Corruption thrives, says Morris Szeftel, because the state is important not only for what it can do (in the form of growth and development), but also for what can be done with it -- using it as a mechanism for ensuring upward mobility or patronage, and easing the way of private access to public resources or corruption. And thus, Ghaffar Jafferji argues, the apparatus of the state becomes the means for an elite to acquire wealth, rather than serving as a corrective mechanism to promote social justice and economic development.
Politics in Africa has always been concerned, to quite a significant degree, with the management of spoils. But, if anything, the liberalisation programmes induced by international financial institutions may have had the ‘unintended consequences’ of increasing rather than decreasing the scope of corruption. And privatisation has afforded opportunities for the political elite to acquire public assets cheaply or fraudulently, while market forces have not measurably reduced the charging of gate-keeping rents or bribes.
Development policies remain, too often, contingent upon how government plans overlap with personal enrichment projects. In such circumstances, clientelism, factional competition, and corruption flourish. There is, therefore, a need to develop strategies that uncouple private wealth accumulation through corruption from access to public office through politics.
It is self-evident that governments not only have to give a much higher priority (not just paying lip-service) to fighting corruption, but also to take a much tougher stand against the abuse of power -- not to succumb to pressure, opportunity, and ability to abuse power and thus become active participants in corrupt practices. To effectively fight the scourge of corruption, it is imperative that the tenets of constitutional liberalism (liberal democracy) and the principles of good governance must be internalised and become everyday practice.
So, how does South Africa feature in the context of rampant corruption, a good governance deficit, and lack of transparency and accountability? A few comments, illustrating the complexity of the challenges facing the country, will suffice.
The disease of corruption has permeated South African society for quite some time, and its corrosive effect is being felt everywhere. Many auditors-general found that there are massive ‘unauthorised and irregular expenditure’ by state and provincial departments and public institutions, mainly due to uncompetitive and unfair procurement practices, as well as through what has become known as ‘tenderpreneurship’.
They urged government to address the problem by appointing ‘experienced officials with appropriate skills’ -- in other words, on merit and, clearly, a sideswipe at the unintended consequences of ‘affirmative action’. But, sadly, ‘cadre deployment’, appointment on the grounds of party-political affiliation and large-scale nepotism, cronyism and favouritism, instead of focusing on the necessary skills-sets and merit, have transformed government departments and public entities into mediocre institutions and factional political battle grounds.
The result is that corruption in South Africa has become not only systemic but endemic and, to paraphrase Max du Preez, has probably moved beyond the point of no return. Indeed, corruption is tearing the country’s social fabric apart -- it has morphed into a cancerous growth and has become a crippling scourge. The leadership of the ANC, by silently condoning a post-1994 culture of entitlement, should ask itself what role it has played in creating the rot that is eating away at the moral and ethical fibre of South African society.
ANC leaders have unstintingly and unquestioningly defended the new black oligarchs (the nouveau riche) and the beneficiaries of broad-based black economic empowerment (BBB-EE). But BBB-EE and preferential tendering in government procurement (through tenderpreneurship) has become nothing more, nothing less than legislated and institutionalised corruption.
Testimony to this are the revelations since August 2018 about corruption, spilling out in hearings before the Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture like Alpine avalanches, and the long drawn-out sagas around the ‘Vrede dairy project’ and the ‘Asbestos “audit” (roof-counting) project’ in the Free State.
Also, the recently uncovered corruption with the supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) in the healtcare sector is another striking example of the consequences of BBB-EE, leading to the self-centred, callous and nefarious conduct of tenderpreneurs – and this, in the midst of a nation-wide Covid-19 pandemic!
Indeed, the virus of corruption is coursing through the varicose veins of South African society. Self-interest overrides the national interest -- right and wrong are defined as profit and loss, not good and evil. Already a decade ago, Mondli Makhanya cautioned that South Africa was at the crossroads as “dangerous men and women are making wrongdoing [look] normal, alienating the population from democratic institutions, and instilling a culture of mediocrity”.
Being a member of the ANC, Allister Sparks observed, is “the gateway to opportunity, to power, and to status and wealth”, and Kader Asmal counselled that “political activism is becoming synonymous with, or an excuse for, personal position, access to connected people, and wealth; this is corruption of the most corrosive kind”.
