The poisoned chalice of competition enforcement
There is little question that vigorous free market competition is a good thing for economies. Such competition spurs on innovation, cost reductions and increases in productivity. Where competition and active rivals or at least the possibility of rivals emerging to contest market share, are absent, companies stagnate. As much is evident considering many of South Africa’s dysfunctional state-owned enterprises.
While certainly not without criticism, governments world-wide have assumed the authority to set laws to “promote competition”, which manifests in competition enforcement. These laws and policies are typically technical and convoluted, but also bolstered by an established consensus based on the supposed virtue of governmental competition promotion.
Competition policy in South Africa, however, goes further than the mere consensus of ‘competition promotion’ and the likes of ‘collusion prevention’ and aims to promote the ANC government’s public interest and redistributive goals.
The promotion of the broader policy of BEE through competition policy is noteworthy in this context. Locally competition policy, therefore, allows for economic intervention that arguably leans more extreme than in other jurisdictions. For instance, nowadays, frequent mention is made by policy makers of “ownership structures” and “participation in markets” as a focus for competition interventionism. The recent proposed amendments to the Competition Act will likely exacerbate the scope for interventionism along these lines.
Strict free market advocates, like me, would argue that sustained “participation” in markets depends on a firm’s ability to serve consumers with goods and services they value – this is also, in our estimation, what determines “dominance” or large market shares. Such ideas assume minimal government regulation and intervention as best.