IN THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT, PRETORIA

(REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA)

CASE NO. 26912/12

In the matter between:

Freedom Under Law - Applicant

and

The National Director of Public Prosecutions - First Respondent

The National Commissioner: South African Police Service -Second Respondent

The Head: Specialised Commercial Crime Unit - Third Respondent

The Inspector-General of Intelligence -Fourth Respondent

Richard Naggie Mdluli - Fifth Respondent

Minister of Safety and Security - Sixth Respondent

Applicant's Written Submissions

A. Introduction

1. The two parts of this application arise from the continuing controversy relating to the unexplained, far-reaching and constitutionally impermissible decisions made by the first to fourth respondents, resulting in the withdrawal of both criminal and disciplinary charges brought against the fifth respondent, and his immediate re-instatement as the head of Crime Intelligence in SAPS, on 31 March 2012. Whilst the substantive part of the application, the review application,[1] is in its early stages, the application for urgent interim relief[2] is set down for hearing on 5 June 2012. The submissions that follow are made in support of the grant of the urgent interim relief, as it has become clear that none of the respondents disputes the factual and legal foundation of the interim relief.

2. Although the second, fifth and sixth respondents oppose the urgent interim relief, the fifth and sixth respondents have done nothing beyond filing their notices of intention to oppose. They have not delivered any answering affidavit to explain the factual or legal grounds upon which they oppose the interim relief. The second respondent delivered an answering affidavit in which he merely contests urgency, and claims that the interim relief has become academic, in the light of his decision, of which the applicant was informed on 28 May 2012,[3] to suspend the fifth respondent from office. The fourth respondent abides the decision of the court.

3. We immediately address the two main grounds on which the second respondent opposes the interim relief. Thereafter we deal with the applicant's case to show that it has, at this stage, not only established a prima case for review, but also a justifiable basis for the grant of the interim relief, whose factual substratum, and legal foundation, remain uncontested by each of the opposing respondents.

4. The following undisputed brief factual account is important:

4.1. With effect from 1 July 2009 the fifth respondent became the head of the Intelligence Division of SAPS.[4] 

4.2. Criminal charges of murder, intimidation, kidnapping, assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm and defeating the ends of justice were brought against the fifth respondent, on 31 March 2011.[5]

4.3. Further criminal charges of fraud, corruption, theft and money laundering were instituted against the fifth respondent on 20 September 2011.[6] 

4.4. These criminal charges are a product of intensive investigations by an investigative team which compiled a report and several affidavits explaining the factual bases of the charges, as well as supporting evidence. It follows that the institution of the criminal charges was not a light matter which can be explained by anything other than the strength of the evidence against the fifth respondent on those charges.[7]

4.5. The second respondent suspended the fifth respondent from office as the head of Crime Intelligence, as a result of the serious criminal charges brought against him, and instituted disciplinary proceedings against him.[8]

4.6. On 6 December 2011 criminal charges of fraud and related offences against the fifth respondent were withdrawn on the instructions of the third respondent.[9]

4.7. On 2 February 2012 the criminal charges of murder and related offences against the fifth respondent were withdrawn by the first respondent or officials acting under her authority.[10] 

4.8. After the withdrawal of the criminal charges against the fifth respondent, disciplinary charges against him were similarly withdrawn, and the disciplinary proceedings immediately terminated.[11] In consequence, the fifth respondent was re-instated and resumed office as the head of Crime Intelligence. He did so with effect from 31 March 2012.[12] 

4.9. Although the second respondent accepts that the applicant does not have knowledge relating to the re-instatement of the fifth respondent,[13] he did not take up the invitation extended to him to explain the nature of the disciplinary charges, when they were instituted and the status thereof when they were withdrawn.[14]

4.10. As a result of serious allegations of conspiracy that the fifth respondent made against other senior members of SAPS, the sixth respondent announced in Parliament that the fifth respondent would be re-deployed from his post as the head of Crime Intelligent to a post to be identified by the second respondent, pending investigation into those allegations by a ministerial task team.[15]

4.11. On 15 May 2012 the attorneys of the second respondent served a notice on the fifth respondent to show cause why he should not be suspended from SAPS.[16]

4.12. On 22 May 2012 the second respondent's attorneys informed the applicant's attorneys that disciplinary proceedings against the fifth respondent have been instituted.[17] 

4.13. On 28 May 2012 the second respondent informed the applicant's attorneys that the second respondent had suspended the fifth respondent from office, pending the finalization of disciplinary proceedings against him. [18]

5. The above facts are common cause.[19] The second respondent contends that the relief sought in part A of the notice of motion has become academic in the light of his decision to suspend the second respondent for the second time. He now opposes that relief on that ground, and also claims that there is no urgency to entertain that relief. We consider each of these contentions, in the light of the common cause facts summarised above.

