Speech by Helen Zille to the annual meeting of the Convocation of Stellenbosch University, Thursday, 21 April 2022

A Bookmark in the Pages of History

Goeienaand, good evening, molweni,

Allow me to recognise with thanks the presence of the Vice Rector, the Mayors of Stellenbosch and Cape Town and all other dignitaries. There is one useful thing I have learnt from the ANC -- the phrase “all protocol observed” which I use tonight in the interests of saving time.

The purpose of my talk, in the thirty minutes I have, is to try to make sense of where South African politics are right now and, briefly, at the end, to say what I think the implications are for universities.

Ek respekteer natuurlik die feit dat die konvokasie van ‘n universiteit mense van verskillende politieke oortuigings insluit. As ‘n politikus sal ek uiteraard oor die politiek praat, maar ek sal my bes doen om so objektief as moontlik te wees oor die huidige stand van sake in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek, sowel as oor die rol van universiteite in die algemeen – en spesifiek oor die rol van die Universiteit van Stellenbosch. Ek sal ook meer as gelukkig wees as daar ‘n kort bespreking of debat na my toespraak plaasvind.

Hierdie gaan ‘n analitiese en uitdagende toespraak wees – met ander woorde, presies die soort toespraak wat ek dink ‘n gehoor van universiteit-alumni verdien.

I have 20 points to make in 30 minutes, so that will be about a minute-and-a-half per point, although I have not divided each into equally timed sections.

Point Number 1: The 2021 Local Government Election was historic because it signalled the beginning of the end of the single party dominant system. The ANC fell below 50% nationally for the first time. It also fell under 50% in every major City. Although, at a national and provincial level, it is still the biggest party by far, its decline and fall will continue, first slowly, and escalating with time.

Point Number 2: As soon as the ANC loses its grip on power in any sphere of government, starting at local level, it loses control of the patronage networks it needs to hold itself together through money, jobs and tenders. Without control of these, it starts to crumble. This is most clearly illustrated in Cape Town, where the ANC – which previously governed both the City and Province – has now fallen below 20% of the vote and only has 3 functional branches left in the City.

The same goes for Stellenbosch, which is an exemplar of good governance and innovation and reduced the ANC to only 17% in last year’s election.

In Cape Town, the ANC’s slide started with the DA’s victory in a 7-party coalition back in 2006, and 15 years later the ANC has been flattened, not only in the City, but throughout the province. A similar process has now started in all the major cities and many towns throughout South Africa, albeit in the context of their unique local dynamics.

Punt nommer 3: Die DA is lankal nie meer net ‘n opposisieparty nie. Ons is nou in beheer van munisipaliteite in sewe van Suid-Afrika se nege provinsies. Ons het vyftien regerings met volstrekte meerderhede gewen, in vier provinsies, en is die grootste party in ‘n verdere twee-en-twintig koalisies, en ook die kleiner vennoot in nog ‘n koalisie. Nie minder nie as twintig miljoen mense lewe nou onder DA-beheerde regering.

Die punt is eenvoudig: ons kan en ons wen inderdaad gereeld verkiesings, en ons lei regerings. Ons is die leidende party in koalisies in al die groot stede van Gauteng – van Johannesburg tot Tshwane, Ekurhuleni en Mogale City. Min mense besef waarskynlik hierdie is ‘n veel beter uitkoms as na die 2016 verkiesing, ten spyte van die feit dat ons ‘n effens laer stempersentasie gekry het.

Dit is omdat, op die mees fundamentele vlak, is beheer oor regerings die uitkoms waarna ons streef tydens verkiesings. Die 2021 plaaslike regeringsverkiesing het ons in staat gestel om hierdie geleentheid in Gauteng met albei hande aan te gryp. Daarmee tesame kom natuurlik die enorme verantwoordelikheid om hierdie komplekse koalisies doeltreffend te bestuur – ‘n tema waarna ek kortliks sal terugkeer.

Point Number 4: Despite the ANC’s setback in the local government elections, Cyril Ramaphosa will in all probability survive the ANC elective conference in December this year, and run for a second term as South Africa’s president in 2024. But the mood in the country has changed profoundly since he came into office.

