Weight and Counterweight: Analysis of the results of a Political Opinion Survey on Party Support Patterns and Inter-party Cooperation, April -June 2008

Lawrence Schlemmer
Executive Director
MarkData
July 2008

1. Background

Since the first open democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the ANC Alliance has steadily increased its majority in general elections to the point that it has appeared to have unassailable dominance of parliament and South Africa has come to be regarded as a clear example of a one party dominant system.

Single party dominance for a protracted period, particularly where the dominance is such as to ensure a two-thirds majority in parliament with the power to change entrenched clauses in the constitution, is likely to erode the vitality of any democracy. The morale of opposition voters is understandably depressed and the relative lack of leverage of opposition parties threatens their electoral credibility and capacity to mobilise both material and human resources.

In recent months in South Africa, three developments have occurred that might signal possibilities of the power imbalance becoming ameliorated and of the initiative beginning to shift towards alternatives to one-party dominance. The first factor has been the surfacing of disunity in the governing Alliance accompanying the success of Mr. Jacob Zuma in being elected as President of the ANC and ushering in a change of key office bearers to challenge the influence of personnel associated with the leadership of the outgoing President of the country. The tensions within the governing Alliance and associated policy difference could well signal the dilution of the liberation solidarity that has given the ANC formidable coherence since 1994.

The second development has been the quickening descent of neighbouring Zimbabwe into political chaos and economic crisis, along with a surge of refugees across the borders and anti-foreigner violence in South Africa that has punished economic confidence in the economy. These developments might for South Africans provide a warning of the consequences of political domination by a party impervious to legitimate challenges to its control.

A third factor has been interest among key South Africa opposition parties in the possibilities of augmenting their influence by collaborating in some form of alliance, possibly as an electoral alliance for the next general elections in 2009 or possibly thereafter in coalition form in the legislative process at all three tiers of government.

This political opinion survey is intended to shed light on the reactions of voters to the events and possibilities briefly sketched above and the further possibilities emerging after the next general election.

2. The Survey

MarkData, an opinion polling and strategic research company that has operated as an independent private sector organisation since its separation from the statutory Human Sciences Research Council in 1996-1997, regularly undertakes surveys of political support patterns in South Africa and other African countries. Its political opinion surveys are based on two-stage stratified probability samples of adult voters in households in all communities throughout the country in both rural and urban areas, using census enumerator areas as a sampling frame. 

The current survey, which covers 2415 adult South Africans, is slightly larger than the 2250 of previous surveys and also incorporates a modified design intended to strengthen the sample size and reliability of results in opposition constituencies without sacrificing the relevance of results for the electorate as a whole. Hence, in the first stage of sampling, constituencies more likely to include opposition voters were given a slightly higher chance of being randomly selected than those that typically contain dominant majorities of governing party supporters, but subsequent to the completion of fieldwork the sampling results were re-weighted using appropriate post-weighting software in order to provide estimates of the overall national support patterns of political parties.

3. The Results: weighted and rectified

Party Support Patterns

The following breakdown of party strengths emerged from the standard open-ended question posed: "Which political party will you vote for in the general election in 2009?" The results are presented in the table below compared with results in two previous surveys by MarkData.

Table 1. Current strength of political parties compared with two previous surveys

(The percentages in parenthesis exclude respondents not intending to vote or not responding in order to approximate an election outcome) 

Comparisons of party strength have to be based on the second set of estimates for each year (the figures in brackets) that allow standardised comparisons with the uncertain voters removed. These figures also approximate election outcomes (it is a common procedure in electoral research to remove the uncertain voters and those who refuse to give a choice in order to estimate election outcomes).

