The sociological - or as Marxists would say, the class - purpose of the Zuma regime is to act as a front which, while attempting to placate the poor and unemployed by promises of sympathy, solidarity plus some hand-outs, actually exists to further the interests of a rapacious new class of ANC tenderpreneurs and BEE "businessmen".

In fact, the interests of this new bourgeoisie are such that their goals of primary accumulation by any means cannot be met except at the cost of the further despoliation and immiseration of the poor and the working class.

This contradiction is evident even within the Zuma family itself in the monstrous figure of Kulubuse Zuma, whose progress to ever further riches has been achieved over the bodies of the desperate workers at the Aurora mine. It is hardly accidental that Khulubuse has now progressed to mineral exploitation in the DRC, an arena in which extreme corruption and the most depraved exploitation of the poor has always gone hand in hand.

In fact the mining arena is really the key in a much larger sense. The passage of the Minerals Development Act was accompanied by dire warnings of how it would inevitably hinder investment in this all-important sector of the South African economy. And thus it has been, with a complete and still ongoing collapse of new investment, costing scores of thousands of jobs. While Zuma was in opposition I begged him, if he did nothing else, to repeal that Act for no other measure would do more for employment.

In fact he has maintained it unchanged because this Act allows all manner of state interference on behalf of would-be black ANC mining bosses, a crucial matter to the new bourgeoisie - which cares not one iota how many working class jobs that may cost. But this example is replicated in one sphere after another. The educational prospects of working class black children are sacrificed on the altar of deference to SADTU, a key interest group within the aspirant bourgeoisie. Meanwhile, the labour aristocracy within Cosatu is deferred to in a manner which systematically prices South Africa out of foreign markets, thus depriving the country of investment and further hurting job prospects.

Hence the ridiculous situation in which the ANC says it would, above all, like to emulate China - but where South African workers earn six times as much as their Chinese counterparts - who are also more productive than them. Clearly, the best way to emulate China would be to devalue by 600% - say R50 to the dollar. But that would mean that all sorts of imported luxury goods (such as expensive foreign whiskies and brandies and large Mercedes cars, favoured by Blade Nzimande and other members of the new bourgeoisie) would become prohibitively expensive, which would never do.

Zuma's job, then, is to preside over these processes and maintain social stability as best he can despite the evident immiseration of the poor which such policies entail. And while he may talk left, the truth is that the new bourgeoisie requires the maintenance of a capitalist framework for the purposes of its own enrichment.

Even when "nationalisation of industry" is advanced as a slogan, the assumption is absolute that greater state control will merely enable even greater enrichment of the tenderpreneur class via political control of hitherto private industries. Thus, by definition, Zuma's role is difficult and contradictory. While promising lower unemployment and the general good his regime - the programme of the BEE and tenderpreneur class - is in fact bent upon producing higher inequality, higher unemployment and greater poverty.

By definition such a situation is vulnerable to populist attack, particularly given the high expectations engendered by the ANC's accession to power and its thoughtless promise of "Jobs, jobs, jobs". In practice, just as Marx would have predicted, the national executive committee of the ANC is "the executive committee of the ruling class", and what it is bent upon is making the world's most unequal society more unequal still, for that is the only way in which a new black bourgeoisie can be borne alongside the old white bourgeoisie - which must continue if capitalism is to be maintained.

For a political entrepreneur like Malema - bent on personal advancement and making himself the inevitable future leader of the ANC - this was an inviting situation. He assaulted the Zuma regime dressing himself in the robes of the Freedom Charter, attempting to capitalise on the vast popular disappointment with the ANC. He did not, however, call for opposition to the new black bourgeoisie whose desire for instant wealth is driving the new equation, for no black politician is strong enough to stand against that class.

Instead Malema capitalised on traditional black resentments against the whites and suggested - dishonestly - that their expropriation would resolve the matter. He did so partly because he is a tenderpreneur himself but also, probably, because he is too ill-educated to understand how the current processes of accumulation work.

Ironically, the only way to create greater equality and fairer distribution in South Africa would be via the victory of a party willing to ignore the demands of the black bourgeoisie and concentrate instead on promoting a faster growth rate and the creation of more jobs. It is tempting to see the DA as such a party but it is not clear that even it would be willing to over-ride the clamant demands of the new bourgeoisie.

It would seem probable that Zuma has defeated Malema's attempted populist insurgency but it is important to realise that the class project on which Zuma (and other, future ANC leaders) are and will be embarked will automatically produce stagnation or slow growth in the South African economy, even while elsewhere in Africa growth rates are two or three times higher; will produce ever-higher unemployment and poverty; and will thus be inherently and systemically unstable. As such they are bound to produce recurrent waves of populist protest. Malema may have been defeated - but he is only the first of many. One is tempted to make the comparison with ancient Rome. The first barbarian waves may have been seen off but there will, inevitably, be more. We are waiting for the barbarians.

