Since 2000 various commentators have, at different points, predicted the imminent demise of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe. In that year Zanu-PF lost majority support to the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) that year. Yet, despite a collapsing economy and various political crises it has managed to hold onto power through a combination of brutish force, plunder, and electoral theft. Robert Mugabe and Zanu-PF's miraculous defeat in the March 29 2008 elections raised hopes, once again, that this time things were going to be different. And, once again, those hopes were dashed.

Zanu-PF aims (it seems) to overturn the results of Morgan Tsvanigirai's victory in the presidential poll in the re-run, using the same tactics it employed to such devastating effect in 2000. On February 15 2000 the Zanu-PF government was defeated in the referendum on the new constitution. In a clear rebuke to the ruling party 697,754 people (54,6%) voted "no", while only 578,210 voted "yes". By the end of the month the regime had launched a campaign using intimidation, farm invasions, and terror, to ensure the defeat of the MDC by the time of the June parliamentary poll. The election was held on June 24 -25 and the results were announced on June 27. Zanu-PF managed to scrape out a narrow win with (initially) 61 seats to the MDC's 58; and 48,6% of the popular vote to the MDC's 47%.

Mbeki played a crucial role in legitimising this outcome. In early May 2000 he flew to Bulawayo where he was photographed walking hand-in-hand with Mugabe. In a speech he blamed the violence on the fact that the land question was still "unresolved." Then, on a visit to the United States a few weeks later, Mbeki said there was no reason to think the elections would not be free and fair. "If you stand there a month before the elections and already discredit them, I don't think that is correct," he told reporters.

Following the announcement of Zanu-PF's stolen victory on June 27 Mbeki immediately issued a statement calling on "all parties to the elections" to "respect and abide by the outcome as the expression of the democratic will of the people of Zimbabwe." On August 7 2000 the SADC heads of government issued a communiqué, through his office, expressing their satisfaction "that the elections were held in a transparent, peaceful, free and fair environment, in accordance with our shared democratic principles and values."

So, in many ways we are (or were) witnessing a simple replay of Zanu-PF's 2000 strategy. The delay in announcing the results of the presidential poll has bought the regime an extra four weeks in which to terrorise MDC supporters in the rural areas. Mbeki meanwhile has set about performing his usual role of actively underplaying Mugabe's extra-constitutional activities, while (covertly) interceding on his behalf diplomatically.

On April 5 2008 he told reporters in England, "I think there is time to wait, let's see the outcome of the election results. If there is a re-run of the presidential election, let's see what comes out of that. I think that is the correct way to go."

On Thursday April 10 the An Yue Jiang arrived in Durban harbour with a consignment of weapons for the Zimbabwean military.

On Saturday April 12 Mbeki stopped off in Harare, on his way to the emergency SADC summit that evening, for a 90 minute meeting with Robert Mugabe. Once again the two men were photographed standing hand-in-hand. Mbeki told reporters "If nobody wins a clear majority the law provides for a second run. If that happens I would not describe it as a crisis. It's a normal electoral process in terms of the law of Zimbabwe."

According to a well-informed article by Fiona Forde in The Star Mugabe's input to the meeting, which he had chosen not to attend, was delivered by Mbeki. The Zambian president Levy Mwanawasa apparently told him, "If Robert Mugabe has anything to say to me as chairperson, then he can talk to me himself." He added that Mbeki was creating the impression that he was becoming "Mugabe's messenger". Mbeki was also opposed to allowing Tsvangirai to address the meeting, but was overruled by Mwanawasa.

On Monday (April 14) the South African government, through the National Conventional Arms Control Committee, secretly approved the transhipment of the weapons aboard the An Yue Jiang to the Zimbabwean security forces.

So if these tactics worked in 2000, and Mugabe still enjoys the loyal support of Mbeki, what (other than wishful thinking) suggests that the outcome is going to be any different this time around?

The first is that Mugabe has committed the unforgivable sin of trying to rig an election, and still (very publicly) losing it. This has greatly complicated matters for his allies, and it has emboldened his opponents. By voting Zanu-PF out of office the Zimbabwean people have recovered their sense of pride, they have begun to have confidence in one another again, and they have realised that Mugabe is no longer all powerful. None of this bodes well for a tyrant.

The second is that, after eight years of plunder by Zanu-PF, the regime is now running short of the resources it needs to maintain the loyalty of the junior and middle ranks of the state security apparatus. The Zimbabwean reported this week that "middle and junior-ranking officers of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) have recommended that Robert Mugabe concede defeat and step down."

The third, and perhaps crucial difference between 2000 and now, is that Mbeki is on his way out. The sole purpose of re-running the presidential poll and then using state-sponsored terror (and even more vote rigging) to ensure victory for Mugabe is to provide some kind of democratic re-legitimation for his regime. But for this to work South Africa and SADC have to go along with the charade and endorse the results - as they did in 2000, 2002, and 2005.

Mbeki is no longer in command of the ANC and his political authority is draining away both within South Africa and the region as a whole. He is too weak politically to insist that the ANC and South Africa endorse any future victory by Mugabe, or corral SADC into doing the same.

ANC president Jacob Zuma has not actually had to do that much to make an important difference. He has just had to make clear that, firstly, he does not condone (even by omission) anti-MDC violence; and secondly, that he would not endorse the result of any Mugabe-ite victory in a re-run conducted under the current conditions. His statements have (thus far) deprived the Mugabe regime of the kind of moral affirmation it craves, and which Mbeki was always happy to supply.

Although Zuma went along with the Mbeki-ite line on Zimbabwe up until late 2006, he has had every incentive to pursue a different approach following his victory at Polokwane. His allies in the SACP and COSATU are wholly opposed to Mugabe's continuation in office. And he is already reaping major dividends internationally from simply saying and doing the decent thing on Zimbabwe.

Finally, the Mugabe regime is more politically isolated than it has ever been before. The scuppering of the An Yue Jiang's delivery of its deadly cargo to Zimbabwe was crucial in this regard. China has said that the cargo is to be recalled, and Angola has promised that the weapons will not be allowed to be off-loaded while the ship is in port.

The authority of even the most tyrannical regime rests on a perception - that, its power will continue to endure into the foreseeable future. Once the realisation sets in that it will not be around in perpetuity - and people start looking beyond it - its authority is liable to dwindle extraordinarily rapidly. The whiff of mortality is deadly.

Barring an uprising by the lower ranks of the security forces the Zanu-PF elite can probably hang on for a while yet. But they must have started asking themselves for how long they can survive. In which case, should they concede now, when they can probably leave with something? Or hold on for as long as possible, at the risk of leaving with nothing (not even their heads)?

The Herald's columnists, while still praising Zanu-PF's "all weather friends" in China and (Mbeki-ite) South Africa, now rail against the SADC leaders who have broken ranks with their cause. The tone reminds one of Dylan Thomas's immortal line: "Rage, rage against the dying of the light."