Clearly, there is a turning away from democratic values towards a much narrower and more predatory conception of empowerment, leading to what has become known in political science literature as the ‘predatory state’ or the ‘vampire state’.
Why, then, has corruption become so widespread? Allister Sparks suggests that the answer lies in what might be called the Law of Creeping Corruption: “If corruption, verbal or monetary, is not dealt with the moment it manifests itself, the corrosion will spread. And the more it spreads, the harder it becomes to stop …. When so many people in high places … [may implicate] each other, no-one dares blow the whistle”.
Moreover, what lessons can be learnt from past experience? Several factors are bolstering the feeding frenzy of corruption: government secrecy in the multi-billion rand arms deal scandal, inappropriate influence peddling by elite groups (the entanglement of public utility Eskom and Chancellor House, the ANC’s investment arm, with the multi-billion rand contracts for the Medupi and Kusile power stations), and corruption-induced party-political funding to the governing party (the Oilgate scandal, involving another public utility PetroSA).
It is, therefore, argued that privatisation of ‘non-natural monopolies’ is necessary to keep state enterprises from being used as a corrupt source of financing for political parties and to provide employment for those with party connections. Although Mail&Guardian unmasked Chancellor House as an ANC front for BEE deals and state tenders in the minerals and energy sectors, and opposition parties and NGOs heavily criticised the Eskom/Hitachi Africa Power-deal as a clear conflict of interest, the ANC government bungled ahead nonetheless.
Showing the ANC’s lack of moral fibre, then Secretary-General Gwede Mantashe defended Chancellor House, declaring that there is nothing wrong with the party investing in ‘public companies’ that later secure state contracts. Ever since 1994, as a consequence of the ANC’s policy of black economic empowerment, black ‘entrepreneurs’ were given share options in existing business companies, was ‘redeployed’ by the ANC to the business sector, enabling them to acquire assets at no cost to themselves or, alternatively, simply take over entire companies at absurdly knocked-down prices.
Moreover, experience in South Africa and elsewhere, like in Eastern Europe and Russia, has shown how privatisation can create opportunities for politicians to distribute favours to their friends or party hacks through what is known as patronage. Major economic assets have been sold at knock-down prices and are now in the hands of the new elites, the oligarchs, the nouveau riche. A nearly R2bn claim was lodged against insolvent mining company, Aurora Empowerment Systems, whose chairman Khulubuse Zuma (a nephew of former President Zuma) had been accused of letting a once promising mine go to rot, stripped of its assets, and flooded by acid mine water.
This is but one of many instances where nepotism, cronyism and party-political patronage has created millionaires and billionaires almost overnight. But the lesson is that although profit can be ‘privatised’, where strategically important assets are involved, risk cannot be ‘privatised’, and many of these companies already had to be bailed out by either the banking sector or the state.
So, even when privatisation is not actually corrupt (and here, ‘privitisation’ should not be seen in the generally accepted sense of the word, since the ‘p-word’ is anathema to the ANC and its alliance partners) there are instances where the officials responsible for privatisation policies (and their private-sector partners/advisers) are inadequately informed as to the real value of the assets they are selling.
In particular, management buy-outs have been exorbitantly profitable where those individuals who had to calculate the monetary value of take-overs have had inadequate records of ownership or have been influenced by political considerations such as the ‘economic empowerment of the previously disadvantaged’. Without complete transparency, businessmen and entrepreneurs waste time and money negotiating each transaction with government officials, a process that opens the door for bribery and corruption.
But to return to the infamous arms deal. Although it was the ANC’s original sin, with highly placed politicians and government apparatchiks creaming off large kickbacks from arms manufacturers desperate to secure contracts for the supply of weaponry to the air and naval forces of the new SANDF, the real crime was the cover-up.
This began when the scandal became public knowledge, and it has continued ever since. A judicial inquiry, requested by opposition parties at the time, should have been instituted immediately, not belatedly by the ANC in the form of the long drawn-out, disastrous, and discredited Seriti Commission.
As Allister Sparks put it so eloquently: “The primary cancer should have been surgically removed early. The failure to do so has allowed this malignant tumour to grow uncontrollably and to metastasise to the point where the whole body politic is … riddled with its infectious suppuration. Eradicating it now is so much more difficult, for South Africa has reached a kind of corruption gridlock.”
