DEFENCE AND SECURITY IN A NEW ZIMBABWE
A PAPER COMMISSIONED BY ROY BENNETT
INTRODUCTION
1. The politicisation and abusive character of Zimbabwe's defence and security institutions has played a key role in the tragic course of our nation's history, beginning in the colonial period and continuing beyond independence in 1980. It is clear that Zimbabwe cannot complete the transition to democracy, or heal the nation's deep wounds, without the democratisation of these institutions.
2. This defence and security paper, the first of its kind in Zimbabwe, represents the start of a process of reform in the army, air force, police service and intelligence service. It is intended to stimulate a thorough and vigorous debate on the future of the security services.
3. All Zimbabweans-including ordinary citizens, members of parliament, civil society, the military, the police and the intelligence service-have a right to be involved in this debate and to contribute toward the reconstruction of their defence and security organs. Ultimately, these institutions belong to the people and must become their servants.
4. When it takes office, the new government will use the results of this dialogue to implement a comprehensive official review and, thereafter, a democratic defence and security policy for a new Zimbabwe.
5. A people-driven constitution establishes the proper framework for democratic civil- military relations. Under such a constitution, the security services are to be non-partisan; they are subject to the control and oversight of the duly elected government and are obliged to perform their functions in accordance with the law.
6. This ideal has become progressively perverted in Zimbabwe. The security services have become tools of the ruling party and have repeatedly thwarted the democratic will of the people. Thus, the depoliticisation of these institutions and the restoration of their role as subordinate to the elected civilian authority is fundamental to the reform agenda.
7. In practical terms, the unconstitutional role taken by the security services has manifested itself in overt declarations of support for the ruling party and in grotesque human rights abuses at all levels. A democratic government will establish a strong institutional framework, ensuring that punitive measures are brought to bear on those in the services who digress from their constitutional obligations to desist from political activity and to uphold the rights of the individual as enshrined in the constitution's Declaration of Rights.
8. At the same time, the process of review and reconstruction will not be arbitrarily vindictive or retaliatory. Past political affiliations, tribe or race will not disqualify members of the services from serving in a new Zimbabwe. Instead, a premium will be placed on professional skills and a willingness to uphold a people's constitution in a democratic dispensation.
CHAPTER 1: AIM, SCOPE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PAPER
1. This paper presents the defence and security position of a new, democratic government. In view of the many comparable transitional challenges facing South Africa in the 1990s and Zimbabwe today, it draws substantially on the principles elucidated in The white paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa (1996), while paying due attention to Zimbabwe's unique circumstances. Its principal purpose is to stimulate a public and inclusive debate that will lead to a comprehensive official review once a new government has taken power. The official review will be followed by the implementation of a new defence and security policy.
2. Defence and security policy should be in harmony with all other aspects of government policy, particularly the broader domestic reform agenda, foreign policy and national security policy.
3. The new government will be committed to consultation with parliament, political parties, members of the services, civic groups, non-governmental organisations and citizens in order to forge a national consensus on defence and security matters. This spirit of inclusivity signifies a major departure from the autocratic and oppressive practices of the Zanu-PF regime and is commensurate with a democratic commitment to accountability, responsiveness and openness in government.
4. This paper will provide the basis for an official review which will elaborate on the consultative process in considerable detail. The review will include an examination of relevant legislation and comprehensive long-range planning on such matters as doctrine, posture, force design, force levels, logistic support, armaments, equipment, human resources and funding.
5. The review committee will include members of cabinet, the civil service, the security services and international experts. The committee will be formed within 30 days of a new government taking office. A first draft of the committee's report will be published for parliamentary and public comment and will contain options with respect to the size, roles and structure of the army, air force, police and intelligence service (hereafter referred to collectively as the ‘security services').
6. Further, the new government will submit to parliament detailed proposals on important matters such as redeployment, demobilisation, reintegration, a security services reserve, human resources development and arms procurement procedures.
7. After the approval of legislative changes by parliament, a restructuring and reorientation of the security services will take place.
CHAPTER 2: TRANSFORMING ZIMBABWE'S SECURITY SERVICES
Locating defence and security policy within the reform agenda
1. In the new Zimbabwe, national security will no longer be viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It will be broadened to incorporate political, economic and social matters. At the heart of this new approach is a paramount concern for the well- being of the people over and above the survival of political parties.
2. Security is an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety, participate fully in the process of governance, enjoy the protection of fundamental rights, and have access to resources and the basic necessities of life.
3. At national level the objectives of security policy therefore include the consolidation of democracy, the achievement of justice and economic development, and a substantial reduction in the level of violence, political instability and crime. Peace, stability and development are regarded as inseparable and mutually reinforcing.
4. At international level, the objectives of security policy include the defence of the internal security, sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the Zimbabwean state, and the promotion of regional security in Southern Africa.
5. A democratic government will recognise that the greatest threats to the Zimbabwean people are not external but internal: socio-economic problems like poverty, unemployment, poor education, the lack of housing and the absence of adequate social services, as well as growing levels of crime and violence.
6. A new government will reorient the security services and contain spending without undermining the country's core defence capability or national security in the short or long term. As a matter of sound organisational practice, reorganisation of the security services budget should be rational and well planned.
7. The defence forces may be employed in a range of secondary roles as prescribed by law, but their primary and essential function is service in defence of Zimbabwe, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
8. The defence forces therefore remain an important security instrument of last resort but neither they, nor the intelligence service, will remain the dominant internal security institution. The primary responsibility for ensuring the day-to-day security of the people will rest with the police and be shared by many government departments whose authority and limits are prescribed by the constitution and parliament.
Defence and security in a democracy
9. The theme of this paper is the formulation of a new policy for the transformation of the security services. Transformation is essential in the light of two main factors: the negative role of the security services in the history of our country and, in time, the advent of democracy.
10. The process of transformation will be guided by the following principles that will derive from a post-Zanu-PF reforming agenda and a new people-driven constitution.
11. National security will be sought mainly through efforts to meet the political, economic, social needs of Zimbabweans-and through efforts to promote and maintain regional security.
12. Zimbabwe will pursue peaceful relations with other states. It will seek a high level of political, economic and military cooperation with Southern African states in particular.
13. Zimbabwe will adhere to international law on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which it is party.
14. The defence forces will have a primarily defensive orientation and posture.
15. Zimbabwe is committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament. It shall participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.
16. Within the Republic, only members of properly constituted law enforcement agencies and duly licensed residents will be permitted to bear firearms. Civilians will not be permitted to bear arms of war.
These strictures are currently legislated but are not effectively enforced. The new government will maintain a policy of strict gun control and will target the possession and use of illegal weapons.
17. Zimbabwe's force levels, armaments and military expenditure will be determined by defence policy, which will take account of the social and economic imperatives of a democratic government.
18. The security services will be professional, balanced, modern, affordable and technologically advanced, capable of executing their tasks effectively and efficiently.
19. The security services will be apolitical and will not further or prejudice party political interests.
20. The security services will develop a non-tribal and non-racial institutional culture as required by the constitution.
21. The functions and responsibilities of the security services will be delineated by the constitution, an amended or reconstructed Defence Act and Police Act, and new legislation that will, for the first time, bring the operations of the intelligence apparatus under the authority of parliament.