Polokwane's misleading message

One of the results of Polokwane was that it encouraged the feverish notion that an ANC leader could easily be overthrown. The sensational sight of Mbeki brought low at Polokwane and then the knife-edge tension of his remaining months in office until his final resignation as President on 21 September 2008, sent a surge of excitement through the world of the ANC factions.

Julius Malema, the Youth League leader, had often boasted of how Mbeki would be defeated but this confirmation of his power was thrilling, while for would-be presidential contenders like Tokyo Sexwale the result was a beacon of hope for his own prospects. After all, everyone - not just Business Day - soon agreed that Zuma was not up to the job, so perhaps he could be got rid of with equal dispatch? Malema, eager to brandish and grow his power as a king-maker - and, indeed, as something more than that - soon picked a quarrel with Zuma. Sexwale happily backed him in the hope that the Youth League could again de-stabilise the presidency, while Mathews Phosa also pleaded his cause.

Malema had made an extremely foolish miscalculation. Mbeki, as we have seen, managed to create an opposing alliance of Zuma+ the SACP + Cosatu + the ANCYL, to which Zuma was able to add an increasingly solid Zulu base. Clearly, Zuma could not be defeated if he could maintain this winning coalition. When Malema led the ANCYL into opposition this did not of itself de-stabilise Zuma for he retained the support of the SACP and, thanks to Sidumo Dlamini, Cosatu's Zulu President, he also retained much Cosatu support, including such powerful unions as Nehawu and the NUM.

In addition, Zuma continued to strengthen his Zulu base, enrolling huge new numbers of party members and winning votes and seats from the IFP. Malema then made the cardinal mistake of attacking both the SACP and Cosatu head-on - even threatening that the Youth League would move into the factories and try to steal Cosatu's members there. This merely solidified their opposition to him, while at the same time the powerful KwaZulu-Natal section of the ANCYL began to detach itself from Malema, out of loyalty to a Zulu President.

The overall result was that Zuma's coalition was little or no weaker at the end than it had been at the start, largely because the more Zuma was threatened the more he resorted to the ethnic mobilization of his Zulu base. It was precisely because of the strength of Zuma's position that the President was able to allow Malema more and more rope until at last he over-committed himself, whereupon Zuma pounced in order to destroy his upstart rival. It was nicely done. Zuma, of course, spoke at the ANC's centenary celebrations at Bloemfontein in January 2012 of the need to "stamp out factionalism" in the ANC. This is absurd, as anyone familiar with William H. Riker's Theory of Political Coalitions will know. For Riker showed that all parties are coalitions and that when a party enjoys a large majority this inevitably empowers the factions within it to try to manipulate that majority.

What Zuma actually means is that he will work to maintain the current factional balance which is favourable to him and stamp on anyone, like Malema, who attempts to de-stabilize it. For Zuma the maintenance of political stability depends on his retaining a majority position within the ANC, so this, rather than any government target or policy, is the main aim of government.

In fact, of course, factionalism is becoming stronger and more open all the time. Malema has been carrying out a virtually open insurrection against the leadership for several years now and even after his suspension he continues to command the ANCYL, to address rallies and cheerfully threaten Zuma with his revenge. Motlanthe is repeatedly mentioned as a possible alternative candidate for the Presidency, a threat at one remove to Zuma - and never bothers to disavow such a possibility. Sexwale manoeuvres quite openly, turning up to plead Malema's case, while Mathews Phosa, though one of the Top Six, has openly taken Malema's side. None of these things would have been imaginable under Mbeki, let alone Mandela.

Zuma has been forced to accept all of this as normal - but he has executed another major factional strike by setting up a commission on inquiry into the arms deal. This move was undoubtedly aimed at Mbeki and any remaining members of his faction. For, of course, while the arms deal was in process Zuma himself was a mere provincial minister for economics and tourism in KwaZulu-Natal, while anyone who has examined arms deals in developing countries (or, indeed, in Italy or Japan) knows that the invariable beneficiaries are the defence minister, the prime minister and/or the president.

Quite clearly, in the South African case, Joe Modise, the defence minister, was a major beneficiary, so the real question marks attach to Mbeki and Mandela. It is already the case that South African newspapers have published reports that Mbeki received large sums from the deal, and Mbeki has failed to sue for libel. The real problem is Mandela. If he took bribes, it's terrible; if, on the other hand, he didn't and he was completely out of the loop on such a vital matter, it doesn't reflect well on his presidency. One has a suspicion that no inquiry judge is going to want to look too hard at that one.

