The developmental state as a social construct

IN 1987, in his January 8th Statement, the late ANC President, Oliver Tambo, said to the youth of South Africa that:

"We must proceed from the position that our task is to win a revolution.

Political revolutions are about the capture of state power and its use to advance the objectives of fundamental social transformation. This task must be carried out consciously and intentionally by the revolutionary forces to bring about profound change in favour of the social classes and strata that have gained power.

Without the victory of the revolution, revolutionary changes are not possible. The state is a vital feature in that effort to bring about those revolutionary changes because a new society cannot be built within the existing framework."

There are on-going debates about what is a developmental state. These debates gain prominence given both the present historical conjuncture of globalisation as well as the challenges facing developing countries.

It has been said that every society bears the birthmarks of the old order. Accordingly, the new South Africa itself bears the birthmarks of its past. Meanwhile, the vision of the future society being created is the antithesis of apartheid South Africa. To eradicate the political system related to the previous dispensation is thus not enough; what is needed is the eradication of the entire social relations that gave birth to and sustained that system.

Developmental state: rejecting the neo-liberal paradigm

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s was seen as the triumph of the neo-liberal policies; also known as market fundamentalism.

Nothing more tragically illustrates market fundamentalism than the current global financial crisis which has been brought about by among others the absence of regulations and supervision of the financial markets particularly in most developed countries.

Neo-liberalism had commenced in the 1970s. As South Africa gained her independence, the notion of a strong and active state was already in retreat globally as the neo-liberal policies stubbornly and fanatically marshalled by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan had become rampant, spreading arrogantly across the globe and obviously defeating developmentalist ideals in the newly-independent states through structural adjustment programmes. This resulted in the total dominance of finance capital which was able to move freely around the world, freed from the burden of regulations and supervision.

This epoch was characterised by the rolling back of the state, the reduction in public and social expenditure and the removal of market regulations. The market principle was thus unleashed and extended into almost every walk of life and penetrated into fields of activity where they did not properly belong. There was great hostility towards the role of the state in driving development, except when it harnessed society in favour of capital accumulation and profit maximisation by a minority.

This ran contrary to the logic of early capital accumulation which required a strong state that could enforce the adoption of the capitalist logic. There could be no doubt that had the current developed countries not have had strong and active states during their early years of development, colonising foreign countries and driving development in favour of the capitalist class, they would not have reached the current levels of development. This simply means that the argument for a weak state today is an ideological construct aimed at further capital accumulation and ensuring the political and economic dominance of the property-owning classes.

Meanwhile, in the book, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century, Francis Fukuyama argues that the reality is that particularly in the developing world, weak, incompetent or non-existent government is the source of severe problems. Further, Joseph Stiglitz, in Globalisation and its discontents, argues that in developing nations, markets are often absent, and when present, often work imperfectly.

Therefore, the state's role in managing the economy is not only historical, but also current and pertinent. Fukuyama further argues that "although states needed to be cut in certain areas, they needed to be simultaneously strengthened in others... The result was that liberalising economic reform failed to deliver on its promises in many countries. In some countries, indeed, absence of a proper institutional framework left them worse off after liberalisation than they would have been in its absence. The problem lay in a basic conceptual failure to unpack the different dimensions of stateness and to understand how they related to economic development".

This prescription proffered during the neo-liberal epoch as the only path to development for developing countries and a panacea for their problems of underdevelopment and poverty, proved itself very fragile and held out a false promise. Actually, in his book, How Rich Countries Got Rich... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor, Erik S. Reinert says: "History reveals how rich countries got inch by methods that by now had generally been outlawed by the ‘conditionalities' of the Washington Consensus".

For developing countries to achieve the objective of development, it is important that they address these vital issues of the role of the state and the market, and where they will get the resources to stimulate development. Developing countries need a strong and active state that will manage the economy in the interests of society as a whole, as was the case in East Asia. But, this state must do more to also address other socio-political challenges health, education and crime.

The East Asian tigers reached their current level of development through a combination of various factors, which included an active developmental, and repressive state, as well as a supporting international environment during the Cold War, when they were cushioned by the Western countries in particular to confront the Soviet influence. Thus, whilst the East Asian model offers much to the developing world as a lesson, the conditions that gave rise to and supported it disappeared with the end of the Cold War. After this, strong states were punished as the dominant view was that the state must be lean and mean, stay out of intervening in the economy and leave much of its functions and responsibilities to the private sector.

Revolution is change

The national democratic society is an act of creation; a conscious, intentional act. It will be the outcome of the revolution, and thus neither will be an accident of, as Jack Simons states it in his book, Comrade Jack: The political lectures and diary of Jack Simons, Novo Catenque, a "‘natural' spontaneous growth arising from interactions between individuals each seeking their own interest". Similarly, developmental states are "social constructs" devised by different role-players in a particular society, given their own unique historical, domestic and global contexts, as well as their ideological predispositions.

