fExtract from the COSATU Secretariat Report to the 5th COSATU Central Committee, June 27 2011

Political Report to the 5th COSATU Central Committee

1. Introduction

This Political Report to COSATU's 5th Central Committee takes stock of political developments since the last Central Committee in September 2007. It identifies the key political challenges facing the working class moving forward. It also assesses developments in relation to the three key mandates of the 2009 COSATU Congress:

• political transformation; particularly in relation to the Alliance, governance, and advancing a working class political agenda;
• building of working class consciousness and ideological cohesion; and
• building the organisational engines of COSATU and the working class.

 Key international developments

Neo-liberalism has suffered a major crisis of legitimacy since the 1997 Asian Crisis. The IMF and the World Bank have been forced to refine some of the stringent assumptions of the model, including that on the role of the State and liberalised capital markets. In addition, the Washington Consensus is becoming completely discredited, and new economic models are beginning to emerge.

The international political situation has shifted, as evidenced through the emergence of victorious left parties in Latin America and elsewhere, the recent upsurge of democratic movements in North Africa, and the emergence of a group of developing nations that challenge the hegemony of the West, principally around trade negotiations.

A confluence of opportunities for a more rigorous transformation programme to be advanced has emerged. The global financial and economic crisis, together with the energy crisis, presents us with opportunities for innovation on how to cushion our economy and also build a durable development strategy.

With the economic crisis, a new wave of neo-Keynesian economic thinking, where States had to lead the economic recovery and provide rescue packages to sinking private companies came to the fore.

However, there has been a re-emergence of conservative centre right parties in Europe and they have been swept into power despite the international economic crisis. Formerly secure left parliamentary seats in the European Parliament have been taken over by the conservatives.

We are still paying the price of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The existance of a single center of power and the domination of the world by the USA and its junior partners in Europe has seen bullying of the world by these super powers.

Recently we have seen France and Britain launching a regime change programme in Lybia using the protection of the pro democracy forces that Maumar Gadaffi brutally oppressed as an excuse. France interfered with internal affairs of Ivory Coast to install a President they preferred following a disputed presidential elections. Double standards remain the order of the day in all their interventions.

The financial crisis has ravaged many countries' economies, leading to millions of workers losing their jobs. The inequalities within and between countries, in particular between North and South countries, remain massive. In South Africa we lost 1.17 million jobs and our tax base has taken a strain. Furthermore, climate change is beginning to impact on the lives of people more than ever before, as demonstrated by the floods and drought in parts of South Africa and the world.

Realignment of global forces, particularly in the South, and the democratic upsurge in North Africa (in which the working class is at the forefront), opens up possibilities for progressive advance, but also contain a range of contradictions, which require careful analysis, in order to objectively assess the implications of this changing international situation for the working class, and left politics.

2. Challenges of Political Transformation

This political report covers the period from September 2009 to April 2011. It has probably been the most dynamic and volatile 3 1/2 years in South African politics since the democratic breakthrough nearly 17 years ago.

This period has seen a popular political revolt in the ANC in December 2007, followed by:

• The adoption of a new policy agenda, and the break away of the previous leadership;
• The removal of a President;
• The inauguration of a new administration;
• The emergence of a powerful, corrupt, predatory elite, combined with a conservative populist agenda to harness the ANC to advance their interests;
• A fight-back by conservatives in the State, and massive contestation over economic policy;
• Challenges by demagogues to the new leadership in the ANC;
•  The development of political paralysis in the State and the Alliance;
• Deepening of social distress and mobilisation of communities;
• Massive international and domestic economic shocks as a result of the economic crisis;
• Resurgence of the progressive centre in the movement at the 2010 NGC and ANC NEC Lekgotla;
• A difficult but successful 2011 Alliance Summit;
• Attempts by progressive elements within government to assert a developmental agenda, and resistance by the old guard bureaucracy and conservatives in Cabinet and;
• Difficult national and provincial elections in 2009 and an even more difficult local government elections in 2011 where we have witnessed a decline in the support of the democratic forces.

In other words we have seen intensification of ongoing contestation within the Alliance, the ANC and the State, unfolding and deepening contradictions, and wild zigzagging in the political direction of the country. Although covering a relatively short period, this report deals with an almost bewildering array of political developments. To adopt the saying that "a week is a long time in politics", this 3 Y2 years seems like several political lifetimes!

Given the complexity of these political dynamics, and the speed with which they are changing, it is therefore important that we analyse these matters as objectively as possible, without allowing political sentiment, rhetoric, or wishful thinking to obscure the true character of the unfolding situation, and the choices available to workers to transform it. As Marx said, "Philosophers have interpreted the world. The point, however is to change it."

3. Key Political Phases: A Summary

To assist in this bewildering array of developments, it is useful to break this period up into various, overlapping, phases. In taking stock of each of these periods, we will draw from key documents of the Federation, and ultimately assess where we stand today in relation to each of the critical issues. We outline five phases, which can be roughly identified for the purpose of political analysis. We only highlight the key features in point form, as a full analysis would require a discussion paper for each of these phases:

Phase 1. Polokwane and the end of the Mbeki Era, the emergence of dual power: September 2007- September 2008.

Key elements of this phase include progressive momentum from the September 2007 COSATU Central Committee; the ANC Policy Conference in the same month, which proposed major policy shifts; the political revolt at the ANC National Conference in December 2007, and the overhaul of leadership and policy; the ‘dual power' situation from January 2008 to September 2008, with the Mbeki leadership controlling government, and the new leadership under President Zuma controlling the ANC; and the removal of Mbeki from office in September 2008. Nevertheless most of the old cabinet remained in place until May 2009.

Phase 2. The Alliance honeymoon: December 2007 to mid 2009.

The shift in policy and leadership lays the basis for what appears to be a new era of Alliance relations, following the Polokwane Conference outcome, in which COSATU and the SACP played a key role. Important elements of this included: significant policy convergence between the Alliance partners; better and more functioning of Alliance structures, including an Alliance economic summit on the 09-10 May 2008 and an Alliance Economic Summit on the 03-04 October 2009; negotiation of a progressive national framework agreement, in late 2008, to respond to the international economic crisis; inclusion of the Alliance partners in a greater range of processes, including planning for the transition to a new and restructured ANC administration; joint formulation of a progressive elections manifesto, and close co-ordination of the elections campaign; consultation on the appointment of the new Cabinet appointed in May 2009; reconfiguration of government, including a new Ministry to co-ordinate economic policy; and an apparent translation of much, but not all, of the manifesto into government's overarching programme, the medium term strategic framework (MTSF); nevertheless there are signs that conservatives in the ANC, and the bureaucracy aim to derail the new agenda.

Phase 3. Fight back and contestation: mid 2009 to 2010.

In Government: Conservative bureaucrats, particularly in the Presidency and Treasury drive old polices and block new ones, supported by some leaders in Cabinet; Treasury continues to use control of the fiscus to assert conservative economic policies, and thwart the mandate of the Economic Development Department (EDD) to align economic policies towards the objectives of the Manifesto; attempts to position the Minister for ‘National Planning' (Commission) as a centre to assert overall control of government policy, as proposed in the Green Paper; bureaucrats in the Presidency, in the Monitoring and Evaluation Department, also drive a conservative policy agenda, under the cover of technocratic outcomes and performance agreements; progressive Ministers struggle to assert the new Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP2), Growth Path, rural development agenda, National Health Insurance (NHI) etc., in the face of this.

In the Alliance: Elements within the ANCYL and tenderpreneurs linked to the movement, work to undermine ANC leadership, and oppose closer Alliance relations; attempts to isolate the ANC Secretary General, and attacks on left] ‘communists' in the Alliance; the Alliance Summit in November 2009 reverses agreements on the Alliance political centre resulting in a failure to adopt a programme for transformation to take forward the ANC Manifesto commitments.

Even the compromise proposed by ANC Deputy President that both the ANC and ANC led Alliance are the strategic politic centre is resisted by this grouping; blocking of progressive resolutions of the 2008 Economic summit on macroeconomic policy; COSATU steps up a programme of mass mobilisation.

The emergence of a new tendency in the movement is not an aberration, it reflects the changing class basis of the State and the ruling party and cements an old alliance with finance capital.

Phase 4. Political paralysis: January to September 2010

In Government: Neither the National Planning Commission (NPC) nor the EDD can assert its role as economic planning centres in government. A ‘Prime Ministerial' role for a Minister in the NPC is blocked. EDD still awaits definition of its role and powers; failure to discuss proposals for New Growth Path (NGP) at January 2010 Cabinet Lekgotla, or to adopt it in the July Cabinet Lekgotla - the NGP is bitterly resisted by Treasury; key people leave the Presidency and Departments. There is the removal of some Director General's but no clear political agenda, or direction; there appears to be a lack of decisiveness among leadership to resolve key stalemates.
In the Alliance: An engagement with the ANC in the April 2010 Bilateral with COSATU reveals that the ANC is deeply divided. Attacks by the right in ANC have made progressives excessively cautious; the ANC is unable to engage on substantive policy issues, and the Alliance Summit is repeatedly postponed. There are signs of closing down of engagement in the ANC e.g. COSATU's exclusion from the ANC Economic Transformation Committee (ETC) preparing for the National General Council; issues are reduced more to a discussion of symptoms, such as the problem of ‘public spats', while fundamental differences aren't addressed; major mobilisation of workers in a public service strike.

Progressive forces wield a degree of social power, particularly through organised labour. They also have a greater presence in the State post-May 2009, but are not strong enough to dislodge the 1996 class project, and the new predatory elite.

Phase 5. New development strategy and political ‘defeat' of the predatory elite: September 2010 to February 2011.

In Government: Various measures introduced to crack down on corruption; the New Growth Path (NGP) is released in November 2010 championed by the President as governments overarching development strategy, signalling a shift in the centre of power within government. The conservative bureaucracy remains powerful but cannot block it entirely. COSATU welcomes aspects of the NGP, but also has serious concerns with framework; the Presidents 2011 State of Nation Address strongly asserts the new agenda, and dismisses opposition of conservatives to the NGP, and particularly to the decent work agenda, but we retain differences on macro economic policy; 2011 Budget remains overcautious, and Treasury continues to drive dual labour market strategy. Forced to submit youth wage subsidy proposal to Nedlac. Concerns remain about predatory elite using access to the State to drive their accumulation agenda.

In Alliance: The September ANC National General Council (NGC) sees a decisive ‘defeat' of conservatives, demagogues, and tenderpreneurs in society and in the ANC, with the President and working class delegates playing a decisive role; the NGC takes a powerful stand against illdiscipline and corruption in the movement and the State; the Polokwane policy agenda on the five priority areas is consolidated and advanced by the NGC, although contestation remains on aspects of economic policy; the NGC reasserts the importance of the Alliance, but insists on the one-sided formulation of the ANC as the political centre; the ANC 2011 January 8th statement and the 2011 ANC NEC Lekgotla takes forward the progressive elements of the NGC, and the latter commits to an engagement on areas where COSATU has raised concerns in relation to the NGP, including on macro economic policy; a stronger agenda by ANC to drive policy in the State, in some areas, rather than using the ANC fora as rubberstamps for government policy.

However, worrying signs in preparation for 24 February Alliance Summit emerged, the conservative, tenderpreneur elements in the ANC want to continue to hold the ANC hostage and reverse progress made in the NGC and Lekgotla. The main battle in the Summit was to stop the conservatives from derailing the Summit. In the end an accommodation was reached that the Alliance Secretariat must still produce.

Analysing the five phases

It has become clear that a major difference in the pattern of the political trajectory between the pre and post- Polokwane era, is that of political zig zagging, and lurching between different political postures. This characterises not only the Alliance, as during the Mbeki era, but also characterises developments in the State. Both the Alliance and the State are highly contested. It is also apparent that the class basis and character of the State and the ANC are undergoing rapid transformation, and that the working class is fighting a fierce battle for the soul of the ANC and the State. The progress registered at Polokwane, the NGC, and in the State on the five priorities, among others, will never be sustained unless the working class is able to exercise its hegemony in the ANC, the Alliance and the State.

We need to ask whether our defences were down at the 2009 Congress. In the aftermath of the post-Polokwane euphoria, the removal of the Mbeki administration, the improvement of Alliance relations, and the election of a new government on a progressive manifesto, it seemed to many that the challenges of the previous period had been overcome, and that we were moving into a new era. Clearly, this was to misjudge the extent of contestation, and different agendas, both within the ANC and the State.

If we are to properly understand and address the realities of political incoherence, and even paralysis, we need to look beyond the symptoms e.g. the ‘problem of spats' in the Alliance. We need to look at the underlying contradictions, and the root of the contestation in the Alliance and in government.

From a class analysis, we are sitting with a paradigm of continuity, and change, in relation to elements of the current state pursuing an agenda that is hostile to the working class:

Continuity, in that the 1996 class project was a long-term project which has rooted itself with concrete class interests in the State and society. It represented an alliance with big capital, particularly finance capital, and the creation of a black capitalist class. It laid the basis for the politics of crass materialism as a replacement for the politics of service and solidarity, which has initiated its own dynamic.

This new culture in turn laid the basis for corruption at all levels of society, including within the movement. This class project depended on low intensity democracy and brutal suppression of alternative views within the movement and in society. It represents the politics of labelling and closing down of the democratic space. The agenda of the 1996 class project still remains firmly entrenched within powerful State institutions, including the National Treasury;

Change, in that the relative prominence of a predator class, which relies on access to state levers for accumulation, vis. a vis. big capital (which is arguably more prominent now), is growing by the day, in the most frightening way, with the Mittal deal and ICT consortium being the most prominent example of this. This could foreshadow a form of accommodation between these two centres of capital.

However, this accommodation comes at a big price to established capital, which would pursue a different path, if this were open to them. There are pro-capital elements and institutions in the State who would see this comprador elite as being a threat to the stability of the accumulation project of big capital, and therefore would be hostile to their attempt to colonise the State for their own parasitic agenda.

We must not confuse the 96 class project with the new tendency. The former were clear about their class agenda and followed this agenda with military precision. The difference is that with the current clique such ideological clarity is absent. The new tendency largely depends on demagogue zig zag political rhetoric in the most spectacular and unprincipled fashion and is hell bent on material gain, corruption and looting.

Politically , therefore the main task is to defend the ANC against attempts by these various interests to capture its soul; advance the resolutions that emerged in Polokwane; and support the leadership in taking this project forward. A failure to defend and advance this project, and the implosion of the ANC as a result of the machinations of the predatory elite, could be used by the liberal-right and capital in the country, not only to drive their agenda through the State, but also to mobilise more effectively for a change in the ruling party and change of the current largely pro working class policies. Such a disastrous scenario will not reflect so much as a failure of left policies but rather a failure of the left to politically deal with and defeat the contestation by these various class forces for the soul of the ANC and the State.

Further, the ANC leadership have committed a number of mistakes which have made it more difficult for COSATU to effectively mobilise support of its constituency. Some actions by the ANC leadership have tended to discredit itself, and have unnecessarily placed itself in opposition to COSATU. Such errors have ranged from failures to take forward ANC and Alliance resolutions at the level of government; failure to decisively respond to issues effecting workers at local and national government level; refusal to consider COSATU views on important policies such as the militarisation of the police, and many others; failure to respond effectively to calls by communities to ensure proper service delivery; and an insistence on retaining old, discredited economic policies, as manifested in the NGP.

On some occasions, the leadership have attacked the Federation without provocation. This has been worsened in certain instances, by inappropriate conduct which has undermined the battle against illdiscipline and corruption. All this conduct has given oxygen to the new class project to deepen and exploit divisions in the ANC and the Alliance. On the other hand, the type of decisive leadership demonstrated at the ANC NGC, shows how appropriate interventions can make it far more difficult for these class forces to manoeuvre.

Discussion point: What must COSATU do to defend the ANC and the working class against these class forces, and ensure that the leadership of the ANC advances the Polokwane mandate, and succeeds in its implementation? What can the ANC do to help COSATU promote these objectives?

4. Developments in the Alliance Since the 10th COSATU Congress

4.1. Convergence in the Alliance 2008 to mid 2009: the Alliance honeymoon

The report to the 2009 COSATU Congress contained an optimistic account of progress in the Alliance, based on extremely progressive resolutions from the Alliance Summit from 09-10 May 2008, and the Alliance Economic Summit of the 17-18 October 2008. This reflected the political situation, and balance of forces outlined in Phase 2 above, where in the immediate post Polokwane period, the ANC and the Alliance were clearly separated from, and in some respects, raged against the leadership in government, and where the new ANC leadership relied heavily on support from its Alliance partners. It was also a period in which the new leadership, which had many different strands and backgrounds, had not clearly gelled into a coherent ideological force. Under these circumstances, and given the progressive policy boost from Polokwane, the right in the ANC, and in government found it difficult to oppose this new agenda.

