ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL AND ORGANISATIONAL DESIGN:
Consolidating the ANC as movement for transformation and the centre of power
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past”.
Abbreviations
AAC: All Africa Conference ANC: African National Congress
ANCYL: African National Congress Youth League ANCWL: African National Congress Women’s League BEC: Branch Executive Committee
BGM: Branch General Meeting
COSAS: Congress of South African Students COSATU: Congress of South African Trade Unions CBOs: Community Based Organisations
NDP: National Development Plan NDR: National Democratic Revolution NDS: National Democratic Struggle
NGOs: Non-Governmental Organisations NYO: National Youth Organisation
NGC: National General Council MDM: Mass Democratic Movement MK: UMkhonto Wesizwe
OR&OD: Organisational Renewal and Organisational Design PoA: Programme of Action
RECs: Regional Executive Committees R&D: Resource and Development SACP: South African Communist Party
SANCO: South African Civic Organisation SANSCO: South African Student Congress SAYCO: South African Youth Congress UDF: United Democratic Front
S&T: Strategies and Tactics
INTRODUCTION
1. This draft discussion paper on Organisational Renewal is a preliminary construction emanating from consideration and consultation of the following primary sources:
- 53rd conference resolutions and papers on Organisational Renewal,
- Previous National General Council (NGC)
Reports especially 2015 reports
- The Organisational Building and Mass Mobilisation Workshop Reports held on the 19th–20th November 2016.
- Most Recent Strategies and Tactics document
- Rebuilding the organisation, and other discussion and policy documents of the movement and alliance partners.
2. Encapsulated in the draft document are recommendations from both the National Organising and Mass Mobilisation Workshop held on the 19–20th November 2016 and the National Policy Workshop held on the 12th–13th January 2017. These Reports were elaborated with the aim of producing this discussion paper for submission to the National Executive Committee for approval and processing.
3. The discussion paper approaches the debate from a historical and theoretical perspective and creates a platform for debates and ventures into specific recommendations in order to develop a Road Map to the National Policy Conference in June 2017 and ultimately the 54th National Conference in December 2017.
4. The chief aim of the discussion paper is to provoke robust debates within the structures of the ANC (African National Congress) and Alliance partners on the perennial questions of organisational renewal and organisational design challenge. The questions are posed within the political context of the origins of the ANC, the evolution of the movement, attendant organisational ebbs and flows hitherto. An attempt is made at diagnosing the imperative for organisational renewal and inevitability of organisational design of the overall ANC architecture and organisational processes with a view to mitigate ideological degeneration and organisational paralysis.
5. We argue that the ANC remains the leader in the processes for social change as demonstrated by our delivery since 1994. That said, the ANC must retain its dual character as a liberation movement and a political party. However there are lessons to be learned from the Mass Democratic Movement’s appeal to a broad spectrum of sectors and strata, elevating mass mobilisation, sustained campaigns on bread and butter issues and entrenchment of organs of people’s power. We are of the view that the ANC can renew itself without losing its traditional outlook. Organisations exist within a political and ideological context; there is an urgent need to strengthen the organisational machinery to achieve the ANC’s historic mission.
6. We must review the structural reach of the ANC such that the broad forces the ANC organised under the then UDF to topple apartheid, remain mobilized under the ANC political and ideological hegemony.
7. The organisation must re-orientated itself, readjust and completely reorganise itself and its organisational machinery to be inclusive and representative in all its decision-making
structures, at all levels/spheres in order for the organisation to be more responsive to the new demands of the current conjecture characterised by modern young, savvy and media literate captive markets and voter pools. In the subsequent chapter, we have for purposes of this debate highlighted possible assumptions of how different sectors of society must view the ANC and still find it as their political home.
8. What informs the need for Organisational Renewal and Organisational Design? What needs to be done in the re-orientation and modernisation period in the ANC? What is the locomotive and who the drivers who will spearhead this task?
WHAT ARE SOME OF THE PRE- REQUISITES FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL GOALS?