B. Urgency

6. The submissions we make on the issue of urgency must be considered in the context of the provisions of section 237 of the Constitution which make it clear that functions and duties imposed on public functionaries in terms thereof must be fulfilled "diligently, and without delay". The obligation to act with diligence and promptitude is always enforceable, not only where a public official has failed or refused to fulfil a constitutional duty, and is sought to be compelled to do so by way of mandamus,[20] but also where there is a need to "cure" any unconstitutionality.[21]

7. It logically follows, from the express language of section 237 of the Constitution, and the judgments to which we have referred, that there will always be an element of urgency in the need to fulfil constitutional obligations and the need to cure unconstitutional conduct, which is based upon a failure to fulfil a constitutional duty. The degree of urgency will, of course, depend on the facts of each case.

8. The foundation of the interim relief is the enforcement of the provisions of section 205(3) of the Constitution, which requires SAPS and its members to prevent, combat and investigate crime, to maintain public order, protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic, and uphold and enforce the law.[22]

9. The applicant has made it clear, and its version has not been denied by any of the respondents, that the serious allegations of criminal conduct levelled against the fifth respondent "affect the very foundation of the constitutional duties" required of SAPS and the fifth respondent;[23] that SAPS has a duty to act decisively against any of its members against whom allegations of criminal conduct have been levelled;[24] that the decisive action required of SAPS in this case is that the fifth respondent should not remain in, or resume office until allegations against him have been finally been determined;[25] and that the legitimacy of SAPS, which is so vitally important for its ability to fulfil its constitutional duties, ought not to be tainted by a tolerance of allegations of criminal conduct, including allegations of corruption within its ranks.[26]

10. By virtue of those undisputed considerations, the purpose of the urgent application is to remedy a continuing adverse impact on SAPS, as an important law enforcement institution.[27] Again, the applicant's version in this regard is not denied or disputed by the respondents. As we show, below, that version, and the need to act urgently, derives some support from the conduct of the second respondent, and, to a lesser degree, of the sixth respondent.

11. We submit that the above considerations plainly make it clear that the relief sought in part A of the notice of motion is urgent, and requires urgent attention of this honourable Court.

12. One of the grounds on which the second respondent disputes urgency is that the applicant did not launch proceedings immediately after 31 March 2012, when the fifth respondent was re-instated.[28]

13. We submit that the second respondent is mistaken. On his version, the applicant did not have adequate factual background to the decisions that were taken to bring about the re-instatement of the fifth respondent on 31 March 2012.[29] It is therefore unreasonable to expect the applicant to have launched an urgent application immediately after 31 March 2012, in circumstances where the decision-maker accepts that the applicant did not have knowledge of the decisions which triggered the application.

14. What is important, though, is that the second respondent does not deny the applicant's version that it became aware of the public controversy relating to the impugned decisions, including the decision to re-instate the fifth respondent from media reports, including the article in the Sunday Times of 6 May 2012.[30] It launched the application without delay on 15 May 2012. In these circumstances the applicant cannot be criticised for the approach it adopted.

15. We have already indicated that the second respondent himself wasted no time before initiating proceedings which led to the suspension of the fifth respondent, pursuant to a decision that was communicated to the applicant's attorneys on 28 May 2012. The urgent way in which the second respondent acted shows that there is a justifiable basis for this Court to urgently consider the relief sought in part A of the notice of motion.

16. We also emphasise that the urgent consideration of that relief is justified by the uncertainty arising from the public controversy surrounding the manner in which the second and sixth respondents have previously dealt with the fifth respondent. It will be recalled that, after the fifth respondent had been suspended, then re-instated, both the second and sixth respondents decided to "re-deploy" the fifth respondent from the office of the head of Crime Intelligence to a post yet to be determined. This fact too reinforces the need for urgent consideration of part A of the notice of motion.