Ramaphosa has not been the country’s saviour as so many commentators predicted. On the contrary, under him the ANC has been confirmed as the thoroughly venal and corrupt organisation it is, despite the presence of a few decent people. Under former President Jacob Zuma, commentators presented it as a basically good organisation – the party of Mandela – marred by a few corrupt leaders at the top. That cover is now completely blown. And with it, any hope that President Ramaphosa can be his party’s Messiah. The ANC is unsalvageable.

Point Number 5 is a crucial one: The most important shift that has occurred in our politics over the past ten years involves diverging approaches to our Constitution. A decade ago, the Constitution, despite its various shortcomings, was still seen as the foundation of our social compact, across all parties and sectors of society. That has now changed.

The key difference between the two contending ANC factions – RET on the one hand, and the “New Dawn” ticket on the other – lies in their approach to the Constitution and constitutionalism. The RET position was most clearly set out in a recent article by Lindiwe Sisulu, in which she attacked the Constitution, and the role played by the Constitutional Court, in unambiguous terms.

Shortly after that the Premier of KwaZulu Natal, Sihle Zikalala, repeated her arguments, on Human Rights Day, no less.

Sisulu’s article was not an aberration. Her attack on the Constitution accurately represents the views of the RET faction that, together with the EFF, want to see South Africa return to a Parliamentary Democracy, in which a simple majority can pass any law it likes, unfettered by constraints such as the Bill of Rights interpreted by the Constitutional Court.

In essence, the battle for the Soul of South Africa is now crystallising in the starkest possible terms: it is a battle between Constitutionalism and Majoritarianism. Across party lines, it is waged between those who believe the essence of democracy is placing limits on the unfettered power of the majority, versus those who believe that democracy involves winning and using power with minimal constraints. The former, constitutionalist, position is most clearly embodied by the DA, while the latter position is most clearly represented by the EFF, which believes that the majority party should control the state, and that the state should control society – the very antithesis of constitutionalism.

The ANC is deeply divided on this issue.

When all is stripped away, this will be the most important single battle for South Africa’s future. In a more sloganized form, it can be presented as Democrats vs Demagogues.

Of course, we have significant protection against the demagogic drive to do away with constitutionalism, because the foundational clauses of the Constitution are entrenched by a Parliamentary Super-Majority of 75%, and the rest by a two-thirds majority. Nevertheless, events over the past ten years, particularly “state capture,” have demonstrated that corrupt leaders can neutralise state institutions, and undermine the Constitution, without changing a single word of it. Constitutionalism is profoundly vulnerable to those who do not even recognise the validity of the rules, let alone play by them, as the July riots in KwaZulu Natal last year illustrated.

But then, at least we still have the means to fight back using constitutional rights, like speech and media freedom, and harnessing the very same institutions to resist their capture. Examples include the cases we have taken against former President Zuma, Judge Hlophe and Public Protector Mkhwebane for clear constitutional violations. The point is that the battle is still being waged, and is not lost, as long as we keep on fighting, and have the courage to do so.

There are many who take issue with my characterisation of the key contestation in our politics. They argue that the battle around the Constitution pales into insignificance in comparison with unemployment and poverty. To which the answer is: if we abandon constitutionalism, and with it the rule of law, in favour of unfettered majoritarian power, we will destroy any chance of achieving the investment and economic growth South Africa needs to lower the rising tide of unemployment. Living up to our constitutional vision is not a diversion, nor an obstacle to saving South Africa. It is the only way we can do so.

Punt nommer ses: die stryd tussen Demokrate en Demagoë word bedek met die taal van ras, wat ‘n veel meer emosionele en verstaanbare argument is vir vele kiesers as debatte oor die Grondwet. In sy eenvoudigste vorm voer hierdie ras-argument aan dat die Grondwet wit monopolie-kapitaal en “wit belange” beskerm ten koste van die meeste Suid-Afrikaners. Die keersy van die argument is natuurlik dat enige swart persoon wat opstaan vir grondwetlike waardes, insluitend regters van die Grondwethof, meelopers is van wit monopolie-kapitaal. Hierdie gevaarlike ideologie is presies wat Lindiwe Sisulu se artikel bevorder het. Alhoewel baie mense tereg ontsteld was daaroor, het nie almal die werklike betekenis besef nie. Enige persoon wat sosiale media gebruik sal sien dat dieselfde argument gereeld daar geopper word.