9. Modern organizations pay significant attention and resources to the capacity and interphase between its back-end office and front end office in pursuit of its organizational goals. These are complex systems- driven and people-driven organizational processes with change-drivers orchestrating the day-to-day functions in line with the overarching strategy of the organization, in line with the “change drivers” in the movement can only be effected to achieve a desired outcome if they is “driven” by a selected entity for a specifically “desired outcome” that will result in the “targeted action”.
10. The core processes of Organisational Renewal entail consolidating the organisational architecture of the ANC, policy formulation, monitoring and evaluation, relentless communication and the battle of ideas, political education and ideological training, constant engagement with the centres of power, flawless engagement with the motive forces, bolstering organising and campaigns, mass mobilisation as it relates to membership growth and election’s development.
11. The support processes are essentially the inside- out activities and programmes that support and defend the core mandate such as Human Resource Management, Financial Management, Fundraising, Research & Development (R&D), and Information Technology.
12. As Amilcar Cabral pointed out in a book titled Unity & Struggle: Speeches and Writings about his homeland, Guinea-Bissau, “For the struggle against colonialism means are also required. In the first place one must create an instrument of struggle. Our party is that instrument of struggle. You might say that the party is the base instrument, the mother instrument. Or if we like, the principal means which creates other means linked to it. It is the root and the trunk which produce other branches for the development of our struggle”.
13. The primary mission of the ANC is to serve the people of South Africa, the ANC exist for the people of South Africa. It is therefore the historic mission of the ANC to build a humane and caring society. This struggle must be lead by a vanguard leadership that leverages the ANC as an instrument of struggle. The ANC must enjoy hegemony amongst all classes, races, social strata, social forces in keeping with its revolutionary mass character, non-sexist and non-racial outlook.
14. The aim of the paper is to consolidate the ANC as a movement for social transformation and strategic centre of power. This debate will and must address the critical weaknesses of the ANC and the question of the optimal mobilisation of the motive forces for change. The paper is aimed at energising the structures of the ANC, of the Alliance partners, of the South African Civic Organisation (SANCO) and other youth, students and women progressive formations to engage the centres of power.
15. Of critical significance, the debate about the life and soul of the oldest liberation movement in the African Continent takes place as the African National Congress celebrates the centenary of the ANC’s longest serving President, Oliver Reginald Tambo. The movement deservedly declared 2017 the year of Oliver Tambo! It is incumbent on the cadres of this glorious movement to Deepen Unity of purpose during this period and beyond. The current generation owe it to Oliver Reginald Tambo and his generation to conduct the battle of ideas with revolutionary discipline and spirit that epitomises the dignity and care with which Oliver Tambo and other combatants carried the ANC.
16. The discussion paper is a launching pad for the festival of ideas and neither seeks a forced convergence of ideas nor some kind of political nirvana. Divergent views or differing opinions should inspire healthy and robust debates, ignite organisational renewal, revitalise the movement and bring about vibrancy into the movement and dynamism amongst the cadres as it seeks to reproduce itself and safeguard its core values.
17. The discussion document postulates a view that the conditions in which the ANC operates have changed thus necessitating a comprehensive review of the ANC structural design and organisational design. The review must take into account the current structural design, the Party constituent structures, ANC Parliamentary, Legislative, Council and caucuses’ functionality, efficiencies and effectiveness. We pose the question of whether, in light of subjective and objective challenges confronting the ANC, there is a discernable risk of organisational paralysis
manifesting itself through among others perceived or real; fragmentation of the constituent parts of the ANC? Can we safely say there is disintegration and weakening of the Alliance and its component parts? Is there lack of coherence within the historical alliance partners?
18. Our entry points in this discussion are considerations of the salient political elements drawn from the Strategies and Tactics. We recognise that Organisational Renewal cannot be discussed outside our analysis of the current local and global balance of forces.
EBBS AND FLOWS IN A FRAUGHT TRANSITION: CHANGING DOMESTIC BALANCE OF FORCES
19. Assessment of the balance of forces helps clarify opportunities and constraints in the process of social transformation. The forces of change are thus able to avoid paralysis dictated to by an underestimation of their strengths, or voluntaristic adventurism informed by an overestimation of their power.