Hence, as voter attitudes stand at the moment, what may be predicted from these results is that the ANC majority in the next election will decline slightly to just over 70% and that the DA will consolidate its position as the major opposition to government, with results like the following:

Party outcomes 2009:

• ANC/SACP: 70-71%
• DA: 20-21%
• ID: 2-3%
• IFP: 2-3%
• UDM: +- 1%
• ACDP: +- 1%
• PAC:  < 1%
• FF+: < 1%
• AZAPO: < 1%
• Others: < 1%

Broadly what the results in table 1 show is that the level of uncertainty among voters has declined from 2004. Currently only some 16% of the electorate does not make choices between parties in the survey interviews. There is a challenge for opposition parties, however, in that the motivation to vote among their supporters is slightly lower than that among ANC supporters:   

Table 2. Motivation to vote among party supporters

* "Definitely" or "probably" is taken as a firmer intention to vote than other responses like will "possibly" vote or will probably or possibly not vote

It is clear from the table above that the ANC has a motivational advantage, not necessarily because of enthusiasm among supporters but because of what is by now an established habit of high voter turnout amidst the boredom of life in the mass townships. The opposition parties are going to have to work on strengthening the motivation to go to the polls among their supporters. 

The results in table 1 broadly show that:

• The ANC/SACP: while it strengthened up to 2007, its support has now fallen back slightly to some 71% in an election outcome. It may be seen as surprising that it has maintained its support at so high a level despite the lack of service delivery for many supporters and the turbulence in the party but it should be expected for the following reasons:
• The disagreements over leadership in the party have kept it very firmly in the news, and publicity is a first requirement in the maintenance of party support - "any news is good news" as it were.
• The leaders of different support groups in the party are all inside the party, hence not only villains but the heroes as well are ensconced in key party structures.
• The prospects of a new leader in the person of Mr. Jacob Zuma, notwithstanding his controversial position, is a source of hope for the poorest, most aspirant and most numerous section among the party supporters.
• Among ANC supporters in our survey results, President Mbeki has a 53% "admiration" rating, but Mr. Zuma's rating is higher at 60%. The current Deputy President Mlambo-Nguka's admiration rating is a mere 35% and Blade Nzimande of the SACP gets only 21%. Some 22% of ANC supporters positively dislike Mr. Zuma. If Mr. Zuma takes over as Party Leader the level of disaffection therefore will not be very high - somewhere between 10 and 20%.      

It is therefore more probable than not that the support for the ANC will consolidate around Zuma if he assumes the leadership, and that the party will strengthen slightly before the next elections. "Centrist" supporters that dislike Zuma and who will feel less comfortable in the party, will not exceed 10-20%. There will thus be rather limited gains for the opposition if Zuma succeeds Mbeki, but small gains from a very large party could nonetheless be significant for a smaller opposition party. 

If Mr. Zuma does not assume the leadership due to the legal charges pending against him, the party will be thrown into disarray because there is no alternative candidate with a sufficiently prominent profile to unite the party at short notice. Under these conditions the support for the party will weaken, perhaps significantly. This is not to say that the ANC will lose its dominant position. Opposition parties are also not likely to gain from disaffection among Zuma loyalists. But there will be some potential gains for opposition parties.

It is very difficult to say which one of the two scenarios for the ANC holds most promise for increased opposition support.  

• The Democratic Alliance has strengthened since 2004, most particularly since 2007, and now could capture some 21% of the vote in an election, the highest level any opposition party has achieved in any MarkData survey since 1994. This support is significantly multiracial: 21% African, 17% coloured, 8% Asian and 54% white.
• The DA's growth prospects at this stage are somewhat limited by considerable hostility to it among African voters: 65% dislike the DA leader and 14% admire her. It is not because of her race - African voters have almost exactly the same reaction to Bantu Holomisa, Patricia de Lille and Mangosutho Buthelezi of the UDM, the ID and the IFP respectively. The hostility is significantly due to what one could call liberation solidarity -- a tendency among ANC activists and spokespeople to vilify and stereotype any leader outside the ANC Alliance. While the vilifications are usually no more than very loose rhetoric, like all stereotypes their effects are remarkably persistent.

