South Africa’s change of government: Substitute governments in a dissolving order

10 October 2023

Long before next year's general election, it has already garnered a great deal of the public’s attention. The obvious reason for that is the exciting prospect of a change of government: that the ANC loses power to an opposition coalition, if not nationally, then at least in addition in the Western Cape, perhaps also in Gauteng and in Kwazulu-Natal.

1. Relinquishing / abdicating governmental powers; Substitute governments and no-man's lands of no government

However, there is no need to await a change of government following an election, because the ANC regime is increasingly suffering losses of the means and tools of government as a result of which it is ruling over less and less. The official government – the regime - is, increasingly, relinquishing governing functions to various other institutions. These institutions, now functioning as substitute governments, simply push the weakening regime aside.

Among them are constitutional institutions, such as efficient provincial and municipal governments. Of greater significance, however, are the unofficial substituting governments, consisting of civic and business initiatives and formations. Although the Constitution does not recognize them as governmental institutions – and though they do not necessarily conceive of themselves as governments – they nevertheless possess the requisite will and ability to govern in quantities which far exceed those of the incumbent regime.

They become substitute governments as they acquire governing functions and start to exercise forms of self-government over participating communities. Numerous institutions emerge in this way as substitute governments. However, the prominence of Afrikaners coming to the fore as substitute governments in place of the regime is particularly noteworthy.

The reconfigurations of government playing out in this way are mostly informal, yet far-reaching; in fact, more far-reaching than a change of government in consequence of an election, because it dislocates the Constitution and creates a variation of actually substituting local and corporate constitutions. This trend is gaining strength as the regime's loss of the means of government worsens and the capacity of substituting governments strengthens.

In some places, however, certain government functions simply cease to exist, as neither the regime nor substitute governments exercise the relevant functions. This results in the emergence of no-man's-lands of no-government (anarchy) in the countryside and, increasingly, also in urban areas.

The regime – the official South African government "under" the Constitution – increasingly changes into government in name only: a nominal government. There are ministers, premiers, CEOs of state enterprises, mayors and many officials who benefit from the fiscus, but an effective South African government in relation to all traditional government functions across the entire territory known as South Africa is receding into the background.

2. Patchwork in southern Africa instead of the South African state

Substituting governments cannot replace the official South African regime in full. They are too weak for that and, in any case, typically have little interest in doing so. They focus only on the community, function or area (seat) in respect of which they exercise governing functions.

In step with that, South Africa forfeits its character as a single constitutional entity with a single national government that exercises sovereign functions over the entire territory. Instead, South Africa is transforming into a constitutionally amorphous region. Thus, in terms of the exercise of governmental functions, the following constitutional patchwork emerges:

(1) the official government – the regime called the South African government – which still holds some sway in places and in relation to a number of functions, albeit increasingly weakening over time;

(2) an increasingly assertive Western Cape provincial government (which may be further supplemented after next year's election), as well as with a number of effective municipal councils;

(3) and – in my opinion the most important – an assortment of informal substitute governments consisting of civil institutions, business enterprises and organisations;

(4) as well as interspersed with an array of warlords - reigns of terror by organized crime - and constitutional no-man’s lands where government has basically withdrawn, or where forms of government appear but fleetingly now and then. There are many such areas in the countryside, but Johannesburg's city centre and a range of other urban areas offer the most prominent, more precisely urban, examples of this.

The profile is therefore of a South Africa that is constructively and destructively disintegrating - constructively through efficient new forms of government and destructively through gang-rule and constitutional no-man's-lands where government has deserted. The Constitution no longer provides a reliable indication of which state organs govern where, or what kind of governing functions are exercised. The true state of affairs is to be determined by observing what actually happens on the ground, rather than by what the Constitution purports to prescribe.

3. Means / tools of government

The tools or means of government comprise the physical and human infrastructure that enable a government to govern, including the following six critical sectors:

(1) electric power;

(2) water infrastructure;

(3) transport and communication;

(4) a criminal justice system providing the structures and facilities for combatting crime, thus guaranteeing public safety and the upholding of a system of criminal justice;

(5) a dedicated and adequately funded public service including local authorities;

(6) the administration of justice.

