Liberal Democracy, Good Governance and Competent Leadership
3 September 2020
In recent times, ‘liberal democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ has come under concerted and increasing attack from various quarters, oftentimes laced with vitriol and misrepresentation. In America, the sycophants in the Republican Party and their idol, Donald Trump, have been responsible through outright lies, misinformation, fake-news and twitter gibberish to vilify the concept of liberal democracy, equating ‘liberalism’ to ‘socialism’.
The egotistical, narcissist, reality-show host occupying the White House, who has spent his whole life wheeling and dealing in real estate and now masquerading as the 45th US President, is clearly out of his depth when it comes to these matters. Even more so, his constant fear-mongering to boost his re-election chances, as well as his divisive and inflammatory, often racist, rhetoric has put democracy in the US in mortal danger.
So, let us unpack the relevant concepts from an African and South African perspective by first setting the scene, always keeping in mind that these concepts and principles have universal application.
As the world and Africa is entering the third decade of the new millennium, of what is euphorically called ‘Africa’s century’, there is a profound sense of hope being frustrated, of stereotypes being reaffirmed -- once again, of particular countries like Emerson Mnangagwa’s Zimbabwe embarrassing the African continent. The most common perception about Africa remains that of democratic government under siege, of constitutional governance being undermined, and of the rule of law being flagrantly disregarded.
This situation presents itself, as Frederik van Zyl Slabbert has said, not because of biased media coverage, racial prejudice, the arrogance of Western powers, or an un-African response to problems, but because there is no binding commitment by African leaders to democratic governance, and the consequences that flow from such a commitment. Clearly, in many African countries the fundamental principles of democratic governance are consistently, deliberately, and openly violated.
So, liberal democracy is a compelling necessity – and as Eboe Hutchful argues, democracy should be focused on two critical elements: the political will to uphold its basic principles, and concerted efforts to create an economically enabling environment for it to thrive. Efforts to build institutional, administrative and other capacities, and to facilitate economic growth, will be wasted if the political context is not favourable.
And, ultimately, good governance requires political reform and renewal, and a concerted attack on corruption. This can be done only by strengthening the transparency and accountability of representative bodies, by free elections in a multiparty system, by encouraging public debate, by nurturing press freedom, by developing civil society organisations (CSOs), and by maintaining the rule of law, and an independent judiciary.
Indeed, democracy must be carefully nurtured, because democratic values (especially, political tolerance) cannot be inculcated in, and internalised by, African societies overnight. In addition, relatively sound economies (to provide basic human needs) are essential ingredients for the ultimate success of a democratic order. Economic growth and sustained development are of the essence in supporting Africa’s fledgling democracies and preventing further tragic relapse into despotism and authoritarianism.
For Christopher Clapham, the dismal record of democracy raises the question of whether there is anything about Africa that makes it inherently difficult to sustain reasonably fair and enduring multiparty democracies. The popular argument against democracy suggests that, in what are essentially artificial African states, democracy must inevitably lead to the mobilisation of ethnic identities, which will then, in turn, split the state into its constituent ethnic communities and render impossible any form of government based on popular consent.
Evidence, however, strongly indicates that multiparty democracy is much more likely to promote national unity than destroy it. By contrast, those regimes that have nearly destroyed the unity, or even the very existence, of their states have all been autocratic -- witness Somalia.
How democracy is visualised and defined varies from situation to situation, and nowhere is this more of a truism than in Africa. However, in almost all circumstances, democracy involves social justice, governmental accountability, and human freedoms. Certainly, Ed Keller asserts, democracy involves the procedural minimum of contestation for political office and policy choices, of popular participation in elections and other elements of political decision-making, and the accountability of elected public officials under the rule of law. All this must take place within a culture in which fundamental human rights and political freedoms are guaranteed.
However, democracy should be made, and should be seen to work -- particularly where there is, as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum acknowledged, ‘inadequate commitment to multiparty democracy and politics among leaders and politicians who talk democracy, but use undemocratic means to remain in power’.