In the Western Cape the DA and the ANC receive exactly the same level of support. Western Cape support levels are as follows:

ANC 36,3%, DA 35,9%, ID 5,5%, UDM 2,3%, ACDP 1,2% and all the other parties below 1%.

If these results are right, the DA could win the province with either the ID and, or the UDM as coalition or electoral alliance partners. The ANC, on the other hand, would have a problem finding a significant partner because all Western Cape parties with support levels above 1% would lose significant numbers of their supporters in a coalition or electoral alliance with the ANC.

• Support for other opposition parties is at a low level. The ID has recovered marginally but its support is still well below its high point in 2004. The UDM does not seem to be going anywhere, and nor are the IFP and the FF+.

Therefore it seems at this stage that the DA is the only opposition party that has a record of recent growth. This does not mean to say that other opposition parties will remain static from now on. The further growth of opposition in general, however, is made difficult by the political polarisation in the electorate that makes many if not most African voters hostile to any opposition, irrespective of its composition.

This is notwithstanding the fact that among ANC supporters:

• Nearly 40% are highly or partially dissatisfied with the performance of the government
• Nearly 40% feel that their quality of life is bad
•  Some 40% feel that the country is moving in the wrong direction
• 47% would most like to support a party that is free of corruption - clearly not an attribute of the current ANC

Aside from the exaggerated sense of solidarity in ANC ranks, and notwithstanding lip service to democratic principles, when asked what kind of opposition they would most like to see, ANC supporters respond as follows:

• 44% would like a "cooperative" opposition that sometimes criticises but more often helps and supports the government
• 22% would like no opposition at all
• And when asked to identify things that ensure that a governing party keeps on doing its best for its supporters, only 10% prioritise an opposition party that criticises government and can attract support away from it.

The ANC has clearly done very well in discrediting the principle of opposition and along with it a tradition of pluralism and dissent.

It can be argued that opposition parties, therefore, have a dual responsibility. Not only should they promote the policies that they consider most desirable for the country and its people but they also have to defend and promote the principles of political pluralism, checks and balances, freedom of dissent and the rights and role opposition in democracy.

It is in this latter respect that there is a very great need for opposition parties to work together. It is also often said that the image liabilities of the opposition parties within the ANC camp and its stakeholder groups would be ameliorated if opposition parties were to operate in some form of wider Alliance. This challenge will be explored on the basis of other findings of this survey.                

The growth potential of existing political parties

In order to assess the zone of possible expansion among political parties, two additional questions were posed about voting preferences in order to estimate the "closet" support that parties enjoy. The respondents were also asked:

1. What party "most" deserves to be supported
2. What other parties also deserve to be supported

In response to the first additional question the following pattern emerged:

Party most deserving of support:

• 2% of ANC support selects the DA
• 6 % of DA support selects the ANC
• 12% of IFP support selects the ANC
• 2% of IFP support selects the DA
• 12% of ID support selects the ANC
• 6% of ID support selects the DA
• 28% of ACDP support selects the DA
• 2% of ACDP support selects the FF+
• 12% of FF+ support selects the DA
• 10% of UDM support selects the ANC
• 3% of UDM support selects the IFP

The key issue, however, is how much overall "closet" support within other parties each party enjoys. This closet support represents a potential for expansion by a political party. In table 3 an estimate is calculated of the overall amount of potential support within other parties that each political party enjoys.

Table 3. The overall amount of hidden support within other parties that each political party enjoys (selected parties only)

Based on the parties that respondents consider:

1. To be most deserving of support

2.  To be also deserving of support

In analysing the table, each party has to be considered separately because a gain for one means a loss for another and here the focus is only on potential gains. Summing up what table 3 tells us is that, due to hidden or "closet" support, under favourable circumstances, a better election campaign than all other parties and high supporter turnout, the potential for expansion in support for the following parties could be as follows (rounded %s):