All six sectors have deteriorated significantly. As a consequence, the regime’s rule has substantially diminished. New substitute governments, anarchy, gang rule and constitutional no-man’s lands are increasingly the order and, indeed, disorder of the day.

3.1. Electricity

The once-effective state enterprise, Eskom, established the generation and distribution of electricity as an essential tool of government. The state was thus enabled to provide electricity for remuneration to the public and to the business sector; contracting with local and foreign consortia to embark on massive strategic public works undertakings (water, transport and similar infrastructure); and attract large investors who could comfortably use this state-supplied infrastructure to invest and achieve large profits. This, in turn would also serve to generate a consistent, substantial stream of tax revenue for the state.

Since its establishment in 1923, Eskom essentially reduced power generation and distribution to a state monopoly. Consequently, being dependent on power meant, by necessary implication, being dependent on the state. In this way, the electricity monopoly has provided successive governments with a strategic governing tool for almost a century.

Mainly owing to poor management, Eskom is on an irreversibly downward trajectory. In full knowledge of the importance of the generation and supply of electricity as a strategic tool of governance, the regime is trying its level best to arrest the decline – but such attempts are, increasingly, being met with failure. In contrast, the public has enterprisingly taken over the function of power generation and distribution. As a result, households and businesses become state-resistant (or 'staatsbestand' as termed by Piet le Roux of Sakeliga) and independent of the state, thereby exercising communal self-government in the critical field of power generation and supply.

This applies not only to power generation but also to distribution – so much so, in fact, that large investments, often from foreign sources, are being made into micro-power networks. This, in turn, results in industrial, commercial and residential areas with the necessary entrepreneurship and capital muscle becoming completely self-sufficient and, therefore, independent of the state.

3.2. Water supply

Long before 1994, successive governments succeeded in building water infrastructure including dams, canals, reservoirs, and pumping stations. This infrastructure would serve to make more areas of South African economically useful, providing numerous benefits to agriculture and industry in particular.

This would ensure that various semi-desert areas became agriculturally prosperous and that Johannesburg, arguably the only large city in the world far from natural water resources, met its enormous water needs. Much has, however, changed over recent decades due to neglect and poor management and, alas, taps often run dry.

Fortuitously located rural communities and towns may be able to address this problem, at least in part, with local infrastructure. Businesses may, likewise, be able to get by with the judicious use of limited water resources. The same applies to some local governments, in particular that of the Western Cape province and effective informal regional governments, such as that of Orania. For the time being, however, the rest of the population remains dependent on the national government.

3.3. Transport and communication

The establishment and operation of both long-distance and suburban rail transport of freight and passengers is an enormous achievement of the South African state and its colonial and republican predecessors long before the establishment of the Union in 1910. Ports too. Long-distance and urban roads boomed in the 1960s. Like power generation and distribution, it involves strategic infrastructure for economic operations. At the same time, it also involves a governing tool, which enables state organs to enforce their presence everywhere and enforce governmental power, which naturally entails dependence on the state.

Over recent decades, this infrastructure has declined significantly – a trend that only accelerated during the state-mandated lockdown. Rail transport has been reduced to a shadow of what it once was. This is due, in part, to the decay of railway lines, stations and locomotives. Apart from this loss in physical capital, the railways suffered a concomitant loss in human capital as well. Competent railway personnel have gradually been phased out, as a result of unwise personnel policy, itself the product of representativity, BEE, cadre deployment and affirmative action. South Africa's once highly regarded ports have deteriorated in likewise fashion – and for similar reasons.

Thousands of kilometres of roads, especially provincially and in urban and town areas, have been destroyed owing to poor maintenance.