20. How did the balance of forces express itself during the transition?
21. In the early years of the democratic dispensation, it became necessary to contain various forces which were bent on frustrating and even reversing the democratisation process. The compromises contained in the ‘sunset clauses’, security operations and reconciliatory assurances to the white community formed part of this arsenal. This tactical approach afforded the liberation movement the possibility to capture a political beach-head, and use it to advance towards the ultimate ideal. In that sense, it was profoundly revolutionary.
22. The democratic government inherited an economy dominated by monopoly capital, with a few white- owned conglomerates owning large swathes of critical sectors. The optimistic assumptions about a post-apartheid dividend were not borne out by reality, as little new investments – domestic and foreign – flowed into the economy. Instead, several large corporations sought to diversify by relocating their primary listings and headquarters from South Africa. Despite the policy positions articulated by the democratic government, a narrative about policy uncertainty was propagated even beyond the country’s borders. In addition, all manner of obstacles was placed to block new entrants. This aggravated the fiscal and monetary crisis that had afflicted the country during the last days of apartheid.
23. While this balance of forces in the early years of the democratic dispensation slowed down thorough-going transformation, the programmes to improve people’s quality of life had started in earnest. As asserted above, the confidence of the people in the democratic dispensation grew; and political resistance against change was at best akin to whistling in the wind, with the ANC attaining close to 70% of the vote in the 2004 elections.
WHAT ABOUT THE BALANCE OF FORCES BEYOND THE TRANSITION?
24. By the turn of the century, the liberation movement had strengthened its grip on the state machinery and, in line with precepts of the Constitution; it could use this machinery to speed up the transformation project. Fiscal expenditure on social and other services grew by leaps and bounds in real terms. Microeconomic reform programmes were introduced. Combined with the windfall of a bustling global economy, growth started to pick up, with the period, 2003 to 2008, experiencing not only high growth rates, but also a significant reduction in the rate of unemployment.
25. Combined with all these developments was increased activism within civil society, represented by organs which co-operated with government where there was agreement; but which also challenged it on other issues. To varying degrees, institutions tasked with defending and promoting the Constitution sought to play their role, with the judiciary standing out among them in asserting its independence and a progressive interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution.
26. In a nutshell, well beyond the tenth anniversary of democracy there was marked progress towards a National Democratic Society. However, there were also fundamental weaknesses, many of which persist to this day.
27. At the centre of South Africa’s fault-lines is the structure of the economy, trapped as it is in the path dependency of the minerals-energy complex. As a small open economy, with a colonial background, it also reflects subordinate relations with countries of the North. It is characterised by high levels of concentration and centralisation of capital; and small, medium and micro-enterprises do not enjoy the same broad proportion of the GDP as in other developing countries. Over the years, manufacturing has been decimated.
28. As elaborated in the Diagnostic Report of the National Planning Commission, the central challenge is that the economy creates too few jobs and economic opportunities. The education system in general and the skills programmes in particular, have not addressed the structural weaknesses inherited from apartheid. All this impacts most negatively on youth, women and rural communities.
29. There is welcome, though inadequate, progress in reducing poverty. However, inequality has not been dented. This has shown an uptick even during periods of high economic growth. Instructively, inequality between the races has declined; but this had increased within the Black community, particularly among Africans.
30. Progress was made, over the years, in eliminating manifestations of patriarchy in legislation, the orientation of social programmes, economic empowerment and demographics in positions of authority. However, within the private sector performance in this regard has been woeful; patriarchal attitudes and practices have remained stubbornly negative in workplaces and communities; and discourse on gender issues has mostly been shallow. Similarly, while there is formal recognition of gay, lesbian and transgender rights, the lived experience in most cases defies this formality.
31. Objectively, political liberation has presented opportunities to right the historical injustice. Some progress has been made in that direction. South Africans’ quality of life has significantly improved. But the fundamental essence of apartheid colonialism remains.
32. It is precisely this ‘sixth sense’ that impelled the ANC in 2012 to call for a second phase of transition to a National Democratic Society. Without deliberate and targeted interventions, current social relations can only reproduce themselves.
33. The issue is whether there is sufficient capacity and will for such a step-change! Regrettably, it is exactly at this moment of opportunity to forge a social compact towards Vision 2030 that the ANC and its Alliance partners, as well as the government it leads, are at their weakest since 1994.