Almost a decade ago, Reuel Khoza has warned that democracy and good governance are under increasing threat and called on South Africans to hold to account a political leadership whose “moral quotient is degenerating .... a strange breed of leaders who are determined to undermine the rule of law and override the Constitution”.
Was this a portend to the appearance of unsavoury characters like Ace Magashule, Supra Mahumapelo, Mosebenzi Zwane, Hlaudi Motsoeneng, Richard Mdluli, Nomgcobo Jiba and Nomvula Mokonyane on the national scene? And, especially during the Zuma presidency, key public institutions had been gravely weakened in a bid to protect himself and further the careers of his protégés, making the exposure of malpractice and corruption by government officials and politicians extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Even under a Ramaphosa presidency, the paralysis and chaos that has become a regular feature of South African society cannot be divorced from the bedlam in various institutions of state, including SASS, the NPA (until Shamila Batohi’s arrival), sections of SAPS -- like the Hawks, and Crime Intelligence Unit -- and state enterprises (parastatals) such as the SABC, SAA, Eskom, Transnet, PRASA and others, primarily because of factional infighting and political interference by the ruling party.
Rather than decisively dealing with endemic and systemic corruption and bad service delivery at the local, provincial and national levels, all efforts seem to be directed at shielding ANC cadres from prosecution, in the process crippling many state institutions, including the justice system.
Meanwhile, investor confidence is being destroyed by emotional and brainless rhetoric about large-scale nationalisation and so-called ‘radical economic transformation’, as well as about the perceived ‘missed opportunities’ of a National Democratic Revolution (whatever that means in neo-Marxist parlance). Moreover, there is a lack of decisive leadership (in fact, a leadership vacuum), prevailing in a climate of rampant corruption in the public sector and amongst political office-bearers, relative impunity from prosecution for abuse of power, a dysfunctional judicial system, contempt for the law and subversion of the judiciary, the escalation of violent crime and a pervasive lack of personal safety amongst the general public, large-scale labour unrest, disruptive strikes, violent protest action, and monetary and legislative insecurity.
An enabling environment has been created in which corruption is thriving as the battle for political power and control of resources is raging unabated, Thuli Madonsela warned. Corruption has played an important role not only in sabotaging the quest for economic growth and development, but also in undermining efforts aimed at the consolidation of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.
Poor enforcement of anti-corruption measures has bred maladministration and fostered impunity, a major cause of pervasive and systemic corruption. And one should always be mindful that reality is very often obscured by imagery. Behind a façade of democracy, reconciliation, accountability, and transparency lurk the ugly gremlins of authoritarianism and centralist control, political intolerance and retribution, patronage, cronyism, nepotism, and corruption.
Some of the factors that have emerged from discourses on combating corruption and promoting good governance are the requisite political will, good leadership, a functioning democracy based on diffused state power (independence of the judiciary, supremacy of the rule of law and, most importantly, the separation of the three branches of government), strong constitutional institutions, a sound judicial system, openness and transparency (underpinned by freedom of expression and freedom of the press), strong accountability structures and the safeguarding of human rights.
Clearly, a united front is fundamental in addressing corruption and ensuring good governance. And this must be supported by a sound integrity framework and an unwavering commitment to public accountability and transparency. The strengthening of compliance and best practice is, therefore, central to an effective fight against corruption.
So, to get into a more general discussion on corruption. Clearly, space does not allow a treatise on the topic, but only allow us to touch on some aspects of what it entails – ‘scratching the surface’, so to speak.
It should be emphasised that no country, however democratic, is free from corruption. This social ill touches government officials, politicians, the business sector, and civil society alike. It destroys national economies, undermines social stability, and erodes public trust. It lowers tax revenue, inflates the costs of public services, and distorts the allocation of resources in the private sector. And it has a palpably negative impact on good governance and economic development, weakening the state and civil society.
There are those who see the glass as being half empty rather than half full. At times globalisation, for all its benefits, seems to undermine international governance structures and making possible corruption on a scale never seen before. Political corruption and public and private-sector corruption have never seemed as visible, though it is arguable that this is due, in part at least, to the emergence of a freer media operating with improved access to information, coupled with a more assertive stance adopted by enforcement agencies and demands for action by the general public.