The contention by some African leaders that there is an ‘African variant of democracy’ is disconcerting, especially in a context where, throughout the 1990s and into the 21st century, there has been a disturbing phenomenon in international life: the rise of illiberal democracy. As Fareed Zakaria contends in his seminal article in Foreign Affairs, beyond any doubt the values inherent in democracy are universal. Democracy is liberal because it emphasises individual liberty; it is constitutional because it rests on the rule of law.
Clearly, the values of liberal democracy have spread universally, especially among the growing ranks of the educated middle classes. Prominent African intellectuals such as Claude Ake and Peter Anyang’Nyong’o vigorously espouse the advantages of core democratic principles over the indeterminate, and possibly second-best, forms of governance based on so-called authentic culture.
As a political system, democracy is marked not only by free and fair, multiparty elections, which is a rather mechanistic conception, so prevalent in the pseudo-democracies in Africa and elsewhere, and fuelled by the fad of event-focused election monitoring and observation. Extremely important, it is also marked by what might be called constitutional liberalism: the rule of law, a separation of powers (between the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary), and protection of the basic civil liberties of freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion, as well as the right to property.
Indeed, there is far more to a free society than multiparty elections. But often the arduous task of inculcating and internalising democratic values in society is widely neglected. And today, the two strands of liberal democracy are coming apart: pseudo-democracy, seen in the context of multiparty elections and rule by the majority (what might be called ‘brute majoritarianism’), is flourishing while constitutional liberalism is not.
It is, perhaps, salutary to note that constitutional liberalism is about the limitation of power -- democracy, in its over-simplified form, about the accumulation and use, or misuse, often abuse of power. One should be mindful of the Actonian dictum that ‘power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely’. Therefore, democracy stripped of constitutional liberalism is not simply inadequate, but dangerous. To paraphrase Woodrow Wilson in a different context, the challenge for the 21st century is not ‘to make the world safe for democracy’, but ‘to make democracy safe for the world’.
Quite often, good governance has proved to be a rather elusive commodity. Governance is the practice of good government and it remains, as Joel Barkan argues, a fragile process that depends on the restraint of the ruler and the tolerance of the ruled. The concept of governance refers in a generic sense, to the task of running a government or any other appropriate entity, like a business; and, since the late 1980s, the World Bank suggests, the crisis on the African continent and in many other parts of the world has been identified as one of governance.
Goran Hyden lists four shortcomings that constitute bad governance -- the personalisation of power, the denial and often widespread abuse of fundamental human rights, the prevalence of unelected and unaccountable government, and pervasive, endemic corruption. Countering this, he records three markers of good governance – citizen influence and oversight, responsive and responsible leadership, and social reciprocity or inter-group tolerance.
Michael Lofchie suggests that ‘governance’ is a more useful concept than ‘government’ or ‘leadership’ mainly because it does not prejudge the locus or character of real decision-making. For example, ‘governance’ does not imply, as ‘government’ does, that real political authority is vested somewhere within the formal-legal institutions of the state. Nor does ‘governance’ imply, as the term ‘leadership’ does, that political control necessarily rests with the head of state and government, or official political elites.
Again, as Goran Hyden asserts, ‘a governance realm is grounded in an effective, rules-based leadership, which is perceived to be legitimate, and from which authority or power is derived’. It is a concept which, through the prerequisite condition of mutual trust or compliance, is based on reciprocity or the voluntary acceptance of an asymmetrical relationship between the ruler and the ruled.
Dankwart Rustow and James Burns argue that, in a very real sense, politics is about leadership. Leaders must have the charisma to provide their people with a national vision and purpose, as well as the ability to galvanise the efforts of their people towards, and to sustain their enthusiasm in, the pursuit of these stated objectives. Strong, dedicated, self-confident, skilful, visionary and capable leadership is the key to the reforms the world needs and the policy actions that are required for development.