34. The ANC faces declining fortunes. Internal squabbles, money politics, corruption and poor performance in government all conspire to undermine its legitimacy in the eyes of the broader public. Some progressive formations and individuals who historically have been part of the broad front of forces for change are challenging the movement on important current issues, particularly corruption.
35. While workers have made great strides in campaigning to extend the frontiers of freedom, the level of working class organisation has declined; and the progressive trade union movement is in disarray. The sense of hope in broader society has dissipated. Social cohesion seems to be withering. Rampant selfish interests, in broader society and within the liberation movement, are the stock-in- trade. More and more, an impression of reliance on security agencies is taking root. Instead of being the centre of transformative and ethical rectitude, increasingly the ANC and the government it leads have occasionally to be directed from elsewhere – in the manner of ‘lawfare’ – to do right. The moral suasion that the ANC has wielded to lead society is waning; and the electorate is starting more effectively to assert its negative judgement.
36. The postulation that this is the natural trajectory of liberation politics some two decades after the attainment of freedom misses two fundamental issues. Firstly, weaknesses with a root cause that can be identified, especially if they are subjective, should be corrected rather than being accepted as the natural order of things. Secondly, electoral performance in a transforming society such as ours is not for its own sake. It is about social emancipation and the quality of life of especially the poor.
37. The weakening of the ANC, which still contains the main ingredients of the glue that holds South African society together (at least in its formal policy posture), can undermine the state and the democratic system as a whole. With optimism and hope among the people squandered, the social tinder of old and new contradictions can explode in a raging fire. Urgent organisational renewal and intensified action towards a National Democratic Society are required.
38. Given the experiences of the past few years, the question does indeed arise whether the process of fundamental change in South Africa is irreversible! There is no simple answer to this question.
39. The motive forces of change – the classes and strata which objectively stand to benefit from fundamental transformation – still desire such change and are prepared to work for it. It may well be that many of these forces are starting to lose confidence in the capacity and will on the part of the ANC to lead such a project. But this does not mean that they have abandoned their profound self- interest. In fact, it is testimony to the hegemony of the liberation ideal that even parties historically opposed to fundamental change have sought, at least in their public posture, to embrace both the content and symbols of reconstruction and development. In addition, pretentious radical left rhetoric has found fertile ground within significant sections of the electorate.
40. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the mass of the people can, by commission or omission, precipitate an electoral outcome that places into positions of authority, forces that can stealthily and deceitfully chip away at the progressive realisation of a National Democratic Society. The Constitution and bodies meant to protect and defend it may serve as a bulwark against open and frontal undercutting of social change; but on their own, they cannot prevent an insidious slackening or even reversal of revolutionary transformation. Whether, and how, this can unfold, depends fundamentally on social agency.
41. What are the lessons drawn from the analysis of the domestic balance of forces and what is our organisational response thereof?
THE WORLD IN WHICH WE LIVE:
ASSESSING THE GLOBAL BALANCE OF FORCES
42. As an important site of the global project to build humane social relations, and as a small open economy, South Africa needs to pay keen attention to the global socio-political environment. Besides this, the country’s geographic location and the abundance of its natural resources render it a location of interest to the global community. Indeed, the liberation struggle and South Africa’s political transition, owed their positive or negative attributes in large measure to the contradictory global balance of forces, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s. The world, currently, is characterised by primary unipolarity and secondary multipolarity.
43. On the one hand, capitalism is the dominant social system. This system does have variants in different parts of the globe, ranging from developmental states and social welfarism to rapacious domination by poorly regulated markets. China and Vietnam – the major countries propounding socialist ideology – are interlinked in an intractable web of mutual dependence with the capitalist world; and they argue for a prolonged period of development of productive forces before socialism can be attained. Added to this is the military dominance of the United States hyper-power. Combined, all these factors underline the primary unipolarity.
44. On the other hand, a few countries in the developing world, particularly in East Asia have experienced high rates of growth over a generation and more. This has resulted in developmental convergence and the shift in regional economic power balances. At the same time, regional and inter-regional blocs have emerged or consolidated, including the European Union, Eurasian Economic Union, BRICS, the Gulf Council and others. While some of these blocs have a subordinate relationship with the dominant global hyper-power, there are often contradictions. They do serve as a counterweight, limited as this may be. Combined, these factors characterise the secondary multipolarity.