This balance of forces was reflected in the key meetings of the Alliance over this (pre Congress) period including the two key summits mentioned above. We focus in this report on the post September 2009 developments, since the pre Congress situation was reported in detail to the 10th National Congress. However, in the context of the discussions in this political report to the CC, it is important to remind delegates of the decisions arrived at during this period. We have therefore attached an extract from the Congress report dealing with an analysis of the Alliance during this period.

4.2. The Emergence of Political Contestation Post Polokwane

By the September 2009 COSATU Congress, it was already becoming clear that the political honeymoon was nearing an end. While Alliance processes in 2008 had seemed to signal significant progress, a number of problems were becoming apparent. In an assessment by the COSATU Office Bearers, following the discussions in our November 2009 CEC, some sobering observations were made, which anticipated the fierce contestation which emerged in the Alliance, particularly in 2010, and the ascendancy of the predatory elite. We quote an extract from this assessment:

"The tenth Congress, whilst acknowledging and celebrating this progress (of Polokwane), cautioned, in the light of some of the public utterances by some ANC leaders, that we cannot afford to celebrate forever. The reality is that despite the tremendous progress we made in closing the policy gaps in the Alliance, there is a contest on the policies with some pretending that some policy matters have not been resolved in Polokwane ... The congress affirmed that whilst it is true that we have dislodged the 1996 class project, the ideology and practises have not been altogether wiped out. Since the 2007 52nd ANC national conference we have identified the task of defending the working class gains achieved in Polokwane as the prima!y political goal of the working class. We acknowledge that when we were involved in a titanic battle to defeat the 1996 class project we formed part of a broad coalition of forces who demanded change. We acknowledged that there was no unifring ideology or politics between those who imposed change in Polokwane except dissatisfaction with the previous leadership.

Everyday it is becoming clear that the working class has a daunting task of defending the space created in Polokwane. For this reason, we gave ourselves a task to impose a new progressive hegemony in the Alliance, based on Alliance policy positions, ANC 52 National Conference and ANC 2009 elections Manifesto. We drafted the ‘Seizing the moment document', (in 2008) which was broadly endorsed by the Alliance National Political Council. We knew that the other Alliance components did not ensure a discussion within their ranks on the document. In a nutshell we always feared that the attempt to impose a progressive platform might be highly contested.

It is now clear that there is a realignment of forces in the National Executive Committee of the ANC with a new tendency emerging. There is a growing tendency to use the rooi gevaar and the usual anti-COSATU anti-union rhetoric. These are reinforced by the use of the concept of the left as some kind of new bogeyman or swear word by the mainstream media. All frustrations with the unhelpful culture of lack of service in the public service are blamed on unions that are randomly accused of being obstructionist and of not being revolutionary.

Society is confronted with a major challenge of crass materialism and corruption. No organisation or institution is not challenged by this new phenomenon. Many ANC members and leaders want an end to the politics of patronage, backstabbing, careerism and crass materialism. They may not support a socialist cause per se but constitute an important ally in returning the ANC to its values. It is worrying that organisational policy is debated and announced in social occasions like parties rather than in the structures of the movement. We must defeat this tendency of this tiny minority of leaders who believe that they are above the organisation and their word must be taken as policy.

All these developments should not demoralise our forces. The reality is that we remain strong politically and organisationally. The anti communist and anti-COSATU forces cannot openly advance their agenda and do not represent the views of a majority in the ANC. They have to resort to codes and misinformation to gain ascendency. COSATU has to a large degree managed to get a critical mass of its shop stewards to participate in the branches of the ANC. What is still worrying is the participation of the industrial working class in the SACP. We are not there in big numbers - according to the last SACP congress reports only 40% of the membership of the party is drawn from the industrial proletariat. A further challenge though is whether we have swelled the ranks of both the ANC and SACP with the most conscious and advanced cadres of our movement..."

In our view this description of the political challenges facing the working class remain as correct today as it was yesterday. The political paper we are writing to stimulate debates in the run up to this Central Committee will build on these CEC statements.

4.3. Alliance Summit November 2009

We had an important bilateral with the ANC followed by a critical Alliance Summit on 13-15 November 2009. The ANC was not well represented in either meeting.

In terms of policy, the Alliance summit maintained a progressive stance on all the policy areas it had engaged with in the past. We made fresh gains on the macro-economic policy debates. We set ourselves the objective of ensuring that the Alliance task team on macro-economic policy was established and that the Minister of Finance drove through the consensus areas in preparation for the 2010 budget. Neither of these materialised.

It became clear at the Summit that there is a body in the ANC that is no longer comfortable with the Alliance being a strategic political centre. The summit reinforced our view that we have relied too much on the top six of the ANC to sway things in our favour, and that if we place all our eggs in the one basket, i.e. in the top six, we will lose the fight. "Signs are emerging that there is a new grouping of conservatives and materialists who may attempt to establish a new power block outside the top six and isolate it. "1

4.4. April 2010 bilateral with the ANC

COSATU presented a detailed and comprehensive submission to the bilateral with the ANC on 9th April 2010, outlining COSATU's perspectives on a whole host of burning policy questions, as well as strategic concerns facing the Alliance.

In response COSATU was subjected to ridicule, caricatured, dismissed and misrepresented, to advance an argument that the Federation is being oppositionist, generally problematic and not loyal to the Alliance.

Below we repeat paragraphs in the ANC response to COSATU's concerns, concerns that in our view were legitimate then, and remain legitimate today. The response was shocking: confrontational, positional and brutal.

1. "Our reading of the positions taken by COSATU in respect of the State of the Nation Address by the President, the Budget Speech by the Minister of Finance and the COSATU CEC statement, is that the Federation has taken an oppositionist stance that is not helpful at all. The double meaning it employs by making positive remarks that are cancelled by negative ones in the same statement causes massive confusion in society. In its articulation, COSATU elevates itself into being the vanguard of the revolution against an ANC leadership it portrays as ready to betray that revolution, by projecting itself as responsible and duty-bound to defend ANC resolutions from the irresponsible leadership that fails to take its responsibility to implement them seriously."

2. On the Nature of the Alliance and Alliance Programme of Action the ANC has these rather shocking things to say:

"The second mistake is the insistence that "Alliance Summit resolutions must form the basis of government policy" Notwithstanding the importance of the Alliance, and the influence it has in policy development and formulation, it is the resolutions of ANC conferences that form the basis of government policy."

"The impression emerging is that the Federation is elevating the Alliance into an organisation, rather than an Alliance of independent parties with different long-term objectives. This defeats the reality that the Alliance is an inter-class Alliance, wherein working class organisations do not melt into the alliance and lose their class outlook and ideology. The minimum Alliance programme is itself a compromise where long-term objectives and, even immediate goals, do not converge but are managed to ensure that progress is made in advancing the National Democratic Revolution.

Neither partner can impose its will over another. This is the character that has sustained the Alliance over decades. The impatience reflected in the Federation's approach has the potential to collapse the Alliance in the long term. This approach is at the centre of what informed the decision to hold an Alliance Summit that will focus on the character and political framework that governs the Alliance.

The tone and content of the ANC document in many places was disturbingly like the ‘Unmandated Reflections' of 1994, in that it tries to create a bogeyman to stir up false fears amongst ANC leaders about COSATU's agenda, in making wildly exaggerated claims, to divert attention from the real issues. For example:

Page 1: "COSATU elevates itself into being the vanguard of the revolution against an ANC leadership it portrays as ready to betray that revolution ..."
Page 7: "seeking to project COSATU, instead of being a partner with the ANC, as the sole representative of the poor against the ANC government. This reinforces the view that the Federation is working hard to project the ANC as not having the interests of the poor at heart..."

Page 14: "COSATU must assess whether it is the correct approach to seek to characterise the ANC in ways that divide it into such categories as bureaucrats, government leaders, a small tendency and many other categories" etc. etc.

Regrettably these issues were not engaged exhaustively, in order to ensure that in future they do not become a reference point. We were witnessing the beginning of a systematic representation of COSATU as a bogeyman, and the continuous stoking of fears in the ANC of COSATU's agenda. This partly happened in the ANC SG's organisational report to the NGC and then again in the response of the ANC to the Civil Society Conference.

The May 2010 CEC expressed serious concern regarding the tone of the ANC responses to COSATU. The meeting was concerned that the ANC was adopting an increasingly antagonistic and paranoid posture, and was returning to the Mbeki era of questioning of bona fides, which was slowly, if not fast, taking the Alliance back to the pre-52 Polokwane Conference era. A period where all were under scrutiny and were being suspected of being manipulated by the imperialists and or other forces hostile to the NDR. The CEC noted these trends with alarm, and called for this to stop.

4.5. Bilateral with the ANC NOB's September 2010

On the 13 September 2010 we held a meeting with theANC NOBs. All of them were present. At this meeting, which happened at our request, we apologised for the personalised insults directed at the President and certain other government officials through songs and posters during the public sector strike. The apology was accepted.

The ANC felt that it would nevertheless engage in an internal debate to analyse the public sector strike, as it believed there were lessons that could not be ignored. These views were to be shared with COSATU.

Secondly we took the ANC leadership through the August 2010 CEC discussion paper entitled the "Alliance at a Crossroads- the battle against a predatory elite and against political paralysis". The ANC, through the SG, with the President stepping outside for another meeting, responded to the paper and later circulated this response in writing.

The manner of presentation; the anger combined with arrogance, positional postures, insults and rough language appeared designed to provoke a walkout by COSATU. Rather than trapping ourselves in the same mould, we decided to cool things down, and avoided responding in kind, rather proposing that another meeting be held after the NGC. Since the NGC we have not taken up the matter. No further bilaterals were held. Amongst the countless accusations addressed in the memorandum we wish to highlight the following:

1. An eagerness to play the person in the form of the COSATU General Secretary, instead of the ball, in what is becoming a deliberate attempt to isolate him from the collective.

2. COSATU has an obsession with individual's accumulating wealth, causing it to make wrong conclusions about what it calls the predatory elite.

3. COSATU is being workerist and is projecting itself as a vanguard of both the NDR and the struggle for Socialism.

4. The demand that the Alliance be a strategic centre reflects ideological confusion on the part of the Federation.

5. Insistence that all government policy emanates from the ANC, despite evidence to the contrary.

6. The ANC won't micro manage government, which is implementing ANC policies - this was said in response to the charge by COSATU that at times government has ignored policy directives of the ANC national conferences including the national policy conference and the NGC.

7. Accusing COSATU of prioritising the relationship with the Economic Development Minister, as ‘its man', and in the process helping to isolate him from his other cabinet colleagues.

8. Silence on the role of the trade unions in society, and a claim that the majority of dysfunctional schools are being wn by SADTU cadres, and that SADTU must have a higher commitment than SAOU.

9. COSATU is driving a programme to collapse the Alliance and that the attack on the predatory elite has the effect of discrediting the ANC.

10. The ANC won't be frog marched and won't be blackmailed - COSATU may walk if that is what it wants to do (this was said in response to the demand for a political center).

11. It is dishonest to attack family business links as some union leaders also have family business links, and unions have investment companies engaged in business. COSATU is complaining about the size and is therefore not principled.

12. Decoding COSATU: ‘what foolishness you have been up to, to earn the praise of your adversaries'. (This is said in response to the more favourable publicity COSATU has received for combating corruption and for being seen by some commentators as a conscious of our young democracy.)

4.6. ANC National General Council, September 2010

The ANC NGC in September 2010 was a huge success. The members of the ANC took the opportunity to assess progress in the implementation of the ANC 52 National Conference resolutions and took a number of progressive resolutions including the following:
1. It reaffirmed all the economic resolutions of Polokwane as summarised in the five ANC manifesto priorities. It adopted the framework for the New Growth Path, which emphasised the need for the transformation of the economy to achieve the goal of creating decent work and the eradication of poverty.

2. Further, the Declaration reaffirmed "the ANC's approach that the transformation of the South African economy should always be holistic and comprehensive, covering all sectors of the economy. In this regard, the ANC should ensure greater State involvement and control of strategic sectors of the economy, such as mining, energy, the financial sector and others."

3. The NGC moved decisively to state that "the implementation of NHI should be fast-tracked... The ANC must lead the implementation of the NHI and its promotion amongst the general populace", adding, "the involvement and support of the Alliance is cwcial."

4. The NGC categorically stated that it must go down in history as "the gathering that marked a decisive turning point in tackling, arresting and reversing the negative tendencies that have eroded and threaten to erode the political integrity and moral standing of the ANC among our people. The NGC "went beyond condemning sins of incumbency and other misbehaviour such as ill-discipline and factionalism" and promised that decisive action will be taken "against any tendency to erode the character, principles, core values and culture of the ANC."

In its assessment of the NGC, the COSATU CEC:

5. Observed that the ‘new tendency' of tenderpreneurs was isolated and exposed and their programme disrupted. The meeting also warned that just like the 1996 class project it did not mean that they have been defeated. It will however take blunders and a series of own goals by the leadership to allow a return to the pre-2010 NGC political environment.

6. Asserted that the NGC on the whole constituted not only a defence of Polokwane but significant pro-worker pro-poor advances, even though there remain some worrying elements. The overriding lesson from the past is that it will all depend on consistent and decisive leadership to take forward the clear pro-poor and pro-working class policies that emerged from the NGC. The challenge is to use a combination of strategies to continue to push for fundamental transformation.

8. Overall the framework emerging from the NGC ended the paralysis, emboldened the leadership, and brought the Alliance formations closer to one another.

4.7. The pre NGC political environment

The political environment was not ideal, even though the bilateral of the NOBs that took place on the 13 September lessened the tensions at least at leadership level. Below we attempt to draw a picture of the environment.

1. Even though COSATU had publicly and privately apologised for the pointed and personal insults contained in songs and hand written posters directed at the President and other ANC leaders, and even though this was appreciated by the ANC leadership, the environment and attitude towards COSATU remained informed by these and other tensions.

2. Precisely because of the above, some at the lower levels saw COSATU as a spoiler and, incorrectly, pursuing an agenda of regime change. There are suspicions being expressed even to this day, that the strike was political and formed part of COSATU's strategy to effect a regime change or to weaken the current leadership, in particular in the run up to the ANC 2012 conference.

3. COSATU's campaign against corruption, including the use of terms such as predatory elite and new tendency of tenderpreneurs, fell into the agenda of COSATU detractors inside the Alliance who did not waste time to drive a whispering campaign that COSATU's target was the President of the ANC. In the eyes of some, there was little difference between COSATU and those in the ANCYL driving a regime change agenda. We must assess if our attempts to extricate ourselves from this perception were successful or not.

4. The debate on nationalisation was conducted in a manner that left COSATU divided on tactics, and for even on policy. COSATU had worked with the ANCYL helping them to develop a rather good paper that spoke to the Freedom Charter demand that says all commanding heights of the economy shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as whole. Regrettably in its articulation, the ANCYL league, despite our advice, kept a narrow focus on the nationalisation of the mines. This put COSATU in an awkward position. We did not agree with this approach. In the process the ANCYL opened itself to counter assault as its position was seen to be an unprincipled attempt to use the legitimate demands of the Freedom Charter to save the precarious position of the black mining tycoons who were in trouble after the global economic recession.

5. The Presidents opening remarks diplomatically but emphatically responded to the debates that have characterised engagements in the recent period when he said:

"We must emphasise as well that the Alliance is not based on conformity and monolithic interpretation of events, It is a strategic Alliance. We must avoid a temptation to change the historical character and purpose of the Alliance, regardless of challenges we face today as a sector, group or individuals

There is also a new tendency to re-define the Alliance relationship as if it was based on some legal agreement or memorandum of understanding. Comrade Tambo's articulation is therefore useful: "Ours is not merely a paper Alliance, created at conference tables and formalised through the signing of documents and representing only an agreement of leaders. Our Alliance is a living organism that has grown out of struggle. We have built it out of our separate and common experiences".

6. It was very clear from the quotation that the President was dealing with the current disagreement on the political centre, and the original demand of COSATU that a PACT be agreed upon.

7. The ANC SG's report further pushed COSATU in a corner politically by making an unfounded claim that "the focus of this discussion is always counter-posed to the leadership role of the ANC".