22. The primary role of the defence forces will be to defend Zimbabwe against external military aggression. Deployment in an internal policing capacity will be limited to exceptional circumstances and subject to parliamentary approval and safeguards.
23. The security services will be subordinate and fully accountable to parliament and the executive.
24. The security services will operate strictly within the parameters of a new constitution and reformed domestic legislation. They will respect human rights and democratic norms. The deep-seated culture of immunity and impunity in our nation's security services, underwritten by government amnesties of 1975, 1979, 1980, 1982, 1988, 1995, 2000 and 2002, will no longer be tolerated. As members and servants of society, security services personnel cannot operate above the law; they are to be subject to it.
25. Defence and security policy and the activities of the services shall be sufficiently transparent to ensure close parliamentary and public scrutiny-and to ensure that violations of the law are prosecuted.
26. To this end, it is suggested that constitutional provision be made for an Defence and Security Inspectorate, headed by an Inspector-General. The main duties of the Inspectorate will be to:
- Independently monitor compliance of the security services to constitutional and legislative obligations.
- Undertake investigations on its own initiative or at the request of parliament.
- The Inspectorate will have the authority to subpoena any person, communication, or any other item that may constitute potential evidence, during the course of such investigations.
- Report to parliament on its own initiative or at the request of parliament. Investigate complaints against the security services.
- Complaints may be forwarded to the Inspectorate by any resident of Zimbabwe, including members of the public and the security services.
- Mount prosecutions against the security services in military and civil courts.
27. The Inspector-General shall:
- Be an independent official who is appointed, and can be dismissed at any time, by a two-thirds majority of parliament.
- Serve a seven year first term, renewable once for a second term of no longer than four years.
27. The annual budget of the Defence and Security Inspectorate will be approved by parliament.
28. Information whose public release would damage national security may be withheld by the Inspectorate on the recommendation of the government, but decisions made on this basis will be subject to appeal by a specially-constituted judicial authority. The shape of this authority will be considered during the official review.
The principles outlined above are explored in more detail in the following chapters. The implications for the doctrine, posture and structure of the security services will be dealt with in the official review.
CHAPTER 3: RELATIONS BETWEEN CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND THE SECURITY SERVICES
1. A people-driven constitution will outline the principles, structures, responsibilities and relationships which are necessary to determine correct relations between civil authorities and the security services. This relationship refers to the hierarchy of authority between the executive, parliament and the armed forces, and to civil supremacy over these forces.
Constitutional provisions-the defence forces
2. With regard to the functions of the military and its relations with civil authorities, it is suggested that the constitution contain the following provisions:
The defence forces shall perform their functions and exercise their powers solely in the national interest by (i) upholding the constitution; (ii) providing for the defence of the Republic; and (iii) ensuring the protection of the inhabitants of the Republic.
The defence forces shall perform their functions and exercise their powers under the directions of the government where those directions accord with the Constitution and Zimbabwean law.
The defence forces shall refrain from furthering or prejudicing party-political interests, and no member of the regular force shall hold office in any political party or organisation.
The defence forces shall conform to international laws on armed conflict to which the Republic is a party.
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the defence forces.
The President may declare a state of emergency of up to 14 days duration.
A two-thirds majority of parliament is required to extend a state of emergency
A two-thirds majority of parliament may rescind a state of emergency at any time.
The President may deploy the defence forces in accordance with their functions and subject to the accountability outlined below.
The President shall immediately inform parliament of the reasons for the deployment of the defence forces where this relates to the defence of the Republic, compliance with international obligations or the maintenance of internal law and order.
Parliament may resolve to terminate such deployment.
The Minister of Defence shall be accountable to parliament for the defence forces.
The President shall appoint the chief of the defence forces, subject to approval by a two-thirds majority of parliament.
The chief of the defence forces shall exercise military executive command of that force subject to the directions of the Minister of Defence and, during a state of emergency, the President.
The establishment, organisation, training, conditions of service and other matters concerning the regular force and the part-time force shall be as provided for by the Defence Act.
Parliament shall annually approve the defence budget.
Parliament shall be competent to investigate and make recommendations on the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale, state of preparedness and compliance with human rights of the defence forces, and to perform such other functions related to parliamentary supervision of the forces as may be prescribed by law.
As described in Chapter 2, a Defence and Security Inspectorate will be established and will have powers of investigation and prosecution in relation to the defence forces.
Constitutional provisions-the police service
3. With regard to the functions of the police service and its relations with civil authorities, it is suggested that:
The police service shall perform its functions and exercise its powers solely in the national interest by (i) upholding the Constitution; and (ii) preventing, investigating and combating crime, maintaining public order and protecting the inhabitants of the Republic and their property.
The police service shall perform its functions and exercise its powers under the directions of the government where those directions accord with the Constitution and Zimbabwean law.
The police service shall refrain from furthering or prejudicing party-political interests and no member of the regular force shall hold office in any political party or organisation.
A minister shall be accountable to parliament for the police service.
The President and cabinet must appoint a person as the national commissioner of the police service, to control and manage the police service.
The national commissioner must exercise control over and manage the police service in accordance with the national policing policy and the directions of the minister responsible for the police.
The establishment, organisation, training, conditions of service and other matters concerning the regular force and the part-time force shall be as provided for by the Police Act.
Parliament shall annually approve the budget of the police service.
Parliament shall be competent to investigate and make recommendations on the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale, state of preparedness and compliance with human rights of the police service, and to perform such other functions related to parliamentary supervision of the forces as may be prescribed by law.
The Defence and Security Inspectorate will perform the same duties vis-à-vis the police service as it does in relation to the defence forces.
Constitutional provisions-the intelligence services
4. With regard to relations between civil authorities and the intelligence services, it is suggested that:
The intelligence service(s) shall perform its functions and exercise its powers solely in the national interest by (i) protecting national security from internal threats of espionage, sabotage, terrorism and from actions intended to undermine parliamentary democracy (ii) supporting Zimbabwe's law enforcement agencies (iii) obtaining information on the actions or intentions of persons or entities outside Zimbabwe (iv) liaison or sharing of intelligence with international partners
The intelligence service(s) shall refrain from furthering or prejudicing party-political interests, and no member of the regular force shall hold office in any political party or organisation.
A minister shall be accountable to parliament for the intelligence service(s).
Should more than one intelligence agency be established, different ministers shall be accountable to parliament for internal and external intelligence respectively.
The establishment, organisation, training, conditions of service and other matters concerning the intelligence service(s) shall be as provided for by a new Intelligence Service(s) Act.
Parliament shall annually approve the budget of the intelligence service(s).
Parliament shall be competent to investigate and make recommendations on the budget, functioning, organisation, armaments, policy, morale, state of preparedness and compliance with human rights of the intelligence service(s), and to perform such other functions related to parliamentary supervision of the intelligence services as may be prescribed by law.
The Defence and Security Inspectorate will perform the same duties vis-à-vis the intelligence service(s) as it does in relation to the defence forces and the police.
Lines of authority: supremacy of the civilian executive
5. The constitution will therefore outline a clear hierarchy of authority on defence and security matters: the President and/or ministers exercise executive authority and they are, in turn, accountable to parliament for the security services.