The forward prospect

So what now? The first point is that, barring major new developments, Zuma will clearly be re-elected in an armchair, as the French put it. Whatever Peter Bruce and Business Day say, Zuma will doubtless be president until 2019, if indeed he lives that long. (It's quite a big if: at 69 Zuma has already far exceeded the average African life expectancy.) It is to be expected that, in the usual African nationalist style, his administration will become increasingly Zulu, just as Mbeki's final cabinet was far more heavily Xhosa than at the start. And the devil is in that detail.

Speak to any of the leading Zulus in the ANC and they will admit that, in rugby terms, it is going to be darned difficult to get turn-over ball from the Zulus, and certainly from the larger Nguni grouping (Zulu, Xhosa, Swazi and Ndebele).

A Zulu friend, himself a former cabinet minister, told me frankly "There used to be a lot of fantasizing about Cyril Ramaphosa as president but no one who knows African society could possibly believe in a Venda president. Maybe it could happen in three or four generations from now."

If you look back at the ANC presidents over the century since 1912 one finds five Zulus, four Xhosas, one Tswana, one Northern and one Southern Sotho. However, if, more realistically, one confines one's attention to the era when the ANC became a mass movement - and thus its presidency really worth having - the last 60 years have seen a complete Nguni monopoly with three Xhosas and two Zulus. It would take a brave man to bet against that complete monopoly ending except by the fluke of, for example, Zuma's death in office, the only way that Kgalema Motlanthe (a Pedi) could ever become president. As of January 2012 KwaZulu-Natal accounts for 23.8% of all ANC members and the Eastern Cape for 22%: together nearly half. No other province has as much as 12%. These figures alone make an Nguni president virtually inevitable.

The Xhosas as a group seem only to have realised their misfortune in losing the ANC presidency some time after Mbeki's fall: there was no prior ethnic mobilisation to save him, though there is little doubt that Xhosa resentment at this loss played a role in the rise of COPE in 2009 and, perhaps, in the DA's almost successful attempt to capture Port Elizabeth in 2011.

But the Xhosas are not a cohesive group like the Zulus: they are too divided into Tembu, Mfengu, Amampondo and other clans, and there is no central focus of a single powerful monarchy or, indeed, a single strong historical narrative, as is the case with the Zulus. The dominance of Xhosas in the top ranks of the ANC administration was less the result of any mobilization from below than the ethnic favoritism of Oliver Tambo during the exile period and a similar preference at least allowed, and perhaps encouraged, by Mbeki.

The contenders

The net result of this situation is that it is difficult to foresee any separate Xhosa mobilisation for the presidency unless a powerful figure presents himself and gathers support in the way that Mandela, Tambo and Govan Mbeki did. The only real candidate is Mandela's grandson, Mandla. Despite the controversies that always surround him, the fact is that he is only 37, he is a Tembu chief but also university educated, he is already an ANC MP and also a very rich man, likely only to become richer.

Once Nelson Mandela dies and he becomes the senior Mandela it is quite possible that the enormous wealth sitting in the various Mandela foundations could also come his way. The combination of the magic name together with huge wealth will inevitably make him a major player.

Tokyo Sexwale will remain a potential contender because his characteristic self-promotion requires it and his huge wealth allows it. As a Northern Sotho the realistic summit of his ambitions would appear to be Deputy President but, importantly, he is ten years younger than Zuma and he would be a popular card for the ANC to play with minorities. He has a white wife, mixed race children and would represent the ANC's non-racial tradition far more authentically as a result. If the ANC begins to fret at a regular loss of votes, Sexwale's stock could rise.

However, if Zuma lives all the way through a second term it is more likely that his successor in 2019 will be another Zulu. There is no shortage of candidates with even Blade Nzimande hopeful of a Deputy Presidency.

However, the two really serious candidates are Zweli Mkhize and Jeff Radebe. Zweli Mkhize was by far the most important Zuma backer during his years in the wilderness and could doubtless have chosen almost any job he liked when Zuma came to power. As a medical doctor the post of Minister of Health was his for the asking. But, as any canny Zulu politician would, he preferred to be premier of KZN, that is master of the Zulu base. In this role his fortunes have been mixed. His wife has been accused of profiting from government tenders and this has redounded to his discredit, as have persistent rumours that he was, at least at one stage, party to an anti-Zuma conspiracy. For all that, he has publicly renewed his vows of loyalty to Zuma and can doubtless continue as KZN premier as long as he likes, a role in which he is only likely to become wealthier. KZN's huge bloc vote makes him the ANC's chief king-maker and if he decides he would be king one day, he will be formidable.

