When liberal democracy becomes the problem
7 June 2023
Quite a lot has been said about the shortcomings of democracy in the last decade or so. One particular striking observation is the argument put forth in Ryszard Legutko’s The Demon in Democracy, in which he concludes that liberal democracy eventually leads to socialism. Legutko, who lived first under communism and then liberal democracy in Poland, observes that these two systems share similar presuppositions about history, society, religion, politics, culture and human nature.
By this he refers to the shared rejection of the ideas that formed the foundation of Western civilization over millennia, and a conclusion that old ideas, stemming particularly from Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, have to be replaced with modern ideas.
These modern ideas are then enforced by the powerful state (the Leviathan, as Thomas Hobbes puts is) in order to achieve “progress”. The power of the state is necessary, because these ideas about progress (whether they are liberal or socialist) are contrary to human nature and cannot be achieved if communities are left to organise themselves according to their own customs and traditions.
Liberal think tanks like Freedom House and the Economist Intelligence Unit have expressed concern about the continued global slide from freedom to authoritarianism over the last two decades. Even though they usually don’t explicitly say it, these think tanks tend to define freedom as freedom for the disengaged individual.
I use the word “disengaged” (a term used by the Canadian philosopher, Charles Taylor), because it doesn’t see the individual as part of a larger community with responsibilities and obligations, but rather as a being that can easily detach itself from these things. In fact, to talk about responsibilities and obligations toward the community is usually regarded as a violation of freedom and an expression of authoritarianism. Because to be obligated is the antithesis of choosing for yourself.
When such think talks express concern about a slide from freedom, they usually mean a slide from individualism as encapsulated by modern liberal democracy towards other political ideas and other forms of government. A case in point is the Hungarian prime minister, Victor Orban’s comment that he seeks to promote “illiberal democracy” in Hungary. This was generally accepted to be an indication of anti-democratic, authoritarian tendencies.
Orban made it quite clear that he doesn’t favour the sort of democracy that detaches the individual from the community. The Hungarian approach is to put God, the nation and the family at the center of Hungarian identity, as opposed to the individual. But to favour this kind of democracy is presented in the mainstream as a slide towards authoritarianism and a retreat from freedom.
Herein lies two problems. The first is that any form of democracy that doesn’t comply with the criteria for liberal democracy in particular is regarded as “undemocratic”. The second is that the concept of freedom has been hijacked by the individualists, to such an extent that a rejection of even the most destructive tenets of modern individualism is framed as a rejection of freedom.
By this logic, the inventors of democracy (the Greeks) were not democrats at all, because they didn’t structure their society on individual rights. Similarly, arguably the most famous book ever written on democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, would then not be a discussion of democracy at all. The democracy Tocqueville observed and learned to love in 1830’s America is one with a decentralised political system, underpinned by a strong sense of community and an enthusiastic participation by the citizens in the pursual of the common good (as opposed to what he describes as selfish individualism).
But more importantly, to circle back to Legutko’s observation, the strange conclusion that individual freedom is the only real measure for freedom is a vehement rejection of the foundations on which the West was build. It certainly is a rejection of the ideas originating in Jerusalem, Athens and Rome.
In the New Testament, for example, the Apostle Paul clearly links the notion of freedom to responsibility and to sacrifice, particularly self-sacrifice. To be free is not to “indulge in the flesh” (Galatians 5:13), but rather to live in the fruit of the spirit, i.e. to do good in obedience to God, and not to promote your own interests at the expense of others. The same could be said of the Athenian concept of freedom, so aptly framed by Aristotle as the movement from potentiality to actuality, i.e. to fulfil on earth what were called upon to do.
Similarly, the Roman conception of freedom is encapsulated in Marcus Cicero’s De Officiis (On Duties), which – as the title suggest – explains that we can only truly be free if we fulfil our duties towards God, our communities, our descendants and even our ancestors. Our responsibility to our ancestors, according to Cicero, is to preserve the good things we have inherited from them for our children. To do this is a “most glorious thing”, and to fail in this is “a most discreditable thing”, he explains.
But to talk of these things today is often accepted as a form of anti-liberal heresy. In as far as liberalism means that we should respect differences of opinions and not try to enforce our will on others, this is indeed something that should be cherished and preserved. But in as far as liberalism has become ideological, disengaged individualism at the expense of the bigger picture, and in as far as it has become a rejection of the basic foundations of the West, it is something that needs to be resisted indeed.
Ernst Roets is chief executive for strategy and international cooperation at AfriForum. He holds an LL.D. in legal philosophy.
