EDITORIAL
South Africa has long been a country where, as Rian Malan once put it, “at any given moment, all possible futures seem entirely plausible”. Today this aphorism has seemed never truer, nor more unlikely to endure, for the results of 29th May elections have left South Africa’s political leaders with stark and mutually exclusive choices as to the future they want for the country.
The ANC’s 40% of the vote, which has translated into 159 seats in the 400-member national assembly, means that it will need to enter into a coalition agreement with at least one of the three next largest parties to get to the over 201 seats needed for a secure majority. It will, in the process, need to commit to one of one or other of its two original and contradictory visions for the country – something it has deferred doing up until now – to either plunder it utterly or govern it for the benefit of its people.
The most efficient and, on the surface, ideologically amenable way for the ANC to secure a majority would be to do a deal with the Economic Freedom Fighters and Patriotic Alliance – something which has been on the table for a long time – as this would give such a coalition a narrow majority in parliament and the Gauteng legislature as well.
These are parties led by individuals with deep roots in the liberation movement. Both Julius Malema and Gayton McKenzie served as youngsters in the ANC’s popular militias (the so-called Self-Defence Units) in the struggle against white rule. The ANC and EFF also share the same ideology and ultimate goals. A further option, along these lines, would be to pursue a total reunification of the liberation movement by including Jacob Zuma’s MK Party as well.
Such a re-unification, whether partial or complete, would be built around an agenda of finally realising the goals of the National Democratic Revolution through the confiscation of privately-owned farmland and the nationalisation of the mines and banks, as long demanded by the EFF, and also now by the MKP in its recent manifesto.
Ideologically and emotionally, such a tie-up would be the preferred coalition formation for the ANC. It would, however, send South Africa hurtling down the path of rapid economic decline. That such an option appears self-destructive, and actively harmful to the interests of the black majority, does not mean it won’t happen. Liberation movements can exhibit psychotic irrationality when they feel their ability to eventually realise their end goals are slipping from their grasp, and they can become highly vindictive to their own when they feel "the people” are betraying them by shifting their allegiances elsewhere.
There are, however, other considerations that may stay the hand of the ANC. For one, such a deal would represent political suicide for the pro-Ramaphosa faction of the ANC. It is currently in the majority but with the EFF (and possibly the MKP) back on the inside they would soon find themselves a beleaguered and persecuted minority – as Malema, Zuma, and others sought vengeance for past wrongs.
The ANC could also find itself devoured from within as their leaner, hungrier and more ruthless RET partners went after its positions, tenders, and support base. From the moment such a coalition formation was announced the new government would find itself lurching from one economic, fiscal, and political crisis to another. Far from eating of the delectable fruits of liberation it would, having fatally disregarded the balance of forces, find itself chewing only on soot and bitter ashes.
The alternative for the ANC is to focus on governing well, addressing the most pressing aspirations of the black majority (particularly the need for jobs), and thereby earn back its hard earned pre-2007 reputation as the natural party of government in South Africa. It squandered the opportunity to do this over the past five years and doing so now unavoidably requires a coalition deal with the Democratic Alliance, among others, to form a Government of National Unity or Grand Coalition.
There are obvious incompatibilities between the two parties beyond the differing racial complexions of their leaderships. The DA comes from a wholly different ideological tradition. Its record of effective governance in Cape Town and the Western Cape is built upon an aversion to the kind of patronage-based politics that fuels the ANC (and MKP, EFF and PA.) It draws the bulk of its support from amongst the country’s racial minorities and represents the interests of much of South Africa’s established middle class.
However, these disadvantages could also be read as advantages, from the ANC point of view. An ANC-DA tie-up would most obviously, in the short term, buoy up investor confidence, lead to a strengthening of the Rand, and accelerate an economic recovery already being enabled by the winding down of load shedding. The DA would also not compete with the ANC for tenders and patronage positions, and nor does it threaten to steal votes from the ANC. Indeed, should the DA agree to enter a coalition with the ANC it would be at risk of shedding a large share of its support base to other opposition parties – as the NP, IFP, FF Plus and GOOD all discovered to their cost.
The great problem that nationalist parties have in reforming, and correcting the consequences of past errors, is that the overriding political imperative is maintain the unity of the movement. That has now been shattered. By using the DA to get to over 200 votes in the National Assembly the ANC would keep the most reckless (Malema) and destructive (Zuma) elements in the liberation movement on the outside and prevent them from causing further havoc from within. Though the election result undoubtedly represents a crisis for the ANC, it also opens the door to meaningful reform.
One view in the ANC is that such an ANC-DA coalition would be the “worst scenario” possible as it would be “ideological suicide”. This is however a misreading of the situation. It is perfectly compatible with revolutionary theory to respond to a crisis by focusing, for a period, on consolidation; and/or to enter into a “united front” with “hostile forces” if the situation demands it.
Certain ideological commitments would certainly need to be put on pause by both the ANC and DA, if such a coalition government was to work and achieve anything useful. What would be needed from both parties is five years of ruthless pragmatism as the coalition focused on a narrow programme of ensuring South Africa’s economic, institutional, and fiscal recovery.
However, if such objectives were met and GDP growth reached 3-4% per annum by 2029, the ANC would have the same options it has now. It would probably be in a stronger position to pursue its ultimate goals – it would certainly have more space to do so - and it may have discovered that there are better and more effective ways of achieving them than those followed up until now.