8. The report states that:

"The Alliance partners have been at loggerheads over the concept of the Alliance being the strategic political centre. The focus of this discussion is always counter-posed to the leadership role of the ANC, as the leader of the Alliance during the current phase of our revolution. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) feels so strong about this issue that it has threatened to insist on signing the social pact with the Alliance partners, so that agreements are not changed mid-stream of implementation. This debate remains open in that the ANC has insisted on it being the strategic centre of power. The question that should be confronted is whether the debate is about conceptual disagreements or a fundamental disagreement that talks to the need for the restructuring of the framework governing the Alliance."

9. The public sector strike, which historically represents the point where personal and organisational relationships are undermined, was also a key point of discomfort and anger. Because of the complexity of managing too many COSATU public sector unions, COSATU NOBs get drawn into the details, in the process becoming the public face of the strike. When relations collapse, it is the COSATU unions in particular and public sector union leadership in general that take the heat.

10. There was a conspiracy theory that the strike was politically manipulated to feed into an agenda for regime change. The conservatives at all levels bought into this, and indeed we were viewed suspiciously if not downright contemptuously.

4.8. The NGC itself was a huge success!

As we assess the NGC we should be guided by the August 2010 CEC discussion paper and a key question posed then: Has the NGC put the Alliance back on track? Have the agenda of the new tendency been defeated? Have we conquered the political paralysis? Did we defend and consolidate the Polokwane gains and space - did we defend the leadership collective? Has unity returned and did we succeed to isolate and expose the new tendency? Has the contestation on economic policy that has paralysed the government and the ANC ended?

The agenda of the tenderpreneurs has been isolated and exposed and their programme completely disrupted. Just like the 1996 class project it does not mean that they have been defeated. It will however take blunders and a series of own goals by the leadership to allow a return to the pre 2010 NGC political environment.

Delegates to the NGC categorically stated that the NGC must go down in history as "the gathering that marked a decisive turning point in tackling, arresting and reversing the negative tendencies that have eroded and threaten to erode the political integrity and moral standing of the ANC among our people. The 3 NGC has to be remembered as the gathering that went beyond condemning the sins of incumbency and other misbehaviour such as ill discipline and factionalism. From now onwards, decisive action has to be taken by the leadership and membership to renew our movement and fight tenaciously against any tendency to erode the character, principles, core values and culture of the ANC."

4.9. Emerging consensus on the New Growth Path?

It was important that the NGC reaffirmed all the economic resolutions of Polokwane as summarised in the five ANC manifesto priorities. The ANC President's political report, which was later adopted by the NGC, affirmed a progressive framework for a new growth path even though careful reading reflects a degree of contradictions informed by contestation in government. We quote snippets of what he said about the growth path:

"Going forward, the principle of creating decent work opportunities must be put into practice through the establishment of this new growth path for our country that we are talking about. The new growth path must start with the recognition that on the one hand, we have had economic growth for a sustained period since the advent of democracy, with particularly high growth since the early 2000s and net job creation.

On the other hand, poverty remains high, The qualities have remained the same or even grown worse, while some of the jobs created often brought low wages and poor conditions.

Moreover, the economic downturn saw the loss of over a million jobs in our country; and job losses were continuing in the first six months of this year despite the return of economic growth. This has worsened what is an unacceptable situation of high rates of joblessness among our people.

These developments point to the core importance of redirecting and transforming economic growth, in order to bring about greater equity based above all on the creation of decent employment

The anticipated measures include appropriate fiscal and monetary policy measures that are actively directed to promoting larger number of jobs. These should be linked with measures to control inflation and improve efficiency across the economy, including through a more competitive and stable exchange rate.

They must also involve targeted measures to improve the performance of the economy in a number of areas, such as rural development, strengthening industrial and trade policies, education and skills, small business and cooperatives promotion, strengthened competition policies, African regional development and labour market measures.

We also need to work strengthening the role of state-owned enterprises and ensuring that, whilst remaining financially viable, SOE5, agencies and utilities - as well as companies in which the state has significant shareholding - respond to a clearly defined public mandate and act in terms of our overarching industrial policy and economic transformation objectives. We established a Presidential review committee recently to undertake this work.

We must also address the position of vulnerable workers, and other key areas that would strengthen both equity and growth.

Also critical is the need to strengthen social dialogue to ensure broad consensus on the key priorities. We also need to mobilise our people around core initiatives and identify what all of us can contribute to achieve the national vision founded on the broad mandate we received at Polokwane, and as directed by the ANC Manifesto.

Government alone will not achieve the new growth path. It requires the participation, effort and enthusiasm of all of us.

Government has been awaiting this NGC to take place, to be followed by a special Cabinet meeting that will discuss and finalise this growth path, given the importance and urgency for the country."

Overall however the actual commission dealing with economic resolutions was disappointing.

The commission was highly contested, went in all directions, and reflected contestations in the State and the ANC, which the COSATU August 2010 discussion document describes. The commission therefore contained both negative and positive strands. To the extent that the commission resolution pushed for fundamental transformation of the economy, however the resolution edited and presented in the plenary did a disservice to this progressive outlook. This appeared to be more like a function of the economic policy contestation that the COSATU CEC political paper is referring to, and narrowly concentrates on the debate around State ownership in one sector.

Nevertheless the NGC declaration attempted to broaden the focus. It "affirmed the Polokwane resolutions on Economic Transformation. It further endorsed the call in the Political report for an urgent discussion on the elements and details of a New Growth Path, and how it will sustain economic recovery and inclusive growth. Of particular importance is the decent work agenda in the context of placing our economy on to a new job creating and more equitable growth path".

Further, the NGC Declaration "reaffirms the ANC's approach that the transformation of the South African economy should always be holistic and comprehensive, covering all sectors of the economy. In this regard, the ANC should ensure greater state involvement and control of strategic sectors of the economy, such as mining, energy, the financial sector and others."

On nationalisation the NGC states: "There was greater consensus in the commission on the nationalisation of mines and other strategic sectors of the economy. The NGC therefore mandated the NEC to ensure that further work be done, including research, study tours and discussions, and to report to the Policy Conference for a decision at the National Conference in 2012."

At a time when we were pleading to raise concerns around government giving in to the agenda of capital and other interest groups mobilising against the introduction of the National Health Insurance, the NGC moved decisively to state that "the implementation of NHI should be fast-tracked, but done correctly within reasonable time frames.... The ANC must lead the implementation of the NHI and its promotion amongst the general populace" Adding that "The involvement and support of the Alliance is crucial."

The NGC also demanded that the Community Development Workers (CDW) be integrated into the public sector and be paid salaries not stipends. Further the NGC decided that the Home Based Care Workers (HBCW)/ Community Health Workers (CHW) should be paid stipends in time.

In our view, on the whole, the NGC constituted not only a defence of Polokwane but significant pro worker pro poor advances, although there remains some worrying elements. The overriding lesson we have however learnt throughout our 25 years of existence is that paper accepts anything written on it. Our challenge is to use a combination of strategies to continue to push for fundamental transformation.

The tensions in the Alliance are often not caused by policy differences but by a lack of political will by government to implement ANC and Alliance resolutions, including the manifesto. Overall the framework emerging from the NGC should end paralysis and bring the Alliance formations closer to one another. This will however depend on consistent and decisive leadership to take forward the clear, pro poor and working class policies that has emerged from the NGC.

4.10. Disagreements on the strategic political centre

A clear area of disappointment emerging from the NGC is resolutions on the Alliance. For the record COSATU has long said that the ANC leads the Alliance and that the Alliance as OR Tambo said is not an elite pact signed in conference tables but an organic and unique entity born out of struggle and cemented with the blood of our people. No one disputes this and COSATU fully agrees with this theoretical perspective too. We also agree that "each Alliance component enjoys political independence from one another"

The area where clearly we must have a serious discussion internally as the Federation, and with the Alliance components, is the insistence of the ANC that only the ANC is the strategic political centre of power. In our view it is a contradiction to say the ANC leads a revolutionary Alliance but the Alliance led by the ANC is not a strategic political centre.

COSATU 9th and 10th National Congresses have categorically stated that COSATU must insist that the Alliance as a whole, under the leadership of the ANC, be the strategic political centre.

It is clear from the NGC resolution that we have reached a stalemate on this matter and that positions have been entrenched in opposition to one another. This is what the Central Committee members and eventually the Congress must engage with.

As part of progressively finding a solution to unblock this stalemate, we must spell out what we mean by a strategic political centre. Our understanding and interpretation of the National Congress resolutions is that there should be a joint programme driven by Alliance leadership structures at all levels to mobilise our membership and society as a whole behind the demands of the Freedom Charter and for the implementation of the manifesto commitments; and that government must be strategically led to give effect to this.

The ANC-Ied alliance must drive transformation; government leaders and bureaucrats cannot continue to be the strategic centre of power, as they have been over the last 16 years. Further COSATU resolutions call for the creation of structures to facilitate greater levels of consultation between government and COSATU and an involvement in decision-making. At the political level COSATU calls for direct representation in the ANC deployment and other strategic committees so that workers are not left with the old feeling of being reduced to the metaphorical ‘hunter dog', whose usefulness ends once it has used its energy to catch an animal.

Can we, using the 4t Central Committee paper on this matter, find an accommodation with the ANC? This should be a key area of discussion in this Central Committee and in the 2012 National Congress. On the other hand the SACP, judged by the remarks of its DGS in the bilateral meetings with COSATU seem to have altogether abandoned its call for a reconfigured Alliance. In fact in the presentation the DGS called on COSATU, crudely, to give up the fight. In the past, despite our positions not being identical, COSATU and the SACP were united on this matter. In moving forward this will clearly be a battle between COSATU and the ANC, with the possibility of the SACP either being passive or at worst joining the ANC.

We are aware that this debate falls into the hands of those with the agenda of either collapsing the Alliance by forcing a disagreement they calculate may force workers to walkout; or who want to use this debate to cement practices of the past that seek to marginalise both COSATU and the SACP and minimise the influence of workers and the poor.

The remnants of the 1996 class project unites with the new tendency when they talk about the ANC being the strategic centre, meaning that outside election campaigns there should be no programme, no consultations on any matter (as they read any form of consultation as giving too much to COSATU and communists); and they want to continue to place all faith in government leaders and technocrats to take the key decisions.

A deeper analysis of the ANC official response to the COSATU discussion paper, regrettably indicates a trend in favour of this approach. For example, the President's political report to the NGC where he says "We must emphasise as well that the Alliance is not based on conformity and monolithic interpretation of events" seems to be aimed at the COSATU claim that there was an agreement in the May 2008 Alliance Summit (in black and white that the Alliance as a whole is a strategic political centre).

Further, the ANC categorically stated that the government will only implement ANC policies, specifically responding to COSATU's demand that the government must implement Alliance policies agreed to in Alliance meetings. To us this represents the biggest problem, because if taken to the extreme this position says that there is no need to find any accommodation with COSATU and therefore there should be no Alliance Summits, no Alliance Economic Summits since these do not matter - what matters is what the ANC has decided. This interpretation of the ANC leadership role and on the strategic centre spells a disaster for the future of the Alliance.

We warned that if the ANC and COSATU were to come to the next Alliance Summit only to quote and reiterate their respective National Congress resolutions it would mean a stalemate is maintained with the risk of an implosion. That is why we need a more flexible approach that won't mean COSATU members or ANC members are told to go jump in the pool.

4.11. Battle against corruption

The ANC NGC also made a welcoming, strong commitment to lead a campaign against corruption, and that it would set up an internal structure called the Integrity Committee to enforce high moral standards amongst members and leaders. However this is too much of an internal focus. If there were a criticism of the ANC NGC it would be its failure to articulate a clear and systematic programme to lead society in a battle against corruption in the private sector, public sector and within our organisations.

4.12. Handling the differences or different nuances on nationalisation between COSATU and the SACP

In the previous CEC we have pointed out that there were differences that emerged between COSATU and the SACP on the nationalisation debate. COSATU had felt that the approach adopted by the SACP leadership in particular in the highly publicised public war of words with the leadership of the ANCYL emboldened the demagogues who attacked the SACP and sought to paint a picture of a compromised SACP.

We discussed this matter with the SACP as reflected earlier. Nevertheless during the debates in the commissions these seemingly unresolved, subtle differences imploded. As reported earlier, there were subtle differences internally, with the NUM arguing that nationalisation has already happened through the Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act which empowers the government to own the rights to mineral deposits and also draw revenue from mining operations.

What is COSATU's policy on nationalisation?

Historically COSATU, which regards the Freedom Charter as a minimum programme that unites the Alliance, has positioned itself in strong support for the clause that says:

"The national wealth of our country, the heritage of South Africans, shall be restored to the people; The mineral wealth beneath the soil, the Banks and monopoly industry shall be transferred to the ownership of the people as a whole; All other industry and trade shall be controlled to assist the wellbeing of the people; All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and to enter all trades, crafts and professions."

That remains the position of the Federation. It has not changed. We are strong proponents of this clause of the Freedom Charter and this places us firmly on the side of the debate that would support nationalisation of mines, the banks and monopoly industry. Nationalisation means transferring ownership to the people as a whole with the State representing the people in this instance.

The question the debate has opened however is both practical and political. Practical as the mines are now mainly in the hands of monopoly capital. Does this suggest that the State must confiscate of all mines through legislation or must we pay compensation to the owners at market prices?

Owning a State company to invest in the mines is not nationalisation as envisaged by the Freedom Charter. Setting up a State company talks more to an active State that plays a direct role in the mining industry with the sole purpose of accessing resources for other State activities such as meeting the basic needs of the people.

Because of the evolving debate COSATU was caught up between these trends. We supported but insisted on a broadened nationalisation debate. In our growth path document we talk about further debate and research for a State company. Our position is closer to the ANC NGC resolution, despite our concerns about the one-sided focus of discussions, and hidden political and economic agendas.

The CEC has since discussed this matter and resolved that:

1. COSATU is united in its demand for nationalisation as reflected in the Freedom Charter.

2. The Minerals, Petroleum and Resources Development Act, places ownership of all minerals resources in the people. All mining companies are obliged to apply and pay fees for licences to mine these mineral resources.

3. Nationalisation means that the State, acting on behalf of all citizens, will take over companies and their resources and transfer them to the people. This has not happened. The creation of a government mining company and the Minerals, Petroleum and Resources Development Act whilst representing advances, do not equal nationalisation.

4.13. ANC NEC Lekgotla, January 2011

Following the President's release of a very progressive January 8th statement for 2011, COSATU was invited to attend theANC NEC Lekgotla from the 13-14 January, to feed into the government's annual planning Lekgotla, taking place the following week. At a policy level, the Lekgotla largely took forward the approach of the NGC on most issues, although the economic transformation debate focused mainly on the National Growth Path (which had not been released by the time of the NGC).

On the issue of jobs, the NEC Lekgotla identified a number of practical interventions which government needed to make, particularly relating to shifts in government policies, legislation and regulations, which could play an important role in leveraging greater employment creation, and decent work. These include, but are not limited to:

• Finalising the revised Procurement Regulations aimed at leveraging local procurement
• Finalising the Minerals Beneficiation Strategy
• Agreement on viable options to address the overvalued currency
• The future direction of SADC regional integration
• Strengthening the support framework for Coops, including establishment of a dedicated institutional framework for the promotion of Coops
• Strengthening the support framework for SMME5
• Aligning the BBEEE policy and the Codes of Good BEE Practice more strongly with the New Growth Path
• Legislative initiatives to transform the labour market (Employment Services; Employment Equity, Basic Conditions of Employment). This will also include addressing the issue of labour brokers
• Finalisation of the Integrated Resource Plan2
  Exploring scope for local production into the renewable programmes (wind, solar) as well as nuclear
• Mainstreaming youth development in public sector programmes and investment

On the New Growth Path, COSATU raised a host of concerns, which were discussed in the Commission dedicated to this issue. In response to the issues raised by COSATU, as well as other delegates, the Commission agreed to propose a process, aimed at taking the areas of agreement forward, while at the same time ensuring an Alliance engagement on the major policy issues where agreement had not as yet been reached. The following was agreed:

"The NGP will be further enriched in further engagement in the ANC and in Alliance Structures on the following areas:

While the resolution of the Lekgotla on this matter was progressive, if implemented, there is a concern that this is simply delaying resolution of the identified issues, in a way, which is likely to lead to conflict down the line. This assessment is based, firstly on the fact that not a single Alliance task team, which had been delegated to deal with similar disagreements on economic issues over the last decade, has met, let alone concluded agreements, despite this being mandated by the constitutional structures of the Alliance. It has been the classic case of ‘death by task team'.