17. The second ground on which the second respondents contests urgency is that the applicant has not provided facts to show why it will not obtain substantial redress at the hearing in due course.[31] This is no more than an assertion on the part of the second respondent, without any indication of the factual or legal basis for it.

18. The assertion clearly overlooks the unchallenged evidence of the applicant, particularly the facts set out in paragraph 55.[32] Considered in their undisputed context, those facts make it plain that the applicant will not be afforded substantial redress in due course, should the relief not be dealt with urgently. This is particularly so when regard is had to the clear case of continuing adverse prejudice and impact to SAPS, for as long as the fifth respondent remains in office in the face of serious allegations of criminal conduct against him.

19. We conclude our submissions on the issue of urgency by making the following relevant observations:

19.1. The fifth respondent is one of the most senior police officers in the Republic. His erstwhile position as head of the intelligence division of SAPS is an integral one, not only in the SAPS, but also in the overall intelligence structures of the Republic. Even without that portfolio, as a member of SAPS, the fifth respondent's duties and functions are to combat criminal conduct, maintain public order, protect the inhabitants of the Republic and uphold the law.[33]

19.2. A member of SAPS of his seniority has a greater duty than most in this regard, as it his conduct would impact not only on public confidence in the SAPS but also on the morale of the rank and file within SAPS. 

19.3. The allegations against the fifth respondent are no ordinary allegations of misconduct. Murder, defeating the ends of justice, fraud and money laundering are serious criminal acts, which go to the fabric of public order and security. While these allegations remain unresolved, the fifth respondent's very presence in the senior echelons of SAPS will, necessarily, erode the functions he, and SAPS as a whole, are entrusted to carry out.

20. These are matters with which second respondent does not take issue. In the circumstances, the applicant has shown a case of urgency, and we ask that the second respondent's objection to urgency should be dismissed without delay.

C. The relief sought

21. The second respondent has opposed the relief sought in this urgent application on two bases:

21.1. That the fifth respondent has already been suspended, and

21.2. That the order sought contravenes the requirements of fair labour practices and is antithetical to the rule of law.

22. We deal with each of these contentions in turn.

The recent suspension of the fifth respondent

23. The relief sought in Part A of the notice of motion is not that the second respondent suspend the fifth respondent. It is that the fifth respondent be interdicted from discharging any function or duty as a member of SAPS, and that the second and sixth respondent be interdicted from assigning any function or duty to him.

24. The relief thus seeks to prevent the fifth respondent from working, with a view to preserving the integrity of the investigations into the allegations against him, and the functioning of SAPS.

25. The question of the employment status of the fifth respondent is not at issue in this application, and whether he has, for the present, been suspended or not is not relevant to the relief sought.

26. The relief is sought pending the review application contained in part B of the notice of motion.

27. The fifth respondent has been suspended, apparently until the finalisation of disciplinary proceedings against him.

28. It is important to note that the fifth respondent has been suspended before, also pending disciplinary proceedings, and that this suspension was lifted without the disciplinary proceedings being finalised.

29. There have been allegations of political interference in the process, which the second respondent has not disputed. As a result, it is submitted that there is a risk that the fifth respondent's suspension may be lifted again, whilst the questions raised by this application remain unresolved.

30. If the disciplinary process instituted against the fifth respondent is finalised, this may occur without the outstanding investigations and criminal allegations having been resolved. It is submitted that it would be unconscionable that the fifth applicant resume his duties with those allegations still looming.

31. Similarly, the disciplinary process may be finalised before part B of the notice of motion is determined, and the applicant would be able to resume his duties.

32. Finally, the South African Police Service Discipline Regulations referred to by the second respondent[34] provide at Regulation 4(g) that "the disciplinary proceedings will be instituted and finalised notwithstanding the fact that the act of misconduct is also a criminal offence". Thus, even if the criminal charges are revived, the fifth respondent may be reinstated in his position regardless of the fact that these charges exist.

33. The determination of part B of the notice of motion, particularly whether the criminal charges were lawfully withdrawn, before the fifth respondent resumes his responsibilities, is therefore vital to the functions and integrity of SAPS.