• ANCP/SACP: 70,5% plus 9% - 15% = 81% - 86% 
• DA: 20,6% plus 4% - 18% = 25% - 39%
• IFP: 2,5% plus 1% -   6% =   4% -   9%
• ID: 2,4% plus 1% - 10% =   3% - 12%
• UDM: 1,2% plus 1% -   6% =   2% -   7%
• FF+: 0,6% plus 0% -   4% =   1% -   5%
• ACDP: 1,0% plus 0% -   3% =   0% -   4%

These outcomes are of course possibilities rather than probabilities but they reflect the maximum potential of each party given the extent of hidden sympathy and support, which may very well remain hidden. It certainly might be an incentive for certain parties like the DA and the ID, for example, to keep up the struggle for additional support and to seek potential alliance or coalition partners.

The Issue of an Election Alliance or Coalition

The respondents in the survey were asked a general question about a coalition - loosely defined as parties that agree on basic principles not competing against each other but putting forward a shared list of candidates and operating together thereafter:

• Remarkably, 69% of the respondents felt that this was a very good or fairly good idea
• It was however endorsed more strongly by opposition parties, excluding the IFP, than by ANC supporters

Certain attributes or functions of a coalition were put to all respondents and the proportions considering that the attributes were essential or a good thing were as follows:

• A coalition should be a rainbow coalition with prominent people from all groups: 70% support
• A coalition should strengthen opposition to the ANC: 58% overall support, rising to over 75% among opposition parties excluding the IFP.
• A coalition should draw together the best expertise in running the country irrespective of race: 72% support
• A coalition should only include parties that believe in the same economic principles: 65% support
• A coalition should only include parties that believe in the same political and democratic principles: 66% support

It would seem, therefore that the principle of coalition and cooperation across party lines is rather overwhelmingly endorsed. One must be very cautious in this respect, however - people just love the idea of cooperation and consensus and the replies above may be a reflection of uncritical political sentimentality, very much like our collective enthusiasm for "reconciliation" and "ubuntu" when our actual behaviour is more often than not exactly the opposite.

A far more valid test of the acceptance of political cooperation is to specify the participants in a coalition or alliance and then test voter reaction. The following concrete examples were given and the proportions indicating that they would actually vote for such an alliance were as follows -- first the general response and then the response among ANC supporters and finally the reactions of opposition supporters. See table 4.

Table 4. Reactions to three alternative coalition options

The support among ANC voters is remarkable and probably reflects not only the sentimental attractions of cooperation but also the quite substantial perception among many (but not all) ANC supporters that there should be a stronger and critical opposition to government (34%). While they would probably not actually vote for such a coalition, the ANC supporters in their responses above are possibly responding to genuine enthusiasm for better government.

The first option is clearly the optimal composition in terms of potential support in general and it is very clearly the optimal coalition composition for opposition party supporters.

One notes from a comparison of the options that while the addition of the Freedom Front Plus depresses support it does so most among all voters and among the ANC supporters and relatively less among opposition party supporters. Among the latter it is the second most attractive alternative.

The addition of the IFP also depresses potential support in all categories but most significantly among opposition party supporters. 

As an opposition approach, therefore, a coalition comprising the DA, ID and UDM is clearly the most advantageous, with the addition of the IFP least attractive to opposition supporters.

Another perspective on the composition of the cooperating alliance or coalition is seen in the extent to which certain parties are rejected as participants.

Rejection of party participation in an association, by other parties:

The ANC is rejected by:

FF+:               87% of supporters
DA:                73%
ACDP:           71%
ID:                 57%
UDM:            43%
IFP:               40%      

The DA is rejected by:

ANC:            35%
UDM:           17%
IFP:              14%
ACDP:          7%
ID:                5%
FF+:             4%

The ID is rejected by:

ANC:              42%
UDM:             33%
IFP:                 20%
FF+                 17%
ACDP:            13%
DA:                 12%

The UDM is rejected by:

ANC:              34%
The FF+          33%
DA                  28%
IFP                  23%
ACDP             21%
ID                    13%

The IFP is rejected by:

ANC:              44%
ID:                  30%
ACDP:            30%
DA:                 28%
FF+:                21%
UDM:             13%

The FF+ is rejected by

ANC:              53%
UDM:             45%
DA:                 28%
ID:                  26%
IFP:                 24%
ACDP:            20%

There are certainly few signs of racial patterns in the levels of rejection of one another by parties. The supposedly white dominated DA is rejected less by the supposedly black dominated ANC than the less "white" ID and the black IFP. There is clearly a mindset opposed to the former right wing stance of the FF+ and a strong residue of the tensions between the ANC and the IFP. Hence there is a mix of ideological and leadership factors involved in rejection of parties, as is quite normal in party politics.

Because the notion of inter-party cooperation is to increase the likelihood of drawing support from across the spectrum of parties, and particularly from black voters, it is useful to consider the overall levels of rejection of particular parties among opposition supporters, all voters and black voters. The patterns are given in table 5:

Table 5. Overall level of rejection of political parties as coalition partners among opposition supporters and voters at large

In looking at these figures one must bear in mind that particularly among ANC supporters, respondents who are not interested in a coalition with any party are part of the rejection levels. This distortion applies mainly to the answers by ANC supporters in respect of the ANC. The other figures for rejection levels are almost all rejection of a party as a coalition partner.

The ANC might be the largest party in a dominant position but outside of its large support base it is not popular at all. Despite all the loose or subtle accusations of "racist" intention by ANC leaders and activists, the DA is the least disliked party both in the electorate as a whole and among opposition supporters and black voters. Fortunately the activist denunciation of the DA as neo-liberal or racist has little effect on mass sentiment. 

The IFP has a poor image in both the electorate at large and among opposition supporters, and the same can be said of the FF+. The ID and the UDM are in a relatively favourable position with levels of rejection only slightly higher than that of the DA.

The issue of the race of candidates that a coalition should field was also explored and the results appear in table 6 according to the main prospects for coalition membership.

Table 6. Types of candidates that a coalition of parties should field

If one considers the practices of affirmative action, BEE and candidate selection by the ANC, the results in this table could be from a different country. 

We note that the DA and the ID supporters have distinctly similar views on the desirability of knowledge and ability in the selection of candidates. This is a powerful unifying factor in coalition politics. The other opposition parties are rather more inclined to favour racially based quotas for candidate selection, a problematic preference in democracy. Only the ANC, however, has a significant minority of supporters that favour the exclusion of whites altogether, fortunately small at some 12% of ANC supporters.

Another issue relating to candidates that could be extremely divisive relates to a code of conduct as a basis of candidate acceptance, and the implied exclusion of candidates who are not above reproach. The results of a question on this are summarised in table 7.

Table 7. Strict adherence to a code of conduct for candidates, versus relaxations on the basis of popularity or race 

The supporters of the DA, the ID, the ACDP, and the FF+ are strongly in favour of strict adherence to a code of conduct whereas the UDM and the IFP supporters tend to be rather similar to those of the ANC, who equivocate on the issue.

One should also consider the compatibility of party supporters on issues of policy and socio-political attitudes. Questions were posed with multiple items and the results need not be presented in full. The results will be summarised below.

Broadly the results suggest the following:

Government performance  

• Intense dissatisfaction with government performance is present among 40% of more of supporters of all opposition parties. Intense dissatisfaction falls to just over 20% among ANC support. There is thus considerable opposition consensus
• Some 70% or more of all opposition supporters feel that the country is heading in the wrong direction, as opposed to 40% in the ANC
• Generally only somewhat more than a third of all voters and those in both government and opposition parties feel that their quality of life is bad or very bad. Among IFP and FF+ supporters, however, this rises to over 60%. Quality of life, however, is not necessarily closely linked to government performance.
• Some 70% or more of ANC supporters feel that government tries its best to provide a better life, and this view is shared by 45% of ID, 40% of ACDP and 63% of UDM supporters. In the DA, the IFP and the FF+ less than a third of supporters make this concession. In this respect the opposition is divided.