Secondly, after the NEC Lekgotla, resistance is already emerging to the implementation of this agreement. The element of the draft Alliance POA dealing with this matter, when presented to the ANC NEC, was deleted from the document, despite the fact that it was simply presenting the recommendations of the ANC's own Lekgotla. This is a serious cause for concern and rings alarm bells for the process of discussing the NGP moving forward (see below). We therefore need to open up the space for meaningful debate on the core issues of economic transformation, in particular the issues of macro economic policy.

On a range of other issues, however, such as health, rural development, education, the Alliance seems to be converging in many respects.

4.14. 2011 Alliance Summit

The Alliance Summit took place on the 24 and 25 February 2011. In general, preparation for the Alliance Summit was far better, following months of meetings wherein a joint draft programme of action was prepared. The programme had been circulated to all components of the Alliance prior to the Summit, with each one taking time to identify gaps and weaknesses.

We mainly sought to develop a programme that could help the Alliance mobilise the base to take forward the five manifesto priorities and other programmes by engaging the masses pro actively. In addition we sought to clarify a number of conceptual areas that in the past have caused uneasiness and difficulties.

These conceptual areas included clarifying the nature of the national democratic revolution; what it seeks to achieve, the nature of the Alliance we have, the structures for coordination, its principles and a morality platform, among other issues.

Better preparations and greater earlier involvement of all components set the stage for a more conducive but robust debate on all these issues. At the end we adopted an Alliance programme of action that every component could live with.

In summary, the Alliance programme contains the following elements:

1. All components of the Alliance are mandated to build a strong vibrant Alliance that pursues the national democratic revolution that seeks to liberate black people in general and African people in particular. The NDR seeks to address three contradictions: oppression of the black majority, super exploitation of the working class and the triple oppression faced by women. The NDR seeks to build a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa guided by the demands of the Freedom Charter.

2. The Alliance is a strategic and not a tactical alliance. It's an alliance of three independent organisations with a close and historic relationship with SANCO. It is a multi class alliance that seeks to unite the broadest possible sections of society behind the goals of the NDR. The Alliance is led by the ANC, which is the centre of power from which government programmes shall emerge. However, there is still no agreement on the fact that this strategic alliance is also a strategic political centre whose agreed programmes and policy should inform government.

3. The coordinating structures agreed to in Ekurhuleni II and I were re-endorsed but will be realigned to today's reality.

4. Our revolutionary morality amongst others are a steadfast adherence to the interests of the people, unity, selflessness, sacrifice, collective leadership, humility, honesty, discipline, hard work, internal debate, constructive criticism and self-criticism and mutual respect.

5. A commitment to fight corruption together and expose all those involved irrespective of their positions.

6. We affirmed that "since 1994 the balance of forces has shifted in favour of the forces of change." The balance of forces continues to shift depending on the conscious action by the advanced sections of society. Globalisation imposes challenges and constraints on the democratic movement, including limiting the sovereignty of state. But these are not insurmountable and require intelligent strategy to manage rather than conceding without a fight. Neo-liberalism has suffered a major crisis of legitimacy since the 1997 Asian Crisis.

7. The programme will include building our organisations, mobilising our base around the five manifesto priorities and other programmes to advance our strategic objectives including leading international solidarity campaigns.

There was a lively, robust but constructive engagement on the issue of the Alliance being a strategic political centre. The ANC insists that there can be no two centres of power and that only the ANC is a centre of power. COSATU insists it is contradictory to say the Alliance is a strategic alliance but is not a centre of political power. It was agreed that the Alliance Secretariat should take forward the discussion based on answering the question on what each component means. What does the ANC mean when it says it is the centre of power and what does it fear in agreeing that the Alliance as a whole is a strategic political centre? Equally COSATU must explain what it means and what it fears.

A major concern was the mass ‘stay away' from the summit by the ANC NEC. We estimated that it was represented by a third of the NEC. We fear that some would have deliberately stayed away so that they can undermine every area of agreement in the next meeting of the NEC.

4.15. Summary of the state of the Alliance at provincial and local level

The provincial reports indicate with important variances, that the Alliance largely has not functioned ideally in any province. In a few of the cases there is open hostility between Alliance formations.

In some cases the reasons behind failure to have a coherent programme based on unity of purpose is the existence of divisions and ever-existing succession debates in the ANC. Most worryingly the provincial reports indicate that the SACP is being weakened by its deployment in particular of the provincial secretaries to the provincial legislatures. The provinces report of the absence of the SACP in many working class battles and in some cases the SACP only become active when deployment is on the table.

Reports also indicate that in some provinces, the new class of tenderpreneurs is actively positioning itself to win forthcoming regional and provincial conferences as a stepping stone for 2012. In fact one of the reasons for the problems with the list process to nominate candidates in the local government elections were these factional battles for 2012.

COSATU must pursue class principle at the provincial level and not allow itself to be swallowed by narrow factions. Inevitably if we get drawn into factional battles, end up support a lesser devil instead of pursuing a class based agenda. This however is not a statement that should be understood to advocate neutrality at all cost. The only way we can be a serious motive force is when we dirty our hands and not stand outside positioning ourselves as purists.

5. The NDR, Socialism and Building the South African Communist Party

We need to continue working with the SACP to build a platform on the struggle for Socialism. We must clarify both theoretically and programmatically what this means, and take forward the discussion document on the NDR and Socialism, which we debated at the 2007 COSATU Central Committee as well as in the 10th National Congress in 2009. Our response can't be the same as that of the ultra left that says forget about conditions today - "storm the Bastille".

In our last congress we theorised the relationship between the NDR and the struggle for Socialism. In brief we believe that the NDR is the most direct route to Socialism, meaning that a successful NDR holds the possibility for a socialist future. But the current trajectory of the NDR is moving us further away from Socialism, not closer. Our assessment is that the NDR is at a crossroads itself, and therefore all socialists need to contest the direction of this NDR, if we are to advance the prospects for Socialism. But we need a coherent programme to take the connections between these two struggles forward. In order for this to happen effectively, the SACP needs to occupy its leadership role in the struggle for Socialism.

The post-Polokwane situation, and in particular the period since the May 2009 elections has thrown up particular challenges for the SACP, which threaten to undermine the Party's effectiveness, in particular the deployment of its leading office bearers into government. The September 2010 CEC Discussion document "The Alliance at a crossroads", clearly spells out the problem:

while the SACP's membership has grown to a significant 109 000, it has challenges in reaching its full potential. Increasingly the SA CP is unable to play its proper role. It is in danger of becoming more and more invisible, given the full-time role of its office bearers in government and in the ANC. This equally makes it difficult for the Federation to take forward its Congress Resolution on Socialism, as its key partner is hobbled. Further, the SACP's cautious approach has in some cases been seen as a move towards conservatism and defensiveness. Its initial approach to the nationalisation debate has emboldened demagogues in the ANCYL to use radical populist rhetoric, to disguise a right wing agenda of accumulation, and anti working class politics. The SACP needs to re-establish its focus, and ensure that it has full time leadership whose primary commitment is to driving the organisation forward, at national and provincial level. It needs to ensure capacity, visibility, and ideological clarity."

Concerns raised by COSATU about this situation have led to some tensions with our ally. The November 2010 CEC in considering this issue stated:

"It would be an exaggeration to suggest that all our problems that have caused uneasiness have been resolved. Both COSATU and the SACP have the responsibility to act decisively to close the gaps and ensure that maximum unity exist ... The biggest loser in the deterioration of the relationship between COSATU and the SA CP is going to be the working class and the struggle for socialism."

In the past the CEC has expressed the view that the SACP General Secretary must return to the SACP Head Quarters and lead the party on a full time basis so that it can confront the challenges facing the working class. The CEC reiterated that view. It was emphasised that this was a plea and not a command!

One of the key areas debated in the August 2010 CEC is the SACP's seemingly increasing conservative approach on challenges facing society. This was informed inter alia by the SACP response to the 2010 State of the Nation address and the 2010/11-budget speech. Again the SACP and COSATU took different postures to the New Growth Path. Whilst COSATU was has been largely critical, the SACP has mainly welcomed and supported almost everything coming from the State.

Contradictory approaches have also been taken by COSATU and the SACP on the SABC, where we have worked closely with the Save SABC coalition with other civil society formations, which has generally been critical of the role played by the SABC chairperson, Dr Ben Ngubane and the interference in some matters by the previous Minister, General Siphiwe Nyanda. The SACP, through the Deputy General Secretary, has also chosen to publicly critique COSATU's role in convening the civil society conference in October 2010, on the basis that COSATU is playing into a conservative agenda, as well as rejecting COSATU's criticisms of the New Growth Path. Regrettably all of these differences feed into a view that COSATU and the SACP leadership no longer enjoy a very close relationship, and differ on increasing number of critical areas of transformation.

In recent period, these organisational differences have been reduced into the persons of the General Secretary of COSATU and the SACP. This is a complete diversion! The differences are not personal but organisational involve important principles. Both COSATU and the SACP have the responsibility to act against any escalation of this perception.

At the level of organisation, reports from virtually all the provinces suggest that the SACP is facing serious problems, that the concerns raised about their relationship with governance are real, and that divisions are beginning to emerge which needs to be given serious attention. We need to raise our concerns with the Party leadership in a corn radely but open way.

The coherence and vibrancy of the YCL must also be addressed. Factional conduct, and high handed treatment of members will have long term negative effects, if not arrested.

We cannot overemphasize the need for COSATU to keep the relationship with the SACP strong and vibrant. The SACP is the long-term political insurance of workers. Our relationship with the SACP literally saved the day during the trying days of the Alliance. But it would be a mistake to take this relationship for granted. It needs to be serviced and we must continue to support the SACP politically, and it must rely on organised workers for material assistance and not on BEE or even white capital.

COSATU is aware of the link between the situation facing many in the SACP leadership and the unavailability of resources to pay full time elected office bearers. The organised working class has not adequately played their role in supporting a viable and truly independent working class party capable of being a vanguard for a struggle for socialism.

The November 2010 CEC, having received a report on the successful bilateral meeting with the SACP in September, raised these concerns as expressed above, but also agreed on a detailed programme to build a joint platform with the Party. This would include the following:

a) Develop terms of reference for a programme towards Socialism,
b) Develop a brief document reflecting on the theoretical discussions that took place during the meeting, which can inform future engagements.
c) Convene a meeting of the Socialist bloc in South Africa and in Africa
d) Ensure synergy between our programmes including taking forward the process of a daily newspaper and mass political education programme targeting the youth! young workers.
e) Develop a plan towards a joint Organisational Development programme whose outcome will lay down a clear process of assessment and evaluation of our programmes and effective accountability mechanism.
f) Provide an outline of the resources that will be required to support the SACP and a plan to mobilize those resources.
g) Develop an approach on how we should defend the progressive strand in ANC policy and its continued bias towards the working class.
h) Consciously build the unity of the Alliance on the ground around the vision of the freedom charter and a programme to drive the five priorities.
i) Articulate a vision that will draw the broadest section of people, particularly the middle strata. The vision should demonstrate that there is a common cause between the working class and the black middle strata and to an extent the emerging black bourgeoisie to fight for the radical transformation of our society.
j) This can take the form of campaigns like the financial sector campaign, agrarian reforms and breaking the stranglehold of white monopoly capital.
k) Ensure that the SACP-COSATU bilateral meetings are also convened at a provincial level to pursue working class driven programmes.

Lastly it is clear that COSATU in the forthcoming Central Committee and congress must confront the issue of resources. The SACP is struggling and requires an intervention by those who believe in it playing a vanguard role for the struggle for Socialism. COSATU affiliates must look at different formulae that can address this challenge.

The current formula is that COSATU pays a political levy that is divided into funding the May Day activities, SACP, Chris Hani Institute, SASCO and COSAS. Secondly the SACP have bilateral agreements with some affiliates where they fund specific programmes and projects including in the past some full time staff positions.

Discussion Point: Does this constitute an adequate basis for a joint platform with the SACP? Further, how do we ensure the Party is properly resourced and capacitated, and that deployment of Party cadres into various centres of power doesn't compromise the effectiveness of the SACP?

6. ANC Youth League

COSATU's November 2009 political assessment reflected on the deterioration in our relationship with the ANCYL.

Our relationship with the ANCYL has become more complicated. This is caused by the public engagement strategy. We clashed with them badly when they understood us to be entering an internal succession debate following the May 2009 CEC. In 2009 the ANCYL launched a venomous attack on the NUM following a disagreement on the ESKOM leadership crises.

Despite the ANCYL's political inconsistency, such as support for huge salaries and bonuses to leaders of the state owned enterprises the youth league on many other policy questions remain our allies. This includes their stance on labour brokering, nationalisation, rejection of the youth wage subsidy, strong support for the progressive elements of the Polokwane resolutions, the manifesto, etc.

It would a be mistake to allow a cooling-off of our relationship with the ANCYL, because its leaders still have to master the art of managing disagreements at the public level. COSATU has always enjoyed a special relationship with the young lions. The worker-youth and the worker-student alliance is the most potent weapon whose history began in the 1 940s after the formation of the ANCYL. Naturally one of the issues that have brought workers and the youth closer to one another is high degree of militancy and intolerance with the slow pace of change. This is so precisely because both groupings are on the receiving end of unemployment, poverty, casualisation, labour brokering and HIV/AIDS, and therefore represent the most marginalised in society.

The concern raised by many though is that in recent times the generation of ANCYL leaders appeared to have been vulnerable to influence through patronage that has succeeded to corrupt some of its leaders. Many have spoken of ‘Kebbleism' in the past and tenderpreneurship today involving some of the leaders of the ANCYL.

How should we respond to this phenomenon? In answering this question we must avoid two extremes. Firstly we cannot afford to paint every ANCYL leader with the same brush and label them tenderpreneurs. This is not true. We cannot because we are concerned about the influence of those who may be genuine tenderpreneurs hell bent on hijacking the ANC to accumulate at the personal level then take a posture that all of the ANCYL programmes must not be supported no matter the merits and the correctness of the programme they drive.

Secondly we cannot close our eyes to the reality that some within the ANCYL are driving an opportunistic programme devoid of any principle aimed at presenting themselves as custodians of the correct congress line and not to reposition the ANC to deepen change but as a way of winning unsuspecting and politically immature constituencies for accumulation and tenderpreneurship agendas.

7. Engaging with Government Departments

In line with our overall strategy of not putting all our eggs in the Alliance basket, we have ensured that we build stronger and privileged relationships with departments that will play a critical role in the decent work agenda. We know that if we have a good relationship with most of the Cabinet ministers this means we also have good relationships with a sizeable number of ANC NEC members.

There is no doubt that the relationship with government departments have improved as a result of the 2007 change of political scenery. We have scaled up our interaction and engagement with various government departments. In the main we have used the platform of the CEC to open up space for a more detailed interaction between the government departments and COSATU and her affiliates. We have not relied solely on the CEC but work and engage comrades in between the CEC.

COSATU has identified 16 strategic departments that in our view will drive the agenda of decent work. This engagement is aimed at ensuring COSATU systematically supports government programmes, which are aimed at advancing the Polokwane mandate.

Following are some of the key engagements we have had:

1. Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, Sicelo Shiceka on the challenge of transforming local government. We did not sustain this interaction with the Minister.

2. Minister of Trade and Industry, Dr Rob Davies on the government Industrial Action Plan (IPAP2) - this relationship has been sustained and involves getting COSATU affiliates to provide support and to ensuring effective implementation of IPAP2.

3. Minister for Basic Education, Angie Motshekga and COSATU have interacted on the 10 point plan of the department and have developed a framework for a joint campaign to ensure our schools function with more effective support from the department, parents, teachers and students. This campaign remains at the conceptual level and has still to see practical expression.

4. Minister of Health, Dr Aaron Motsoeledi, he has already addressed the CEC three times and is also addressing the Central Committee. We have developed a conceptual campaign to support in particular the department 10-point plan, but we must move beyond conceptual support to effective support on the ground if we are to succeed to turn our health crisis around.

5. Minister of Higher Education, Dr Blade Nzimande - this relationship must be sustained to ensure that workers reskilling and training continues to receive top priority.