Fighting corruption is recognised as a battle of immense importance. Corruption threatens not only fair competition, but also sustainability (through short-term or opaque solutions to problems), efficiency (through corrupt bureaucracies), security (through threats and violence by organised crime and anti-social groups), and equity (through increased privileges and disparities). Indeed, corruption feeds on a legal void, contradiction between and within legislation, governance weaknesses, lack of political will, and the over-complication of bureaucratic regulations.
The basic cause of corruption is excessive regulation, monopoly, and unchecked discretion without adequate accountability and transparency. This implies that the expanding role of government in development has placed bureaucracy in a monopolistic position and enhanced opportunities for unlimited administrative discretion.
The state intervenes in the economy to provide a framework for economic and social activities, such as the protection of personal and property rights, provision of public goods not supplied by the market, and the provision of opportunities for education, healthcare and employment. However, state intervention is also likely to expand the discretion of public officials to make decisions. And it is the misuse of and unchecked discretion that is one of the primary causes of corruption.
In fact, government corruption is probably the single largest factor hindering the efforts to eliminate poverty in the developing world. It is not only morally reprehensible and socially corrosive, but also hinders development and perpetuates poverty. Gowher Rizvi points out that, typically, countries with high levels of corruption are perpetually poor.
Fighting corruption is a complex and multi-dimensional exercise that involves both government and civil society (the citizenry) and requires various trade-offs. To fight, control, and prevent corrupt practices, there must be an understanding of why the problem manifests itself (why does it exist) and where is it most prevalent.
Once that is known, the key question is how to prioritise counter measures. The task is to maximise and optimise trade-offs, which will depend not only on a particular type of corrupt practice (high-level, ‘grand corruption’; or low-level, ‘petty corruption’), but also on the anti-corruption apparatuses available, as well as specific features of the country’s political and socio-economic make-up.
Levels of corruption will be high when citizens do not value democratic governance, government’s role is broad and intrusive, uncertainty about the future is high, civil servants are poorly paid and not well qualified (especially in the lower and middle ranks), civil society is weak and passive, the media does not have an independent role, and the private sector is limited and uncompetitive (with unclear rules of the game and known for its opaqueness).
Many in society tolerate different forms of corruption as a routinised way of life and/or doing business. Fighting corruption at the level of personal honesty is necessary, because petty corruption paves the way for grand corruption; but it is far from sufficient. Loyalty to one’s family, ethnic or social group or political party does not, as such, point to any wrongdoing. However, such loyalty should not morph into undue pressure, where nepotism and cronyism lead to the favouring of dishonest and incompetent people. Such pressures pave the way for corruption.
There are five main manifestations of corruption of both an economic and political nature. First, payments are made for goods and services above the market value, with payoffs (‘kickbacks’) made in the form of bribes. Second, bribes to avoid delays can serve as incentive payments for government officials to undertake what should be their normal tasks.
Third, bribes can help to reduce transaction costs for companies when governments impose regulations, levy taxes and enforce legislation, because pay-offs tend to reduce the ‘regulatory load’ -- in essence, ‘oiling the machinery of corruption’ and attaching a functional or instrumental value to corruption.
Fourth, illegal payments to obtain large-scale contracts, concessions, and privatisation of state-owned enterprises are the main causes of ‘grand corruption’, which has a significant impact on government budgets. And fifth, the business climate is negatively affected where the judiciary is perceived to be corrupt and the legal and regulatory framework is not enforced: for example, businesses seeking protection by organised crime to operate.
Moreover, corruption is ‘enabled’ by loopholes in laws that define it, conflicts of interest on the part of those directly involved in decision-making, inadequate funding for the civil service, and weak systems of government auditing and monitoring. Corruption is also likely to increase where the press is not free to expose misuse of authority and public resources, where NGOs are not actively engaged in holding those in power accountable for their actions through advocacy and public awareness, and where political opposition is too weak to expose corrupt practices through the use of parliamentary and other forums.
Corruption can be observed both in everyday dealings with government officials (petty corruption) and in the awarding of major government contracts (grand corruption). In recent years, some governments, donors, and NGOs have stepped up the pressure for greater transparency to limit this behaviour and create a more favourable environment both for more efficient use of public resources and for domestic and foreign investment.