Uncle Jack Simons says all previous national democratic revolutions especially in Africa, have been political revolutions. He says that national democratic governments hitherto "seldom destroyed the old machinery of the state. More often, they took over the imperialist-colonial institutions, parliamentary procedures, multiparty systems, the courts and the body of laws, army and police organisations, and the bureaucratic administration. They appointed their own nationals as soon as possible to the positions formerly held by expatriates from the colonising state..."

He proceeds to argue that when the national liberation movements hitherto achieved independence, "they inherited the old colonialist system and went on working along the old lines. They did not destroy the old state machinery to build a new one. They took over government and ministerial houses and other privileges. They became a class of bureaucrats. The tendency in many African countries has been to maintain the old economic as well as political system. There has been continuity and not revolution".

However, because ours is more than the type of political revolution about which Uncle Jack spoke, it has the responsibility to do more than merely working along the old lines, ensuring that there is continuity (from apartheid). Our revolution must destroy the old state machinery to build a new one.

The developmental state: an anti-thesis of the apartheid state

The developmental state is in its essence an antithesis of the apartheid state. It must lead the process of the overhaul of the economic as well as political system. It is underpinned by the vision of reconstruction and development as an integrated process.

Thus the vision contained in the RDP is that: "No political democracy can survive and flourish if the mass of our people remain in poverty, without land, without tangible prospects for a better life. Attacking poverty and deprivation must therefore be the first priority of a democratic government".

Accordingly, from the very outset, the vision of the new state was predicated on the rejection of the liberal view that contrasted growth and development, growth and redistribution, and regarded democracy as elite rule. The post-apartheid state was to be democratic and developmental as an integrated process. The vision of the RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a unified programme.

Holding one-person, one-vote democratic elections was to be the first decisive step towards creating a developmental state. This was because the RDP envisaged the process of a thoroughgoing democratisation of South Africa in terms of which the people participate in decision-making and contribute to reconstruction and development. Democratisation was to transform both the state and civil society, not just through periodic elections, but through popular participation.

The liberal view has also been evident in the attempt to create a false dichotomy between national reconciliation and social transformation. The latter is portrayed as a threat to national reconciliation as though the continued economic marginalisation of the black majority makes democracy, reconciliation and nation-building stronger. Or, to fundamentally transform society at the socio-economic level undermines reconciliation and nation building.

This explains the objection of the same people who claim to support the liberation of people to black economic empowerment and affirmative action. Liberals want liberation without content; retaining economic power in the hands of a racial minority and a coterie of black people invited by white people themselves to the table of privilege.

Although largely debated, the case of South Africa as a developmental state is apparent in the way in which public policies are made and implemented in the country, as well as the boldly stated goal to eradicate poverty through active state leadership and intervention to achieve the objectives of democracy and economic growth, development and redistribution. This then informs the manner in which the state is structured and organised in order to be able to meet its objectives.

The point we want to make is that:

• the new, fifteen year old, South African state is an emerging developmental state;
• the developmental state we are trying to build in South Africa is also inherently democratic;
• this developmental state does not emerge from space, but in the context of the history of our own country as well as of our continent;
• therefore the tasks of this developmental state are as political as they are economic; which means that this new state must be concerned about the consolidation of democracy, economic growth, development and redistribution, as well as such soft issues as the RDP of the Soul; and
• the task of building a developmental state requires agents for change and motive forces.

However, what confronted the new government as it ascended to political power was:

• First, the political settlement was an outcome of a negotiated arrangement where neither of the main contending political forces had vanquished the other in battle. The sunset clauses had placed certain limitations on the new state and cushioned the white minority's loss of power and entry into the new dispensation. While the latter were somewhat accommodated in the political settlement, they had retained the economic power and dominance, as well as their positions in the public service. Property rights had been enshrined in the Constitution. For significant democratisation and redistribution, they needed to cooperate;
• Secondly, the challenge in 1994 was not only that South Africa had been an apartheid-colonial society, with severe poverty and inequality, and stagnation, but a further reality was that South Africa was a developing nation with all the features of underdevelopment and backwardness. In addition to this, it was one of the most unequal societies in the world. Years of isolation and sanctions had led its economy into negative growth and blunted its forces of production.

South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy has been characterised by the rejection of the neo-liberal discourse. The trajectory of development chosen by the new government has placed strong emphasis on the role of a developmental AND democratic state.

Whilst not rejecting the role of the market, the new government has positioned the state such that it is able to drive economic growth and development, to intervene in the economy whenever this became necessary and to manage the economy. The debate in South Africa has not been about whether or not the state has any role to play, but has been about the content of such role.