6. Minister responsible for Performance and Evaluation, Collins Chabane - more issues remain outstanding in particular the disclosure of the performance agreements between ministers and the President

7. Minister of Labour, Mildred Oliphant. This interaction is continuing based on the current labour law amendments debates.

8. Minister of Economic Development, Ebrahim Patel, this relationship has focused on the government New Growth Path and is continuing.

9. Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa. We must still ensure that our support for crime prevention goes beyond statements but includes setting up street committees in the working class residential areas to combat crime. POPCRU is mandated by the CEC to take up militarisation of the police with the Minister.

10. Minister of Home Affairs, Dr Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma. We have developed this relationship further through joint workshops but we must still get an active campaign to change work ethos of our members in the home affairs department.

11. Minister for State Security, Siyabonga Cwele mainly on the protection of information Bill.

12. Minister for Public Administration, Richard Baloyi. We have produced a document on a campaign to take forward the congress resolutions on mobilising our members and public servants to change the culture and develop a new ethos based on understanding that the public sector services the poor and the working class who don't have resources to source private services including on health, education, safety, etc.

13. Minister of Agriculture, Tina Joemat Petersen. We have convened farm workers summits in all provinces as well as nationally. But we still have to systematically implement the need to ensure organising farm workers and improving government capacity to protect them.

14. Minister for Rural Development, Gugile Nkwinti, on the rural development green paper.

15. Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, on budget issues.

16. Minister for water and forestry, Edna Molewa mainly on the preparations for the forthcoming COP 17 meeting

Outstanding departments we must still interact with are Human Settlements, Energy, Transport, Justice and Constitutional Development, Women, Youth, Children and People and Social Development.

8. Institutionalising Working Class Power - The Mandate on Reconfiguring the Alliance, the Pact, and Leadership

The mandate of COSATU's 4th Central Committee, and 0 National Congress, on the Alliance and governance is clear:

1. The Alliance should function as a strategic political centre, to drive governance and social transformation.

2. The political and policy programme should be based on a formally agreed Alliance Pact.

3. Mechanisms should be put in place to ensure a representative and progressive leadership.

4. Mechanisms should be agreed to ensure that the alliance strategically deployes cadres into key institutions of state and society.

The Central Committee should make an assessment of the current developments in these four areas, and decide on the way forward. The discussion that follows attempts to capture some of the key questions confronting us in relation to the four areas listed above.

The ANC and the Alliance has been systematically marginalised from decision making in relation to key policy questions, particularly since 1996, leading to unaccountable governance in the hands of technocrats and a conservative political clique. All Alliance partners agree this needs to change fundamentally.

This was in essence agreed at the Alliance Summit in May 2008. However, this agreement was subsequently reversed in the November 2009 Alliance Summit. In a CEC assessment in November 2009, we stated: "It is clear that there is a body in the ANC that is no longer comfortable with the Alliance being a strategic political centre. We are saying so because in the May 2008 Alliance Summit, perhaps fresh from Polokwane and overwhelmed by the spirit of wanting to give so many things to COSATU and the Alliance (pay back) this matter of the ANC led Alliance as a strategic political centre was easy to swallow. But now, after the elections and the memories of Polokwane starting to fade, coupled with the feelings of communist and COSATU dominance, a new tendency seeks to drive the ANC back to conservatism."2

Our demand for the reconfigured Alliance relations and insistence that the Alliance should be a strategic political centre, seeks to ensure that working class power and influence is institutionalised.

The post-Polokwane situation has seen real change in some respects, particularly in terms of policy shifts at the level of the ANC. There has been marked improvement, at the level of governance, to consult and take the Federation's leadership into confidence on major issues such as cabinet deployments and to a degree the introduction of the New Growth Path. Having said that, there have been recent developments which suggest that the culture of government unilateralism remains alive, which led the February 2011 CEC to raise serious concerns about the continuing trend to marginalise the Federation and its affiliates.

Examples of signs that we may be returning back to unilateralism include:

1. Appointment of the SAA Board
2. Appointment of the SAA CEO
3. Appointment of the Telkom CEO
4. Appointment of the Transnet Board
5. Appointment of the Transnet CEO
6. Appointment of the chairperson of Telkom
7. Announcement that hundreds of billions will be spent on speed trains between Durban and Johannesburg whilst workers have no reliable, cheap and accessible public transport to move from their ghettos to work
8. Installation of electronic toll gates all over Gauteng which in time will be the case everywhere in the country
9. The state mining company was recently launched without informing the federation and the NUM

We know that the above deployments were not presented to the ANC deployment committee. In these cases, both COSATU and the ANC, the so called sole political centre of power, had been marginalised.

It is important to note that during the era of the previous Minister of Public Enterprises, Barbara Hogan, nothing could happen in any state owned company without consultation. Now that a "left wing sympathiser" has been deployed we see the 1996 class project style of marginalisation of unions.

The reality we face is outside cabinet appointments where the working class has had little influence. We are therefore seeing:

• Governance continuing to be unaccountable to the ANC and the Alliance (although it is now subject to greater contestation, within the State);
• A grouping in the ANC continuing to block transformation of the Alliance and its relationship to the ANC and governance

A key theme in all the discussion documents of the Federation is how to address the challenge of institutionalising the power of the working class through a structured relationship in the Alliance, and between the Alliance and government. The interventions which have been attempted to achieve this have at best only been partially achieved; at worst, they have failed.

In the absence of this institutionalised relationship, the Alliance and the relationship of the organised working class to the ANC and government, has lurched from periods of crisis, to temporary honeymoon periods, only to lurch back into crisis again.

It will be the argument of this political report that this pattern of crisis-‘agreement'-crisis- will continue to repeat itself, until a fundamentally new relationship is institutionalised.

Complicating this further, is the fact that the class basis of the ANC and the State has become highly contested, given the rise of a grouping which is opposed, as a matter of self-interest, to the creation of such a reconfigured relationship of political power, in which the working class plays a key leadership role, in and outside the ANC, and the State.

COSATU discussions on the political situation have repeated similar themes over the years:

• It is in the interests of workers to make our Alliance effective;
• However, the Alliance is not succeeding adequately in advancing a progressive agenda, because of obstacles being placed in its way. The recent agreement on a programme of action has a potential to change this but it remains to be seen if we will succeed;
• A conservative clique in the movement has sidelined the ANC and the Alliance and used its access to power to advance a particular agenda;
• Therefore we need a combination of approaches, including the contestation of multiple sites of power and mobilisation of the working class, but ultimately we have to achieve a reconfiguration of the Alliance and its relationship to governance (the ‘political centre'); negotiation of an Alliance Pact; an accountable and representative leadership; and strategic deployment into key institutions of the State and society.

Discussion Point: We must make a total assessment based on the objectives of our 2015 plan. In summary, we have not won the demand that the Alliance be a political centre, we have not won the demand that the Alliance must develop a strategic Pact that will insitutionalise working class power. The jury is out on whether the recent agreement on the programme of action will necessarily transform the relationships to meet our demands. We continue to experience the problem of agreed ANC and Alliance positions not being implemented by government. The 4" CC discussion document on the Alliance Pact proposed the need for a Protocol to govern the Alliance's interaction with government. Should the drafting of this protocol be the function of the existing Alliance ‘Political Centre' (ie the Alliance NOB's)? It also mooted the creation of a COSATUP residency channel (as in Norway), which would meet on a regular basis. Should we pursue this as an alternative, or do we need to continue to pursue a combination of both?

8.1. Leadership

The discussion paper on the Leadership Challenge (see attached extract) tabled at the 4th COSATU Central Committee in 2007 proposed that mechanisms should be considered to ensure progressive and representative leadership of our organisations. It was specifically aimed at ensuring a progressive leadership collective was put in place at the Polokwane Conference. It proposed five criteria for election of leadership (commitment to the radical NDR; proven commitment to the Alliance; commitment to unity of the ANC and the democratic movement; commitment to make this decade a decade of workers and the poor; and internationalism).

It also proposed a framework to ensure working class leadership, given that "the working class has been displaced in the leading structures of the ANC"; and a limit on the representation of certain interest groups, particularly cabinet members and big business. It proposed the need to consider extending the quota system, currently applied to women, to the question of working class leadership (see attached extract). Other alternatives were to have a bloc of seats allocated to COSATU leadership; or to have the entire leadership collective be subjected by the ANC structures to a process of reflecting on the representivity of leadership of the relevant structures in the event these options were not followed at Polokwane, with the resultant problems as outlined above.

We have to recognise:

• It was a mistake to focus on the top 6 and leave the rest of the NEC members for others to decide on.
• Regardless of mistakes committed, the primary targets of the new class project has become the ANC President and Secretary General. Currently the only people running a campaign for the removal of the two are the elements of the new class of tenderpreneurs. If they succeed in this campaign, the ANC as we have known it will be history. Our country we love so much will go straight down the direction of a banana republic. The current challenge of corruption will be institutionalised with a risk that the very country will be sold to the highest bidder. Anything which is done by these comrades or ourselves to deepen their vulnerability to attack must be avoided. This does not mean that they are above criticism, or can act outside the mandate. Issues must be raised in a principled way, and we must not be seen to defend individuals, above principles, and COSATU policies. At times this strategy we have followed seems impracticable because of the extent of their mistakes.

The CEC in the recent times has been debating this complex political situation we face.

In debating let this Central Committee be inspired by the everlasting words of chairman Mao Tse Tung written on the 7 September, 1937 on the manifestations of liberalism, he said:

"To let things slide for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has clearly gone wrong, and refrain from principled argument because he is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, a schoolmate, a close friend, a loved one, an old colleague or old subordinate. Or to touch on the matter lightly instead of going into it thoroughly, so as to keep on good terms. The result is that both the organization and the individual are harmed. This is one type of liberalism.

To indulge in irresponsible criticism in private instead of actively putting fo,ward one's suggestions to the organization. To say nothing to people to their faces but to gossip behind their backs, or to say nothing at a meeting but to gossip afterwards. To show no regard at all for the principles of collective life but to follow one's own inclination. This is a second type.
To let things drift if they do not affect one personally; to say as little as possible while knowing perfectly well what is wrong, to be worldly wise and play safe and seek only to avoid blame. This is a third type."

Lenin takes this question further when he said "Organisation not based on principle is meaningless, and in practice converts the workers into a miserable appendage of the bourgeoisie in power"

When all is done and said, let history not judge COSATU to have converted workers into a miserable appendage of the bourgeoisie in power.

The new class of tenderpreneurs, if they are not able to remove the President at the 2012 Mangaung Conference, may try to retain him but surround him with a right wing NEC, to corrode his political support base, withdraw support on strategic issues, and ultimately pull the carpet from under his feet.

Discussion Point: For various reasons, COSATU focused mainly on supporting (successfully) the slate for the top 6 officials at Polokwane. Attempts to lobby for a working class led ANC NEC have not been successful. Is it time for COSATU to formally introduce the proposal for a framework and criteria for election of leadership? If so, how should we approach the 2012 ANC Conference, and promote a NEC which is progressive in content, and representative in composition ? Further, given the shortcomings of the current ANC leadership, will COSATU be in a position to mobilise for their re-instatement?

8.2. Deployment

The Alliance is agreed in principle on the need for strategic deployments into key institutions of the State and society. Deployment has become a talking point in society for all the wrong reasons - either because of abuse, or because the wrong people are being deployed to positions, or because of the lack of intervention to ensure that key positions are occupied by people who are able to drive the necessary transformation. There is also the lack of an effective framework, and mechanism, to ensure accountability and performance of deployed cadres, despite repeated commitments to do so.

On paper, the Alliance partners have been included in deployment processes. However, this is ineffective in practice. Either partner is not consulted on key deployment decisions, or the ANC itself is not on top of key deployments, or rubberstamps proposals from the bureaucracy. Only recently the February COSATU CEC raised its concern that neither COSATU nor affiliates had been consulted on key appointments in Transnet, Telkom, and SAA. During the transition before the elections in 2009, attempts by the Alliance transition team to engage on appointments were ignored, and the outgoing Cabinet, despite the commitment made to consult, unilaterally made key appointments, including that of DG's.

Discussion point: Should COSATU propose a framework for deployment, possibly as part of the governance protocol, for adoption by the Alliance, to combat abuse, identify key strategic posts which require attention, and mechanisms to ensure accountability of deployees?

8.3. What if we deadlock on this mandate?

Our departure point in assessing this mandate, must be that significant progress has been made since the 4th Central Committee in 2007, in certain respects in taking forward COSATU's agenda: the Polokwane breakthrough; the adoption of a pro-worker policy agenda in the Manifesto; some advances in the state including acceptance of the need for a new development strategy, and tabling of the NGP and IPAP2; significant advances on the agenda to tackle the 5 priority areas of health, education, rural development, crime and corruption, and decent work, despite many problem areas.

Therefore, failure to achieve all four mandates outlined above won't necessarily mean that the working class is unable to make decisive advances in the strategic areas we have identified. The most stubborn area of disagreement with the ANC appears to be on COSATU's demand for an Alliance Pact. If we are able to make significant progress on the political centre! protocol for governance issue, but are unable to win agreement on the Alliance Pact, there may be sufficient agreement on the policy priorities (given the range of issues on which we already agree), to ensure that the Alliance drives a progressive policy agenda, and ensures that government is held accountable to this agenda. In other words, the key issue may not be so much the policy agenda, where there are large areas of agreement, but a mechanism (such as the Protocol) to ensure that agreed areas are implemented, rather than ignored by government. While not ideal, the achievement of the political centre/ protocol may mean that the failure to secure a Pact, under these conditions, is not fatal for the Alliance, or a progressive agenda. The Protocol would also need to include an agreed approach to deployment, as this directly relates to ensuring that the Alliance acts as a political centre. Progress on the political centre/ protocol has the potential to unlock many of the current problems in the Alliance. The key problem it doesn't resolve is continuing disagreement on macro economic policy.

The 2009 ANC Manifesto makes a clear statement on this matter: "Fiscal and monetary policy mandates including management of interest rates and exchange rates, need to actively promote creation of decent employment, economic growth, broad-based industrialisation, reduced income inequality and other developmental imperatives." However, while the Alliance is in agreement on paper, including at the 2008 Economic Summit, a conservative macro economic policy agenda continues to be dictated from within the State. This is a matter, which requires political resolution. Advance on the protocol could assist this, because it would require answers as to why ANC and Alliance mandates are not being implemented by government.

8.4. The question of leadership

A fundamental political challenge confronting COSATU and this Central Committee, is what the Federation should do to break the pattern of zigzagging in the State and the Alliance, to advance a coherent, and consistent, political agenda which meets the key challenges confronting the working class, and broader society. The countervailing agenda of conservative bureaucracies in government, and elements in Cabinet, representing various types of capital in the state, can only be countered by a strong Alliance, progressive ANC and mobilised working class. Reliance on the President to resolve this contestation in the State in favour of the working class ends up in unfairly and unwisely placing too much responsibility, and too much faith in one individual, who is himself subject to all types of contradictory pulls. The same applies to relying too much on individual Ministers.

An important question then, is how to deal with the failure of the current ANC leadership to comprehensively take forward the Polokwane mandate, or to exercise real political oversight over the democratic state. This cannot be explained simply as a failure of political will, or political neglect. COSATU and the SACP, and indeed the ANC's own major gatherings, such as the NGC, have put forward clear proposals as to how these key policy positions can be taken forward. But active opposition to this policy direction by a critical mass of leadership in the ANC, both in the NWC and the NEC, has at times paralysed the progressive core in the ANC leadership from moving forward.

Without crudely reducing everything to class, and material interests, a key reason for this occasional political paralysis must essentially be found in the class composition of many of the current ANC leadership, and the interests they are defending. Previous analyses by the Federation have shown that too many of the ANC leadership are either full time business people, or have significant business interests.

As we have pointed out this did not fundamentally change after the 52 national conference. The balance is largely comrades who are in government, or have recently been in government. While this is not in itself a problem, too many (but certainly not all) rely not only on remuneration from the State, but also have commercial interests. As we have shown, there are literally one or two working class or civil society leaders, who don't fall into one of these categories outlined above. Even though there are many people of integrity in the ANC leadership in all these three categories, this completely distorted leadership composition is a devastating situation for the movement. At the same time the post-Polokwane movement to give ‘power back to the branches'- while important, is not meaningful if key debates in key committees, continue to be dominated by technocrats and unaccountable leaders. Otherwise what happens is that the branches dictate policy direction in large conferences, such as Polokwane and the NGC, but the detailed policy decisions, in the ANC and government, are taken elsewhere. The most glaring current example of this is the imposition of the youth wage subsidy, a policy rejected by the ANC in its policy conference of 2007.