Punt nommer sewe:

Die herlewing van die idee dat ras bepaal wie goed en wie sleg is, wat reg en verkeerd is, word ongelukkig nie deur meeste kommentators gesien as ‘n afwyking van die nie-rassige ideaal nie, en as die ernstige bedreiging wat dit is nie.

In plaas daarvan om hierdie verwoestende idee te sien vir wat dit is, word hierdie nuwe ras-politiek dikwels voorgehou as progressief, en word dit sterk ondersteun deur ‘n internasionale beweging met sy oorsprong aan universiteite dwarsoor die Engelssprekende wêreld. Volgens hierdie beweging is alle instellings, en die somtotaal van Westerse waardes en kultuur beskou as die gereedskap van wit patriargale oorheersing.

This movement, and its ideology known as Critical Race Theory, regards white, male heterosexuals (in particular) as the source of all evil, intent on preserving their power through the dominant institutions and structures of society. These cannot therefore be reformed. They must be defeated and replaced.

This is why the Free State ANC Premier and her colleagues, in the year 2022, sought to blame the fact that roads, sewerage, electricity, and water infrastructure are collapsing in that province, on Jan van Riebeeck's arrival in Table Bay in 1652. This nonsense is not an aberration. Critical Race Theory is the reason why more and more politicians brazenly claim that South Africa’s problems arose when the first whites landed on this continent, just as their American equivalents support the revolutionary goal of overturning all institutions that they argue were built on colonialism and slavery. In this lexicon, Constitutionalism is equated with colonial domination.

The anti-constitutional movement also finds strong alignment with, and is indeed sustained by, so-called “progressive” forces on many university campuses in South Africa, where Critical Theory in general, and Critical Race Theory in particular (which is best described by the term racial Marxism) are disguised by benign sounding phrases such as “transformation”. Slogans, such as “Black Lives Matter” don’t actually convey the meaning we would all fundamentally agree with – that black lives, like all lives, obviously do matter.

Instead, as an instrument of ideology, the slogan means something quite different. It reflects the conviction that all institutions, values and practices of Western society conspire against Black people as if their lives do not matter, and therefore, for black lives to actually matter, these institutions must be overthrown. This is just one example of the subversion of language, as it is generally understood, to advance a political agenda inimical to constitutionalism. Without being paranoid, we must understand what we are facing.

Point Number 8: The battle between the constitutionalists and the majoritarians will not be a simple and easy one. It will not be waged between two large contesting power blocks, represented by two large opposing political parties. On the contrary, our politics are increasingly fragmenting, often along lines that have nothing to do with the central issue at stake.

Een van die grootste risiko’s wat ons in die gesig staar is die fragmentering van ons politiek, as gevolg van die proporsionele-stelsel wat ons gebruik vir ons verkiesings. Die voordeel van die stelsel is dat politieke minderhede nie uitgesluit word nie, maar die nadeel is dat dit die vorming van hordes politieke partye aanmoedig, met elkeen wat streef om net genoeg stemme te kry om ‘n paar setels te wen – hetsy in die plaaslike raad, of in die nasionale Parlement. In Suid-Afrika word hierdie neiging verder versterk omdat daar geen drempel is – van byvoorbeeld vyf persent – om ‘n setel te kry nie.

In Suid-Afrika kan ‘n kandidaat soms ‘n setel met slegs ‘n breukdeel van ‘n persentasiepunt kry, en dit is waarom ons opeindig met soveel klein partytjies, veral in munisipaliteite – ‘n tendens wat waarskynlik binnekort op nasionale vlak herhaal mag word.

Verskeie van hierdie partye is die produk van een individu se persoonlike ambisie, dikwels sonder enige groter politieke visie. Tog is dit hierdie persoon, of ‘n klein groepie soortgelyke individue, wat uiteindelik die magsbalans kan hou in koalisies, en ‘n regering tot ‘n val kan bring as dit in hul persoonlike belang is. Hierdie is ‘n ernstige bedreiging vir ons koalisieregerings.