The present debates about the state in South Africa emanated from the concern for the poor rather than biasness towards capital.

It is important for developing countries to develop and rely on their own resources and capacity if they are to fight back against the negative impact of globalisation that result in the entrenchment of their economic and political marginalisation. The question is, how can developing countries achieve this during such a hostile and un-conducive global environment? What role must the state play in the developing countries as the driver of development in the same manner that the state played a decisive, active and interventionist role in the process of the development of the countries of the North and East Asia?

The developmental state must be conscious of its role in society. The choice for emerging democracies such as ours is not whether the state should play a role in the economy, but it is what role and how, bearing in mind the global and domestic balance of forces and the need to create spaces for a gradual, now accelerated and now incremental progress towards democracy and development. The developmental state we are constructing in South Africa is one which is biased towards the poor; that recognises the fact that market capitalism tends to foster socio-economic disparities.

The impact of corruption on the developmental state

It has been said that every society bears the birthmarks of the old order. Apartheid was inherently corrupt as it was a gross crime against humanity. The entire edifice of apartheid was founded upon a corrupt value system that supported, spawned and was itself, in turn, sustained by corruption.

Like the current global financial crisis, corruption is the brain-child, the most natural off-spring, of the philosophy of greed.

None of the objectives of development can be attained if the state of corruption is high in the public and private sectors, and is condoned by and/or rampant in society as a whole. Corruption, of course, is not limited to the public service; it is pervasive throughout society. The very essence of the Developmental State is inimical to corruption.

Of course, this does not mean that to defeat corruption is a matter simply of replacing the old with the new machinery. To believe so would be naïve. A whole lot more is required.

The ANC Strategy and Tactics (2007) states that there is an existent value system within our society, owing to our past and the current social relations of capitalism, that encourages greed, crass materialism, and conspicuous consumption. Among the off-springs of this value system is included corruption in state institutions and society as well as corporate greed reflected in outrageous executive packages, short-termism in the conduct of business and private sector corruption.

Often, one hears the frequent refrain that public servants engage in corruption because they earn low salaries. This, of course, does not stand to reason and cannot survive logical scrutiny. It does not explain why the highly-paid executives of global companies engage in corruption. Neither does it explain why the working class are overwhelmingly not corrupt and why the culture of corruption is so endemic among the well-paid middle-strata. What it underscores though is that corruption is an act and crime of greed and crass materialism, coupled with a low moral ethos.

The largest incidents of corruption in the public service occur among the senior management services among those that earn satisfactory salaries; where large accounts and budgets are controlled, and decisions taken. It is at this level that huge tenders and contracts are issued and where kickbacks are often demanded for contracts and offered.

Ordinary wage-earners in the public service do not control any capacity to engage in corruption at a large scale. This does not mean though that it does not happen or that it is less important or can be tolerated, such as among those that engage in corruption related to identity documents, social grants, seeking kick-backs for services rendered and others. Besides corroding the public service ethos as well as the integrity of the state in the eyes of the public and private sector, such acts diminish already limited public resources and undermine good governance.

In many instances corruption entrenches poverty and by diverting key resources away from programmes designed to improve the quality of life especially of the poor, it negates the potential for development. Accordingly, corruption benefits the few, and harms the majority. It is inimical to pro-poor sustainable growth and development, as well as to the objectives of the development state.

Laxity in executing their public service duties constitutes corruption. Most of the public servants employed in government today are not from the apartheid era, but were engaged during the democratic dispensation. Apartheid cannot be blamed every time some among them fail to discharge their responsibilities or get involved in corruption. Sure, the legacy of apartheid could be blamed, but for how long!

At the same time, corruption corrodes the essence of the ideal society we seek to create which is a negation of apartheid society. Corruption occurs at several levels. On the one hand, a person engages in corruption on their own and without an accomplice. On the other, there are accomplices.

It is to this that we should briefly comment. Often, when corruption happens in many government departments or state institutions, usually the market can be found in the community. Those that place an order or are willing to pay for the purchase of undeserved services are members of communities who are either left no option because of flippancy among public servants in discharging their responsibilities or because they knowingly seek to engage in corruption.

Obviously, if the market for fraudulently acquired services is shut down, the demand side would have been crippled and the supply side would thus be rendered futile. This means that to fight corruption society must pay attention both to the demand and supply sides.

Addressing corruption in upholding the democratic developmental state

Combating corruption must not be seen as an end in itself. This must be viewed as inseparable from the broader goals of socio-economic development. It must also be viewed as a global effort involving the government, the private sector and society as a whole. It cannot be the responsibility of government alone.

