On Saturday ANC President Jacob Zuma launched his party's 2009 election manifesto before a crowd of 80,000 supporters in East London. There is much evidence in the policy framework for the manifesto (see here) of the so-called ‘shift to the left' by the ANC.
On macro-economic policy the document states that in setting interest and exchange rates consideration should be given to "employment considerations, economic growth and other developmental initiatives." The ANC government is also planning a "major upscaling of industrial policy with significant resources." A "national health insurance system" will be phased in over the next five years and "a comprehensive social security system" (although the precise details of this are left somewhat vague).
There is a positive side to this shift. The ruling party no longer seems particularly concerned with promoting the interests of the black elite. Its focus has (quite properly) shifted back towards trying to address the pressing needs of the working class, the rural poor, and the unemployed.
The problem, as always for the ANC, is a refusal to acknowledge the existence of the law of unintended consequences. For instance, the policy framework for the manifesto complains that unemployment is "unacceptably high" but predictably fails to acknowledge that one of the main contributing factors to this state of affairs are our onerous labour laws.
Indeed, in a sop to COSATU the ANC plans to further restrict the labour market after the election. The policy framework states that the ruling party plans to "introduce laws to regulate contract work, subcontracting and out-sourcing, address the problem of labour broking and prohibit certain abusive practices. Provisions will be introduced to facilitate unionisation of workers and conclusion of sectoral collective agreements to cover vulnerable workers in these different legal relationships and ensure the right to permanent employment for affected workers."
Equally, the manifesto claims that the pursuit of "national food security is a constitutional mandate of the ANC government" but then states that it will "work to intensify the land reform programme" that has resulted in South Africa recently becoming a net importer of food.
The more fundamental problem is that while the ANC envisages a much expanded role for the state, it has no answer to the basic dysfunctionality of most of our state institutions. There are no promises in the manifesto to end cadre deployment, restore the merit system in the civil service, or make the ability to do the job the central criterion in appointment and promotion.
Such reforms would be obviously unpopular with the ANC cadreship and the public service unions in COSATU - both of which have a vested interest in the perpetuation of the current patronage based system. Yet without them the state is unlikely to be able to act efficiently or rationally in pursuit of the ANC's manifesto promises.
For example, the policy framework makes no direct mention of the rotten state of most of our public hospitals (though it does say they need to be ‘revitalised'.) Instead it complains about the private sector. "South Africa commands huge health care resources" it states, "compared with many middle-income countries, yet the bulk of these resources are in the private sector and serve a minority of the population, thereby undermining the country's ability to produce quality care and improve health care outcomes."
It then promises extensive state intervention in private health care. What this means in effect is that the same ideologues and political appointees responsible for wrecking our state hospitals are going to appropriate for themselves enormous powers to interfere in that part of the health care system which still functions (no thanks to them.)
The most positive aspect of the manifesto is perhaps what it did not promise. One possible ANC response to the electoral threat posed by the Congress of the People was to go down the populist route. From 2002 the ANC was able to reverse high levels of dissatisfaction among its supporters - and eventually win 70% of the vote in the 2004 election - largely through the massive expansion of child support grants.
Faced with the unprecedented challenge from COPE the ANC toyed with a similarly large, though this time unaffordable, expansion of the social welfare system. In late November the Sunday Times reported that the ANC was considering a "care-givers" benefit for mothers, a job seekers allowance for young adults, and income support for all adult South Africans.
The ANC seems to have pulled back from this temptation. As Mondli Makhanya noted on Sunday the final manifesto was "trimmed of some of the populist claptrap contained in earlier versions." That the ANC has chosen not to campaign on this basis suggests that it thinks that it has the measure of COPE.
The manifesto launch itself was a reminder of the formidable financial and organisational resources of the ruling party. The huge crowd at the launch rally was - as always - not a spontaneous show of support for the ruling party in the Eastern Cape but rather the product of an impressive, and hugely expensive, organisational effort. It was reported earlier in the week that the ruling party had hired 300 buses, 100 minibus taxis and three trains to ferry supporters to the rally.
In this election the ANC clearly has money to burn. Last time around it was almost bankrupt, and had been unable to pay its salary bill in late 2003. There was subsequently a dramatic, and thus far unexplained, turnaround in party finances. By December 2007 Treasurer General, Mendi Msimang, was able to inform delegates to the ANC's national conference that the value of the party's investments stood at R1,75bn.
It is one of the many ironies thrown up by this election that the ANC is planning to use the money collected by the old discredited leadership - often through thoroughly suspect means - to bury the breakaway challenge.