6. Parliament will have a range of significant powers in order to assert democratic control over the security services. It will have legislative powers, approve the budget of the services and be able to review the decisions made by the executive. Parliament will have powers of investigation and, indirectly, prosecution through the independent Defence and Security Inspectorate-and via parliamentary committees and mechanisms that it chooses to establish by legislative action.
7. The government of the day is bound by the constitution to respect the right and duty of parliament to exercise independent and critical judgement on defence policy and practice.
8. The fulfilment of parliament's responsibilities requires the recognition by the government and security services that it is answerable to parliament, and through it to the people, for defence and security policy and action. Government and the security services will provide whatever assistance and information is required by the Defence and Security Inspectorate and parliamentary committees in order to perform their functions within the law.
9. Parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate is only meaningful if there is sufficient transparency on defence and security. Thus, although a measure of secrecy will undoubtedly be necessary in order to safeguard national security interests, the lives of defence and security personnel and the integrity operations, the governing constitutional principle is ‘freedom of information'. Exceptions to this principle will be limited, specific and justifiable in a democratic society, and will be dealt with in legislation. Members of parliament will also have the right to appeal to an independent judicial body for a review of any decision to withhold information (see Chapter 2). The decisions of this tribunal will be legally binding.
Departments responsible for defence and security
10. New and amended defence and security legislation, operating under a new constitution, will incorporate the following clauses:
Designated ministers will be politically and legally responsible for the defence and security functions of government. The ministers are accountable to the President, the cabinet and parliament-and before the law-for the management and execution of these functions. The ministers constitute the civilian authority on defence and security matters on behalf of cabinet.
The ministers direct and control the performance of departments that will be created or reconfigured in accordance with the defence and security policy of the incumbent government.
The respective statutory powers and functions of the heads of the defence forces and the police and intelligence services-and their departmental heads-will be governed by the Defence Act, the Police Act and the new Intelligence Service(s) Act.
The departmental heads will be the chief accounting officers of their respective departments. He/she is also the principal advisor to the responsible minister regarding matters that fall within the ambit of that minister.
Departmental heads and commanders of the police and defence forces will perform such duties and functions as may be necessary for democratic management of the defence or security functions and to enhance parliamentary and ministerial control over the security services. The heads will monitor and be responsible for compliance with directions issued by proper civilian authorities.
The defence and security departments execute lawful policies and directives of the responsible ministers and direct the work of their institutions to that effect.
11. In determining the respective functions of the civilian heads and military commanders, a fundamental democratic principle is in view: elected civilians formulate defence and security policy within the bounds of the constitution and relevant legislation-and appointed civilian and military personnel implement this policy. It is not within the remit of civilian or military personnel to usurp the executive function of elected civilian representatives or to formulate policy.
Professionalism in the security services
12. Stable relations between the civilian authorities and the security services depend to a great extent on the professionalism of the security services. The challenge is to define and promote an approach to professionalism which is consistent with democracy, the constitution and international standards.
13. More specifically, the professionalism required of the regular and part-time components of the security services includes the following political, ethical and organisational features:
Acceptance by security personnel of the principle of civil supremacy over the armed forces, and adherence to this principle.
Strict adherence to the constitution, national legislation and international law and treaties.
Respect for the democratic political process, human rights, and racial and cultural diversity.
The operation of the security services according to established policies, procedures and rules in times of war and peace and/or national emergency.
A commitment to public service, chiefly in defence of the security of Zimbabweans, broadly defined.
Non-partisanship in relation to party politics.
The establishment of strict retirement criteria, which will encourage a vibrant, capable, modern and forward-looking security services culture.
The maintenance of technical, managerial and organisational skills and resources which enable the security services to perform their primary and secondary functions efficiently and effectively.
The building of a Zimbabwean military and security ethic based on international standards of officership, loyalty and pride in the organisation. This will serve as a basic unifying force which transcends cultural, racial and other potentially divisive factors.
Education and training
14. Education and training programmes within the security services are a basic means of building and maintaining a high level of professionalism. In this regard, it is suggested that the constitution provide that all members of the defence forces ‘shall be properly trained in order to comply with democratic norms and international standards of competency'.
15. At the heart of training is the preparation of officers and other ranks to fulfil the security services' primary function of (i) maintaining law and order and internal security (police and intelligence services) and (ii) gathering external intelligence (intelligence service(s)) (iii) defending the state against external military aggression (defence forces).
16. Specific training programmes will be introduced to prepare security services personnel for regional security cooperation and involvement in international peace support operations.
17. Education and training will also play an essential role in developing the political and ethical dimensions of professionalism. To this end, the cabinet will oversee the design and implementation of an education program aimed at depoliticising and reorienting the security services. The program will be designed by Zimbabwean and international experts from civilian and military sectors.
18. Specifically, the program will be designed to instil respect among security service personnel for the core values of a democratic Zimbabwe. These values derive principally from the constitution and include respect for human rights, the rights and duties of security service personnel, the rule of law, non-partisanship, non-tribalism and non- racism, and civil supremacy over the armed forces. The program will extend to all members of the security services.
19. It is recognised that the program will have no value if misconduct is in any way sanctioned or tolerated by the military or civilian authorities. The institutional culture of the security services will only be imbued with respect for human rights and the rule of law if its members are subject to disciplinary action in the event of abuses.
Responsibilities of government
20. Zimbabwe's new constitution, as with other democratic constitutions, will seek to establish stable relations between civilian authorities and the security services by subjecting the services to the control of the elected civilian authority. Such control is vital because the security services have a substantial history of, and capacity for, organised violence.
21. However, a new government will also recognise that relations between elected authorities and the security services will only be stable if the requisite control is accompanied by the fulfilment of certain responsibilities towards the security services and its members. These responsibilities include the following:
The government will not misuse the security services for partisan or repressive purposes.
The government will not interfere in the military chain of command, the application of military discipline, or operational matters which are under the authority of military commanders or police and intelligence chiefs.
The government will take account of the professional views of senior officers in the process of policy formulation and decision-making on defence and security.
The government will request from parliament sufficient funds to enable the security services to perform their tasks effectively and efficiently.
The government will seek to ensure that security forces personnel are adequately remunerated. It will also ensure that demobilised members of the services are properly cared for and integrated into civilian society.
The government will not endanger the lives of security services personnel through improper deployment or the provision of inadequate or inferior weapons and equipment.
The government shall make every effort to secure the safe release of security services personnel who are captured in the course of official duty by enemy forces.
Rights and duties of security services personnel
22. Members of the security services are citizens and therefore enjoy the same fundamental rights as civilians. At the same time, certain exceptions to this principle are necessary to ensure that security services personnel remain within the bounds of their duties as defined by the constitution and related legislation. Exceptions will include the following:
Security services personnel are entitled to vote but will not be allowed to be card- carrying members of political parties. It follows that no member of the security services shall hold office in any political party or political organisation.
Security services personnel shall not attend political meetings in uniform except when they are on official duty.
Security services personnel will not be allowed to join a trade union.
Security services personnel will be sufficiently remunerated and will be discouraged from extraneous income-generating activities. Such activities will only be permissible if they meet conflict-of-interest criteria and after approval by the appointed internal authority. As with all security services activities, the financial activities of services personnel may be investigated by the Defence and Security Inspectorate at any time. The security services shall use the English language for the purposes of instruction, command and control. Exceptions will only be made during formal disciplinary hearings.