This is seriously harmful for economic activity. It suppresses industrial and commercial activity while imports and exports are severely hampered, as the Minerals Council has repeatedly explained, with consequent losses of government revenue from taxes. Privatisation of (parts of) the rail structure, vehemently rejected by the socialist-centralist ANC-regime, clearly does not lie in the distant future anymore. On the contrary it is on the cards, Even the leftist National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) whose members in the coal mine industry are destined to lose their jobs because of poor exports resulting from the bas state of the rail infrastructure are now desperately hinting at privatisation.  

Transport, as a tool and means of governance, consequently slips out of the regime's control. Many places become difficult for the government to access, leading to the withdrawal of state authority and the emergence of the aforementioned constitutional no-man's lands.

Elsewhere, the agriculture, mining, industry, and civil society sectors assume governmental roles to such an extent that they - not the receding state organs - undertake the maintenance of roads and streets. This will, in all likelihood, soon also be broadened to include railroad tracks.

South African exporters are increasingly switching to foreign outlets, such as the port of Maputo, which, thanks to a European consortium, has significantly expanded its investment and efficiency.

Because of technological advances, government ownership in telephone communications has largely disappeared. Regime control remains only in the area of licensing, which does not appear to be an obstacle of any particular importance. Electronic communications and large-scale private package delivery have made the state's Post Office largely redundant. In consequence of poor management and the bankruptcy of the Post Office, the state has now also lost this tool of government. There is still legislation (the Postal Services Act) which tries to monopolize certain postal services for the Post Office, but due to the dilapidated Post Office and efficient private service providers, the provisions have simply become ineffective.

The bottom line is that the state-provided infrastructure in transport and communication has significantly weakened, diminishing the regime's ability to govern in these areas. In this regard, reliance on the state diminishes, while a wide collection of civic and business institutions assumes these functions, acting as substitute governments.

3.4. Combatting crime; guaranteeing safety; upholding the criminal justice system

The maintenance of public peace is the raison d'être of the state. This is the reason why a government must maintain a criminal justice system, consisting of the police and criminal courts, to prevent, investigate and prosecute crime. The criminal justice system provides the infrastructure and is the governing instrument for maintaining the public peace and for combatting crime.

In South Africa, there is overwhelming evidence that the government has significantly lost its ability to govern this core governmental competency. The structural decline of the police force is evident in the severe shortage of competent officers, rampant corruption and police crime, lack of expertise and experience, insufficient transport facilities, and the like. While the dismissal of Minister Bheki Cele as appropriate as it may be, simply does not address the structural origins of the problem.

The private sector is already responding on a large scale to this challenge and now employs more than three times as many people as the police. It has, in all likelihood also surpassed the police in terms of firepower. In some instances, communities constitute substitute governments by way of neighbourhood watches and related structures. In other cases, communities and businesses, in particular, hire private security services to provide security services in place of the absent police. In this way, they become the substitute governments in these sectors and areas. Similarly, private security institutions provide the executive tools of government. Despite the importance of this area for state legitimacy – and in the face of rising crime – the public has, ironically, become less and less dependent on the state.

Of course, in many places this does not happen. As far as security services are concerned, the regime, or any substitute civilian institutions, are still able to exercise governing functions everywhere. Where they cannot reach, the law of the jungle prevails and government vacuums or gang-related reigns of terror prevail.

In the area of public order and peace, the patchwork profile of government referred to above is most prominently present.

3.5. A dedicated and adequately funded public service, including local authorities

A dedicated and well-funded civil service provides the ubiquitous, essential governing tool of any government. In South Africa it has, however, deteriorated in almost every respect and in many cases, especially in local government, the administration is appalling.

Moreover, the state's finances have now run out. Twice in the past decade and a half, unexpected windfalls from high hard commodity prices have come to the state's rescue. Those tailwinds, however, have now disappeared. In early September, the Department of Finance issued a warning about a looming, ugly budget deficit. Furthermore, it emphasized that no further appointments can be made in the public service and that salary increases are not viable. Essential services to the country's enormous number of government social dependents are bound to be curtailed, especially in light of the strain they already face. The financial tools of government, vital, of course, to all state institutions, seem to be imploding.