As ‘n proporsionele stelsel neig tot oormatige fragmentering, ontstaan die vraag natuurlik oor hoe ons hierdie fragmentering vermy het in Kaapstad en die Wes-Kaap. Ons het die ANC in Kaapstad uit die kussings gelig deur middel van ‘n sewe-party koalisie. Daarna het die ANC versplinter, terwyl die DA gekonsolideer het, en verskeie kleiner partye geabsorbeer het.

Hierdie proses was nie sonder groot uitdagings nie, maar oor die algemeen was die voordele groter as die nadele, en aangehelp deur verskeie faktore, insluitend die Wes-Kaap se unieke demografiese samestelling. Maar die DA is ook gehelp deur die feit dat die grootste koalisie vennoot altyd die handelsmerk van die koalisie dra – ten goede of ten kwade. In Kaapstad se geval was dit ten goede. Mense kon die DA verskil ervaar, en drie jaar later het hulle gestem om ons ‘n volstrekte meerderheid te gee in die hele provinsie, gevolg deur agtereenvolgende en beslissende meerderhede in die stad en in verskeie ander munisipaliteite soos Stellenbosch.

That is the best-case scenario, which is going to be very difficult to replicate in other provinces. An enormous amount is riding on the success of DA coalitions in different cities, but sometimes the sad reality is that our own coalition partners act as our biggest opponents. We may have 26 opposition coalition governments in power as I address you this evening, but the reality of politics is that we are unlikely to have all of them intact by the time 2024 rolls around.

Point Number 9: The next step for Cape Town, Stellenbosch and the Western Cape is to drive the democratic advantage to the next level, and to force far greater functional federalism by taking over the functions of state that the national government continues to fail to perform.

Geordin Hill-Lewis, Kaapstad se nuwe burgemeester, en oud-Matie, Advokaat Gesie van Deventer, Stellenbosch se burgemeester, het reeds die voortou in hierdie proses geneem deur saam met die privaatsektor te werk om Eskom se monopolie op elektrisiteit opwekking, sowel as Transnet se monopolie oor ons vervalle spoordiens, en die SAPS se monopolie oor ons mislukkende polisiediens uit te daag. Op elk van hierdie gebiede is DA regerings besig om die grense van plaaslike regeringsmagte te verskuif deur ‘n wetlike saak uit te maak daarvoor dat goed-regeerde DA munisipaliteite die dienste moet oorneem wat die falende nasionale regering nie kan lewer nie. Die volgende stap in hierdie proses behoort te wees dat die Provinsie beheer oor ons hawens neem.

Namate Kaapstad en die Wes-Kaap ‘n weg baan na funksionele federalisme, sal ander provinsies hopelik volg deur ANC oorheersing te verbreek in die 2024 verkiesing. As ons dit regkry, sal die versugting vir groter federalisme ook in ander provinsies soos Gauteng en KwaZulu-Natal begin opklink. Hierdie is ‘n perd wat ons dringend, doelbewus en vasberade moet opsaal.

Punt nommer tien: Terwyl die DA werk om funksionele federalisme ‘n werklikheid te maak, is voormalige President Thabo Mbeki besig om deur die land te reis na die ANC se mees onstuimige streke, waar hy probeer daardie organisasie te verenig. Tydens ‘n onlangse besoek aan die Vrystaat het hy gewaarsku dat as die ANC uitmekaar val, Suid-Afrika onregeerbaar sal word.

Selfs terwyl ons onverpoos werk om die ANC uit die kussings te lig, behoort ons hierdie waarskuwing ernstig op te neem. Die groot risiko is dat, namate die ANC uitmekaar val, lei dit tot die geboorte van ‘n hele reeks kleiner partytjies – baba ANC’s – wat elk onder die beheer van ‘n plaaslike sterkman staan wat probeer om net genoeg stemme te kry om die magsbalans te bepaal en sy eie patronaatskap to bevorder.

Point number 11: As the ANC shatters, it is essential to work towards the consolidation of the constitutionalists, across party lines. This is much harder than it sounds, because there are many fundamental differences between the various parties who claim to support the Constitution. One of the most crucial is whether it is acceptable and desirable for the state to use race as a determinant of access to resources and opportunities.