Jeff Radebe is interesting because he unites the various strands of ANC history. A graduate of the Karl-Marx University, Leipzig in the old DDR, Radebe also spent four years on Robben Island. He is married to Bridgette, the sister of South Africa's richest black man, Patrice Motsepe, and hugely wealthy mining magnate who still claims to represent the under-privileged. Jeff has been a Minister ever since 1994 and is highly ambitious. He is so senior that the pictures of the top ANC cadres cutting the centenary cake in Mangaung in January 2012 showed Zuma, Motlanthe, Gwede Mantashe as ANC Secretary-General - and Jeff Radebe, all cutting the cake together. The first three were there because of their office but Radebe because he is the highest ranking cabinet minister. It should be noted that Radebe served eight years under Mbeki but managed his switch to Zuma so smoothely that he remained a senior Minister throughout, while all other Mbeki-ites were being purged. He is a skilful manoeuvrer, a Zulu and, effectively, a billionaire with a family alliance to further wealth.

We are the 99 per cent

This sums up where we are going. Even the toughest ANC ideologue would find difficulty in denying that Zuma's family has enriched itself enormously under presidency. So Jacob Zuma is now very rich. As we look at other possible future contenders, the outstanding commonality is huge wealth. Mandla Mandela is very rich and getting richer, as is Zweli Mkhize's family. Tokyo Sexwale, Jeff Radebe and Cyril Ramaphosa are all billionaires. The one certainty about South Africa's next President is that he (it will always be a he) will be one of the country's very richest men.

And that is really the key point. South Africans have been so mystified by race politics that they have not sufficiently realised that the really key change in their politics is not do with race but with wealth.

Under the Afrikaner Nationalists none of the prime ministers or presidents were rich men. When Malan was prime minister he carefully kept note of which letters were personal and which official and refunded the state for the former. The Nats were, after all, Calvinists. It is too easily said that we had corruption then and now. There were important differences and one was that money did not control political power. Now it quite clearly does.

And that is the point. The ANC has been busy celebrating its centenary but far more relevant is that, with astonishing speed and determination, its leaders have transformed South Africa into a functioning plutocracy after less than 20 years in power - and the SACP has been as happy to build and defend that plutocracy as anyone else. Sadly, this is just what African nationalist elites tend to do unless constrained by alternation in power.

Both Kenyatta and Moi used power in Kenya to become fabulously rich men, an example followed by Mugabe in Zimbabwe. Armando Guebuza, Mozambique's president, is the country's richest man. Angola's President, Jose Eduardo dos Santos, is one of the world's richest men - the IMF reports that $32 billion just disappeared from the government accounts in 2007-2010 and there are no prizes for guessing where it went. And so it goes. Dos Santos has even gone so far as floating the possibility that his successor should be Manuel Vicente, head of Sonangol, the state oil company - thus making quite explicit how far the Presidency is now entwined with the business of creaming off the oil wealth.

This is where the SACP's treason against the working class is so important. What the situation cries out for is a principled party of the left willing to subject the new plutocratic regimes of Africa, including South Africa, to the withering critique of a proper Marxist analysis, a critique which refuses to be mystified by race or ethnicity and focuses instead on class.

Really there is both need and room for several competing schools of Marxist analysis, debating exactly how the new constellation of forces works and what systemic imperatives it generates. But none of this exists because the Party has sold its inheritance for a mess of potage. Indeed, its leaders have cheerfully joined in the ANC wrecking gang which is destroying the country's institutions one by one - the civil service, the municipalities, the parastatals, the schools and soon the universities.

It is thus a grave mistake to believe in Zuma or Blade Nzimande when they talk about their concern for the poor and working class. This is just a mime they perform in public. The real game is building their own elite wealth as far and fast as they can. Similarly, Julius Malema is singing yesterday's song when he focuses on anti-white populism, for political power has long since been transferred from the white bourgeoisie to a small black plutocracy - of which, indeed, Malema himself is already a paid-up member. This is what ANC rule is really all about: the construction of a new system of rule by a tiny group of the black super-rich. We are, all of us in South Africa, black and white,  in the position of the Occupy Wall Street protesters. The 1% - or rather the 0.1% - are in power and are consolidating their rule. The rest of us are the 99.9%. Race, the subject South Africans love to digress about, is merely a distraction that we cannot really afford.

RW Johnson

This is the second article in a two part series. The first appeared here.

This article was published with the assistance of the Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung für die Freiheit (FNF). The views presented in the article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of FNF.

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