Jacob Zuma does not act like a president whose rule is coming to an end.
That was evident from the confidence with which he defended his allies like Faith Muthambi, Bathabile Dlamini and others during Parliament’s most recent monthly question session. The contempt with which he handles the opposition in parliament and within the ANC/SACP/Cosatu alliance, is also telling. During the recent cabinet reshuffle, Zuma got rid of four ministers, apart from finance minister Pravin Gordhan.
In regards to the traditional ANC approach of racial head-counting appointments, in order to maintain some diversity and representivity, Zuma made a point here as well. He replaced the five ministers he sacked - one white, one Indian, one brown and two black – with five black ministers. There is now only one remaining white minister in Zuma’s cabinet, Dr Rob Davis, and one Indian, Mr Ebrahim Patel, both SACP deployees to cabinet. If the SACP maintains their overt opposition to Zuma, they may also get the boot.
Thus, Zuma is trying to “cleanse” the ruling circles ideologically, morally and ethnically. He is preparing for a renewed attack on his position and will not shy away from using all the levers of power at his disposal, which he has successfully mastered.
Many South Africans believed the economic crisis that erupted last week after Zuma’s dismissal of Gordhan would be the beginning of Zuma’s end. But the first indications are that the ANC structures side with Zuma. According to leaked documents from the recent National Working Committee meeting Zuma’s critics had the wind against them.
But how does Zuma plan to retain power?
Section 88(2) of the Constitution provides that no person shall hold the office of president for more than two terms. Zuma will not be able to stay on as president of South Africa after August 2019.
However, the ANC’s constitution does not contain a similar restriction. With the support of the ANC branches Zuma can be re-elected as president of the ANC in December.
The Zuma-administration’s nuclear partner, Russia has a similar constitutional limitation on their president. Therefore, Vladimir Putin stepped down as president between 2008 and 2012 in favour of the prime minister, Dmitry Medvedev. For those four years Putin was the prime minister. In 2012, Putin and Medvedev once again swapped roles.
In certain circles, it is already rumoured that Zuma’s intention is similar and that his ex-wife, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, will then be elected as deputy president of the ANC. If the plan passes, Zuma will then be president of the ANC and deputy president of the country while his ex-wife will be president of the country and deputy of the ANC.
Another rumour doing the rounds is that Zuma asked the top management of the ANC for a few months in which to complete certain important matters (such as replacing Gordhan), after which he would voluntarily step down. It is uncertain whether there is any truth to this, but what was not mentioned was that he would use this window to get rid of his critics in earnest – a process that has already begun. If such an agreement does exist, it is only to Zuma’s benefit and can always be reneged upon later.
One can expect Zuma’s strategy - for the December 2017 national conference and then in the run up to the 2019 general elections, and after - to continue building on the basis that was laid with the recent controversial cabinet reshuffle. This may well include the following:
- A further “cleansing” of the ANC leadership in order to side-line dissenting voices. The first victims may be outspoken critics such as Pravin Gordhan and any other ANC MP that may consider voting in favour of the 18 April no-confidence vote;
- A deliberate move towards the left, thereby creating the façade of an ideological rationale for his strengthened grip on the fiscus and ever increasingly centralised power;
- A re-racialisation of the South-African political landscape in order to label any form of criticism as racism in disguise and to smear all opposition parties, including the EFF and their leaders, as puppets of the ever-present white monopoly elite.
During the 2014 municipal elections, the ANC received 11,4 million votes nationally while minority parties received 6,7 million. If 4,7 million of those ANC voters abstain from voting or if 2,4 million of them switch their votes towards any of the minority parties, the ANC’s will drop below 50%. During the 2016 municipal elections 8,1 million ANC voters voted with more than 3 million abstaining, while 6,8 million minority party voters did vote.
The fact that opposition parties succeeded in getting their voters out to the polls in large numbers while the ANC failed to do the same, was the main reason for opposition success in key metro’s and various other municipalities across South Africa.
With a combination of ANC-voter apathy, opposition growth and the likelihood of a further split within the ANC, there is indeed a possibility that the balance of power could shift towards the opposition in 2019.
The unprecedented co-operation between hugely diverse minority parties in the current civil society campaign against President Zuma could potentially lay the foundations for a rainbow coalition of some sort securing a majority in the 2019 national elections. Should this happen, South Africa may be much better off in 2019 than it would with a mere change of leadership within the ANC in 2017. This possibility, although difficult to achieve, seems less far-fetched today than it did only a few years ago.
