), were made in general terms; they nevertheless bear careful analysis. This is especially so as the chief justice chose not to name any names of those he appears to regard as the culprits when delivering his broadside.
The starting point of such analysis is naturally the Constitution itself. The judiciary is afforded special protection by the terms of its section 165. Interference with the functioning of the courts is specifically proscribed. Organs of state, through legislative and other measures, must assist and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity, accessibility and effectiveness of the courts.
Contempt of court is a long-standing and well recognised criminal offence, one which the courts and litigants have not shied away from utilising when the need arises. Defamatory criticisms can give rise to both civil and criminal proceedings. Intimidation is a statutory offence. The Judicial Service Commission is always available to investigate complaints of misconduct by judges, including retired judges, though it seems that this avenue has not yet been explored by anyone as dissatisfied with critical comments as the chief justice appears to be.
Against this is the right of all, including retired judges, to freedom of expression. This right is central to the press and other media and includes the right to impart information or ideas. The limitations on the right to freedom of expression do not appear to have any bearing upon the matters alluded to by the chief justice and need not form any part of the analysis of his stance.
The context of the remarks made by the learned chief justice is one in which the transformation of the judiciary remains a contested terrain. To some the process of transformation has been pursued with too much vigour; to others not enough has been done to take gender and race into consideration when judicial officers are appointed. Certainly, when it comes to the appointment of women as judges there has been less transformation than has been the case in respect of redressing the racial imbalances of the past. Central to much of the criticism of the judiciary is the weight to be attached to the primary requirements for appointment of judges: they should be appropriately qualified, fit and proper persons. The problem, not to put too fine a point on it, is that there are too many candidates for the bench who meet the primary requirements but do not fit the need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the racial and gender composition of the country. These, constitutionally speaking, "must be considered" when appointing judges. Some critics contend that this consideration has been allowed to trump the primary requirements too often in the helter-skelter pursuit of transformation at a rate that the pool of persons willing to be candidates for the judiciary is not able to sustain. Others bewail the slow rate of transformation, pointing to the fact that at no sitting of the JSC has a pale male candidate (the demographic in greatest over-supply) not been appointed.