Local authorities in the current dispensation in South Africa are large-scale and worsening failures. Many local authorities are under the administration of provincial governments, which usually fail to save the municipalities concerned. Most no longer have professional staff, offer minimal to no services, and struggle financially. Municipalities under ANC control perform exceptionally poorly. The failure of specifically ANC-led municipal councils results in a significant reduction of governance tools for the ANC. In many places, driven by necessity, civic and business institutions simply take over municipal functions, if not in the entirety of the relevant municipal areas, then in parts of them.

3.6. The administration of justice

Of course, the decay of the criminal justice system, extends beyond inadequate policing to include the criminal courts themselves. As such, they are plagued by shortages of prosecutors – in particular those with sufficient experience to go toe-to-toe with senior counsel, typically favoured by affluent white-collar accused. The criminal courts are also hampered by unacceptably long delays. According to successive reports from African Barometer, the public's confidence in the courts has fallen to unprecedented lows.

Adjudication of large commercial disputes have all but disappeared from the country's courts, because parties, having lost faith in increasingly incompetent adjudicators, prefer private arbitration instead. The high estimation in which South Africa's civil courts were held, both locally and abroad, is now a relic of the turn of the century and the days of white minority rule.

4. Governmental dispersal and diffusion – the emerging constitutional patchwork

The profile of our unfolding constitutional patchwork from the disintegrating South African state is already partially apparent from the discussion so far. Let us look at it in more detail now: first in relation to the population in general and then more in particular with respect to the rather fascinating position of Afrikaners.

4.1. General

4.1.1. First, there is the official part of the emerging patchwork. This may by and large still be in conformity with relevant constitutional provisions.

For the foreseeable future, there will be the regime known, if only nominally, as the South African government. If it remains under the control of an ANC it will carry on maintaining the pretence of government, largely spurred by greed, as well as fear and envy towards the civil and private sector. Considering its unparalled record of large-scale corruption it will, no doubt, persist in its current role of harasser, nuisance and plunderer. This will be accomplished by the means of foolish ANC ideological projects, such as black economic empowerment, bullying of the business sector, harassment of Afrikaans schools, and unaffordable fantasies like the National Health Insurance (NHI), Basic Income Grant (BIG), a spectacular express train, an awe-aspiring high-tech super city and the like. However, because of its growing loss of essential governing resources, it will rule increasingly weakly and over fewer and fewer functions.

If, after next year's election, the regime is a coalition of the ANC with any other party, it will similarly suffer from a loss of governing means and tools and govern weakly and more thinly.

However, owing to its weakness and its diminishing ability to provide social benefits, the regime will face increasing resistance. It will also no longer be able to rely on a stream of money from taxpayers to finance its corruption. Resistance will become more sophisticated and effective. The currently high degree of ungovernability will worsen and be widespread. “Ungovernability” - the battle cry of the ANC and its allies in its Peoples War in the 1980s and 1990s is increasingly destined to be disorder of the day.

As before, the Western Cape provincial government will continue to govern well. It will continue to cooperate with all its (cultural) communities - including Afrikaners - and offer everyone, if not an ideal, then at least an acceptable home.

Depending on what next year's election yields, Gauteng and/or KZN may also fall into opposition hands. And don't be too surprised if (parts of) the ANC from KZN join a new IFP/DA provincial government. A weakened ANC national regime ultimately is less cohesive, and a few positions for ANCs in the KZN government in exchange for cooperation with the new provincial government is ultimately much more attractive than the "languishing" in the ANC opposition benches.

If an opposition coalition does unseat the ANC in Gauteng and / or KZN, the new governments will have an uphill battle: disruption in council chambers, sluggish or openly hostile provincial officials, political criminality and similar harassment. However, the new government/s will not be easily deposed. After all, with the preponderance of public support, they are on an upward curve and the ANC down. Add to that a militant, nationalist Zulu factor in KZN, which will not tolerate ANC mischief, as well as the solid Indian factor in the province.