In this context, the need for a representative, and accountable, leadership becomes critical. The principle of representivity and working class leadership should not be controversial. However, it may be too optimistic to ask the current ANC leadership to support a framework for more representative leadership, if it is likely to mean their removal in 2012!

The ANC NEC decision to co-opt individuals shows there is some sensitivity to the problem of representivity. But COSATU's proposals on leadership (see above) have far-reaching implications for the current leadership collective. Nevertheless it would be important for the Federation to re-raise this matter in the wn-up to the 2012 Conference, given our experience since Polokwane, and to put a formal proposal on the table. The argument that this is interference in the internal affairs of an Alliance partner, while it may appear to hold water on the surface, doesn't bear scrutiny.

As the leader of the Alliance, and the NDR, the ANC has the responsibility to ensure that its own leadership is broadly representative of the constituency it represents, to ensure responsiveness, and legitimacy, particularly in the light of common perceptions about social distance of the leadership, and the view that its current composition is distorted far too strongly in favour of business people, and those in government.

COSATU will continue to raise this matter as a matter of principle. However, lack of proper organisation is undermining the Federations political leverage to achieve these objectives. Without sufficient organisational strength on the ground, we will not be taken seriously. Therefore, the only organisational guarantee is to implement the 2015 programme for working class leadership of the NDR. This means not only swelling the ranks of the ANC, but also developing a programme for clear working class leadership, and political consciousness amongst workers as to what this means.

Otherwise we will continue to experience the problem of worker activists being consumed by opportunistic and self-serving politics. It also requires a psychological shift to understand that ‘swelling the ranks' not only requires the majority of ANC members to be workers, as is currently the case, but also for workers to swell the ranks of leadership, and to rightfully earn and take up leadership positions at all levels of the organisation. As COSATU's post-Congress assessment in November 2009 stated: We must "not make a mistake of swelling the ranks with workers who have low political consciousness and who are generally politically unreliable. We have countless examples of worker leaders who once they join the ANC and government spend the rest of their lives not advancing the working class cause but trying to prove to all that they no longer have any connection with workers." The question that must be answered is how far we have succeeded in implementing the 2015 Plan, which is not just about building COSATU but also strengthening the ANC and SACP, building the Alliance, and building a developmental state.

Discussion Point: Are we on course to implement the 2015 plan? If not, how do we move forward? Why are trusted individuals being co-opted by forces hostile to the working class?

8.5. An honest assessment

As things stand, we are not making significant progress in any of the 4 areas outlined above- political centre; Alliance Pact; leadership; and deployment. If we fail to advance on at least some of these fronts, it will be impossible to make sustained progress, and the Alliance will be plunged into perpetual crisis management mode. This scenario will ultimately throw the very future of the Alliance into question, and therefore it is a scenario, which must be avoided at all costs. But to avoid this, we need to develop practical strategic alternatives to deal with the deadlock. To achieve this, it is proposed to put real political energy, in seeking to resolve in particular the matters of the political centre! governance protocol, and forward movement on the issue of leadership, to unlock the current impasse. We need to examine where COSATU has the most power to unlock progress, and use COSATU's leverage strategically.

Discussion point: Is the approach proposed above of shifting strategic focus to the area of the political centre and governance protocol, as well as the issue of leadership a basis for moving forward? Are we not opening ourselves to a counter attack on the issue of leadership, that we are now returning to the days of a quota because we are failing to get our members to be active in the ANC so that they can be elected in their own right as members of the ANC?

9. Mobilising Civil Society

Successive COSATU National Congresses have called on the Federation to work more closely with other civil society formations. Informed by this, COSATU convened two major civil society conferences to broaden its jobs and poverty campaign in recent years.

The August 2010 CEC adopted a programme, which said:

‘The COSATU post-World Cup Declaration is gaining broad support. We need to create a bigger profile for this, and convene a platform of organisations to focus on the issues raised in the Declaration. We can use this to unite South Africa around a positive campaign of social renewal".

This led to the Civil Society Conference on 27-28 October 2010. Close to 60 community based organisations, NGOs and the mass democratic movement, including SANCO, attended the highly successful gathering. The Conference focused on three main areas (see attached declaration):

• Social Justice
• Economic Development and the New Growth Path
• Advancing rights to health and education

Unfortunately, the ANC NWC chose to launch a harsh attack on COSATU and the Conference, objecting to the fact that it hadn't been invited to the Conference, and making a range of allegations, including that it was an attempt "to put a wedge between civil society formations, some unions, the ANC and its Government"; that Civil Society found the government "guilty in absentia of inactivity in fighting corruption" etc. Most surprisingly the statement alleged that this initiative could be "interpreted as initial steps for regime change in South Africa", and suggesting that unnamed international forces were funding the initiative aimed at weakening, dividing and ultimately dividing the ANC and the Alliance, and setting up an opposition party.

The November 2010 CEC expressed shock and regret at the reaction of the ANC NWC. It stated:

"The ANC has never attended any of the three previous major summits convened by COSATU and in fact refused to attend at least one of these when it was invited to observe. Today, informed by an uninformed insecurity and paranoia it suddenly smells a rat and develops all manner of conspiracy theories."

The CEC in particular was angered by a baseless accusation that it was fomenting regime change in South Africa. The CEC argued that there was no difference between what the NWC of the ANC was accusing COSATU of, and what the late James Nkambule accused three prominent leaders of the ANC, Cyril Ramaphosa, Tokyo Sexwale and Mathew Phosa of plotting a regime change.

The CEC concluded that the COSATU convened October's Civil Society Conference was located squarely within the MDM tradition of mobilising progressive forces for change. It was attended by 56 organisations represented from a wide range of church, community, NGO and special interest formations.

Within the same wavelength the CEO reaffirmed OOSATU's response to the ANC NWC that:

"COSATU remains firmly committed to its Alliance with the ANC, SACP and SANCO, mandated by many National Congress resolutions. It has however also always been, and will remain, a trade union federation, independent of the ANC, the state and capital, with the right to meet and interact with any organisation, as long as this advances the interests of the working class."

"COSATU has no need to seek permission from anyone to meet and work with friendly organisations. We are not an anti-A NC and anti-government coalition. We are not here to begin a process to form any political party, nor to advance the interest of any individual".

"Contrary to the impression given by the ANC statement, speakers at the conference went out of their way to heap praise on the ANC government's achievements. COSATU, and the overwhelming majority of civil society organisations, are fully committed to working with, not against the ANC and the government. United together, the liberation movement and civil society are an invincible force for change and national liberation. Let us unite and work together to achieve our shared aims!"

The CEC agreed to continue to organise provincial civil society conferences the following year and called on the leadership of the Federation to move with speed to organise the Conference of the Left of all forces committed to the goal of Socialism, in conjunction with the SACP. The CEC reiterated that COSATU is an independent organisation free to pursue its congress resolutions.

Discussion Point: The Central Committee must in discussing this evaluate the response of the CEC to both the ANC and the SACP. Was our approach correct and did we go overb oard? Did we commit an error in not inviting the ANC when we knew we would have lost a few of the NGOs who we can relate to better whilst they do not necessarily relate well with the ANC and the SACP?

9.1. Building campaign coalitions

Campaigns are the lifeblood of the Federation. Through campaigns we make our organisation relevant to members and the broader society. Campaign work gives us a chance to conduct mass political education, they help us train new leaders and they test the durability of the organisation.

We have over the years built a number of coalitions, with other organisations. Because of the weakness of civil society, disproportionate pressure has been placed on the Federation as the main driver of the coalitions. Further, COSATU has not always been effective in playing this role. We must find ways to address these weaknesses, including through strengthening our co-ordinating capacity, as well as through encouraging other civil society organisations to take on more responsibility.

We list below the number of coalitions that exist, or recently existed:

a. Jobs and poverty campaign
b. HIV and AIDS campaign
c. Peoples Budget
d. Basic Income Grant (defunct)
e. Climate change
f. Save SABC coalition
g. International solidarity

Zimbabwe
Swaziland
Western Sahara
Palestine
Burma
Others

9.2. Service delivery protests and social movements

There is a wave of community service-delivery protests, which are about specific local grievances but are also related to the structural problems in the economy. The patience of increasing numbers of poor working class communities seemingly is running thin. They are facing a huge squeeze in the former black only residential areas, as well as the former Bantustans.

They are living with massive unemployment and grinding and humiliating poverty in places such as Alexandra, while across the road they see that the grass is green in the flashy buildings in Sandton. At times we have come to appreciate that there are also opportunistic agendas around elections to fuel ‘service delivery protests' to promote individual careers. Behind these opportunistic tendencies are members of all the components of the Alliance. COSATU, SACP, SANCO and even ANC cadres pursuing careers in the ANC and failing to achieve this and suddenly stoke anger and mobilise communities for violent community "service deliver protests". This goes back to what all have pointed out that the biggest enemy of the ANC is the ANC itself.

The CEC strongly urged locals of COSATU to link up with communities so that we can take up their issues with relevant authorities. The CEC wanted COSATU to not only champion community struggles but to build a strong relationship between organised workers and mushrooming issue based social movements.

This has not happened except in a few isolated cases. The danger of this is that a gulf may start to emerge between organised workers who in the context of the grinding crisis of unemployment, poverty and inequalities represent a privileged group and the issue based social movements. Too often township/residential based stay away from work is called with COSATU not even aware of the plans.

This weakness is not unrelated to the low working class consciousness that the 101h National Congress enjoins us to build. This low class consciousness is demonstrated by our inability to mobilise our members en masse beyond the struggle for wages and better conditions. Whereas the leadership link up well with civil society formations but we have simply struggled to get workers to support many genuine causes including international campaigns beyond Swaziland and Zimbabwe.

10. Local Government Elections

(The CC is asked to note that a more detailed assessment of the elections will be contained a discussion paper to be distributed later. What follows here is brief and initial set of comments.)

The 2011 Local Government elections campaign were most difficult and contested election ever held. The people are more directly in contact with government at the municipal level and thus all the inherited experience of unequal social and economic opportunities, inferior social and economic infrastructure, mass unemployment and poverty play themselves out at this level, in municipalities. We have seen sporadic service delivery protests spiralling in a number of municipalities across the country.

Apart from developing a local government manifesto, deploying cadres into local government and campaigning to win local government elections, the Alliance needs to do more to confront the glaring constitutional, legislative, political, administrative and service delivery crisis of our emerging local government system and turn the tide in order to build a developmental local government.

COSATU has called on government to spell out plans to improve service delivery, particularly to our poorest communities. Far too many township, rural villages and informal settlement still lack sanitation, wnning water, electricity, tarred roads, etc. We have millions of unemployed workers, yet at the same time there are thousands of communities, which still lack the basic amenities for a decent life. Government must assure us that there will be no more scandals of provincial and local governments not even being able to spend the money allocated in their budgets for service delivery, and that more money will be available to employ more workers to improve the lives of our people.

The February 2011 CEC approved plans for COSATU's intervention in the local government elections. The crucial areas, which the CEC identified as priority areas for its work in support of the ANC, are the Western and Northern Cape, the Nelson Mandela Municipality, Sedibeng and Ekurhuleni in Gauteng. In other provinces - North West, Limpopo, Eastern Cape (apart from Nelson Mandela Metro) and KwaZulu Natal - support for the ANC remains solid, despite some challenges.

COSATU participated in the ANC candidate selection process and implemented our decision to oppose any candidates who are corrupt, lazy or incompetent. This vetting of candidates has however led to some attempts by ‘gate-keepers' to manipulate the list process, and this has caused disputes within the ANC over the candidate lists.

COSATU must strive to support the reinstatement of any comrades unfairly excluded from lists by ‘gate-keepers', but once the selection process had been completed, COSATU could only support official ANC candidates and oppose any rejected candidates who decide to stand as ‘independents'.

We have also expressed anger at deteriorating levels of discipline in some localities with comrades completely damaging the image of the movement to advance their narrow interests. In some areas we have witnessed assaults on leaders and violent behaviour, which is so foreign to what we stand for as a broader movement. We have called on the ANC and the Alliance to enforce iron discipline and expel any members involved.

Resources proved to be a challenge in fronting a more high profile campaign. Affiliates only contributed around R800 000 to the campaign and to complicate matters more, some unions paid the levy very late.

11. The Battle against Corruption and a Predatory Elite

Most members of the Alliance just like all South Africans are deeply concerned that corruption, particularly the abuse of public office for private enrichment, is a cancer, threatening the foundations of our democracy. The overwhelming majority wants us to defeat the ‘get rich quick schemes' and the ‘grab what you can whilst you can' mentality.

Corruption is tantamount to stealing from the poor. It must be fought wherever it occurs, in the public and private sectors. It is not just a moral crusade but also an important political struggle to defend and deepen our democracy in the interests of the workers and the poor. The large majority of public representatives and senior officials are honest and dedicated servants of the public and are not involved in any form of corrupt activities. But for as long as a minority can get away with corrupt and fraudulent activities, it will undermine public confidence in all officials and the whole democratic system.

Our biggest concern is that some government leaders are also business leaders. Further family links to business also create a conflict of interests. Even if they are not benefiting directly from government tenders, the danger always exists that in taking decisions and in formulating policy, they will be guided by the impact this will have on their businesses rather than the broader public interest. It is the biggest threat to our efforts to establish a transparent and corrupt free government.

It is not good enough for ministers and public officials to hide behind the argument that they have ‘declared an interest' in the companies they and their family own. The fact that they are in business to make money creates an inevitable conflict of interest when they are legislating in parliament, a provincial legislature or municipal council.

The phenomenon of politicians, public servants and unionists leaving the service to go and work in the same sector in the private sector, without a cooling off period, is known as ‘throwing the javelin'. The Department of Public Service, in recognition of this problem has developed guidelines for a cooling-off period of one year after a public servant leaves the public service. COSATU's counter proposal is a five-year cooling off period.

All public representatives must be forced to choose whether they are servants of the public or in business to make profits. They cannot be both at the same time. The succession of corruption scandals and the spread of the capitalist culture of greed and self-enrichment are threatening to unravel the fabric of society and to undermine all the great progress we have made.

The February 2011 CEC expressed concern at the growing number of reports and allegations around the Gupta brothers' involvement, along with the President's son, in various deals in mining, property and elsewhere. Recognising that the newspapers publishing these stories may have their own agendas, it was agreed to commission independent research into these very serious allegations to determine facts and in order to answer these questions:

1. Is it true that the success of the Gupta brothers amounts to plundering of the economy bearing in mind that they remain citizens of another country?

2. If so what is the implication of the involvement of other role players and partners in the plundering?

3. Is the focused media attention on the Gupta family just a negative preoccupation and a jealousy at the success of a genuine business?

4. Are the allegations that the Gupta family uses underhand means and political influence to advance its interests true or is it jealousy on the part of those raising the matter?

Suggestions have been made that COSATU's motives for raising the issue of corruption is part of a campaign to target political opponents. This is untrue. The fight against corruption has to target culprits regardless of their political affiliations or ideologies.

The politics of patronage have destroyed the self-sacrificing and service ethic that characterised the movement for decades. It is a cancer eating slowly at all components of the mass democratic movement, from branch to national level.

The seriousness of the extent to which it has infected our organisations, our polity, and society is shown by:

The emergence of death squads in several provinces, linked to corruption, and the murder of people who have taken a stand, or have blown the whistle;

The open way in which prominent ‘business figures', are linked to top political leaders deepens perceptions that there is blatant abuse of power to concoct illegitimate business deals worth billions of rands;

The extent to which factions in organisations are increasingly not about ideology or political differences, but about access to tenders.

Notwithstanding the work of government, a danger exists that if the current trajectory continues, the entire state and society will be auctioned to the highest bidder. Given that state procurement is on a massive scale (over R800 billion for infrastructure over 3 years), failure to deal with endemic corruption would leave us with a huge challenge. Corruption covers a range of activities in society, but the most insidious and dangerous is the systematic abuse of access to state power and political contacts, to accumulate capital illegally or immorally (with a thin line often separating the two). This includes abuse of political influence to corrupt state tenders and procurement processes, and illegitimately win contracts; and abuse of political access and manipulation of BEE provisions to manufacture illegitimate business ‘deals' (e.g. Arcelor Mittal, AMSA, and ICT) etc. All these practices have in common the systemic creation of a network of patronage and corruption which means that over time no-one will be able to do business with the state, without going through corrupt gatekeepers, who don't merely demand bribes, but systematically leverage their power to control large chunks of the economy. Once this becomes the norm, we will have become a predator state.