Security Services personnel will be required to comply with the Official Secrets Act and will be prosecuted for any and all breaches, including, but not limited to, those motivated by political and military espionage and financial gain.
23. Democratic opponents of the regime have also noted with grave concern the abuses committed by security services personnel under the pretext of ‘following orders'. The new constitution will stipulate that a member of the security services ‘shall be obliged to comply with all lawful orders but shall be entitled to refuse to execute any order if the execution of such order would constitute an offence under Zimbabwean law'. Security services personnel shall be obliged to report unlawful orders and actions to an appropriate authority and will be held responsible for non-reporting or for executing an unlawful order.
24. The constitutional provision stated above will be applied strictly and its implications for operations by the security services will be conveyed to all officers and other ranks in the course of their training and education.
25. In general terms, the security services shall conduct themselves with honour and dignity and shall abide by the provisions of the Declaration of Rights in its interaction with civilians. Security services personnel shall treat civilians with courtesy and respect in the performance of their duties. They should no longer to be viewed by the public as enforcers, an army of occupation or an instrument of repression, but rather as servants and protectors of the people of Zimbabwe.
26. The military disciplinary code will be reviewed and revised to bring it into line with a new constitution, taking into account the unique requirements of the military justice system.
CHAPTER 4: THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
The domestic, regional and global context
1. The re-configuration of the security services to reflect their core democratic responsibilities will mean a greater emphasis on the role of the police and intelligence agencies in the maintenance of law and order. These agencies will be freed from partisan activities to focus on helping to build Zimbabwe as a peaceful society underwritten by the rule of law.
2. The establishment of democracy will also give rise to significant changes in the external strategic environment as it affects Zimbabwe. The country will no longer be isolated internationally and will participate as a democratic member of international organisations including the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
3. Zimbabwe is expected to play an active role in these fora, especially with regard to peace and security in Africa and in Southern Africa in particular. Zimbabwe will be involved in multinational peace support operations on the continent, the more so given its own experience as a nation that has emerged from instability and dictatorship. A new government will ensure that Zimbabwean peacekeepers develop a reputation as well- equipped, well-supported and well-trained, as befits a proud and democratic nation-state.
4. Zimbabwe will not have aggressive intentions toward any state nor is it confronted by a conventional military threat in the short to medium term (+/- 5 years).
5. The absence of a foreseeable conventional military threat provides considerable space to reorient and reconfigure the defence forces. The details of this process will be spelt out in the official review.
6. Nevertheless, the long-term future cannot be determined with any degree of certainty because international relations are unpredictable. The defence forces have to maintain a core defensive capability because of this potential for change. Such a capability cannot be created at short notice as the need suddenly arises. The maintenance and development of weapons systems is necessarily a long-term endeavour.
7. Within budgetary constraints, the security services will engage in co-operative ventures with its regional and global counterparts in fields such as training and education, defence planning, exchange visits, combined exercises and procurement of arms and equipment.
8. For historical, political, strategic and geographic reasons, defence and security cooperation with other Southern African states is a priority. Zimbabwe will seek to make a strong contribution to the security and defence organs of SADC.
9. As a responsible member of the international community, Zimbabwe will conduct its foreign policy, arms trade and external defence activities in accordance with international law and norms. Zimbabwe will cooperate fully with the international community on matters such as arms control and the threat of terrorism.
CHAPTER 5: ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE SECURITY SERVICES IN DETAIL
THE DEFENCE FORCES
Constitutional provisions
1. It is envisaged that a people-driven constitution will provide that the defence forces may be employed in the following functions:
For service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
For service in compliance with the international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and other states.
For service in the preservation of life, health or property.
For service in the provision or maintenance of essential services.
For service in the upholding of law and order in the Republic in cooperation with the police and intelligence services under circumstances clearly set out in law where the police service is unable to maintain law and order on its own.
For service in support of any department of state for the purpose of socio-economic upliftment.
2. In any genuine democracy, the above functions do not carry equal weight. The primary function of the defence forces is to defend Zimbabwe against external military aggression. The other functions are secondary.
3. The size, design, structure and budget of the defence forces will be determined mainly by its primary function. However, provision will have to be made for the special requirements of internal deployment and international peace support operations.
4. The rest of this section considers the various functions of the defence forces in more detail.
Self-defence
5. Governments have an inherent right and responsibility to ensure the protection of the state and its people against external military threats. Zimbabwe will employ the following principal strategies to this end:
Political, economic and military cooperation with other states. In this context, regional defence and security cooperation in Southern Africa is particularly important.
The prevention, management and resolution of conflict through non-violent means. Conflict resolution, in the form of diplomacy, mediation or arbitration, may take place on a bilateral basis or under the auspices of an international or regional body.
The deployment of the defence forces. The use or threat of force against external military aggression is a legitimate measure of last resort when political solutions have been exhausted.
6. The preferred and primary course of action for a democratic government will be to prevent conflict and war. It will only turn to military means when deterrence and non- violent strategies have failed.
7. Deterrence requires the existence of a defence capability which is sufficiently credible to inhibit potential aggressors. Although Zimbabwe is not confronted by any foreseeable external military threat, this capability cannot be turned on and off like a tap. It is therefore necessary to maintain a core defensive capability.
8. A core defensive capability includes a balanced and sustainable nucleus with the following features:
The ability to deal with small-scale contingencies of a short-term nature. The ability to deal with a range of contingencies.
The ability to expand the size of the defence forces to appropriate force levels within a realistic warning period should the threat situation deteriorate significantly;
The maintenance and, where necessary, the adequate and appropriate upgrading or replacement of equipment and weaponry; and
An effective intelligence capability to ensure early warning of potential conflicts and crises.
9. This focus on the retention of a core capability takes account of government spending priorities and the fact that the self-defence problem is likely to be limited in the short to medium term. It does not require a large standing force.
10. The official defence and security review will address in more detail the implications of core capability retention for the size, doctrine, posture, structure, weaponry, equipment and other features of the defence forces.
Deployment in cooperation with the police service
11. Historically, the Rhodesian Front government and Zanu-PF have deployed the military internally for party-political ends and for prolonged periods of time. This history and that of many other countries suggests it is inappropriate to utilise the defence forces in a domestic role on a permanent or semi-permanent basis. This perspective is based on the following considerations:
Armed forces are not trained, oriented or equipped for deployment against civilians. They are typically geared to employ maximum force against an external military aggressor.
Ongoing deployment in a law and order function invariably leads to the defence forces becoming increasingly involved in non-military activities.
Efforts to apply military solutions to political problems are inherently limited and invariably lead to acts of repression.
Prolonged and partisan deployment undermines the image and legitimacy of the defence forces in the eyes of the people.
Prolonged internal deployment places a substantial and unnecessary burden on the defence and security budget.
12. In the light of these considerations, the policy goal of a democratic government will be to build the capacity of the police service to deal with the physical aspects of public violence and law and order on its own, with added technical and informational assistance from the intelligence service(s). The defence forces are thus deployed only in the most exceptional circumstances, such as a complete breakdown of public order.