A similar scenario is likely to play out in Gauteng, albeit with a different cast. Civic organizations have become formidable factor in our political landscape. These include AfriForum, which is well-established in Pretoria and areas of the Rand as well as with ties of friendship with parties involved in the new provincial coalition governments, are a formidable factor in support of such a new provincial government. During the municipal strike that began in July 2023 and the attempted city coup in Tshwane, we saw the AfriForum factor working in the favour of the coalition government of the city.

Of course, new coalition governments formed among the country’s opposition parties will not have an easy time. How they plan to save Johannesburg and Emfuleni from the political mire remains a mystery.

A collection of municipal governments formed by opposition are well-governed and there is a fair chance that their number will rise if only marginally. These include municipalities in the Western Cape, along with others like Midvaal in Gauteng. Thanks to a fairly stable coalition, evident strong leadership, and despite facing political criminality, there is good hope that Tshwane will also be successful.

4.1.2 Then, secondly, there is the significant and expanding unofficial parts of the patchwork.

The Constitution neither provides nor allows for emerging unofficial governments. That, however, is of no moment. They simply emerge where the regime retreats due to its loss of the tools and means of government, and where civic and business enterprises, chambers of commerce, and similar institutions step in as substitute governments in place of the withdrawn regime.

Several civil communities and institutions demarcate themselves into regions, in which they govern themselves to the extent that they are not only enclaves, but rather something in the nature of autonomous micro-republics. There are many of them: the Midstreams, the Dainferns and countless others. They are destined to grow, both in their size as well as their number. They are, as it were, relinquishing their relations with the South Africa state and the regime in a number of important respects.

They generate power themselves and distribute it independently of the state; maintain roads and streets themselves; take measures for water supply; keep the peace, not so much through prosecution, but through crime prevention, through access control (border control); provide education services themselves based on non-state standards that are now widely available and of high quality; provide health services themselves; and generally provide for peaceful, civilized and pleasant micro-dispensations. We now begin to see the beginning of similar trends not only in the cities, but also in the countryside.

Businesspeople, individually and collectively, have taken a similar tack in protecting their business interests. They establish access-controlled industrial, commercial and office parks in which they exercise increasing degrees of autonomous governance.

In some cases, these business parks naturally combine with the residential micro-republics discussed above. They reinforce each other's viability and effectiveness.

The variation of self-governing micro-republics goes even further, of course.

To complete the patchwork, there are, of course, gang "regimes" – as well as regions where all government has simply withdrawn, owing to a general dissipation of governing capability.

4.2. The (micro-)republicanism and federative synergy among Afrikaners

Afrikaners distinguish themselves in that, of all communities, they show the highest degree of dynamism in various places – seats – in the development of autonomous government for communities – self-governing micro-republics.

Many Afrikaners are involved in all the initiatives for self-government mentioned above, either in cooperation with provincial and municipal governments, either in cooperation with business initiatives, or with other cultural communities, and then of course also with a view to the further expansion of their (own) distinctive micro-republics.

In several initiatives, the Solidarity Movement, and specifically AfriForum play a significant part as builders of Afrikaner public works and sustained initiatives. However, individual Afrikaners are enterprising and thrive in numerous private and corporate initiatives, chambers of commerce, and in many other institutions.

The variety of nascent seats of Afrikaner micro-republicanism and similar initiatives of self-reliance and autonomous management are consistent with the history of Afrikanerdom. After all, there was never just a single Afrikaner republic. At their very least there were two: Die Republiek van die Oranje Vrijstaat (The Republic of the Orange Freestate (OVS) and the Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek - ZAR (South African Republic (Transvaal) during the second half of the nineteenth century.

At present, Afrikaner republicanism mainly seems to be germinating in four seats that are in increasingly close synergy with each other. Simultaneously, they expand to other smaller centres, further strengthening a new synergetic and federative relationship. The four seats are:

Pretoria; Orania; Mossel Bay / George; and the Western Cape Crescent.