Social and economic policy

Not surprisingly, with the exception of the FF+ which is cynical about state action, all party supporters, ANC included, are broadly agreed on the following policy priorities:

• Assistance to people in poverty
• Investment for growth
• Combating crime and abuse
• Fighting corruption
• Improved basic service delivery
• The need for a more efficient public service
• Improved education and training
• Improved health and HIV/Aids policies
• Improved public housing delivery
• Changing labour laws to combat unemployment (except among ACDP and FF+ supporters). The respondents' agreement was elicited more by the concern over unemployment than a desire to change labour laws, however.  

There is somewhat less general enthusiasm, but broad inter-party consensus on and support for:

• Protecting workers' rights (the FF+ disagrees)
• The protection of language and cultural rights
• Achieving racial harmony and reconciliation (except the FF+)

There is, however, divergence of views on the following issues:

• State appointments on merit and ability irrespective of race. Only half of ANC supporters support merit appointments whereas majorities of all opposition parties, particularly the ID, the UDM and the DA support merit.
• The ID, the ACDP and the FF+ are fairly strongly opposed to transformation policies to overcome the effects of Apartheid. The ANC, the DA and the other opposition party supporters are, however, lukewarm in their support. This policy was once more widely supported but it has been partially discredited by promoting the interests of a new elite.
• There is only lukewarm support or less for policies to reduce inequality between rich and poor of any race, even in the ANC. While the inequality is condemned government intervention is mistrusted, except among IFP supporters, who see themselves as the poorest of the poor.
• There is fairly lukewarm support for Affirmative Action and Empowerment policies, but moderate opposition to these policies by DA, ID, ACDP, and FF+ supporters, once again because government has misapplied the policies.
• For the very same reason there is even more lukewarm support for restitution policies to compensate for Apartheid        

4. Leadership Image

In table 8 the proportions of all voters and of opposition voters who either admire or dislike the country's leaders are presented.

Table 8. Admiration versus dislike of political leaders

These results are remarkable. Only Jacob Zuma is admired more than he is disliked among all voters, the majority of whom are ANC. Mbeki is admired and disliked in equal measure and the other leaders of the ruling Alliance are disliked more than they are liked. There is a leader-appeal vacuum among the governing elite, and even Zuma is disliked by well over a third of all voters.

As expected, opposition leaders are disliked much more than they are liked among all voters, but Helen Zille and Patricia de Lille are disliked least.

Among opposition voters, Helen Zille is admired most and disliked least, followed by Patricia de Lille. The other opposition leaders clearly do not have a following outside their own parties. Helen Zille is the leader most likely to find support outside her own party.

5. Broad Conclusions

Party strength: 

The ANC/SACP Alliance is still clearly the dominant force in the electorate. It has, however, weakened slightly after sustained growth since 1994. The end of a trend and the peaking of support always signals possibilities of a change of direction and opposition parties should take heart from these signals.

At the same time, however, there will be some consolidation of ANC support during the 2009 election campaign under a new leader, and the effects of the peaking of underlying support may not be very clearly evident until after the elections. The consolidation of support will not be as powerful as it has been in past election campaigns, however, because never before has the ANC gone into elections with a leader whose popularity is not universal in the party.

In the past opposition parties have perceived the effects of the ANC party activists playing the race card to consolidate black support against the opposition. Whether the exploitation of race has been the main consolidating factor is debateable, however. Other possible factors are the effects on voters of overblown and over-optimistic promises of a "better life" (detailed results in Appendix B show how susceptible mass voters are to such promises) as well as the pervasive pressure of politics in public life. In response to question 8 (see Appendix A) it may be noted that black and so-called coloured voters are most likely to find it very difficult to hold political opinions different to those of the people around them (around 20%), and this diffuse pressure certainly helps the consolidation of parties dominant in specific areas. Racial solidarity, in this author's interpretation of trends in the results, not as powerful a factor as it has been in the past. Among rank-and-file black voters it is less powerful than it is among new elites and among a fairly distinctive African nationalist core within the ANC, which is less than 20% of ANC support. This leads to the second theme in these conclusions.