13. In order to achieve this goal, financial resources for maintaining internal stability should be allocated to enhancing the capacity of the police service.
14. The internal deployment of the military will be subject to parliamentary control and the constitutional provisions on fundamental rights, and will be regulated by legislation. Officers and other ranks deployed in internal operations will be equipped and trained appropriately.
International peace support operations
15. As a respected member of the international community, Zimbabwe will fulfil its responsibility to participate in international peace support operations.
16. There are two types of peace support operations in which the defence forces may become involved: (i) peacekeeping, which entails military operations undertaken without resort to force and with the consent of the major parties to a dispute in order to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement; and (ii) peace enforcement, which entails the application or threat of force, pursuant to international authorisation, in order to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order.
17. Public awareness and parliamentary debate on the complexities and different types of peace support operations is equally important.
18. Zimbabwe will only become involved in specific peace support operations if the following conditions are met:
There should be parliamentary approval and public support for such involvement. This will require an appreciation of the associated costs and risks, including the financial costs and risk to the lives of security services personnel.
The operation should have a clear mandate, mission and objectives. There should be realistic criteria for terminating the operation.
The operation should be authorised by the United Nations Security Council.
Operations in Southern Africa should be sanctioned by SADC and should be undertaken together with other SADC states rather than conducted on a unilateral basis. Similarly, operations in Africa should be sanctioned by the African Union.
19. Zimbabwe's consideration of involvement in specific peace support operations will not be limited to the possible deployment of troops. The involvement could also take the form of, inter alia, providing equipment, logistical support, engineering services, communications systems and medical personnel and facilities.
20. The acquisition and maintenance of military equipment shall take account of the particular requirements of peace support operations.
Other defence functions
21. As noted earlier, it is suggested that a new constitution will provide that the defence forces may be employed in a range of activities in addition to those discussed above.
22. These activities include disaster relief, the provision and maintenance of essential services, search and rescue, evacuation of Zimbabwean citizens from high threat areas and regional defence cooperation.
23. It should be stressed again that these are secondary functions. They arise from the unique capability of the defence forces. Inappropriate use of military forces in non-military activities is economically inefficient.
24. The long term, the new government will not be partial to the use of the defence forces in socio-economic development. Such employment blurs the distinction between the military and civilian spheres, it contributes to the militarisation of society, it undermines the preparedness and capabilities of the force with respect to its primary function, and it may undermine the image of the defence forces in the eyes of sections of the population.
25. However, in the transitional phase, during which the defence forces are being restructured, and when party/youth militia and war veterans are being integrated into the forces or reintegrated into society, it will be necessary and beneficial to deploy elements of the forces to assist line departments in the provision of essential services to the community. These deployments will be authorised by the appropriate civilian authority and defence forces personnel will be unarmed and subject to close scrutiny during such activities.
26. The deployment of the defence forces on social development projects during the transition will not only benefit the wider community in a direct sense; it will make an important contribution to developing the skills of personnel through associated education and training programs. For those who are integrating or continuing with the armed forces, such programs will contribute substantively to professionalisation-and those demobilising will take with them skills of value to the community and the economy.
THE POLICE SERVICE
Constitutional provisions
27. It is envisaged that a people-driven constitution will provide for the police service to be employed in the following functions:
Preventing, investigating and combating crime. Maintaining public order.
Protecting the inhabitants of the Republic and their property.
28. The over-arching goal of these stipulations is the provision of a safe and secure Zimbabwe for all citizens, residents and visitors-the core objective and function of a police service in any democracy. Over three decades of abuses by the Mugabe regime, this ideal has been progressively distorted by politicisation, corruption and administrative incompetence.
29. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) has developed a deserved reputation as, at best, impotent, and, more often than not, as predatory and as an instrument of political control and repression. This is a process that began in 1980, but one that has accelerated markedly since 1999.
30. In keeping with this trend, increased emphasis has been placed on an adversarial and para-military approach to policing. It will, therefore, be necessary for a democratic government to adopt a two-step method to reforming the police service. First, it will be necessary to actively dismantle the practices and structures of oppression within ZRP and, second, it will be necessary to replace these with a new culture and orientation: that of service to the people. Zimbabwe's police service can only restore its legitimacy and reputation if it makes a dramatic shift from a punitive and authoritarian role to that of servant and protector.
Preventing, investigating and combating crime
31. The use of the police service as a tool of the regime has meant that the prevention, investigation and combating of crime has been pushed into the background. Instead, normal criminal activity has grown while ZRP has focused on protecting and furthering the political objectives of Zanu-PF. Zimbabwe has become a more dangerous place for all residents, with substantial increases in hijackings, burglary and street crime. Meanwhile, white collar crime and criminal syndicates have flourished in the business community and the civil service.
32. It is important to develop a sophisticated policy response to these problems. Crime is a complex phenomenon that defies easy solutions; ill-conceived and reactive approaches will not provide long-term success.
33. It is essential that a holistic strategy is adopted, beginning with crime prevention.
International experience suggests that it is more cost effective in the medium to long term to invest in projects which prevent crime, as opposed to simply spending more on the institutions of policing, courts and corrections.
34. The crime prevention strategy will have the following emphases:
Substantial investment in crime research and close cooperation with government and academic institutions, both domestically and internationally.
Cross-government responses that target the socio-economic causes of crime.
Intelligent, creative and flexible policing that produces different responses to different problems.
Effective deterrence through visible policing, efficient law enforcement and an effective criminal justice system.
Rehabilitation and reintegration of those who have passed through the criminal justice system.
35. Where crime has already occurred, the ability of the police service to investigate violations and assist prosecuting authorities must be vastly improved. Zanu-PF's politicisation of ZRP's role, combined with economic mismanagement and a lack of resources, has meant that the will and capacity of the police to investigate and combat crime has been vastly diminished. In order to reverse the position, a new government will:
Allocate sufficient resources to recover capacity and to maintain high standards into the future.
Provide modern training, equipment and technical support to personnel.
Re-establish the proficiency of special investigative units and establish new ones where necessary.
CID will be retrained and re-equipped.
Particular attention will be given to the form, function and effectiveness of minerals units, particularly those dealing with gold and diamonds.
Restore coordination with the justice ministry and a reformed intelligence service. Establish mechanisms for effective and compassionate victim support.
Maintaining public order
36. The maintenance of public order is essential to any rules-based society that seeks to protect its citizens, be they individuals or groups, from arbitrary violence, offensive behaviour and the illegal disruption of economic activity. That said, Zanu-PF's definition of what public order means and how threats to it should be countered has been directly contrary to most fundamental democratic freedoms. The constitutional provision for the maintenance of public order is designed to respect and defend those freedoms and not to obstruct or to deny them. Thus, the police service's approach to public order-as in other areas-must be radically reoriented.
37. In order to ensure public order while protecting democratic liberties, the new government will:
Repeal repressive legislation that has underwritten police brutality (for example, the
Public Order and Security Act (POSA)).
Demilitarise the riot police and align personnel and specialist units with contemporary methods of control geared to the minimum use of force.
Comprehensive training and the use of up-to-date equipment and techniques will be key in this regard.
Introduce more exacting conditions for the deployment of specialist public order units, thereby shifting responsibility for control of most public events and political rallies to regular personnel.