4.2.1. Pretoria

Pretoria and its surroundings are home to a diverse population, but still remains the largest – and, indeed, growing – seat of Afrikaners. It currently comprises the most important engine of self-government and federative synergy among Afrikaners.

Without diminishing the importance of other places (and recognizing that this may change over time) Pretoria, essentially serves as Afrikaners’ main centre. It is further bolstered by Afrikaners from its surroundings, especially parts of the Witwatersrand. It offers a comprehensive range of specialized cultural and related infrastructure, serving not just Pretoria Afrikaners, but all Afrikaners, whether they reside locally or abroad.

Of importance in this regard are growing educational institutions, Akademia and Sol-Tech, several private schools, as well as public schools, which maintain the living spaces for the practice of Afrikaans community life and culture; the main centres of workers, employers, business, agriculture, vocational, academic, culture, art, security and similar other institutions; media houses; theatres; monuments, museums, and a wide variety of public spaces, which enable Pretoria's Afrikaners and Afrikaners who are sojourning there temporarily for study or for whatever other reason, to enjoy their own culture in the broadest sense of the word in a homely atmosphere and to contribute to it.

4.2.2. Orania

The Afrikaner town, Orania, has in recent times seen many advances. These are not only limited to a significant growth in its population, but also in investment, economic activity, services, labour, quality of life and other respects. The town is the epitome of civility and safety, while making ample provision for the essentials of contemporary infrastructure. Where Orania was previously ridiculed, it is now a modern model town that compares favourably with most towns and cities in the country.

According to current planning, as set out at an Orania city conference on 23 August this year, the town is destined to develop into a small city. Because of its homogeneity, economic growth, efficient and generous public services, as well as its growing prestige among Afrikaners and respect among the wider South African population. Orania is, amongst all Afrikaner communities (geographical and corporate) the furthest along the path to developing into a full-scale autonomous micro-republic.

Orania also boasts a competitive advantage with technical training at Bo-Karoo Opleiding (Training), training artisans and technicians who are readily integrated into the local economy. Furthermore, educational institutions such as Akademia with its main centre in Pretoria, have already established a nascent presence in Orania. As Orania grows into a regional town, its influence and benefits naturally radiate to the larger hinterland surrounding the town.

4.2.3. Western and Southern Cape seats: Mossel Bay / George; and the Western Cape crescent

The Democratic Alliance, bolstered by its effective governance in the Western Cape and several municipalities within the province, espouses a federalist vision, as opposed to a unitary constitutional one. Consequently, it functions as a powerful driving force for growing regional self-government. Given this vision, as well as the decline of the central regime, it is likely that the Western Cape provincial government will acquire more powers, either on the strength of formal constitutional and legislative amendments – or, indeed, in their absence. The same could be said, to an even larger extent, of several strong municipal governments in the Western and Southern Cape.

This development is similarly of great significance for growing Afrikaner self-government. Two seats are important: (1) Mossel Bay / George and (2) the crescent around Cape Town (Somerset West; Stellenbosch; Bellville; Paarl; Worcester and surrounding areas).

These two seats, together with Pretoria and Orania, form the core of an rising network, encompassing a number smaller Afrikaner centres, which, in turn, both benefit from and contribute to their larger counterparts. This synergistic interaction is further channelled and consolidated by a series of Afrikaner institutions such as Akademia, Soltech, similar educational institutions, Sakeliga and chambers of commerce, agricultural organisations, cultural, art, security and various other organizations and institutions, projects and initiatives.

Although the four seats differ, they are growing more cohesive, building on cultural, economic and political commonalities to emerge as distinct micro-republics – which, despite their distinctness, still function within a broader federative synergy for Afrikaners. So, elsewhere, there are a small handful of rural and town centres with significant Afrikaner populations, capital, institutions and leadership in several provinces. These, effectively, are further potential nodes for this federative network and they can, as it were, align themselves with the four seats as participants in Afrikaner federative synergy.