But country strategies to combat corruption are frequently no more than ‘wish lists’, quite incapable of implementation within existing absorptive capacity and sometimes lacking any strategic thinking in the sense of sequencing. There are no ‘quick fixes’ or ‘silver bullets’, and certainly a single anti-corruption agency is unable by itself to address deep-seated problems. There is the hope, however, that the establishment in 2019 of an anti-corruption investigative unit within the NPA, under Hermione Cronjé, will start to make a difference.
Symbolic ‘quick fixes’ in efforts to increase trust in democratic governance and combat corruption may not be enough since there is a need to deal with more structural issues of high levels of stratification and inequality. While ending impunity and punishing the corrupt could be an important step, it should only be the ‘signal’ or ‘consequence’ of some larger shock treatment.
For citizens to start trusting democracy enough to be keepers of democratic values, they need to feel that they are treated impartially and are equal before the law, and that playing into the various justifications for tolerating and engaging in corrupt practices is ‘not profitable’ and, certainly, ‘not morally and ethically correct’. Similarly, elites who are the main decision-makers need to show the necessary political will to enforce existing laws and to strengthen transparency, integrity and accountability systems, and to think in terms of the interests of all (society as a whole) and not in furthering their own, personal interests.
However, often citizens also become participants in nefarious and improper conduct. Although they take note of corrupt practices and may even acknowledge that it is bad, instead of fighting it and demanding more transparency and accountability, they simply ‘join the party’ to satisfy their aspiration ‘to be included’ and/or ‘to be counted’, allowing high levels of tolerance for corrupt behaviour to persist.
As such, elites who have political and economic power (controlling the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, and the business sector) and large segments of society become ‘keepers’ of corrupt practices and perpetuate inequality. Thus, high patterns of inequality reinforce and justify corrupt behaviour among ordinary citizens, while justification among the elite is geared towards obtaining personal financial gain at the expense of a more collective interest.
Without doubt, corruption is a clear breach of equity: merit is substituted by bribes and nefarious relationships, fair competition is undermined, privileges are strengthened, and impunity is reserved for a select few.
A fight against corruption that limits itself to individual honesty and moral virtue only is, therefore, doomed to failure. Without such institutional mechanisms as an independent judiciary, financial and penal sanctions, whistle-blower protection, and fair competition among businesses, it may prove mere lip service, concealing a disastrous reality and opening the door to even worse and more systemic corruption than hitherto.
In addition to abstaining from corruption, officials in societies in transition need more incentives and training to be proper bureaucrats -- that is, public officials who exercise their powers impersonally and according to the rules, not extracting money from poor people for doing what public officials ought to do anyway.
Even though public officials may callously argue that corrupt practices are traditional (‘part of the culture’), that does not make them acceptable to ordinary citizens who are vulnerable to exploitation by unfair officials. So, truly astonishing was Jacob Zuma’s depiction of corruption as “a Western thing” in the context of the Shabir Shaik trial!
Effective, transparent, and accountable government institutions significantly increase the risk of engaging in corrupt behaviour, while substantially raising the rewards for adhering to the rule of law. Consequently, any anti-corruption strategy must have a law enforcement component, but it also needs to include policies to improve the quality of public services, increase transparency and accountability in government, engage civil society in community oversight, and restore the trust in, and dignity of, enforcement agencies within the community (especially, the police force and prosecuting authorities).
Corruption manifests itself in a variety of ways in different settings and changes in intensity and scope over time. As such, any strategy must be responsive to ever-changing conditions of, and ever-increasing opportunities for, engaging in corrupt behaviour, combined with low levels of risk. An effective anti-corruption approach must, therefore, include both prevention (the reduction of opportunity) and enforcement -- an increase in risk and a reduction in impunity.
Experience in countries like Singapore, Mauritius and elsewhere has shown that it may take at least ten years of tenacious effort in fighting corruption to reach a point where the tide can begin to be turned. Such a lengthy battle has no chance to succeed unless it is backed by a solid platform of values shared by everyone in society and sustained over time.
As a start all those in government and in the public and private sectors should work hard to establish a climate of integrity; and leaders should go beyond mere lip service and make good on their promises to provide the commitment and resources to improve governance, transparency, and accountability. Only then can corruption begin to be defeated.
* The author holds a doctorate in Political Science from the University of South Africa (Unisa) in Pretoria. He is a former Executive Director of the Africa Institute of South Africa, and Nelson Mandela Chair Professor in the Centre for African Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) in New Delhi, India. He is retired and lives in Pretoria but is still academically active.