A true leader must have the courage and ability to communicate these realities to his or her followers. Political leadership can imbue hope by excellent performance, or sow despair and precipitate more hardship by ineptitude, corruption, and brutality -- it can unite societies and move citizens to positive action, or it can engender apathy and phlegmatism, hinder the pursuit of development and change, and trigger further crises. Good leaders, says Allister Sparks, ‘lead by example: uphold principles and the rest will follow; condone and cover up and things fall apart’.
While leadership is a challenge at the best of times, it is much easier to be a leader when all is going well. But in difficult times, courageous leadership is usually in short supply. Leaders often do what is expedient, not what is right – witness President Donald Trump’s erratic and divisive responses to the Covid-19 pandemic ravaging the US. In a crisis, citizens look to leaders not for all the answers but for pillars of assurance, for certainty of direction.
The prime factor in leadership is the need to interact with people, to set, pursue, and achieve goals and to offer committed performance, yielding clear benefits – witness New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s transparent and accountable leadership style. The essence of leadership, says Jean-Germain Gros, is the ability of a leader to see what followers cannot yet see, and the willingness to take them where they do not yet want to go.
The late Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere’s interpersonal skills, his integrity, articulateness, down-to-earth demeanour, strength of character, and political cunning made him an excellent leader. He was that rare political specimen who had all the powers necessary to be a dictator yet did not become one. In this, he resembled the late Léopold Senghor of Senegal and former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa.
These giants of late 20th century African politics owed their success not to charisma, which is by nature messianic, uncompromising and thaumaturgical, but to the strength of their intellect and the clarity with which they expressed their views. They evinced an admixture of courage, intellectual profundity, and personal charm.
However, quite often leadership turns awry. Despite all the trappings of what these leaders regard as ‘democracy’, it becomes mere sloganeering, stripped of all meaningful content and marked by authoritarian tendencies, producing inadequate or failed leadership. The problem with leadership is the big ego: the arrogance, the pretence to omniscience, and the extreme sensitivity to dissent and criticism. Unfortunately, all these characteristics could be discerned in the personality make-up of South Africa’s former President Thabo Mbeki.
Inter-communal and interpersonal harmony were not helped along by his political leadership style which constantly played the race card when he came under pressure, thereby amplifying racial stereotypes rather than breaking them down. And his successor, Jacob Zuma, was intellectually, as well as morally and ethically, unfit to occupy any public position, least of which the presidency.
It is a pity that few leaders are gracious and wise enough to leave office under conditions that would allow them to play a constructive role in the affairs of their countries and of the world. Today, with self-centred leaders (leaving Donald Trump and his admirer, Brazil’s Jair Bolsenaro, aside for the moment) like Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Belarus’s Alexander Lukashenko, Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Syria’s Bashaar al-Assad, the Philippine’s Rodrigo Duterte, Zimbabwe’s Emerson Mnangagwa and many others, what hope is there that the world will make steady progress towards greater democracy and better governance?
They represent the embodiment of just about everything the world hopes to move away from: flagrant disregard for human rights, lack of respect for the rule of law, and harassment (in some instances, even murder and genocide) of political opponents. Indeed, what hope is there that true democracy – not the sham or pseudo variety – can be established and consolidated in, at least, some of these countries?
In South Africa -- as the example of so-called ‘African democracy’ that its leadership wishes to portray -- reality is very often obscured by imagery. Behind the façade of democracy, accountability, reconciliation, and transparency lurk the ugly gremlins of authoritarianism and centralist control, political intolerance and retribution, patronage, cronyism, nepotism, and corruption.
So, if South Africa, as one of the leading proponents of Nepad (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development), cannot even set a proper example, what hope is there for the rest of Africa to comply with, and commit themselves to, the well-formulated principles, codes and standards of democracy and good governance enunciated in the African Union (AU) Constitutive Act, as well as many declarations and policy documents of the organisation?
Nepad requires governments to subject themselves to a peer review process as a measure of compliance. Crucial is the nurturing of a democracy and governance culture, as opposed to simply putting down guidelines, also involving civil society and a sophisticated, not a sycophantic, media. Business and civil society have a key role to play in holding leadership accountable, though their relationship with governments is typically too close or too contested.