4.2.4. Synergy and federal focus

Afrikaners have already developed governing resources and capacity in a variety of fields. Included in that is safety; public works (the establishment of facilities for educational, health and various other services); aspects of school and tertiary academic and technical education; social services; employment; power supply; water supply; industrial development; trade; intercultural relations; foreign relations and a variety of others. These services and government resources are spread over the four seats of Afrikaner micro-republicanism. This distribution, naturally, underscores the necessity of federative synergy, cooperation, and coordination, so as to maximise the benefits of these resources and capacities.

4.2.5. The Afrikaners as a community of communities

People live not only as an arbitrary aggregate or totally of free-floating individuals. Neither do Afrikaners. They belong to communities and, to use the formulation of professor Danie Goosen, each community is part of a community of communities. Hence, Afrikaner communities in the Afrikaner centres and, as a whole, forge ties and cooperate with other communities to the benefit of all. Mutual cooperation is an ethical responsibility, and one which grows ever more important as the decline of the regime deepens. By necessity, cooperation of Afrikaners with other communities is no abstract idea, but practical politics, in which several Afrikaner institutions such as AfriForum, Orania, agricultural organizations, and similar others such as Sakeliga, by way of assistance and cooperation across the whole spectrum of human life are involved.

5. Conclusion

We find ourselves a wide-ranging tides of changes of government largely divorced from formal processes of constitutional and legislative amendments or election results. This shift stems primarily from the regime’s diminishing resources and capacity of governance and its consequent increasing inability to perform governmental functions. On the other hand, a variety of new official and especially unofficial alternative centres of self-governance are emerging. These centres develop the ability to govern and, as a result, are increasingly, although to varying degrees, taking up governmental roles and, so-doing, govern themselves in distinct geographic hubs.

Afrikaners are at the forefront of these varying forms of growing self-government in the four mentioned seats, as well as in some other smaller Afrikaner nodes. Here self-government develops in the form of Afrikaner micro-republicanism, all forming part of an Afrikaner federative synergy.

Following the decline of the central regime, a variety of substitute governments are emerging, but concomitantly, so too are regions where there is no government and organized legal order anymore. The effect of this is that South Africa becomes an abstraction, all while the actual state and constitutional order fades away. In place of this, the other governments as discussed here become the actual centres and seats of effective government, civic life, legal order, and cultural and economic vibrancy.

The South African order as set out in the 1996 constitution at the same time, forfeits its practical meaning and effect. In its place, a patchwork of government, including informal substitute self-government as well as governmental no-man’s lands describes our varied new dispensations.

Against the background of the fragmented reality, the state identity of South Africanism naturally also fades, to the extent that group, community and regional identity also changes in keeping with the fragmented governmental reality. Our identity documents and passports still testify to the formal legal status of South African citizenship, and when the Springboks defeat the All Blacks we are rightly proud and jubilant. For the rest we embrace our identities and invest our energy into what we are sentimentally attached to, and in relation to which we can actually make an impact – our own communities, centres, micro-republics, federative synergy and such meaningful projects of self-reliance and self-government and inter-communal cooperation.

Just as the written constitution recedes into the background, other things that are also defined in statist terms also fall away. Especially economic aggregates such as the gross domestic product, national growth rate, national unemployment rate, national per capita income, etc. More to the point are the more reliable and widely varying indications of what all these things amount to within specific provinces, functioning municipalities, seats, and micro-republics.

Such, then, are the regime changes that are now underway and how new governments come into existence and new dispensations gain substance in place of the moribund ones.

Prof Koos Malan is a constitutional jurist from Pretoria.

This article was first published in Afrikaans in Litnet.

Malan’s publications include:

Politocracy – An assessment of the coercive logic of the territorial state and ideas around a response to it Pretoria: Pretoria Univ Law Press 2012 (Also in Afrikaans) (The publication is freely available on the Internet);

There is no supreme constitution – a critique of statist-individualist constitutionalism Stellenbosch: African SUN Media 2019;

Studente-inleiding tot die konstitusionele reg with Ilze Grobbelaar-Du Plessis. Pretoria: FAK 2022.