Build robust and transparent systems of monitoring, compliance and discipline, both internal and external/independent.
Protecting inhabitants and their property
38. Commensurate with the police services' new role as a defender and servant of the people, a new constitution will underline the responsibility of the police to shield inhabitants and their property from harm and to assist where harm has been done. This role includes, but is not limited to, protection from, and assistance in the case of:
Political, criminal and domestic violence.
Natural disasters such as drought, fire and floods. Road vehicle accidents.
Terrorism and border violations.
39. Beginning in Matabeleland in the 1980s, ZRP progressively abdicated this role under instruction from political interests and elements of the security services. This impotence and lack of independence has become endemic during the 2000s. Under a democratic government, the police service will not be permitted to divide its duties into ‘political' and ‘non-political' compartments or to engage in criminal behaviour under the guise of executing orders.
40. A new government will:
Strengthen legislation to increase and emphasise the legal obligation of police personnel to protect.
Make this obligation and the requisite operational methods a centrepiece of police training.
Provide specialist equipment and, where necessary, create specialist units that will work closely with relevant partners in government.
As above, build robust and transparent systems of monitoring, compliance, and discipline, both internal and external/independent.
Restoring confidence in our police service
41. As is the case across Zimbabwe's security services, the key to reform in the police service is not inherently legislative but cultural. The ZRP sub-culture has become severely distorted and must be fundamentally reformed if the police are to regain a reputation as guardians of the people and as enforcers of the law without fear or favour.
42. While all arms of the security services are in need of major reform, a quantum shift is all the more important within the police service given its place as the chief custodian of internal law and order. It is the institutional bedrock of peace and security in Zimbabwe and must worthy of this role.
43. Politicisation and bias must be replaced by a culture of impartiality-and corruption must be replaced by a culture of transparency and accountability. A democratic government will be determined to inculcate these values in the police service so that Zimbabweans can again look to the police service for help in their hour of need and for the guarantee of a stable and orderly society.
THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE(S)
Constitutional provisions
44. It is envisaged that a people-driven constitution will provide for the intelligence service(s) to be employed in the following functions:
The protection of national security from internal threats of espionage, sabotage, terrorism and from actions intended to undermine parliamentary democracy.
The support of Zimbabwe's law enforcement agencies through the provision of information, analysis and technical assistance.
The obtaining of information on the actions or intentions of persons or entities outside Zimbabwe where (i) such information supports the government's foreign, economic and defence policies (ii) such persons or entities are believed to represent a threat to national security.
Liaison or sharing of intelligence with international partners where such sharing assists the core functions of the intelligence agencies.
45. Zimbabwe's Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) has become notorious for its party- political orientation and its opaque character, operating, as it does, beyond the confines of the law and parliamentary scrutiny. It will be the intention of the new government to remove these tendencies and to replace them with a proper focus on the national interest and democratic accountability.
46. The constitution will provide the basis for this two-step process. As outlined in Chapter 5, the intelligence service(s) will be subject to a series of hitherto absent checks and balances: it will be expressly forbidden from furthering or prejudicing party-political interests and no member of the service(s) force shall hold office in any political party or organisation. Moreover, for the first time in Zimbabwe's history, the intelligence machinery will be made directly accountable to parliament and the people: a new Intelligence Service(s) Act will be brought into law, the budget of the service(s) will have to be approved by parliament, and parliament will have the authority to investigate and make recommendations on the full range of intelligence service(s) activities. These powers will be operate in a manner consistent with the protection of national security, but their thrust and purpose is to ensure that the intelligence service(s) become, and remain, an instrument of the people and remain answerable to it. Never again must intelligence agencies become a tool of the ruling party.
47. The second part of the reform process is more positive-it is to reconstruct the role and functions of the intelligence service(s) around democratic norms. Here, again, the constitution will provide the framework, as described above and fleshed out below.
Protection of national security from internal threats and actions intended to undermine parliamentary democracy
48. Every democratic state has an obligation to protect its citizens and residents from those who seek to harm individuals, communities, property or infrastructure within the state.
The right to safety and liberty are fundamental to any democracy. Primarily, this is the task of the police service and other internal law-enforcement agencies. However, when threats take on a more systemic nature they become matters of national interest and therefore of proper of concern to the national intelligence service(s).
49. It is the responsibility of the intelligence service(s) to collect, analyse and disseminate information so as to prevent and react to:
Espionage in all its forms. Sabotage.
Terrorism.
50. No nation is immune from the threat of espionage, ranging from the military and political fields to those of industry and commerce. Zimbabwe and its resources are of interest to foreign powers and a competent counter-intelligence capability must be established if the nation's secrets are to be protected. The all-encompassing focus of CIO on the survival of Zanu-PF as a political party has meant that Zimbabwe's capability in this regard has suffered markedly. Far from enhancing national sovereignty, the involvement of CIO in domestic politics has made Zimbabwe a state weaker and more vulnerable to foreign manipulation and penetration.
51. The same may be said of Zimbabwe's preparedness with regard to sabotage and terrorism. While the country is not a prime target for international terrorists, its economic and governmental weaknesses have made it vulnerable as a base for such activity, be these in the areas of identity fraud, weapons smuggling, drug trafficking and money laundering. It will be incumbent on a new government to ensure that Zimbabwe's intelligence service(s) are capable of handling these threats, working in conjunction with international partners.
52. Internal or external threats may also take the form of an attack on the democratic system itself. This will be of particular concern during the period of transition and reform-and because of the country's history of authoritarian and anti-democratic rule. The intelligence service(s) will be responsible for protecting our hard-won democracy from
‘actions intended to undermine parliamentary democracy'. It should be noted that this phraseology is carefully chosen. In a democracy, freedom of expression and the right to protest are basic rights-and it is not the place of the intelligence service(s) to become involved or to take an interest in political debate or domestic activities unless these constitute a direct and real threat to the system of parliamentary democracy. In this context, parliament, through its committees and the Defence and Security Inspectorate, is to take an active interest in order to ensure that intelligence gathering and associated activities do not infringe on democratic liberties or favour/prejudice party-political or financial interests.
Support of Zimbabwe's law enforcement agencies
53. As this paper has made clear, internal security and law enforcement are roles that rest largely with the police service; it is not proper in a democracy for the military or intelligence agencies to take a lead in these areas. Their role, if any, is subordinate and governed by strict conditions.
54. Nevertheless, there are key supporting roles to be played by national intelligence agencies in these areas, roles that have been almost entirely obscured by CIO's involvement in party politics and bogus ‘law and order' operations. Intelligence gathered by the national intelligence service(s) in the course of its normal duties will often be of importance to the police and vice versa. Criminal intelligence is one example. In such cases, government- to-government cooperation develops powerful synergies and efficiencies that can be utilised to great effect. Where the police service can lawfully require or expect assistance from the intelligence service(s), these shall be provided, be they related to the collection or analysis of intelligence or the technical means of acquiring it. In such situations, the national intelligence service(s) will be working in a role subsidiary to the police service.