Effective anti-corruption strategies must be intricately and intimately linked to sustainable development. We must resist the worshipping of the capitalist value-system that deifies individualism and the material possession as the pinnacle of human success. Only through broad and sustained efforts to create a shared future, based upon our common humanity in all its diversity, can we succeed to defeat and eradicate the value system that justifies such naked selfishness represented by acts of corruption.

Clearly, we need a new cadre of public servant who shares the vision of our government and people; and who can manage the inherent conflict of interest between public and private interest and between satisfaction with what you earn and have and desire for more. This new cadre must subordinate the private interest to the public interest and must accordingly be committed to serve the public with integrity. In this way, we must succeed to create a harmonious relationship between the private and public interest, and treat these two as not mutually exclusive.

But, such a situation would not create itself or be arrived at automatically. It must be enforced through codes of ethics informed by the ethical values of the society we are trying to create as well as other enforcement measures. Combating corruption in the public sector requires both internal and external measures. External measures must include uncompromising and unyielding law enforcement and promotion of good governance as well as punishing those in public and the private sector that either instigate or benefit from corruption. It must also involve the development, implanting and management of an integrity ethos among public servants.

Good governance is fundamental to the creation of a developmental state. This responsibility of good governance is as important for the public sector as it is for the private sector and civil society. Usually, where corruption occurs, it involves both or all of these parties. Business and civil society are usually the market encouraging the outbreak of corruption.

There is a need for the establishment of a professional meritocratic public service that is able to uphold the values and principles of democracy, good governance, and Ubuntu; whilst sharing the ideology of development.

We cannot allow the new dispensation to be indistinguishable from the previous such that national democracy would seem pretty much like apartheid and thus be equally damned.

To succeed in combating corruption, it is not enough that people should fear the law and punishment; they must also be ethical and possess the ethos that makes corruption fail to thrive. In this regard, we need to prevent and punish what is morally wrong and to encourage and reward all that is morally right.

We must inculcate a culture of hard-work in society as a whole; and the leadership must lead by the force of example. At the same time, we must strive to achieve a balance and harmony between both material and spiritual needs.

There is need for united action by all stakeholders such as political leaders, business leaders, civil society, public intellectuals and academics, and others, to expose the root causes of and combat corruption and implant in society as a whole the values of integrity, hard-work and respect for public resources and the common good.

The allegation that corruption is necessarily caused by poverty must equally be rejected contemptuously. Even where they participate in corrupt activities, the poor are often the victims rather than the propellers of corruption. And where they are not victims, they are involved in petty corruption, albeit corruption nonetheless. Corruption is after all a conscious abuse of power for personal enrichment by those who have such power.

The developmental state is not inherently immune from corruption; such values and ethos of anti-corruption must be enforced through all sorts of measures, both positive and negative. Refraining from corruption must be rewarded, whilst engaging in it must be severely punished. This means that we must strive to ensure that people refrain from corruption either because they are just good or because they know the penalty is high and they will not get away with it.

At the same time, as well as good governance structures, such measures as information technologies must be explored in order to preclude the incidents of corruption. Quite often, archaic systems allow for the prevalence of the human intervention which often exacerbates corruption.

A strong and robust democracy is essential to ensure that all sectors of society including the media and organisations of civil society, private sector, trade unions and faith based organisations jointly share the collective responsibility to promote the values apposite to developmentalism.

What South Africa needs is a robust and very public campaign to mobilise communities both to report incidents of corruption where they are aware of it and themselves to refrain from knowingly being involved. In this area, we have not been as successful as we were or are in mobilising people for political causes. Whereas the Moral Regeneration Campaign was a noble attempt, it seems to have fizzled out and its effectiveness was compromised by the exclusive participation in it of religious groupings. Whilst religious groups no doubt have an important role to play, the campaign for the RDP of the Soul or moral regeneration must be broad, itself secular, be spread to youth, women, teachers, nurses and other sectors and exist in everybody's door-step.

It is not given that corruption should prevail. It can be defeated. For the purposes of building the national democratic society, corruption must be beaten.

MALUSI GIGABA is a member of the National Executive Committee.

REFERENCES

ANC (1987). Statement of the National Executive Committee of the African National Congress on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the African National Congress, presented by President Oliver Tambo, 8th January 1987. www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=ancdocs/history/jan8-87.html

ANC (1994). The Reconstruction and Development Programme. www.anc.org.za/show.php?doc=rdp/rdp.html

Fukuyama, Francis. (2004) State-building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century. New York: Cornell University Press.

Reinert, Erik Steenfeldt. (2007). How Rich Countries Got Rich ... and Why Poor Countries Stay Poor. London: Constable.

Stiglitz, Joseph. (2002). Globalization and its discontents. London: Penguin Books.

This article first appeared in the ANC journal, Umrabulo No. 32, 1st Quarter 2010

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