The South African government's consistent support for ZANU-PF has moved along shrouded by a fog of obfuscation. At last week's summit of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) the mist briefly cleared.

On his arrival at the summit President Robert Mugabe was greeted by delegates with "thunderous applause." Earlier the Zimbabwean Justice Minister, Patrick Chinamasa, stated that ZANU-PF had absolutely no intention of acceding to the MDC's demands for the political reforms necessary to give it a fair chance at next year's polls.

SADC leaders also made clear that they had no intention of pressurising ZANU-PF into doing so. In a press conference at the end of the summit South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki, stated that there would be no political pre-conditions placed on any economic rescue package put together for Zimbabwe.

The Western media is suddenly casting around for reasons to make sense of this all. Why are SADC leaders still supporting Mugabe despite the ruin he has brought to his own country, and the harm he is doing to theirs?

In an editorial the Daily Telegraph (London) suggested three possible explanations. Firstly, there was Mugabe's "status as the oldest of the freedom-fighting leaders still in office"; secondly, there was his "brilliant" propaganda campaign which has pinned blame for Zimbabwe's dire economic situation on Western sanctions; and, thirdly, there was the traditional reluctance of African leaders to criticise their peers in public.

Reuters meanwhile claimed that southern African leaders look up to Mugabe "as a respected liberation hero who still takes on the United States and former coloniser Britain, even though he is accused of bringing Zimbabwe to its knees in the process."

Such explanations tend to suggest that Mugabe is protected from criticism by a kind of misguided idealism, and sense of loyalty, on the part of his peers. Very little attention is paid to the character of the regimes which are supporting him. SADC is dominated by five national liberation movements. These are Frelimo in Mozambique (in power since 1975); the MPLA in Angola (1975); ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe (1980); Swapo in Namibia (1990); and, the ANC in South Africa (1994).

The attitude of these movements to political power was well captured by David Apter when he wrote: "Those who won independence know that it was not granted because of the kindness of colonial officials. Fought for by those willing to risk and dare, power has been captured by the nationalists; and having won it they intend to hold it by almost any means."

None of these movements has ceded power through the ballot box, nor do any of them intend to do so at any point in the foreseeable future. Elections are seen as useful for legitimating their rule - especially while they enjoy overwhelming popular support - but not as a means by which the voters can remove them from office. As Mugabe put it in 1982, "as clear as day follows night ... ZANU-PF will rule in Zimbabwe forever. There is no other party besides ours that will rule this country."

The current ANC leadership has described the idea that the role of the opposition should be to criticise the government of the day, and try and win power through the ballot box, as a "reactionary, dangerous and opportunist position." Their belief, as Deputy President Jacob Zuma famously put it before the 2004 elections, is that the ANC "will rule South Africa until Jesus comes back."

It was in reaction to the rise of the MDC in Zimbabwe that these five movements first met in October 2000 to strategise ways of holding on to power. The Sunday Times (October 15 2000) reported that the meeting was a bid by these organisations "tighten their grip on political power and halt the growing support for opposition movements in the region." The intention was to thrash out ways "of bolstering support and devising strategies to win future elections." Mavivi Myakayaka-Manzini, head of international relations in the ANC, told the Sunday Times:

"Never before have these parties come together like this. We are linked not only in the agreements sealed through our governments but our relationships are also sealed in blood. We fought with each other in our battle for liberation."

Their sense of solidarity is underpinned less by historical loyalty - though it is expressed in these terms - and more by the old sentiment that if they do not stand together they will "hang separately."

I

At various points during the unfolding crisis in Zimbabwe Western leaders seem to have sub-contracted their foreign policy to Thabo Mbeki. On June 1 this year Tony Blair met with Mbeki at the conclusion of his farewell tour of Africa. In a press conference after their meeting Blair lent his support to Mbeki's SADC-mandated mediation efforts. He told journalists:

"... in the end the solution is an African solution for Zimbabwe and that is why I welcome very much the work that President Mbeki has undertaken on behalf of SADC and we wish it well and we will do everything we can to support the changes necessary to improve the lot of people in Zimbabwe. But that is something in the end that will have to come from within Africa itself with the support of course from people outside."

For the British to place their trust in Mbeki in this way reflects a level of hard-nosed realism similar to that displayed by Ms. Puddleduck when she left all her eggs in the care of the foxy-whiskered gentleman.

It is quite clear from the summit communiqué that omelette is (once again) on the menu. Although Chinamasa publicly rejected any meaningful compromise with the opposition, SADC nonetheless welcomed the "progress" in the mediation process. It called on the rival parties to conclude work as soon as possible so that "the people of Zimbabwe" are able "to elect the leaders of their choice in an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity." Meanwhile, Mbeki told reporters:

"Everybody is interested that when the presidential and parliamentary elections take place in March next year in Zimbabwe, they should be held in an atmosphere that will result in free and fair elections without controversies and so on."

The one small problem with such assurances is that neither SADC nor Mbeki have ever met a rigged election in Zimbabwe which they did not think free, fair, peaceful, and tranquil.

In August 2000 a meeting of the SADC heads of state formally endorsed ZANU-PF's victory in the first stolen elections in Zimbabwe two months earlier. A communiqué expressed their satisfaction "that the elections were held in a transparent, peaceful, free and fair environment, in accordance with our shared democratic principles and values."

After the second stolen election in 2002 - which returned Mugabe to the presidency - it was the "considered opinion" of the SADC ministerial task force that the elections were "substantially free and fair, and were a true reflection of the will of the people of Zimbabwe."

Following the third stolen election in 2005 - which saw ZANU-PF increase its parliament majority - the SADC observer mission congratulated "the people of Zimbabwe for peaceful, transparent, credible, well-mannered elections, which reflects the will of the people."

Clearly, Chinamasa's claim that Zimbabwe is a democracy "like any other democracy in this world" - with a system which cannot be made "any fairer or more transparent" - is one widely shared by leaders in the region. However, the great mystery is why, despite all this, Blair thought that Mbeki could be relied upon to bring about change in Zimbabwe?

II

Hannah Arendt once observed that European history "through many centuries had taught people to judge each political action by its cui bono and all political events by their particular underlying interests." It was for this reason that that the "anti-utilitarian behaviour of totalitarian governments, their complete indifference to mass interest" proved to be such a shock.

The lessons of that time seem to have been forgotten, at least as far as Southern Africa is concerned. Western politicians and opinion makers have slipped back into the assumption that objective interest is the rule that "alone can never fail."

It seems that SADC and Mbeki were expected to pursue a rational solution to the crisis in Zimbabwe simply because it was in the interests of their countries to do so. Yet all of the national liberation movements - most notably in Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe - have displayed, at various points, a complete indifference to the mass interest.

Mbeki himself has revealed on numerous occasions the anti-utilitarian core of his ideology. This is evidenced most clearly in the long period during which he prevented the provision of anti-retroviral drugs through the public health care system in South Africa, and in his support for the dispossession of the white farming class in Zimbabwe. Both of these policies were pieces of "prodigious insanity."

Mbeki's HIV/AIDS policy taught South Africans two invaluable lessons. The first was that he - and the ANC more generally - could not be relied upon to automatically act in the interests of (black) South Africans. The second was that he could be forced to reverse policy, if the pressure from civil society was outspoken, sustained, and powerful enough.

They are lessons Western leaders would do well do bear in mind - when formulating any new policy towards the Zimbabwean catastrophe.