And there must be no illusions that mainstream business, with all their codes for corporate governance, will fight this predator elite, if that elite is their only route to state- controlled resources. AMSA were prepared to pay a premium of billions to get access to their mineral rights and apparently the necessary political influence.

When key actors in this patronage network are close relatives or friends of people in power, the situation is particularly serious, since the likelihood of decisive action being taken to stop these practices becomes increasingly slim. So it becomes crucial to examine what steps are being taken to act against these practices, and implement the measures agreed at Polokwane. Further, we need to assess whether the measures proposed at Polokwane are still adequate to address the challenges being faced.

We have welcomed the strong stance the ANC has taken against corruption. But the key issue is the need to act with urgency to implement our undertakings on this front. We are happy that the Receiver of Revenue is conducting targeted lifestyle audits on those suspected of dodging their tax responsibilities. Powers exist to enable the Asset Forfeiture Unit to use similar methods to combat serious crime. They can both investigate the lifestyles of those they suspect of accumulating wealth illegally, and also freeze their assets even before securing a conviction.

Polokwane and the ANC Manifesto proposed that in order to combat corruption:

The NEC must develop a framework on post-tenure rules, including a cooling- off period during which public representatives and senior officials will be prohibited from accepting appointment to a board, employment or any other substantial benefit from a private sector organisation that has benefited from a contract, tender or partnership agreement with the public service/state in a process that the official has participated in. (Polokwane)

Government will step up measures to ensure politicians do not tamper with the adjudication of tenders; the process of the tendering system is transparent; as well as ensuring much stronger accountability of public servants involved in the tendering process. (Manifesto)

Neither of these commitments appears to have been followed up by the NEC or government with the necessary urgency. Papers for the NGC on leadership, and organisational renewal, which deal with related matters cite these commitments on tackling corruption, but don't comment on the lack of progress, or make recommendations on how to take them forward. The Organisational Renewal NGC resolution only proposes an internal mechanism to discipline members found guilty of corruption, but no measures to effectively combat the roots of corwption which has become so endemic, such as abuse of tenders, shady BEE deals linked to access to the state etc. While it is welcome that the resolution proposes dismissal of "members found guilty of corruption and abuse of power" it doesn't suggest the necessary mechanisms to give either the state or the party real bite when it comes to acting against corruption.

The NGC resolution's proposal for an internal ANC ‘Integrity Committee' also doesn't adequately respond to the seriousness of the situation. The Committee "will manage the interests of those who hold office in the state and organisation and investigate any allegations of improper conduct." Whilst this responds to some to the issues we have raised and is therefore welcome, the emphasis appears to be more on protecting ‘genuine' ANC business people than ruthlessly cracking down on corruption.

The August 2010 CEC decided on the following focus around corruption:

Massive intensification of the anti-corruption campaign. ... We need to go beyond moral condemnation. We must deal with the systemic issues, which are reproducing corruption. To do this we need a far-reaching programme to fight this cancer. What are the institutional, legal, political, economic changes, which are required to lead society out of this malaise? Fighting the scourge of corruption requires clear leadership. We must develop a programme with civil society and our allies, and host a Summit with a broad range of society. .We need to put the predatory elite on back foot. We need to strike a strategic blow against the elite- e.g. by reversing, or taking legal action against the Mittal deal. We need to commission serious research on the nature of the problem3. Action against corruption must be incorporated into our Section 77 demands at Nedlac.

Building a powerful anti-corruption institution of civil society - a corruption watch, with the capacity - including a team of lawyers, accountants, auditors, etc to conduct preliminary investigations, and process these with the relevant authorities."

Corruption Watch

Over the past several months a task team appointed under the direction of the COSATU CEC and the NOBs has been engaged in establishing the institutional framework capable of giving expression to COSATU's objective of contributing to the fight against corruption. To this end a closed corporation (CC) named Corruption Watch (CW) has been registered. CW will be the body charged with leading and implementing the civil society campaign against corruption initiated by COSATU. The task team has also considered the aims and objectives of CW, the activities in which it will be engaged, its governance structures and the further steps required to establish CW on a sound footing. It has prepared a budget for the planning phase of the project.

What is corruption?

Corruption takes many forms. In essence however, it is a relationship between private parties that seek to advance their private commercial interests and to enrich themselves by developing a privileged relationship to the public authorities. The most common ‘hard' forms that this takes is, firstly, in the relationship between public procurement bodies, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, private providers of goods and services. Secondly, corruption is often encountered in the relationship between, on the one hand, public regulatory and licensing authorities, and, on the other hand, private interests that, in order to advance their private commercial interests, seek licenses and regulatory ‘support' from the state. The activities that fall under these headings are generally subject to criminal sanction. While dishonest activities of public servants or parastatal employees who abuse or misappropriate resources belonging to their institutions may also constitute theft or fraud and be punishable as such, that these are public resources subject to misappropriation will also define these as instances of ‘hard' corruption.

[3 We should commission research on the size and character of this new elite; their connections to the state; their relationship to different factions in the ANC; their relationship to elements of big capital; and their relationship to foreign business and governments.]

The aims and objectives of Corruption Watch

Under the broad heading of fighting corruption and building a corruption-free society, Corruption Watch has identified the following activities:

It will act as a ‘safe haven' at which whistleblowers, many of whom will be members of COSATU affiliates, will file reports of corrupt activities.

CW will investigate alleged corrupt activities and, will, after conducting initial, but indepth investigations, hand over dossiers that document prima facie evidence of corruption to the law enforcement agencies for further investigation and prosecution.

CW will, where appropriate, initiate civil litigation against individuals and institutions engaged in corrupt activities.

CW will develop advocacy campaigns and training programmes designed to increase awareness of corruption and to promote good governance practices that are designed to counter corruption.

CW will carry out research into corruption and establish relationships with national and international bodies similarly engaged in fighting corruption

A more detailed business plan is being developed reveal other pertinent activities. in pursuance of these objectives.

Where are we now and what are the immediate tasks?

We have identified an executive director and a consultancy with the appropriate experience to engage in the process of drawing up a business plan and operational plan. The executive director that we have identified is David Lewis who has spent his entire career in public service work. Throughout the ‘seventies and ‘eighties he worked in the trade union movement, first as General Secretary of the General Workers Union and then as a national organiser in the then Transport ad General Workers Union. He then directed the COSATU-initiated Industrial Strategy Project. Since then he has worked in a variety of public sector jobs. Most recently he served two terms as Chairperson of the Competition Tribunal, which has brought him into close contact with collusion and corruption in public sector procurement processes. He is currently a part-time Professor at the Gordon Institute of Business Science where he teaches and researches on the relationship between the public and private sectors in the process of economic development. The consultancy identified is the Resolve Group which has worked with COSATU on a number of occasions and which has considerable experience in forensic investigations in parts of the public sector.

Some informal stakeholder consultation has already commenced, and some potential board members have been identified and canvassed. Although, as expected and as appropriate, those stakeholders and potential board members are all keen to see an elaborated business and operational plan, the feedback from the informal consultations is overwhelmingly positive.
The most urgent task is raising the funding necessary to undertake the planning phase that is the preparation of the business plan and operational plan. An indicative budget exists. Note that this task will be carried out under the supervision and with the participation of the executive director designate who will devote a specified number of person hours per week over the 2 month planning period and then extending over the further period until the day on which CW is launched.

Discussion point: In addition to these above initiatives, what can COSATU and COSATU affiliates do to act against corruption?

12. Economic Policy Contestation and The New Growth Path

The Polokwane conference goes a long way to close the policy gap in the Alliance. The Manifesto and Polokwane clearly set out that economic policy needs to be realigned to the central objective of creating decent work and eradication of poverty.

This clarity however did not end the intense contestation within the ANC, government and between Alliance components. The rightwing has despite these categorical statements been trying to reinterpret the resolutions in order to give them a conservative meaning.

Creating more effective policy co-ordination, and aligning the programmes of all Departments around a coherent vision has not gone unchallenged. We have come to be accustomed to contradictory policy developments, zigzagging in government, and major resistance from old centres of economic power in the state. The result has been that economic policy realignment, where it has taken place at all, has been partial, and has had to coexist within the old macroeconomic policy framework. The result has been that at times of severe economic crisis, when over a million workers have lost their jobs (throwing over 5 million people deeper into poverty), government has dithered and failed to provide direction.

The 2010 COSATU CEC discussion paper called "The Alliance at a Crossroads- the battle against a predatory elite and against political paralysis" outlines the nature of these contestations.

Finally government has released its new Growth Path in the midst of these contestations that will not end. Clearly the document is a compromise policy statement reflecting intense battles on economic direction within the state. We return later to show the extent of the zig zagging in the policy approaches.

COSATU has since its inception demanded that we break out of the structural crisis we inherited from the colonial and apartheid era. In our own growth path proposals launched in September 2010, we argued that:

Unemployment is persistent and is increasing,
Poverty incidence remains high,
Redistribution of income has not occurred,
The means of production and power remain concentrated in white capitalist hands,
The structure of the economy remains mineral-dependent and is now finance-led,
The health profile of the population has deteriorated because of HIV and AIDS,
The crisis in education persists and the quality of education is poor,
The housing challenge is still persistent and
Progress has been registered in meeting basic needs but affordability remains a problem

This crisis leaves no space for political plays! The crisis is real and is deep. To workers this is a life and death issue. As we have so often pointed out, we are sitting on a ticking bomb that is beginning to explode as evidenced by the violent service delivery protest in many parts of the country.

Politically COSATU has campaigned against neo liberal policies since their imposition in 1996. We have had countless general strikes and protests, we have initiated at least three jobs summit with government, business and community organisations, we have held jobs and poverty summits with civil society, and last year we convened a civil society summit with 56 formations.
Many of these struggles led to the Polokwane revolt against policies that have not adequately responded to the crisis facing humanity. COSATU cannot extricate itself from Polokwane outcomes. This was and remains our project. We influenced not only the policy direction but also the leadership.

We have set ourselves a goal to defend Polokwane and its outcomes including the leadership collective that emerged from that conference. We have done so in the past three years but not blindly. We have not signed a blank cheque. So our people know that whilst we defend the leadership, but when the leadership does not decisively defend policy platforms agreed to in Polokwane, we have not hesitated to raise that in private and public discussions.

The point we are raising is that if this project, led by President Jacob Zuma, fails to bring down the unacceptable high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequalities, society may be persuaded by nghtwing forces like the DA, and employers who will use their weapons and control of the media that left wing solutions to the economic crisis do not work.

If by 2014, which will represent two full decades of freedom, our people see no real and tangible change in their situation and start to lose hope that we can change their lives for the better, they may start questioning the whole left wing project? If by 2018 the crisis remains, and the structural fault lines remain, we risk a social implosion on the scale we have seen in North Africa recently.

COSATU must therefore continue with its overall strategy of supporting government, and push for real and genuine change of the situation of the poor. At the same time COSATU must continue to be willing to disagree with government including using mass action so that at all times ordinary people appreciate that we act on principle and not on friendship.

12.1. New Growth Path

COSATU has published a comprehensive document on the 14 September 2010. The document has since been warmly welcomed by the 56 civil society formations. The usual suspects - the employers and their "experts" in the media have rubbished the document as unworkable.

Government released its own New Growth Path document with no input from the ANC and the Alliance. The document has since been endorsed by the ANC NEC Lekgotla and by the SACP. Business like certain aspects of the document but hates what they see as state led growth.

After a robust debate the CEC took the following decisions.

The CEC reiterated that it welcomes the publication of the long-awaited New Growth Path. For more than 16 years COSATU has campaigned for the introduction of a New Growth Path, in recognition of the fact that our country is in an absolutely wrong and disastrous growth path that will continue to reproduce unemployment, poverty and inequalities.

After a long public contestation, the historic ANC 52nd National Conference held in Polokwane in December 2007 endorsed the call made by many in the ANC and the Alliance. The publication of the government proposals towards the end of last year should be seen as part of this protracted process. COSATU naturally regards the introduction of the government proposals as a decisive breakthrough and a victory for the national democratic revolution.

COSATU has now studied the document and has made a detailed critique of the government's New Growth Path, informed by its own proposals that were released in September 2010. Subject to further tweaking and reworking some of the New Growth Path proposals have a potential to unlock South Africa's potential.

COSATU's view is that, overall, the New Growth Path proposed by government falls far short of the comprehensive and overarching development strategy capable of unleashing a plan that will fundamentally transform our economy and adequately address the triple challenges of extraordinary high levels of unemployment, wide spread poverty and deepening inequalities.

The document in its current form does not adequately take forward the ANC 52nd National Conference economic resolutions and will require an overhaul if it is to succeed in uniting the Alliance behind the type of programme envisaged by all Alliance formations. Its weaknesses demonstrate that it was not a product of collective wisdom of Alliance processes.

COSATU identified these weaknesses and developed detailed alternative proposals, which it will raise with its Alliance partners at every opportunity that will present itself, including in the ANC NEC Lekgotla and the Alliance Summit. Our approach is informed by the need to engage with both the document and all other role players to overcome the structural and analytical deficiencies of the proposed New Growth Path.

Indeed we raised our critique of the document in the ANC NEC Lekgotla which was well received.

The NEC Lekgotla directed the NEC Economic Transformation Committee to engage with COSATU as well as addressing other concerns of some ANC leaders. Regrettably we have no influence in directing this process and this engagement has not happened since.

The Alliance Summit did not engage on the New Growth Path because of the nature of discussions we had on the programme of the Alliance. The Alliance Secretariat must now look at ways we can take this discussion forward.

The danger we face is that since we started to engage based on the so called "low hanging fruit" (i.e. the easily achievable areas of common agreement) we may find ourselves in a situation where after a year or forever there is no engagement with the issues of serious concern. Accordingly the document will not deliver, and we could find ourselves in a spot where in 2014 and 2018 there is little progress with regard to the triple challenge of unemployment, poverty and inequalities.

12.2. Engagement on the NGP

A meeting of all stakeholders was convened on the 08 February 2011. The first meeting was held on 25 November 2010. Bilateral engagements have taken place since the first meeting.

The meeting received reports from the Minister of Higher Education and Training (on training and skills development), the Minister of Basic Education (on the steps taken to address basic education challenges) and an executive of the Industrial Development Corporation (on green economy projects).

This note sets out the agreed outcomes of the meeting.

12.3. On the overall approach

1. The parties committed to the broad goals of five million new jobs by 2020 and to work in partnership to achieve these

2. The parties agreed to build on the consensus of the meeting of 25 November 2010, including through commencing discussion on the immediate deliverables identified at that meeting
3. The parties agreed that action and implementation should be a hallmark of the discussions, with constituencies identifying areas where they can make firm commitments as well as identifying actions that other constituencies would need to undertake in order for the broad goals of the new growth path to be achieved.

12.4. On training and skills development

1. Business agreed that companies will train (particularly artisans) beyond their own needs and will work with government to fully utilise the training facilities that they have available in the private sector. By March this year, business will finalise numbers of persons that can be trained in existing facilities in different sectors. The mining sector for example believes it may be able to train an additional 3 000 persons a year. Government committed to ensuring that State- owned enterprises have training beyond their own needs as an explicit mandate. Organised labour and government agreed that in order to ensure full take-up of unutilised capacity, there has to be recognition that not all trainees will become employees in the company concerned and a distinction will be drawn between trainees and employees.

2. Companies will make placements/internship spaces available for students who complete their certificates at FET Colleges, 3 year students at Universities of Technology who need the work experience as part of their qualifications, and for lecturers at FET Colleges. Concrete commitments will be developed within the next month.

3. Business commits to the principle of a ratio of artisans: apprentices that companies should be encouraged to have, and will table a proposal for a specific ratio to be used as a guideline, by February for dialogue with the other parties, with a view to have this finalised by mid-March. It will also consider appropriate sector-level ratios of engineers: technicians: artisans, taking note of the Transnet guideline of 1:3:8.

4. Business commits in principle to improve spending on training that companies undertake, and will revert with a proposed guideline of training spending as a percentage of payroll (total salary bill).
5. All parties support the NGP commitment to revise the BB-BEE scorecard to give more prominence to training and skills enhancement.

6. All parties support the NGP commitment to training targets that every SOE will have.

7. All parties commit to improve SETA governance and business and labour commits to improving the seniority of their delegations to SETA Board meetings; acknowledge the need for the Minister of Higher Education and Training to have a greater role in ensuring that SETAs are effective (including possible nomination of chairpersons and appointment of additional board members).