The DA rejects that approach outright, and our economic justice policy is based on non-racial forms of redress, which we think are crucial. Many other parties that claim to be constitutionalists, still argue for race to be the arbiter of redress – which we believe can only end up as a cover for corruption to benefit a political elite, in other words replicating the corruption synonymous with the ANC. True empowerment of those who need it most can only ever succeed if done on the basis of non-racialism. After all, social grants and pensions are already dispensed on a non-racial basis; and taxes are levied on the basis of income, not race.

These differences are significant, and make it unlikely that all parties that claim to support the Constitution will be able to consolidate into a single bloc. But the bigger we can grow a centrist party that champions constitutional values, the rule of law, non-racialism, and market economics, the more we can enable the country to succeed. That is the space we occupy. And where we win, we force through greater functional federalism.

Punt nommer twaalf: In die konteks van toenemende politieke fragmentering, en met die ANC wat net verder verswak, gaan enige party wat twintig tot dertig persent van die stemme trek, ‘n invloedryke mag word in die Suid-Afrikaanse politiek. Onder proporsionele stelsels soos ons s’n is dit inderdaad uiters ongewoon vir enige politieke party om meer as dertig persent te kry – wat nog te sê van vyftig persent.

Vir die meeste van die vyftien jaar waartydens Angela Merkel aan die hoof gestaan het van die Duitse politiek het haar Christin-Demokratiese Party tussen twintig tot dertig persent gekry, en het sy regeer deur middel van koalisies. As Suid-Afrika se veranderende politieke landskap, waar geen party binnekort meer as vyftig persent gaan kry nie, kan uitloop op ‘n situasie waar ‘n paar sterk partye tussen vyftien persent en vyf-en-dertig persent elk kry, kan ons begin praat oor betekenisvolle koalisieregerings soos in ander lande met stabiele proporsionele stelsels. Maar as ons politieke landskap aanhou fragmenteer, gaan ons opeindig met hordes klein partytjies sonder enige ideologiese onderbou wat ons grondwetlike bestel gaan bedreig.

Punt nommer dertien: Ons sien reeds die gevolge van oormatige fragmentasie in ons koalisies in die groot stede. In Johannesburg het ons ‘n nege-party koalisie. In Ekurhuleni het ons ‘n sewe-party minderheidskoalisie, wat beteken dat, al stem al die koalisiepartye saam, ons steeds nie by vyftig persent kan uitkom nie. En ek het sopas teruggekom van Nelson Mandelabaai, waar daar enorme druk op die DA is om ‘n tien-party koalisie te vorm om die ANC-koalisie uit die kussings te lig.

Ek wil net vir ‘n oomblik praat oor waarom ons deelneem aan minderheidskoalisies soos in Ekurhuleni en nog agt ander munisipaliteite. Ons is in hierdie posisie omdat ons ‘n burgemeesterskandidaat genomineer het, en die EFF besluit het om vir ons kandidaat eerder as vir die ANC s’n te stem. Dit het gebeur sonder dat ons ooit vir die EFF daarvoor gevra het, of ooit daaroor onderhandel het.

Soos hulle in Engels sê: Unrequested, and with no strings attached.

Ons het die wen gevat, maar ons is onder geen illusies oor die EFF se motiewe nie. Hulle wil vir Cyril Ramaphosa verswak. Hulle doel is om die RET-faksie van die ANC te ondersteun en die skuld vir die ANC se ondergang op Ramaphosa te pak.

Dit is juis omdat ons hierdie agenda verstaan dat ons die geleentheid moet aangryp om kiesers te konsolideer rondom ons verbintenis tot grondwetlike waardes deur te probeer wys, waarookal ons aan regering kom, al is dit deur komplekse koalisies, dat ons die party van goeie regering is.

Point 14: Let me return to Nelson Mandela Bay, where the DA emerged as the biggest party, with a very respectable 40% of the votes in last year’s election, against 39% of the ANC. In the proportional system, it meant that we both got the same number of seats in the council: 48 each. But to get to the 61 seats, just 13 more seats, needed for a simple majority, we need nine coalition partners. That means working with nine tiny parties that can each hold a gun to our head in a coalition government every time any single one of them does not get their way. That situation is surely the very definition of ungovernability.

