Mbeki and Monopolisation of Power
Former President Mbeki penned an article titled “Yet Another Myth: Mbeki and the Monopolisation of Power”. In this article the former president sought to present his version of how the ANC functioned and its interaction with the State. In the process – as has been the case since his first letter – the former president sought to insulate himself from known history of his term of office by, this time around, trying to dispel what the termed a myth of him monopolising power.
In this article, he enumerated a number of processes which were and are involved in decision-making in the ANC. However, his consequent observation is telling and maybe the source of what appeared as the centralisation of power in the Union Building – leading to delegates in Polokwane Conference reaffirming the ANC as a strategic centre of power.
President Mbeki makes an observation that “…the ruling party, the ANC, did not and could not have the capacity that the State has to generate and consider the kind of enormous details which Government had to deal with as it translated broad policies into specific programmes relating to more than thirty (30) Government Departments. Fully understanding this, the ANC Headquarters and the NEC, for instance, never intervened in Government work pretending that they could have the same capacity with regard to matters of detail as would the Ministers and Deputy Ministers and the National Cabinet.”
Although, Cde Mbeki’s observation is justified in technical terms, he cannot escape criticism that his observation is also motivated by political posturing. His observation should take into account the practical concerns in relation to the political issues that marked his term in office. His preferred argument also confirms the unhealthy interplay of the political dynamics between the movement and government during his tenure.
This is when power shifted from one source to the other depending on the political mood. It was a strategic positioning by Cde Mbeki to use government as a shelter to seek refugee and insulated himself where he had better control of the situation instead of dealing directly with his comrades. It is common cause that state organs such as departments have enormous systems of control, inter alia- decision making processes, knowledge and information management systems, structures and rules. These were the things that were captured during his tenure as part of a power play to limit the role and influence of others, especially those out of government. This was another reality that found expression in the discussion documents of the movement leading to the ANC 52nd National Conference in 2007.
The discomfort that power was shifting away from Luthuli was not an ill-informed one or just a creation of the media. The ANC 2007 Discussion Document on Organisational Renewal observed that “…there are occasions when we operate as if there are two ANCs: the one ANC in government and the other outside government. The relationship between ANC constitutional structures and cadres deployed in government is often fraught with conflict…In some cases, cadres deployed in government are impatient with and reluctant to subject major governance issues to organisational discussions.”
The essence of the analysis contained in the discussion document that - cadres deployed to government are impatient and reluctant to subject major governance issues to organizational structures clearly communicated a frustration of the organization on how the government was led. To deny this reflects intellectual laziness in analysing that period in the movement or a continued effort to rewrite history so that it favors the author.
The above observation led to the delegates at the Polokwane Conference resolving this impasse by resoundingly re-affirming the ANC as an ultimate strategic centre of power. The delegates further called for the improvement of ANC capacity to hold deployed cadres more accountable to the movement. Amongst the far-reaching decisions taken was the appointment of Premiers should be a collective decision of the NEC as opposed to be by the President in consultation with the NEC. The decision was a clear indication of a failed process of consultation, as proffered in the letter, and a growing unease that the President had too much power concentrated in his office, which at times has be exercise without taking along the feeling of the movement.
Cde Mbeki must allow his leadership to be defined based on how he handled difficult issues in his tenure, after-all this is how leadership is defined world over. How Cde Mbeki handled differences on socio-economic issues within the movement and with civil society, in particular on HIV/AIDS and GEAR is what will continue to define his leadership for generations to come. Further, the policy conference of the ANC in 2002 revealed something about his leadership.
It is not all clear what extraordinary crisis or challenge would have caused Cde Mbeki to propose to delegates that they reflect on the application of the principle of “better fewer but better”. The only thing that was made clear by him is that this proposal was made to “…ensure that all our members, whatever their position in our movement and society, work to defend and implement all agreed policies…” Cde Mbeki clearly knew that there are secondary class contractions which must be continually managed within the ANC. Also, he could not go against the 1997 ANC Strategy and Tactics document which spelt out clearly that the “…Tripartite Alliance was not a matter of sentiment, but an organisational expression of the common purpose and unity in action that these forces share, and continue jointly to define and redefine in the course of undertaking the tasks of the NDR.”
What is troubling about his proposition, given the context of the time, was that his leadership was not inspiring and uniting. He chose the path of emphasising control and security within the ANC- in a way seeking to redefining the context of keeping membership within the ANC without any mandate.
The restriction of the role of Alliance participation only into policy formulation and not monitoring is another case in point of an ANC that was being led into a direction of “better few, but better”. Since Polokwane, while delegates re-affirmed the ANC as an ultimate strategic centre of power, there has been an increased participation of the Alliance – not only in policy formulation but also in monitoring and in decision making. The unintended consequences of this increased participation will be a debate of another day.
The Alliance was not only confined to consultation during policy-making, it has also to endure unabated attack from President Mbeki. As pointed out in the Biography of Former Deputy President, Cde Kgalema Motlanthe, “though (Motlanthe) would not say it publicly, there is a strong sense that he found it difficult to deal with Mbeki’s repeated attacks against the ANC allies…he knew that if he differed with Mbeki publicly it would lead to serious problems in the ANC.”
The generalisation put forward by President Mbeki on the perceived ‘lack of capacity in the ANC on matters of government details’ is mechanical at best. The categorisation between members of ANC at work and home is an abstraction which is difficult to objectively assess. Also, the influence of ANC members from government in ANC structures is not fully appreciated. In fact what Cde Mbeki is advancing has never been the understanding of the movement. The availability of resources in government has never been understood to justify a shift the power from Luthuli House.
In fact, the relationship between the ANC and its deployees to government is regulated by the known principles of consultation, mandates and accountability. In the ANC, consultation is not an end in itself. It is a process aimed at harvesting popular support for decisions and policies and to empower members to be able to explain such decisions to others and the public in general. Consultation is also part of ensuring that as a liberation movement, we remain true to our conviction that people should shape their own destiny.
The enumeration of processes entailed in the decision-making does not automatically translate into effective consultation as envisioned in the movement. In terms of mandate and accountability, organisational structures are expected to provide deployees with mandates on policies and broader strategies to guide them in their respective areas of deployment. On the other hand, deployed cadres are expected to account on the structures on how they have carried out the mandate, including on challenges they encounter.
This, however, has always been understood not to mean that organisational structures must micro-manage deployees. The essence of it is that members are deployed to further the policies, objectives and strategies of the movement. Deployees are at liberty to use their individual skills and thinking to enhance the implementation of the mandates.
In the final analysis, President Mbeki fell into a cliff that President Mandela warned against during his farewell speech at the ANC 50th National Conference when he said, “One temptation of a leader elected unopposed is that he may use that powerful position to settle scores with his detractors, marginalise them and in certain cases get rid of them and surround himself with yes men and women” Indeed, the judgement on the matter raised by the former President Mbeki was passed and handed down in the 2007 ANC National Conference. The appeal against this judgement has no prospects of success and fall to be dismissed.
Sihle Zikalala is the ANC provincial chairperson in KZN.