Gathering of external intelligence
55. As a landlocked country living in a competitive, volatile and increasingly globalised world, it is essential that Zimbabwe has an efficient external intelligence capacity. The first function of foreign intelligence is to obtain information on the actions or intentions of persons or entities outside Zimbabwe where such information would support the government's foreign, economic and defence policies. In the main, this information is used as a basis for better-informed decisions: raw intelligence is distributed by the national intelligence service(s), analysed by relevant arms of the civil service-and thereafter used by policy-makers and the political executive as a vital input in the decision-making process. External intelligence is therefore a vital tool for the government in its quest to accurately configure foreign, economic and defence policies in accordance specific objectives and overall policy.
56. The collation of external intelligence is distinct from the internal intelligence function, although there are also areas of important overlap. One is the national security facet of external intelligence gathering. While internal intelligence units are charged with preventing and combating domestic threats of a systemic or national character, it is the role of external intelligence structures to obtain information on the actions or intentions of persons or entities outside Zimbabwe who are believed to represent a threat to national security. These threats are extant in a variety of forms, including (but not limited to) terrorism, sabotage, espionage and cyber-crime-and they are present in times of both war and peace. Given the inter-related nature of internal and external threats to national security, external intelligence structures will be required to cooperate closely with counterparts on the internal side.
57. Though they operate outside Zimbabwe, external intelligence operatives and structures will be required to observe a code of conduct and will be liable to internal disciplinary mechanisms and-with due regard to secrecy-answerable to parliament through its committees and the Defence and Security Inspectorate.
A fresh start for Zimbabwe's national intelligence organisation: a new name and shape?
58. In view of CIO's lack of legitimacy in the eyes of the Zimbabwean people, it will be necessary-in addition to a wholesale shift in culture and focus-to consider restructuring the organisation and giving it a new name (or names).
59. Consideration will be given to the possibility of splitting CIO into two-establishing one agency for internal intelligence and another for the external side. A rigorous cost-benefit analysis will need to be conducted, but two obvious advantages of disaggregation are the dilution of a single centre of power (hitherto a ready-made instrument of authoritarian control-and possibly so in future) and its value as a symbolic break with the past.
60. The latter also pertains to a change of name. It is critical for Zimbabwe's new intelligence service(s) to regain the confidence of the people whom it is meant to serve. The service(s) must come to be viewed by the public as key democratic institution working in support of the national interest and the ordinary citizen. To achieve this, the requisite paradigm shift within the intelligence apparatus must be both emblematic and substantial. A change of name would be part of this process.
Special operations: a note
61. Beginning in Rhodesia and continuing beyond independence, CIO has become synonymous with ‘special operations' involving the abduction and assassination of
‘elements' deemed undesirable by the Rhodesian Front government and Zanu-PF. Such activities are inherently undemocratic and represent a denial of the rights of the individual to due and transparent process in accordance with the law. Special operations within Zimbabwe will be prohibited under the new Intelligence Service(s) Act-and consideration should be given to an express prohibition in a new people-driven constitution.
62. With regard to special operations outside Zimbabwe, it will be the task of the official review committee to consider whether such actions will be permissible in situations of extreme threat to national security.
CHAPTER 6: HUMAN RESOURCE ISSUES
Change and continuity
1. The breadth and depth of democratic reforms to be introduced by a new government do not imply arbitrary and large-scale demobilisation across the security services. This would be neither right nor wise. On one hand, there are many competent personnel whose skills will be of great value to a democratic Zimbabwe-particularly younger members of the services whose prospects of promotion have been reduced by politicisation-while, on the other hand, there are members of other groups who will need to be redeployed within the services or reintegrated into wider society.
2. The starting point of this process will be a human resources audit of the security services, including para-military organisations such as the Zanu-PF militia and members of the National Youth Service program.
3. Having met a series of minimum standards, including age, health and aptitude, all members of the services will have an equal opportunity to demonstrate their suitability for the positions and ranks which they hold-or which become available-when the reform process begins.
4. All members of the security services shall be treated with respect and dignity; reform will proceed in a spirit of partnership and there will be no discrimination. The overarching goal is to establish institutions that are professional, efficient, effective and broadly representative of Zimbabwean society.
5. It is not expected that the process of reform will be easy or trouble-free. Difficulties are inevitable given the troubled past of the security services and the political and administrative complexities of democratising these institutions. The new government will be committed to managing such problems and tensions in a constructive way.
Redeployment
6. Among those who have met minimum standards and who choose to remain as part of the security services, there will be some who, of necessity, are redeployed and placed in different roles. For example, all members of party militia (including operational war veterans groups) fall into this category given that party-political para-military forces will become illegal under a new constitution. However, new opportunities will be available within a professional environment and with remuneration that befits a professional security apparatus. In this way, a democratic government will provide fresh openings for personnel and will prevent the destabilising effects of rapid demobilisation.
7. Those who have been redeployed will receive specialist training in addition to the re- training that all members of the services will undergo as part of the democratisation program.
Demobilisation and reintegration
8. For those members of the services who fail to meet minimum standards, or who opt to rejoin civilian life, a comprehensive demobilisation and reintegration program will be designed. This program will involve training, advice and financial compensation, subject to economic constraints.
9. This process will take due regard of fair labour practice, transparency, the maintenance of expertise, the retention of people with a high level of performance or potential and the need to maintain operational readiness. Procedures and timeframes for rationalisation will be formulated in consultation with military and civilian personnel.
Part-time or reserve components of the security services
10. There will be part-time or reserve personnel for the defence forces and the police service.
Reserves are a cost-effective way of drawing on the skills of people who are former members of the regular forces or civilians who have specialist skills that are of value to the services. The reserves will be made up of volunteers who will receive attractive remuneration on a pro rata basis.
11. Individual reserve personnel will be drawn on as needed and will be particularly valuable in specialist roles (such as forensics) within the police service. The size and structure of the defence force's reserve units will be determined by the design and structure of the forces as a whole. These matters will be dealt with in the official review.
12. The defence force reserve will be organised, trained and equipped in such a way that they are available for deployment alongside regular force members according to the demands placed on the defence forces.
Developing the nation's human resources base: national service or apprenticeships?
13. National service has a twofold value: it is a form of youth job creation and it is a means by which talented men and women can gain skills that build and strengthen the national human resources base. Such skills can be used in the security services or they can be transferred into the civilian jobs market.
14. It must also be acknowledged that national service has negative elements. It is politically contentious and can be socially disruptive. As such, apprenticeships offer a possible alternative. The security services could offer to gifted candidates free or subsidised training-in both vocational and professional fields-at the end of which apprentices would receive a degree or diploma through an accredited educational institution and be required to work for the sponsoring service for a number of years. At the end of this period, they would be free to pursue a career in the security services or take up civilian employment.
15. The official review will be tasked with considering the pros and cons of national service versus an apprenticeship program.
CHAPTER 7: BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Defence and security budgets are typically the product of a range of considerations: the wealth and size of a country, competing demands on resources from different sectors of government and the population, prevailing and projected threat scenarios, the actual and anticipated role of the defence and security apparatus, and its doctrine and posture.
2. In the Zimbabwean context, spending on this apparatus has been skewed by the party- political orientation of the services-and there will be pressure to reduce defence and security spending in a new dispensation. Inter alia, points of pressure include:
The urgent requirement to focus financial requirements on basic socio-economic needs. A failure to meet these needs will generate conflict and instability.
The absence of a conventional military threat in the short to medium term.