Point 15: Increasingly, civil society organisations – the organised business community, trade unions, church organisations – are seeing the corrosive consequences of this level of instability in Nelson Mandela Bay, and they are putting pressure on the DA to enter a grand coalition with the ANC. The argument goes that these two parties, between them, won 80% of the vote and need to put our differences aside to bring stability and good governance to the Metro.

It is a beguiling argument, but is really not the quick fix it seems, because the ANC in Nelson Mandela Bay is the party exposed in that frightening book by a once-loyal ANC cadre, Dr Chippy Olver, called How to Steal a City. Allowing the ANC back into power could potentially mean opening up the looting channels once more, and we have to think very carefully before we take that risk.

The crucial question in politics, as Bill Clinton reminded us, is “Compared to What”? In this case, we must compare the risks of a DA Grand Coalition with the ANC, to the risks of trying to hold together a fragile coalition of 10 parties, and to the risk of leaving the current ANC coalition in government.

Up till now, we thought the safer option was for us to stay out of government and to be a good opposition – but the downside of this is that we are increasingly being accused by a growing chorus of voters of not taking our responsibility seriously as the party that won the most votes in the local government election. There is simply no point in saying to voters: you voted for this mess, now live with it. What is more, this state of affairs in Nelson Mandela Bay foreshadows some of the very difficult decisions we will have to make in various provinces after the 2024 election.

Punt nommer sestien: Ons politiek wentel al hoe meer, nie om ‘n keuse tussen goed en sleg nie, maar rondom die soeke na die mins-slegste opsie. Nelson Mandelabaai vergestalt hierdie situasie. In ons soeke na die mins-slegste opsie, word ons gelei deur die volgende vraag: watter opsie sterk die hand van die blok ten gunste van ons grondwetlike bestel? Hierdie vraag hoef natuurlik nie eers gevra te word in volwasse demokrasieë nie, omdat byna alle rolspelers van dwarsoor die politieke spektrum die land se grondwetlike bestel as vanselfsprekend aanvaar. Maar in ons land word die Grondwet al minder as vanselfsprekend aanvaar, wat beteken dat ons selfs meer werk het om te doen. Ons is steeds besig om ons demokratiese fondament vas te messel.

Punt sewentien: Die implikasie is dat die Grondwetlikes moet deelneem aan elke stryd, en dat ons moet wen oral waar ons kan – in elke organisasie, instelling en ook universiteit – om ‘n kritieke massa te bou téén diegene wat ons grondwetlike bestel wil vernietig in hul soeke na absolute mag. Universiteite soos Stellenbosch is nie vrygestel van hierdie uitdaging nie.

Point 18: So, what does this all mean for universities? It means recognising what is going on in our society as a whole, understanding what is at stake, and how the battles within their own institutions align with the political forces arraigned against constitutionalism. It means challenging prevailing orthodoxies in the academy, that are now no longer anti-establishment. The orthodoxy of Critical Race Theory has become the new establishment, and a profoundly dangerous one at that. In several of our institutions of higher learning the battle seems to have already been lost, as David Benatar’s book: “The Fall of the University of Cape Town” tragically attests. The former Vice-Chancellor tried to appease these forces, and pander to their demands, with grave consequences.

We have to be up for the fight, and believe me it is not easy. So many people are terrified of the labels that are attached to those of us who defend constitutional values and seek the truth in this time of ideological madness. But the price of freedom is not only eternal vigilance. It is also enormous courage.

Point 19: The idea of the Civic University, engaging with organisations and practical realities beyond the walls of the ivory tower and partnering organisations in civil society, is an important and noble one. But without a broad social compact, and a common core of shared societal values, this role of the University becomes difficult at best, and positively dangerous at worst, if it aligns the institution to organisations and movements dedicated to undermining the institutions on which constitutionalism depends, as the foundations of the open society, which is the only context in which universities can flourish.

Right now, certainly at many universities across the country, the anti-constitutionalists are winning, whether the university authorities recognise this or not. And an insidious ideology, with a progressive veneer, is providing the perfect cover.

