Development needs history and patience: Cardo needs a few lessons in history

Michael Cardo, in his article The ANC's developmental doublethink, does his PhD in History a grave disservice for two reasons.

Firstly, he seems to ignore the history of "development", the "development discourse" and the emergence of the term "developmental state". Had he taken the time to study the developmental discourse in the last, say, 50 years, he would have soon discovered the metamorphosis, almost literally, of this science and practice. Erik Thorbecke's research paper, The Evolution of the Development Doctrine, 1950-2005, is a good starting point.

If anything we can deduce from Thorbecke's analysis then it is that i) the concept and practice of ‘development' has evolved; and, ii) that ‘doublethink' continues, even to this day, in the scientific field of developmental studies on what exactly ‘development' means. For example, for decades ‘development' was measured, and continues to be measured, in economic terms. There is an almost automatic equation of economic development and development. Worse still, economic ‘growth' means development. Even worst, economic ‘freedom', let's think of freedom in Sen's terms, was to come from the nationalisation of mines, as grossly suggested by some.

Importantly, one would want to suggest that national consensus be reached on what exactly we, as South Africans, not as members of the ANC, the DA, Cosatu, NUMSA, but as South Africans, mean when we use the term ‘development'; but more about national consensus in a bit. There is no one size fits all definition of development.

Furthermore, one would have thought that an academic of Cardo's calibre would interrogate the history of the developmental state. This is as interesting as it is exciting in a number of respects. Studying and starting the concept ‘developmental state', Chalmers Johnson, in his study of the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) came to two particular pointers, relevant to our discussion[i].

Johnson points out that the interventionist state specifically identified special areas in which it found it necessary to intervene and play a role. In the area of social services, it sought it necessary to improve health and education, hence improving human capital. In the area of the economy, it specifically identified sectors and/or industries that were succeeding and invested more funding, directly or indirectly, from the fiscus, to ensure that those sectors or industries grew (see our IPAP and New Growth Path in this respect).

The National Development Plan: Vision 2020 envisages doing just that in its 15 chapters. It is built on the premise that the state must be interventionist and that it cannot leave critical areas such as health, education, the development of industries and even social cohesion and transformation to the varies of the market. This is the contradiction and farce of parties such as the Democratic Alliance. They agree with the plan, with all its ingredients for a developmental state but completely rule out its founding philosophy of a state that must intervene.

Cardo points out this contradiction in his article when he insists on the establishment of "...a capable state whose role is developmental rather than dirigiste...". If only he had ventured into the history of a developmental state, as seen in the rise of the Asian Tigers for example, then he would find that at the heart of the notion of a developmental state is precisely a state that is dirigiste. But then again we might now even question the ‘doublethink' on ‘state'.

As a side point, this contradiction is a symptom of liberals still stuck in the Thatcher/Reagan mould. Even the World Bank, as far back as in 1997, had to recognise the need for the state to intervene in order to play a developmental role. History was simply repeating itself, this is what Hitler had done in pre-World War II Germany and what the Marshall Plan was all about. Free-market economics worked for Thatcher and Reagan, it crashed the world economy in 2008 and yet liberals, of the Cardo ilk, wish for us to go back to Egypt.

In addition, Chalmers Johnson also laid emphasis on the particular characters that bureaucrats had. Peter Evans[ii] later develops this into the notion of embedded autonomy. In deconstructing embedded autonomy, Evans notes that firstly these bureaucrats, though highly skilled, enjoy the institutional culture of gakubatsu. They have studied together, are formed together and are deployed to various strategic positions within the state, be it in government, parastatals and/or government agencies. Here they work for decades before being deployed to head-up certain industries and sectors. In the ANC, we call this cadre deployment.

However, Johnson and later Evans highlight the important role that social capital plays in building a developmental state. In this respect, reaching national consensus is of utmost importance and ensuring that we move beyond the cleavages of our society becomes imperative.

As a student of history, Cardo would hopefully appreciate the role that CODESA I and II played in the shaping of our Constitution, a document that hopefully, he will agree with me, unites and should unite all of us, despite our differences. Reaching consensus through these talks, over time, required all parties to move beyond their corners and bridge the gaps that infiltrated us through our history and circumstances. We could reach a democratic dispensation because of national consensus. We could ride off this wave of national consensus, with social capital in hand, by successfully hosting the Rugby and Soccer World Cups, among others.

National consensus but more importantly social capital, the child thereof, is the hinge in which the NDP works or not. Hence the ANC has assured others that it views the NDP as a working document, a document that is alive. It needs, whether you agree or not, the buy-in from the largest trade union in this country.

Consideration of all views is important even those parties not represented in Parliament. The DA might be arrogant, as they are in the Western Cape, and not give much attention and detail to consultation, participation and engagement but the ANC does place these high on its agenda for it wants to create national consensus. Together, in a non-partisan manner, we need to be patient in order to create a better future for our children.   

Secondly, given this national consensus, Cardo, as a good historian, would know that CODESA I and II was not the first time that South Africans crossed their divisions and sat down to talk to each other and reached consensus. Even though a major role player was absent, the government at the time, the Congress of the People held in Kliptown in 1955 sought to reach national consensus. It was not a gathering of the ANC alone, albeit a major role player. Imagine what the outcome would have been had the other major role player at the time, the National Party, joined the Congress of the People?

The Freedom Charter, the product of that national consensus project, is the gakubatsu of the National Democratic Revolution. Yes the NDR, like any theory on a developmental state, requires an interventionist state but it also espouses a free, non-racist, non-sexist, democratic South Africa in which everyone enjoys in the country's wealth. As a historian, Cardo might be surprised that at the very heart of our Constitution lies the lines of the Freedom Charter. To therefore suggest that the Freedom Charter, which guides the NDR, contradicts the Constitution and the NDP is therefore dangerously disingenuous.

Just as he does his PhD in History a disservice, Michael Cardo does Amertya Sen' definition of ‘development as freedom' a gross injustice. As a student of development, one shudders to think that Sen could have suggested that the state must not be developmental, and all that means with its history, and that the state must therefore leave the circumstances, which create or hinder opportunities for the development of capabilities, untouched. Even in the capabilities approach, correctly as Cardo points out espoused by the NDP, an interventionist and therefore NDR approach needs to take place.  

There is no better example of doublethink and doubletalk in South Africa than the DA's opposition to transformation. We have seen it question this term as it has flip-flopped on employment equity, broad-based Black economic empowerment and land reform. The DA fundamentally opposes transformation and therefore will not agree to the objectives of the NDR. It uses the NDP as a launch-pad, nothing else, to attack the NDR because it dismisses the ideals of a non-racist, non-sexist, free and democratic South Africa where all share in the country's wealth. It wants to perpetuate past privilege. If anything, like Cardo, it professes to acknowledge history but in the same stroke dismiss it.

Yet what the NDP, based on the Constitution and the NDR, calls for is a national consensus and just as the government has to be patient with some in Cosatu and the SACP, so too the ANC government will be patient with the DA. For as with Cardo, and his spin, we have to be patient if we wish to build a capable and developmental state.

Wesley Seale has a Masters in Governance and Development from the University of Sussex, UK and is the Policy Development Officer for the ANC in the Western Cape.

He writes in his personal capacity.

Footnotes:

[i] See Johnson, C. 1982. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975. Stanford: Stanford University Press

[ii] See Evans, P. 1989. "Predatory, Developmental, and Other Apparatuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State". Sociological Forum. Vol. 4 No. 4. Special Issue: Comparative National Development: Theory and Facts for the 1990's. pp561-587

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