Zimbabwe's non-aggressive posture and cooperative relations with neighbouring states.
3. At the same time, there are several reasons to avoid making radical cuts to the defence and security budget:
Rapid demobilisation is unnecessary and imprudent during the transition and reform phase.
The defence forces have to maintain long-term capability to fulfil their primary functions. It is not possible to create such capability from a low level of preparedness if a sudden need arises.
Zimbabwe is expected to play an active role in regional defence cooperation and peace support operations in Africa.
The objectives of the police and intelligence service(s) will be realigned with democratic priorities, but will nevertheless have responsibilities and face challenges that are ongoing.
The realignment of priorities and the program of professionalisation will, in fact, necessitate marked increases in spending in some areas (for example, in the procurement of modern equipment and the establishment of best-practice training programs).
4. In democratic societies the debate around defence and security spending is informed by public opinion and the professional views of the security services and line departments. The resolution of such debate, including the approval of major procurement projects, is the prerogative of parliament on an annual basis.
5. The official review will entail comprehensive long-range planning in the light of approved defence and security policy and the new political environment. The review will present, for the consideration of parliament and the public, detailed and well-motivated budgetary forecasts and proposals, specific policies regarding the provisioning of training and logistical resources, and the identification of appropriate technology to optimise the cost effectiveness of the core functions of the security services.
6. The official review will also include an examination of prevailing conditions in the security services with a view to rationalising current spending, eliminating waste and unnecessary duplication, and determining the most efficient means of managing human and material resources.
7. Prior to the completion of the official review, the government will provide parliament with the information and analysis required to make sound decisions on the defence and security budget.
Transparency, accountability and expenditure on defence and security: a note
8. In view of the substantial costs to the fiscus associated with the procurement of arms and equipment for defence and security, transparency and accountability in this sphere is critical.
9. A democratic government will implement a series of checks and balances to maximise value for the tax-paying public and to protect against corruption during the procurement process. Inter alia:
National anti-corruption legislation will provide an overarching deterrent and punitive framework in regard to irregular transactions-
- The definition of bribery will be sufficiently wide to encompass all such forms including ‘commissions' and ‘gifts'.
- Criminal liability will rest equally on both parties to a bribe.
- Rules regarding conflicts of interest and undue influence will be carefully formulated.
- Powerful monitoring and compliance mechanisms will apply to those with authority to purchase weapons and equipment.
- Tender processes, including reasons for decisions and all bids, will be publicised after completion.
- Regulations governing appointment to tender boards will be carefully formulated with a view to ensuring that appointees are qualified and subject to financial scrutiny.
- All procurement activities can be subject to investigation by the Defence and Security Inspectorate at any time.
APPENDIX: THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY, WEAPONS PROCUREMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
Defence industry and procurement
1. As alluded to above, the retention of a core force capability will entail the maintenance, upgrading and, where necessary, the replacement of weapons and equipment.
2. Zimbabwe has a small government-controlled defence industry function that is inefficient and uneconomic. Even in regard to basic equipment, it is unlikely that it can become relatively cost-effective given the competitive nature and vast economies-of-scale offered by the international defence industry. Further, many complex systems cannot be produced locally for technological reasons. With the lifting of arms embargoes against Zimbabwe, the Republic will be free to choose from a variety of western and eastern suppliers in accordance with its needs and budgetary constraints. The official review will incorporate recommendations on the types and origin of military equipment to be used by the defence forces.
Transparency
3. Taking account of the priorities outlined in this regard in Chapter 7, the official review committee will make detailed proposals on national anti-corruption legislation and on how tender processes and monitoring mechanisms will operate.
Principles governing conventional arms trade
4. It is important that Zimbabwe be regarded as a responsible user and distributor of defence materiel. The import and export of conventional arms, and the transit of arms through Zimbabwe, shall be subject to a control process and permit system whose precise form will be considered by the official review committee.
5. The government will support the export initiatives of a private defence industry, should it develop, by permitting it to honour contractual obligations which have been duly approved. However, the government reserves the right to prohibit or withdraw such support at any time should it be in conflict with international obligations or the national interest.
6. Arms control measures will be based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, international law, recognised international arms control systems, and a balance of economic, ethical, political, military and security considerations.
7. A legitimate arms control system will ensure a responsible approach to arms transfers. In this regard, Zimbabwe affirms the following:
That in accordance with the principles and aims of the United Nations Charter, a reduction of world military expenditure could have a significant positive impact for the social and economic development of all peoples.
That sovereign states have the inherent right of self-defence in terms of the UN Charter.
The need to ensure that conventional arms transfers are not used in violation of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
That excessive and destabilising conventional arms build-ups pose a threat to national, regional and international peace and security. Arms sales should continuously be evaluated and reviewed, especially with regard to countries in war-prone regions, in order to avoid the possible escalation of regional conflict.
The need for effective national mechanisms for controlling the transfer of conventional arms and related technologies.
8. In order to further the general aim of a cooperative and common approach to international security, Zimbabwe will promote and exercise due restraint in the transfer of conventional arms and related technologies by taking the following factors into account:
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country, with reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. Due consideration will be given especially in cases where political, social, cultural, religious and legal rights are seriously and systematically violated by the authorities of that country.
The security situation in the recipient country and surrounding region, in the light of existing tensions or armed conflicts.
The record of compliance by the recipient country with regard to international arms control agreements and treaties.
The nature and cost of the arms to be transferred in relation to the circumstances of the recipient country, including its legitimate security and defence needs and the objective of the least diversion of human and economic resources for armaments.
The degree to which arms sales are supportive of Zimbabwe's national and foreign interests.
9. Zimbabwe shall not transfer arms to countries which systematically violate or suppress human rights and fundamental freedoms. Further, Zimbabwe shall avoid arms transfers and trade which would be likely to:
Be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Contravene Zimbabwe's international commitments, in particular its obligations under arms embargoes adopted by the UN Security Council and other arms control agreements or responsibilities in terms of internationally accepted custom.
Contribute to the escalation of regional conflicts, endanger peace by introducing destabilising military capabilities into a region, or otherwise contribute to regional instability and negatively influence the balance of power.
Be diverted within the recipient country or re-exported for purposes contrary to the principles stated in this Chapter.
Have a negative impact on Zimbabwe's diplomatic and trade relations with other countries.
Support or encourage terrorism.
Be used for purposes other than the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient country.
Arms control process and structures
10. Conventional armaments and related technology may not be imported, transferred through Zimbabwe, or marketed or exported abroad without a duly approved permit.
11. Export permits will not be granted in the absence of an End-User Certificate (EUC) issued by the importing government. The EUC should indicate clearly the identity of the issuing authority, the specifications and quantity of the armaments in question, and a commitment by the purchaser not to resell or transfer the arms without the permission of the Zimbabwean government.
12. In the event of an importing country acting in breach of this commitment, the transgression will be publicised internationally. All further arms sales to that country shall be prohibited.
13. Applications for permits will be assessed on a case-by-case basis in relation to (i) a system of product classification and (ii) the principles and guidelines outlined above.
International arms control regimes and treaties
14. The new government will be committed to the international cause of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and related technology, as well as advanced missile systems and missiles as defined by the Missile Technology Control Regime).
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