34. In IRR South Africa BV v Tarita and Others,[35] referring to the use of trade secrets and an undertaking not to communicate trade secrets to a competitor, the Court held:

 "The risk that the respondents will do so is one which the applicant does not have to run and neither is it incumbent upon the applicant to inquire into the bona fides of the first and second respondents and demonstrate that they are mala fides before being allowed to enforce[the restraint of trade by way of an interdict]".[36]

35. In Mcilongo NO v Minister of Law and Order and Others,[37] a full bench of the Eastern Cape Division held as follows:

 "However, the issue in the present case is not whether appellant is as adequately protected by an undertaking as he would be by an interim interdict, but whether it would be reasonable for a man in the position of appellant to nevertheless apprehend injury despite the undertaking or assurance by the respondents that the alleged infringements of appellant's rights will not recur."[38]

36. The Court went on to state that the value of an undertaking depends on the facts of a case,[39] and whether the Court or the applicant could have any confidence in the undertaking would be the determining factor.

37. In this case, not only is there no basis for the applicant to rely on the "undertaking" of the second respondent, the undertaking is not consonant with the relief sought.

38. For these reasons, it is submitted that, despite the suspension of the fifth respondent, the relief sought in part A is still competent and effective.

 Fairness of the relief sought, and the rule of law

39. The second respondent further contends that the interdict sought in this application would be unfair to the fifth respondent and would undermine the rule of law.

40. The basis for this contention is that SAPS is obliged to follow due process before suspending an employee, and that the relief sought conflicts with this requirement.

41. It is submitted that, as the applicant does not seek the suspension of the fifth applicant by SAPS, this argument holds no water.

42. If the order is granted, the fifth respondent will be prevented from working. It is trite that there is no obligation in South African law for an employer to provide work to an employee, and no right to perform work attaches to an employee. An overview of the law in this regard is set out in Sajid / The Juma Trust.[40]

43. This legal position is acknowledged in the Code of Good Practice: Who is an employee, issued by NEDLAC in terms of section 200A(4) read with section 203 of the Labour Relations Act, 66 of 1995 ("the LRA"), at section 38:

38. Employer may choose when to make use of services of employee.-The courts conventionally state that an employer has the right to determine whether to require an employee to work, while an independent contractor is bound to perform or produce as specified by the contract. An employer will however, in most circumstances, be liable to pay an employee who tenders his or her services, even where the employer does not require the employee to work. 

44. Thus, it is submitted that an interdict preventing the fifth respondent from working, while still employed, does not affect his procedural rights. In any event, he has the opportunity to protect those rights by being heard by this Court before it makes any order.

45. The second respondent relies partly on section 197 of the Constitution, read with section 23, for its contentions.

45.1. It is pointed out that section 197 does not make any specific provision regarding procedures applying to suspension. It merely states that the terms and conditions of employment in the public service must be regulated by national legislation.

45.2. Section 23(1) provides "everyone has the right to fair labour practices". However, what is fair in any given situation depends on the context.

45.3. In particular, the procedural requirements applicable to the employee in question, as well as the nature of the employment and of the infringement must be considered.

46. The second respondent relies on item 4 of schedule 8 of the LRA, which requires an investigation, including notification of the alleged offence and a right of reply, before an employee can be dismissed.

47. The dismissal of the fifth respondent is not at issue in this application. Item 4 of schedule 8 is therefore irrelevant.

48. Finally, the second respondent sets out part of the SAPS Discipline Regulations in support of the contentions that fair procedure is at issue.

49. It is noted that Regulation 13(2), which sets out a procedure including proper notice and a right to reply before suspension, deals only with suspension without pay. There are no such requirements for suspension with full remuneration.

50. It is submitted that this omission takes note of the fact that, on occasion, and particularly within a body which performs the functions performed by SAPS, it may be necessary and appropriate to suspend an employee immediately, and without notice.

51. To the extent that the relief sought in this application coincides with a suspension by the employer, we submit the following:

51.1. The "suspension" is based on the same grounds as the initial suspension which was imposed in May 2011.

51.2. The fifth respondent has either already had the opportunity to respond to those grounds, or it was considered unnecessary to receive representations from him before the suspension was imposed.

51.3. In either event, there is no basis for requiring a further notice and response procedure.

51.4. Finally, the fifth respondent has the opportunity to be heard on the issue in this Court.

52. Regulation 13(4) permits a chairperson of a disciplinary hearing to decide whether a suspension should continue if the disciplinary proceedings have not been finalised within sixty days. Thus, there is no merit in the contention that the maximum length of a suspension is 60 days.

53. In any event, the applicant does not seek an order requiring the second and/ or sixth respondents to suspend the fifth respondent. The procedures for suspension that they would be required to follow are therefore irrelevant.

