Like democracy and racism, the word “reconciliation” has been reduced to a buzzword in South Africa. Although it is sometimes used with sincere intentions, the governing ANC in South Africa has succeeded in assigning its own (political) content to the concept. That is why it is also a thought that no longer creates excitement among those of us who do not support the ANC’s political agenda.

How reconciliation is supposed to work

David Androff, professor in Social Welfare, rightly said that the idea of reconciliation is just as popular as it is unclear. McEvoy and McConnachie point out that the word reconciliation is a dirty word to many people, because different individuals (or communities) are affected by it in different ways. Prof Sandra Walklate, Chairperson of Eleanor Rathbone’s Division for Sociology, explained that the term is complicated, versatile and multidimensional – a concept that cannot be simplified.

If we free the word from its political baggage, there are a few elementary premises that deserve mention. Firstly, true reconciliation can never occur in the absence of true justice – and I use the term “true” because here the concept must be stripped of the definition of justice allocated to it by this or that organisation. Secondly, reconciliation cannot be freed from the truth. Any attempt at promoting reconciliation without basing it on the truth will be artificial and will eventually break down.

South Africa’s mistakes

However, South Africa is an excellent case study for any nation that wants to accomplish reconciliation between communities, as South Africa has made virtually all the mistakes in the book.

The ANC, but especially Nelson Mandela, is praised around the world for their appeal for reconciliation during the early 1990s. This praise is sometimes given as if the appeal by the ANC and Mandela was made at their own expense. However, the ANC, which repeatedly proved itself to be a master of political strategy, was not that foolish. Strategically, a call for reconciliation was in the ANC’s interest. By pleading for reconciliation, the ANC gained the moral high ground in the first place, and increased its political status and support globally. In the second place, the ANC’s call for whites to be “forgiven” drew the attention of the world even more to the crimes committed by whites – away from the ANC’s own crimes.

The Chairperson of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Desmond Tutu, admitted that attempts at establishing reconciliation in South Africa failed miserably. In my opinion, there are three reasons for this. Firstly, the concept has a political colour. Secondly, it is based on a view of reality that was simplified so much that it was stripped of all nuance. Thirdly, the process was manipulated to promote certain outcomes at the expense of the truth.

When we talk about reconciliation in South Africa, we should not only look at the TRC, but also at the negotiations from 1990 to 1994 and the political policy that followed the TRC. In each of these fields there were problems. I emphasise a few examples:

In terms of the memorandum of understanding between FW de Klerk and Mandela, all political prisoners were released, regardless of their crimes. The ANC insisted that the prisoners convicted of the so-called necklace murders were also political prisoners and had, by implication, promoted the ANC’s political struggle. The victims were stripped of justice in the process.

Tutu, who was the Chairperson of the TRC, sided openly with the ANC and its subsidiary, the United Democratic Front (UDF), before the process, and was therefore unable to provide objective judgements.

During the TRC, an exaggerated focus was placed on the mistakes of everybody who was not part of the ANC, while the ANC’s own crimes were seriously played down. For example, the TRC concluded that the Inkatha leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi (the ANC’s enemy for decades), had been the biggest offender in the run up to 1994. This, despite a lack of evidence that Buthelezi had incited violence and a deluge of evidence that the ANC had in fact done so.

Acting was also prominent throughout the process, with TRC officials bursting into tears when ANC associates talked about their pain, and not displaying the same emotion when anybody who was not in the ANC’s good books had to testify. Here the media also played a major role. Journalists burst into tears when certain persons testified and laughed loudly in other cases.

Signs that we have failed

The reconciliation process in South Africa also gains more context when the actions of certain key persons after the process are evaluated. I emphasise a few examples:

After the process had been concluded, the NP’s chief negotiator “against” the ANC, Roelf Meyer, joined the ANC.

The ANC’s chief negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa, warned a crowd of ANC supporters that the “Boers” would come back if they did not continue to vote for the ANC – apparently to oppress them.

Desmond Tutu, who was supposed to play a key role in reconciliation, proposed years later that whites should pay more tax than blacks, because they are white.

Thabo Mbeki, who had been labelled the ANC’s golden boy during the negotiations, later admitted to a biographer that the ANC had not been completely honest during the negotiations regarding its aspirations to protect the rights of minorities.

The ANC stated in its own policy documents that the victory in the 1994 election should be regarded only as a beach head (temporary victory) and that the state power gained in the process can now be used to accomplish fundamental changes in society, regardless of the promises made during the negotiations for a free South Africa. The definition of the ANC’s trusted alliance partner, the South African Communist Party (SACP), of this fundamental change is a deliberate shift away from the free market, to communism.

It is therefore clear that the call for reconciliation and nation building in the 1990s has been stripped of content. The ANC’s appeal for reconciliation has never been more than a strategy to strengthen its moral status, without really attaching content to the concept. The idea of reconciliation in South Africa has always been rhetorical and symbolic, but hollow and meaningless.

The biggest mistake: A hierarchy of recognition

The South African Government also made a basic mistake in its attempts at reconciliation, namely working with a hierarchy of recognition. Excessive recognition is still given to victims finding themselves in the ANC camp, while victims who were outside the ANC camp are ignored. An example is the annual recognition of the Boipatong massacre, where ANC supporters were murdered, compared to the Government’s total silence about the Shell House massacre, where the ANC committed the murders. Another example is the ANC’s appeal for “offensive” place names like Church Street to be changed, while Amanzimtoti’s main street, Kingsway, was renamed to Andrew Zondo Street (in 1985 Zondo planted a bomb in Amanzimtoti and thus murdered five innocent people).

Reconciliation is not accomplished by saying a few magic words at a magic function. It is also not a symbolic event like the 1995 Rugby World Cup that accomplishes reconciliation. If it is not promoted with sincere intentions and a balanced process, or if complicated realities are reduced to sensational short stories, the process is doomed to fail.

Reconciliation has not yet taken place in South Africa and the blame for this can be placed only on those who were responsible for the process.

Ernst Roets is Deputy CEO of AfriForum. He can be followed on Twitter at @ernstroets

This article first appeared on the AfriForum website - here.