8 Business and labour commit to each SETA setting clear targets on the number of apprenticeships to be provided in a sector and to develop systems to track progress against targets.

9. All parties agreed that industrial training should be linked more strongly to the NGP and the needs of sectors and that effective training requires and benefits from a strong basic education system.

10.All parties supported the new focus on FET Colleges and on ABET.

11 .The parties agreed that the Task-team set up by the Minister of Higher Education (with labour representation to be included) would provide further detail on the areas set out above.

1. All parties recognise the potential of the Green Economy to create a large number of jobs and committed to work in partnership to realise the potential.

2. The parties agreed that they will identify specific areas on an on-going basis and identify partnerships: a first project involves the manufacturing and installation of solar water geysers at household level.

3. The parties received a report on, and welcomed the IDC project for the rollout of 200 000 solar water geysers including to poorer households.

4. Business undertook to formalise with the insurance industry a commitment to promote the use of solar water geysers for any insured replacement of a damaged electric hot-water geyser and will revert within weeks with a proposal.

5. Organised labour committed to help form a cooperative of retrenched employees to be trained in the installation of solar water geysers and to utilise support in the public and private sectors.

6. Business undertook to promote opportunities in the Green Economy among women and youth, as entrepreneurs and as employees and will promote the establishment of green incubation centres that provide information on economic opportunities to small businesses.

7. Organised labour commits to convening a meeting of its Job Creation Trust and union investment vehicles to finalise commitments that it will make to promoting jobs and investment in the Green Economy and will revert by the end of April with concrete commitments.

8. Government will set up an information session for constituencies to identify the opportunities in the Green Economy that have been identified in the NGP and at the Green Economy Summit.

12.6. On basic education

1. All parties agreed to work together to change the mindset among teachers, learners and parents in order to rebuild dysfunctional parts of the basic education system.

2. A list of key challenges was identified and the Minister of Basic Education provided information on government's existing plans in respect of these.

3 The parties endorsed a campaign to adopt poor-performing schools, with individual businesses and trade unions/community organisations assisting such schools to develop proper governance, high standards of teaching, basic school-level discipline and adequate supply of essentials (including school textbooks and workbooks). A list of the 1 000 poorest performing schools would be compiled by the Dept of Basic Education to guide the selection of schools to be adopted.

12.5. On the green economy

12.7. Way forward

1. Future meetings will focus on matters not addressed at the meeting of 8 February 2011 (including small business development, the main jobs drivers, filling of public sector vacancies and other projects to achieve the NGP goals of placing employment at the centre of all efforts) as well as additional areas identified for the agenda.

2. The Minister of Economic Development would liaise with one representative from each constituency to receive additional proposals for the agenda in respect of the areas covered in the NGP, including on the timing of addressing some of the systemic and structural issues identified in the New Growth Path.

3. Parties would be consulted on further suggestions on size of delegations and preparation of issues for meetings.

4. The parties agreed to an alignment with Nedlac based on the following four principles

a. The NGP document will be tabled at Nedlac
b. The engagement on the NGP will be through the high-level leadership team chaired by the Minister of Economic Development
c. Meetings will be convened by government with the assistance of the Nedlac Secretariat
d. Regular reports will be tabled to Nedlac structures on progress made and on conclusion of the process, a formal Report will be tabled at Nedlac.

5. The next meeting would be convened following an opportunity for parties to action the outcomes of the 8 February 2011 meeting.

12.8. New Growth Path and the budget

Earlier in the section dealing with economic policy contestation we pointed out that the New
Growth Path is a compromise document between two or even three centres of power within
Cabinet.

The 2011 Budget speech reinforces this contest. We have commissioned a study to look at whether the Budget does indicate reprioritisation in order to advance the objectives of the New Growth Path. Before we do that we need to first understand the key objectives of the NGP in the context of what it calls the job drivers.

The job drivers are:

1. Continuing public investment in infrastructure, creating employment in construction operation, maintenance, and production of inputs and directly improving efficiency across the economy

2. Targeting more labour-absorbing activities in the agriculture and mining value chains, manufacturing, construction and services

3. Promoting innovation through "green economy" initiatives

4. Investing in the social economy and public services

5. Supporting rural development and regional integration

The President in his state of the nation address declared 2011 as the year for job creation and argued that all government departments, provinces and local governments will have their focus the task of creating jobs and contributing to the realisation of the 5 million jobs in ten years target.

Yet the preliminary work we are conducting on the Budget that has only looked at two of the five job drivers reveal an astonishing picture of lack of support for these initiatives in the budget.

a) Budget and the green economy

The Budget allocates R800 million for the next three years on the ‘green jobs' initiatives and promises that specific allocations will be made in the adjustments budget - see page 26 of the Budget Speech. When not situated in its proper context the figure sounds big and reasonable.

But when you consider that the Gross Domestic Product is R2.9 trillion Government expenditure is R979 billion it means that the green economy will receive 0.01%.

Every year we will only have R267 million, meaning that green economy initiatives will be 0.03% (actually less- a third of 0.01%)

b) Budget and infrastructure

In terms of the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) covering the period 2011 -2013, a R809 billon is allocated for infrastructure investment. For the Period of 2011 -2012 it allocates R522 billion on public infrastructure investment.

The national budget of 2010 (MTEF 2010 -2012, R584 billion is allocated for public infrastructure, which is R61 billion more than this year's allocation for the same period. (See the table below). The story this slide table shows is that identification of this area of work as a job driver has not led to more allocation of resources, instead the public infrastructure expenditure will decline from 9.8% of the GDP in 2010/2011 to 8.1% of the GDP in 2013/2014.There has already been an alarming fall of in public sector infrastructure investment this year. According to Business Day, general government investment spending declined in 2009, and declined even faster, by 7-8%, in the first half of 2010, according to the Reserve Bank quarterly bulletin4.

c) Budget and IPAP2

Recently we met the department of Trade and Industry and asked them in the context of the IPAP2 being the top priority of jobs whether the resources allocated to the department to drive the strategy has increased. They responded in the negative.

12.9. COSATU and the NGP - what is the strategic way forward?

Based on all the reports above, COSATU is faced with two challenges: firstly we must ensure that we drive effective implementation of the areas of agreement. It is in the best interest of the labour movement to ensure that we deliver even if that delivery does not lead to a drastic reduction in unemployment, poverty and inequalities. This means that we must insist that government must be more effective and efficient.

This also means we must continue to expose inconsistency in the allocation of resources and the stated political objectives as we have began to do.

Secondly we must ensure that we do not end up with marginalisation of our concerns which address the macro framework. If these are not addressed we will not succeed to restructure the economy, and place it on a real, new path that will lead to full employment, eradication of poverty and inequalities. The question is how do we do that?

We propose a combination of strategies:

1) We must ensure that the Alliance process produces a result - we must clearly list the areas of concerns

2) We must ensure that the engagement with government and business does not sideline our concerns. COSATU should state that it remains critical of the current version of the NGP but it is nonetheless prepared to engage with government for a relatively short period of time (say 6 months) to improve the document in terms of:

a) Setting clear targets for the main development objectives for the next 10 years and
b) Developing specifics of policies that will achieve those goals

3) COSATU must fight for the measures that must be considered for incorporation into the NGP.

4) COSATU should criticise the over-reliance on certain policies whose effectiveness is not supported by domestic and international evidence.

5) COSATU should push for specific commitments to promotion of decent jobs. For example we must set clear targets and higher targets for the portion of total employment that is expected to be decent jobs in 2020 relative to 2011.

6) We must mobilise our members behind specific demands. These must include mobilising them to support areas we have identified including on improving the efficiency of government services as well as demanding real change to deal with the apartheid economy structural fault lines.

13. Building Working Class Consciousness and Ideological Cohesion

When COSATU adopted the 2015 plan, we clearly stated that our political strategy was to assert working class hegemony of society to counteract the entrenched power of capital. To that end, we would seek to combine state and social power in a way that consistently tilts the balance of power in favour of the working class. We argued that our overall policy engagement should be centred on:

1. Strategies to build the power of the organised working class in South Africa, in our region and continent as well as internationally.

2. Strategies to make our relationship with the Alliance work.

3. The priority areas for intervening on socio economic policy in the short term to stem the jobloss bloodbath and fight for quality jobs.

The 2015 plan goes on to recognise that society is characterised by ideological contestation and argues that it is only possible to build working class power where there is a deliberate and sustained cadreship development programme. It argues that political education "should deepen members' understanding of the current phase of our struggle, the challenges it poses and the most appropriate strategy and tactics."

Taking its lead from the 2015 plan and an analysis of the current period, the outcomes of the 10th National Congress prioritised ideological work and political education. It called on the need for "ideological clarity about where we are, what the forces ranging against the strategic interest of the working class are; who are our allies; and clarity about the international ideological warfare." It committed to building Marxism-Leninism as a tool of scientific inquiry and a guide to action and argued for the need to ensure internal dynamism and democracy through heightened mass education and activism to raise the level of class consciousness.

The three-year education programme emerging post congress spoke directly to Congress outcomes in ensuring that its core focus was on:

1. Building and entrenching a mass based class consciousness to guide the Federation's work & to lead the working class. Including developing consciousness, confidence and critical responses among working class formations around political issues.

2. Enhancing critical & creative thinking in the labour movement through developing all round Marxist-Leninist cadres that are able to engage with all terrains of struggle towards deepening the NDR and developing the concrete building blocks for Socialism.

3. Asserting working class hegemony in the public arena; through building a vibrant, democratic, and progressive mass trade union movement.

With this as its focus the 2010 education programme set out an ambitious set of education activities. Its core tenets included:

a) A mass education conference
b) Socialist forums
c) Workplace education programmes
d) National political schools
e) Popular education materials
f) A Marxist-Leninist toolbox
g) Relaunch of the Chris Hani Brigade (CHB)

In critically evaluating this work, there is a need to recognise that we have been big on ideas but small in fully discharging the Congress mandate. While some work has been done, these have been limited, isolated, have often not been sustained, and have not had the mass outreach envisaged.

In effect the capitalist logic and its regressive and destructive value base continues to prevail. The ideological offensive against the working class led by bourgeoisie forces in the media, education and other spheres of society is strengthened and the vision and possibility for a Socialist future is more remote.

We must acknowledge and accept the growing and honest reflections that we have been unable to advance the ideological frontiers in the manner expected of us. Deepening ideological work to increase class consciousness, to engage with class struggle, and our socialist vision is a priority still to be advanced.

Three core factors can be attributed to this:

a) The inability to be creative, imaginative and forward looking in exploring mechanisms for making this task a reality; instead being stuck in models and methods of old. Similarly an inability to make links between ongoing campaigning and daily worker struggles and the need to contest ideological space.

b) The continued hegemony of neo-liberal educational common-sense demonstrated through the ongoing and increasing demand and pressure invested in bourgeoise, accredited education; leaving its form, content and priorities outside the control of workers and in the hands of rival class forces. At times unwittingly. At times not.

c) The conceptualisation of education ideas &! strategies, often too ambitious, not fully owned or supported, and worse still in the face of limited and diminishing resources. And linked to this an inability and sometimes an unwillingness to work with other progressive formations advancing our own ideals.

These limitations should however not distract us from the vital task of making sure that we offer a varied and socialist oriented education programme through the Federation and our affiliates, and especially so now as the crisis of capitalism deepens and threatens to ravage our economy and society yet more in the coming period.

In so doing we need to:

1) Instill the importance of our education first and foremost being about building class consciousness, strengthening organisations of the working class and reinforcing our socialist vision as a critical and decisive factor in shifting the balance of class forces in our favour.

2) Rebuild or refocus our primary task as that of providing creative and pervasive mass educational responses to protect and develop our movement as a whole and to create centres or opportunities for the production of alternative forms of knowledge to challenge the capitalist logic that prevails.

3) Build and instill confidence in our own education practice and institutions of the working class.

4) Mobilising resources in support of OUR worker led initiatives in education and training, including human [people] and physical [funding, infrastructure, administrative costs, etc] reources to give effect to a socialist alternative, without any strings attached!

In 2011, through the Federation this will find practical expression and a test of possibilities through:

1) Mass, popular "Socialism IS Possible" events, translating a range of COSATU positions? policies including; Marxism-Leninism as a guide to action, current issues like corruption and the labour law amendments, socio-economic policy issues, why international solidarity matters etc.

2) Building popular education materials for mass education programmes for use in socialist forums, public seminars, community radio slots etc., aimed firstly at reaching a mass audience, but also at the strengthening of our locals.

3) Building a pool of socialist cadres schooled in Marxism-Leninism through the Chris Hani Brigade, who will primarily be tasked with ensuring mass education delivery aimed at mass based alternative consciousness and political education.

4) Leadership and staff development programmes aimed at advancing a revolutionary trade union movement rooted in Marxist -Leninist ideology and in profoundly understanding our vision for Socialism.

5) Collaborating with progressive intelligentsia to contest intellectual and ideological space and influence centres of knowledge production such as universities, policy institutes, etc.
If successful, COSATU should be at the centre of shaping and promoting alternative working class and progressive values that contributes to the realisation of the possibilities of a Socialist future!

Discussion point: The Central Committee must evaluate this programme in the light of the challenges at hand. We must develop working class cohesion and consciousness if we hope to impact on the ANC and the NDR let alone the struggle for Socialism. In the face of the massive mobilisation of the new tendency! right wing, we need to engage much more actively with workers and communities on the ground. In the absence of a high level of class consciousness, it is not easy to alter conduct; and corruption, greed etc will prevail. We have no effective political education programme, which is leading to a narrow focus by workers on economic issues. We are failing to mobilise workers for May Day, COSATU anniversary etc? Where are our 2 million members are they behind our political strategies? Are they seeing us an an insurance to improve their conditions of employment only?

14. Working Class Unity - Xenophobia COSATU and Home Affairs Programme

There is an estimated 3 million Zimbabweans who are equal victims of mismanagement of the economic and political system, armed with better education, sidelining, and regrettably dragging the basic protection of South African workers' rights down. This estimated 3 million join hundreds of thousands of others from Mozambique and the rest of Africa and from Europe and Asia. Many in the SADC region, the African continent and even as far as Europe and Asia, combine in their thousands under the mistaken belief that South Africa is a land of milk and honey.

We need to begin a conversation on how we can address all these issues in a manner that ensures we maintain our strong stance against xenophobia and the misguided and mistaken belief that our African brothers and sisters who are streaming down south under pressure of poverty are the source of our crises of unemployment and crime.

At the same time we need to ensure that we develop systems to ensure that we do not open the floodgates in a manner that simply worsens the squeeze in the townships and rural areas. COSATU has worked with many civil society formations to battle against violent attacks on foreign nationals. We have also formed a partnership with the Ministry of Home Affairs to intensify the battle against xenophobia.

15. Unity and Cohesion of the Federation is Sacrosanct

Affiliates went to the tenth congress determined to avoid leadership contests that would reopen the healing wounds left by the bitter 2006 ninth congress. Unions managed their disagreements with a high degree of maturity. Unlike in 2006 we did not use tribal and regional mobilisation, posters, divisive songs and negative posturing. The delegates and the CEC must be commended for this. This is what is called a matured dynamism.

All delegates and the leadership jealously guarded the unity of the Federation despite contestations of two positions. There were no deliberate blocks of unions supporting each other no matter what. There were on occasions clear differences of opinion and differences on tactical and strategic considerations, but these were never allowed to dominate the congress.

The CEC has welcomed the statement made by the General Secretary that the announcement that he will not stand in the next congress was a mistake, more so his statement that he would now make himself available for the NEC and Central Committee of the ANC and the SACP, even though not for the position of the secretaries of these organisations.

The meeting noted with concern that this has unleashed speculation about where he is going and what role he will play. The whispering campaign launched by factions outside has sought to isolate the COSATU General Secretary by personalising collective decisions just because he is the chief spokesperson of the Federation.

It was also noted that the media, with the help of some faceless persons within the affiliates, launched a COSATU succession debate and named possible candidates. The CEC has condemned this campaign.

The CEC further reiterated its previous May 2010 CEC decision that there is no succession debate in the Federation until the right time. Regrettably this may destabilise the unity of the Federation by undermining personal relations between comrades, who are pitted against each other by faceless people in public.

Issued by COSATU, June 27 2011. Transcribed from PDF. Please check against the full original text.

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