54. Finally, the procedures regarding suspension regulate the relationship between the fifth respondent and the second (and sixth) respondent. The applicant is not bound by those procedures. The relief sought is extraordinary in the sense that it is not part of the ordinary employment procedures that may apply. It is an attempt to enforce constitutional imperatives, against which the procedures relied on cannot serve as a shield. The reliance on those procedures is, therefore, fallacious.

55. For these reasons, it is submitted that the Court has the power to grant the relief in part A of the notice of motion, and that the contentions of the second respondent in this regard are of no merit.

D. The requirements for interim relief

56. The requirements for an interim interdict are well-established. As stated by Holmes, JA in Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors, Warrenton and Another, [41] they are:

"(a) a right which, "though prima facie established, is open to some doubt";

 (b) a well grounded apprehension of irreparable injury;

 (c) the absence of ordinary remedy.

In exercising its discretion the Court weighs, inter alia, the prejudice to the applicant, if the interdict is withheld, against the prejudice to the respondent if it is granted. This is sometimes called the balance of convenience."

57. Holmes JA also emphasised that the applicant's prospects of success were relevant to a consideration of whether the Court should exercise its discretion in the applicant's favour.

A prima facie right

58. The applicant must show a prima facie right of which it is entitled to claim protection by way of an interdict.[42]

59. The prima facie right sought to be protected by the applicant is enunciated at section E of the founding affidavit.[43] The existence of this right is also what gives the applicant its standing to bring this application. Remarkably none of the factual and legal bases on which the applicant relies for the review of the impugned decisions is challenged by the respondents. It follows that, on the merits, the applicant has shown a prima facie case.

60. The decisions sought to be reviewed in part B of the notice of motion have, it is the applicant's contention, violated the rule of law and the principle of legality. They impact on the ability of SAPS as an organisation to carry out its objectives as set out in section 205 of the Constitution. The right sought to be protected by the applicant is, at its broadest, the right of every inhabitant of the Republic to the protection of the rule of law, and to a police service that is capable of achieving the objects set out at section 205(3) of the Constitution.

61. Just as every South African "has an interest to be served by judges who are fit for judicial office",[44] it is submitted that every South African has a right to ensure that the rule of law prevails.

62. Similarly, every South African has a right to a police service that is able to "maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of the Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law".[45] Once that premise is accepted, it follows that every South African has a right to vindicate the ability of the police service to fulfil those objects.

63. On a narrower level, the rights sought to be vindicated by the applicant on behalf of others are also worthy of protection by way of an interim interdict.[46] These are the right to dignity of the family members of the alleged murder victim, and of the victims of the alleged kidnapping and intimidation charges, as well as their rights to be heard and their rights to equal protection and benefit of the law.

64. It is submitted that the applicant has established a prima facie right for which it is entitled to claim protection.

Irreparable harm and no ordinary remedy

65. The irreparable harm that will be suffered by not only the applicant but by South African society as a whole has already been alluded to in that section of these submissions dealing with urgency. Similarly, the contention that no ordinary remedy will suffice in the circumstances has been dealt with.

66. It is submitted that the continuing public controversy, undisputed by the second respondent, and its effect on the integrity of SAPS and its ability to fulfil its constitutional mandate, coupled with the risk that the fifth respondent may at any time be permitted to resume his duties, are sufficient to found a reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm.

67. Any remedy obtained by the applicant in the ordinary course will not have a remedial effect on the continuing harm identified, particularly in paragraph 55 of the founding affidavit.[47]

Balance of convenience

68. Apart from the question of the procedure to be applied in suspending an employee, the second respondent has advanced no contentions of prejudice that he may suffer as a result of the relief sought in these proceedings.

69. The prejudice that is likely to be the result of a failure of this application is already well-canvassed in these submissions. The continued violation of the rule of law and the integrity of SAPS that would result were the fifth respondent to return to his duties before the review application is determined cannot, it is submitted, be gainsaid.

70. Against that prejudice, the prejudice suffered by the fifth respondent, who would only be prevented from exercising the powers of his rank and fulfilling whatever duties may be assigned to him, while receiving full pay, is miniscule.

71. It is not discernable what prejudice would be suffered by the second and sixth respondents. They would be absolved of the responsibility to suspend the fifth respondent, as he would be prevented from working by virtue of a court order. They would also be afforded the opportunity to take steps to restore the integrity of SAPS.

