Musa Xulu presented a defence yesterday of the ANC's policy of deploying cadres to key positions within the state (see here). He stated that the ANC "deserves to appoint its own cadres in government, they have earned their stripes." And, argued that the ruling party's programme ran the risk of sabotage by disloyal officials. In order then to give effect to the mandate it received in April, the ANC must "choose cadres who understand its policies and above all have no hidden agendas."
The importance of this issue is only dimly understood, and as a result there is a basic lack of clarity about the key points of debate. The question, in this case, is not whether the opposition is trying to impose itself on the ANC, and thereby subvert the popular will, but whether the new government is actually going to be able to deliver on its electoral mandate.
It is by no means obvious that appointing "tried and tested cadres" will allow it to do so, given the ANC's own painful experiences over the past decade. The corruption, factionalism and decay in so many ANC controlled municipalities can be traced directly back to the party's decision in 1997 that "Political appointments at senior levels of the public service need to be extended to local government administration."
The alternative is also not well understood. The debate, such as it is, often gets sidetracked into a discussion of who should get appointed, not how appointments get made. The system which gradually diplaced the patronage or ‘spoils system' in Britain and America, from the mid-19th century onwards, was one of open competition for entry into the civil service, and selection and subsequent advancement determined "solely on the basis of relative ability, knowledge, and skills."
Crucially, power over appointments and promotions was (largely) taken out of the hands of politicians and placed in the care of a non-partisan civil service commission (see article). This is known, at least in the United States, as the ‘merit system.'
The implementation of this system in the British and American civil services solved problems those countries (and their intellectuals) have forgotten they ever had. As a result it is rarely a point of reference in discussions on how to arrest South Africa's decline, or reverse Africa's state of apparent perpetual underdevelopment.