I sincerely hope that Stellenbosch can still avoid the illiberal fate that has befallen many other universities by becoming a truly open university, in the same sense the Karl Popper used the term “Open Society”. In other words, to create a context for the genuine contestation of ideas, where it is not only safe, but encouraged, for anyone to express and defend a position, even if they are in a minority of one. It means firmly resisting the imposition of ideologies that claim to have all the answers to society’s ills.

It means resisting the dangerous dogma that excellence, merit, non-racialism and the rule-of-law are merely constructs of white patriarchal domination, designed to preserve the status quo. These values are fundamental to the very notion of what a university is.

If we are going to import foreign ideologies and apply them to our own circumstances (ironically in the name of anti-colonialism), then let us at least apply them for the purposes they were originally intended -- to advance the rights and interests of marginalised minorities, not to entrench the authoritarian rule of an overwhelming majority.

Die voor-die-hand-liggende kwessie in hierdie verband, is die reg op moedertaalonderrig. Ek gee nie voor dat ek ‘n mandaat het om namens ‘n taalgroep te praat nie. Maar ek het wel ‘n mandaat – en ook ‘n plig – om grondwetlike regte te verdedig. Soos ons weet, is daar baie Suid-Afrikaners wat nie aandring op onderrig in hul moedertaal nie. Baie verkies eenvoudig Engels. Maar waar ‘n beduidende groep mense moedertaalonderrig vereis en wanneer dit inderdaad prakties moontlik is soos op Stellenbosch, moet ons daardie reg verdedig en bevorder. Dit is veral waar in die konteks van ‘n provinsie soos die Wes-Kaap, waar Afrikaans die meerderheidstaal is, en waar al drie ander universiteite reeds geheel en al verengels het.

Die feit dat sommige taalgroepe nie die reg tot moedertaal onderrig wil opeis nie, beteken glad nie dat ander dit nie mag doen nie. ‘n Reg is immers iets wat jy nie op mense kan afdwing nie. Dis iets wat nie weggevat mag word nie.

Al probeer hulle ook hóé hard, kan geen universiteit vrygestel word van die ideologiese stryd wat woed vir die Siel van Suid-Afrika nie. Die dinge wat gebeur op plekke soos Stellenbosch word beide beïnvloed deur die groter politieke dinamika wat ek vanaand bespreek het, en terselfdertyd het die kultuur wat geskep word op universiteite ‘n enorme impak op die wyer samelewing.

Point 20: Some years from now, we will look back at the death of ANC domination in the 2021 local government election as a turning point in our country’s history. Although many might not realise it yet, the old certainties are busy melting away. The days of a single political party controlling everything from electricity generation to the ideology of our public universities, are fast coming to an end.

In its place is rising an often-confusing cacophony of political actors, movements and trends. The task of leadership in a moment like this is to see the wood for the trees, and understand the forces that are shaping our society. In the DA, we are using this moment of flux to consolidate a powerful societal bloc around constitutional values, non-racialism, the rule of law and a market economy. But we also know that, at the other end, the EFF, the RET, many of the newfound tiny parties and their allies at universities are using the collapse of the ANC to mobilise against our constitutional vision.

Aan watter kant staan die Universiteit van Stellenbosch? Ek wens hierdie was ‘n maklike en eenvoudige vraag om te beantwoord, maar ongelukkig, soos met die meeste universiteite, is die antwoord nie duidelik nie.

As Mikhail Gorbachev famously remarked: history has no blank pages. The golden thread through the history of universities, whose role is to push back the limitations of knowledge and understanding, must, by definition, be to oppose authoritarian and totalitarian ideologies, that falsely claim to have all the answers to society’s problems.

When universities fail that crucial test, history judges them harshly.

Those who obsess too much about atoning for the sins of the past, are often blinded to the fact that they are merely repeating them in the present. Race-based ideologies, as we should have learnt by now, are particularly dangerous.

I wish the Convocation of the University of Stellenbosch the very best as you play your part in determining how the pages of history will answer these crucial questions for this important institution. Because that answer will be fundamental to the future of South Africa.

Baie dankie.