More so than in very many survey results in the past, the significance of the racial factor in itself is rather muted. In the patterns of popularity or dislike of leaders and in a variety of direct probes, rank-and-file voters of the ANC and other parties are either disinterested in or firmly reject "race" as a criterion for acceptance. They perceive the complexities and contradictions in behaviour around them and generally see through the racial stereotypes peddled by activists, both black and white.

The DA as a political party is the best example of this. It has been commonplace for semi-"progressive" opinion leaders to hint or allege that the DA has a "neo-liberal" (i.e. new conservative) ideology and to imply that its agenda is racist. Yet the results in the survey show that, while there is minority based racial antipathy for the DA in the ANC, DA communication is more generally accepted as bona-fide and that there is considerable covert sympathy for its stance among rank-and-file black voters. The fact that this sympathy has not yet been translated into open electoral support, in this writers view, is due more to the barrage of promises that the ANC makes of a better life for the poor, a relative lack of healthy cynicism about politics and that the government does get its message through that, all its capacity failures notwithstanding, it is "trying its best" to improve the lives of the rank-and-file poor.

Race can never be discounted in South Africa, but at the same time, open democracy is still fairly new, and the judicious caution and indeed the cynicism about promissory rhetoric that effective democracy requires is not yet well-developed among the mass of voters. However disappointed they are, these voters still play it safe and support the party that most consistently promises that it is "on their side". Lavish promises are also in the nature of a short-term "fix" for disillusionment among all people. We should know how often unscrupulous partners get away with delinquency by promising undying love and fidelity thereafter. Political promises can have the same effect, and the respondents give a clear indication of this in the results of this survey.

Hence while opposition politics faces huge challenges in South Africa's segmented democracy, there is no reason to believe that the factor of majority-based racial solidarity is so overwhelming as to render the task of political education through effective communication at grass roots level hopeless. Certain opposition parties can look forward to steady, if slow, gains in the future, and once a tipping point is reached, gains could be significant. And in the 2009 elections, unless the country is hugely disrupted by the economic downturn that will last through 2009, opposition parties collectively can look forward to increasing their share of the vote.

The DA in particular could look forward to quite significant gains as the major opposition party, taking its support to around the 20% mark.  

Cooperation, alliances and coalitions:  

There is also very substantial popular support for political cooperation between opposition parties and interest in such cooperation among substantial minorities in the ANC support base.

The supporter interest in a coalition of parties is most significant in opposition ranks, however, and a well-crafted election alliance and or post election coalition could consolidate opposition strength.

From the perspective and preferences of the supporters, the cooperation would be most appropriate between the DA, the ID and the UDM and it is this combination that would optimise support levels. The addition of any other party would decrease the overall appeal.

On the basis of policy preferences and political orientations of supporters across racial categories, cooperation between the DA and the ID would be most appropriate, because other opposition parties have rather stronger elements of racial nationalism, black or otherwise, that will make cooperative action after the elections difficult.

The question arises, however, as to whether or not it will be important to include a party with a black leader. Yes and no.

As far as the general image and media profile of the cooperation is concerned, it will be an obvious advantage to have a prominent black leader in the ranks. As far as delivering votes in the short run, however, the effects will not be dramatic. Among black voters at large, none of the possible black participants have public profiles and popularity levels that will deliver very significant numbers of extra votes. Full inter-racial cooperation will deliver medium term rather than short run benefits.

As in most countries aside from the highly developed few, the largest underlying challenge for democracy in South Africa is the level of independence and sophistication of voter choices, across racial categories. Although its current political and economic stresses may disguise it, South Africa is making progress. To that extent the results of this research are encouraging.

This is an edited extract of Lawrence Schlemmer's report. The full version with figures and appendices can be accessed in PDF by clicking on the link below.

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