But, as Stanley Uys and James Myburgh contend, translating governance buzzwords into reality requires considerable institutional capacity, which is still poorly developed, and the sort of political will hitherto lacking. Consequently, leaders backed away from independent review of their political performance record almost immediately, especially after Robert Mugabe’s rejection of the 2000 electoral results threatening his and ZANU-PF’s continued control. And suffice to say, the track record of African states over a period of nearly 60 years of OAU and AU history suggests that its leaders honour any commitment of this kind in the breach, rather than otherwise.
The mantra of many leaders is that they should have their own definition of democracy and that autocracy can be described as the will of the people. It is not within their psyche to relinquish power. The personality cult built around them and their entire personality make-up (of which vanity, or a grandiose sense of self, is but one characteristic) argues against it.
This, while there is a need for visionary, selfless leaders, necessitating a shift in focus from personalities to policies – policies which are firmly grounded in principle, ethical conduct and moral authority. Clearly, as Frederik van Zyl Slabbert argues, the most dangerous moment for a democracy is not the founding elections but when the incumbent government experiences a crisis in leadership and is defeated at the polls. The ultimate test for democracy is the willingness of the vanquished incumbent to cede power to his or her victorious opponent.
A psychometric study by the Unit for the Study of Personality in Politics at the University of Minnesota, St John’s, make use of Theodore Millon’s inventory of diagnostic criteria. The study finds that many leaders are suffering from what is known as a ‘bureaucratic-compulsive syndrome’. Leaders with this syndrome are noted for their ‘officious, high-handed bearing; intrusive, meddlesome interpersonal conduct; unimaginative, closed-minded cognitive style; and grim, imperturbable mood’. And, over time, they ‘become more and more dogmatic (self-righteous and impervious to correction), inflexible (thick-skinned and vengeful), and paranoid (increasingly suspicious)’.
If one looks at all these characteristics, it should be easy to conclude that Donald Trump ‘has not a single redeeming defect’ -- as Benjamin Disraeli so aptly said of William Gladstone many decades ago. Trump is the epitome of arrogance -- observe the facial expressions, the body language, the demagoguery.
Imageries are important not because they portray reality, but because they can mask reality and giving it a sense of normality. This is a truism in the case of quite a few African political systems: the incongruence between their perceived image as guardians of democratic values and good governance principles, and their reality as instruments of civil dictatorship and bad leadership.
The significance of the role that democracy and good governance should play, the values and ideals they represent, and the functions they perform in the political life of citizens have either been misconstrued, even perverted or negated by often corrupt political leaderships -- leaderships interested neither in democracy and good governance, nor in the pluralistic dividends multiparty systems are supposed to deliver.
The prospects of transforming African political systems into functioning, rather than imageries of virtual democracies is an uphill struggle that requires the emergence of new leaderships better placed to meet present-day challenges -- challenges confronting the very core values that inform their current governance and leadership styles.
But, despite the odds against responsible and accountable governance, particularly its potential for institutionalising majoritarian tyranny under the pretext of democratic rule, these constraints are surmountable. The central role given to democracy and good governance principles in Nepad is not only well-formulated but also well-intentioned. However, the bottom line remains the same. Whether Nepad succeeds in meeting its challenging objectives ultimately depends on the one critical ingredient missing in previous, similar endeavours: the political will to translate good intentions and lofty ideals into requisite action.
So, what needs to be done? All those in government and in the public and private sectors should work hard to establish a climate of integrity, morality and ethical conduct; and leaders should go beyond mere lip service and make good on their promises to provide the commitment and resources to improve governance, transparency, and accountability.
* The author holds a doctorate in Political Science from the University of South Africa (Unisa) in Pretoria. He is a former Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa, and Nelson Mandela Chair Professor in the Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi, India. He is retired and lives in Pretoria but is still academically active.