72. In these circumstances it is submitted that the balance of convenience is weighted overwhelmingly in the applicant's favour.

Prospects of success

73. On the evidence before the court, the applicant's prospects of success are good.

74. Another approach which this honourable Court may consider is the one described in the following dictum in Radio Islam v Chairperson, Council of the Independent Broadcasting Authority, and Another,[48]

"In adjudicating upon the interim application I have to consider the prospects of success of the review application and the balance of convenience. The usual rule in this regard is that very good prospects of success may make up for a poor case in regard to the balance of convenience and that the converse applies."

75. On that approach we submit that in this case, the balance of convenience so favours the applicant that the prospects of success in the main application do not need to be considered.

76. In any event, it is submitted that the applicant sets out a strong prima facie basis for the review of the maligned decisions in its founding affidavit.

E. Conclusion

77. We submit that the applicant has made out a case for the relief sought in part A of the notice of motion, and that the appropriate order to make is to:

77.1. Grant an order in terms of prayers (a) and (b) of the amended notice of motion;

77.2. Direct the respondents who oppose the relief sought in part A of the amended notice of motion to pay the costs of the interim application, including the costs of two counsel.

IV MALEKA SC
S YACOOB
CHAMBERS
4 JUNE 2012

Footnotes:

[1] For relief as set out in part B of the notice of motion.

[2] As set out in part A of the notice of motion.

[3] AA3 to the answering affidavit, vol 3, p 293.

[4] Vol 1: p55, para 91.

[5] Vol 1: p 58, paras 98 to 100; Vol 2: p194, para 4.

[6] Vol 1: pp 58 and 59, paras 101 to 103.

[7] Vol 1: p 60, para 106.

[8] Vol 1: p 64, para 119.

[9] Vol 1: p 26, para 37.

[10] Vol 1: p 31, para 46.

[11] Vol 1: p 29, para 44.

[12] Vol 1: p 65, para 122.

[13] Vol 3:p 279, para 16.

[14] Vol 1: p 64, para 119.

[15] Vol 1: p 16, para 5.4; pp 93 and 94.

[16] Vol 3: p 284, para 24.2.

[17] Vol 3: p 284, para 24.3; annexure AA1, pp 288 and 289.

[18] Vol 3: p 285, para 24.6; annexure AA3, pp 293 and 294.

[19] This is acknowledged by the second respondent at paragraph 10 of the answering affidavit, vol 3, p 276.

[20] MEC, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Kate 2006 (4) SA 478 

(SCA), [30] to [33].

[21] S v Steyn 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC), [45].

[22] Vol 1: pp 21 and 22, paras 16 to 18; pp 38 and 39, paras 53 to 55; p 69, para 134; pp 87 and 88, para 173 ; and p 89, para 177.

[23] Vol 1: p 39, paras 55.1 and 55.2.

[24] Vol 1: p 40; para 55.4.

[25] Vol 1: p 40, para 55.4.

[26] Vol 1: p 40, para 55.5.

[27] Vol 1: pp 42 - 43, para 55.15; and Vol 4, p 306, para 10.8.

[28] Vol 3: p 275, para 7.

[29] Vol 3: p 279, para 16.

[30] Vol 1: p 65, para 122; Vol 4, p 305, para10.5.

[31] Vol 3: p 276, para 8.

[32] Vol 1: pp 39-43.

[33] Section 205 (3) of the Constitution.

[34] At para 19 of the answering affidavit, p 280, vol 3 of the papers.

[35] 2004 (4) SA 156 (W).

[36] at 166I-167A.

[37] 1990 (4) SA 181 (E).

[38] at 186A-C.

[39] At 186D-E.

[40] [1999] 6 BALR 684 (CCMA) at 690-691.

[41] 1973 (3) SA 685 (SCA) at 691.

[42] Dalrymple and Others v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 at 379.

[43] Vol:1 pp 43 to 54.

[44] Freedom under Law v Acting Chairperson: JSC 2011 (3) SA 549 [21].

[45] Section 205(3) of the Constitution.

[46] Paragraphs 69-75, pp 48-50, vol 1 of the record.

[47] Pp 39 to 42, vol 1 of the record.

[48] 1999 (3) SA 897 (W).

Source: www.freedomunderlaw.org

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