OPINION

African nationalism’s pathological obsession

An analysis of ANC of Mbeki’s response to the 2002 elections in Zimbabwe (22 March 2002)

Just before last week's presidential election in Zimbabwe, the Economist warned that Robert Mugabe was trying to establish a new concept of democracy in Africa-"a concept so grotesque that it must not be allowed to take root as a standard for other countries".

With Mugabe's triumph, and recognition of that victory by most Southern African states (including the ruling African National Congress in South Africa), it seems this new standard has been endorsed by much of the sub-continent. More accurately, perhaps, an already existing standard finally has been exposed - and, most disturbingly of all, in South Africa.

It was entirely predictable that Thabo Mbeki's ANC would accept the legitimacy of Mugabe's victory. Following the 2000 parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe - which were also characterised by rampant intimidation and vote-rigging - Mbeki moved quickly to recognise the legitimacy of Zanu-PF's victory, warning the opposition at the time to "respect and abide by the outcome as the expression of the democratic will of the people of Zimbabwe".

Although Mbeki has yet to directly pronounce himself on the result of the Presidential poll, various ANC spokespersons have. Smuts Ngonyama, a member of Mbeki's inner circle - a man known for saying what Mbeki is thinking -said, "The people of Zimbabwe have spoken and let their will be supported by all". If Mbeki is contemplating anything, it is not the freeness and fairness of the poll, but how, yet again, to throw dust in the eyes of the West.

With the ANC's endorsement of Mugabe's triumph, South African democracy itself has entered a twilight state. On the one hand, the ANC is ab democratically elected government, enjoying the majority of support in South Africa. On the other, the ANC's response to the Zimbabwe election suggests, logically, they would not respect the democratic rules of the game if their own majority were ever threatened. South Africa, thus, will have ‘free and fair' election' for as long as there is no prospect of an alternation of government.

All this is perfectly consistent with the ANC's political morality as expounded in numerous internal party documents. Since Mbeki's accession to the party presidency in 1997, the ANC leadership (while grudgingly acknowledging the right of opposition parties to exist in South Africa) has made it clear that the desire by the opposition to displace the ruling party in power is a "reactionary, dangerous and opportunist position".

For Mbeki, the ANC derives its entitlement to power not from its democratic mandate - though this is both desirable in itself, and an important instrument for achieving its goals - but from the party's 'historic mission' of transforming South African society and overcoming the "legacy of colonialism".

This vanguard role requires the party to mobilise, conscientise and, if need be, coerce the black majority it is 'meant to lead'. It is only the ANC that can correctly discern the interests of the masses, and protect them from manipulation by the forces of white reaction. Without the ANC, the black majority would be left "leaderless and rudderless, and thus open to manipulation against their own interests". This is not an interpretation of ANC intentions: it is spelt out in detail in various documents issued in the party's name.

The formula Mbeki uses to describe a "transformed" South Africa is one where every institution, from the national sports teams, to the public service and its management structures, and ultimately to the ownership of the means of production, is layered according to the country's racial composition. Whites, in other words, are to be quarantined in the ghetto of their demographic inferiority.

Mbeki, however, is very sensitive to the constraints the ANC operates under, and is only too aware that at this point in time any "great leap forward" in South Africa-especially in terms of ownership-will  "ultimately result in the collapse of the economy and country and the political victory of the forces of the right".

The ANC can afford to pursue the path of transformation gradually, even leisurely, because the one resource they have in abundance is time. It is this patience that Western governments have confused with moderation and reformism. But while Mbeki is patient, he is also relentless. Within the public service, and increasingly elsewhere, the ANC has implemented aggressive Africanisation measures and steadily tightened the party's grip on the levers of power.

It is this worldview that helps explain Mbeki's tacit support for Mugabe over the past two years. Whatever differences Mbeki may have with Mugabe (and there are many) the ANC sees itself in Mugabe's Zanu-PF: both are vanguard parties deriving their transcending legitimacy from their goal of dismantling the "colonial legacy".

For Mbeki the Zimbabwean "crisis" was not about democracy, but about an African nationalist movement which had run out of time. In a revealing address to the South African parliament on 20 September 2000, he stated, "What we have to help to address in Zimbabwe is... the land dispossession of the majority of the people of Zimbabwe that took place as a result of the colonial system". Mbeki added that the reason he was not going to "stand on platforms and denounce the government of Zimbabwe" was that such an approach "is not going to result in addressing this colonial legacy".

The ANC and Mbeki regard Zimbabwe's opposition, the Movement for Democratic Change, as anathema. It is the kind of opposition they fear most emerging in South Africa - one which enjoys the support of the majority of black and white citizens.

If such an opposition were allowed to come to power in Zimbabwe, then - as the ANC sees it - the "historic mission" would be thwarted, whites would be allowed to keep their land, and the "legacy of colonialism" would be entrenched. Whites would have won. As a South African election observer told the Washington Post, "I don't deny that there are problems here, but I don't want to see Mugabe lose this election. He is still a hero to so many of us and I don't want to see the white man beat him, ever."

Why does Mbeki persist with his de-facto support for Mugabe and the land seizure programme now that the terrible consequences of those policies are so apparent? Why would Mbeki rather have the rand trade at 40% of its real value and a neighbouring country descend into autarky than allow the white minority in that country to keep its patrimony?

It is a question that could equally legitimately be asked of Mbeki's own racial policies in South Africa. The de-facto prohibition on any white advancement within the state, the abolition of individual merit, the appointment of people solely on the basis of race or party affiliation, have all resulted in pervasive institutional decay.

Yet despite the fact that the negative consequences of the collapse of state capacity -particularly for a poor (predominantly black) population dependent on state provided services -has become glaringly apparent, the ANC continues, unremittingly, to accelerate implementation of these policies.

Part of the answer was provided in a speech made by Thabo Mbeki a couple of weeks ago. Addressing a sports awards dinner, he said, "We clearly have to change the profile of our winners in terms of the demographics. For two to three years, let's not mind losing international competitions, because we are bringing our people into those teams." This is not just affirmative action: it is a whole new ideology of "demographic representivity".

What Mbeki was saying, was that it is better for South Africa to fail than for whites to prosper (or "retain the privileges" in ANC-speak.)

There is a deeply nihilistic impulse within the racial nationalism of the ANC.  The resentment at the success of non-black minorities is not counterbalanced by any particular concern for ordinary black South Africans, let alone the national interest. As a result there is no appreciation of the interdependency between black and white; whites are viewed merely as 'obstacles to transformation'.

In an Anatomy of South African Misery (1957) - a devastating critique of the apartheid system - the historian C.W. De Kiewiet concludes with a passage from the Report of the Royal Commission on East Africa,which stated: "The theme that those who possess an advantage have attained it because they belong to a more favoured racial community runs like a pathological obsession throughout the daily life and work of the African community. This gives rise to the belief that all would be well if, by a stroke of the pen or the sword, the African could be rid of the presence of the non-African, or could obtain complete political domination over him."

It is this "pathological obsession" which has helped bring ruination to the African continent from Uganda to Tanzania and now to Zimbabwe. It is also the central foundation stone on which Thabo Mbeki seeks to construct his "African Renaissance".

An edited version of this article was published in Die Burger on March 22 2002