45. At the centre of humanity’s development is the changing nature of global production processes. With advances in technology, it has become possible for companies to disperse various elements of production and services across the globe and to operate as a unit in real time. Research, advanced manufacturing components and relevant intellectual property can be located in the advanced countries, while assembly and packaging can be undertaken in geographies with cheap labour. Instructively, some of the countries that became ‘workshops of the world’ have themselves moved up the sophistication ladder and improved the conditions of their workers; and migration of production sites continues.
46. There have been ebbs and flows over the past ten years, and some countries have recovered, albeit at lower rates of growth. Countries such as India have sought to assume the mantle of global locomotive. However, the danger of global secular stagnation remains as stark as ever; and the economic reconfiguration in China will take a few years to mature.
WHERE DOES AFRICA FEATURE IN ALL THIS?
47. During the past two decades, the combination of a bustling global economy and a new corps of continental leaders with peoples’ interests at heart set the stage for the revival of African economies and improvement in the quality of life in most countries.
48. By the turn of the second decade of the century, seven of the fastest growing economies in the world were located in Africa. While the global economic crisis negatively affected most African countries, the Africa Rising narrative seems still to capture the long-term trend. Africa’s trade with the rest of the world has grown massively; foreign debt has declined; and labour productivity has improved. Critically, these advances have found expression in such social indicators as improved income, lower rates of unemployment, reduction in poverty, higher rates of enrolment in primary education, and lower rates of under-five mortality.
49. Ebbs and flows of commodity prices and isolated negative incidents in the political arena do not subtract from the new trajectory the continent has set itself. As articulated in Agenda 2063, the continent seeks to attain prosperity based on sustainable development, democracy and citizen activism, good and ethical governance, as well as multifaceted integration and peace. This vision builds on earlier initiatives to bring about an African renaissance. Infrastructure programmes and consumer spending are expected to intensify. Agriculture is expected to benefit from the fact that 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land is found on the continent. Already, as in banking and communications, the continent is showing signs of leapfrogging some stages of technological development. Several countries are actively taking advantage of off-shoring of production sites to become part of global manufacturing value chains.
50. The continent, though, needs to draw relevant lessons from weaknesses that have been exposed by the global economic crisis. These include issues to do with macroeconomic management, diversity in the economic structure including capacity to process raw materials, and the scourges of patronage and corruption. Formal democratic processes need to be underpinned by citizen activism and the mind- set to accommodate differences, be they ethnic, racial, religious or party political. This should be reinforced by common security strategies which should include firm action against those who violate the principles of the African Union, and the pooling of sovereignty against wilful and unmandated external military interventions on the continent.
51. The fate of South Africa is inextricably linked to the continent’s future. Indeed, the progress that the continent has made in the past twenty years has redounded to South Africa’s advantage. This is reflected in investment, trade, the innovation system, peace operations and so on. However, South Africa needs to develop and implement a clear Africa strategy which includes well-thought- out approaches to the division of labour. Critically, Africa Rising will succeed only if there are reliable law-governed processes to manage investment relations.
52. Though there may be ebbs and flows, the ANC proceeds from the optimistic and realistic assessment that Africa is set on a new course of rapid economic growth and development. It promotes African integration and the alignment of developmental programmes across the continent.
53. This outlook also informs the organisation’s approach to global relations, underpinned by the desire to build a peaceful and humane world order. In this regard, the ANC seeks to work closely with forces that pursue sustainable development, higher rates of investment and job-creation, reduction in inequality and peace. In the current fraught global environment, the ANC will intensify its campaign for rules-based trade and other economic relations, equitable bilateral relations among all countries and reform of multilateral institutions. It will continue actively to campaign against terrorism, militarism, selfish geo-political pursuits and the reform of institutions of global governance.
54. This it will do proceeding from the understanding that the balance of forces in the global arena is not immutable. It is a function of objective conditions; but critically, it also depends on conscious action by the broad front of global progressive forces.
55. What are the lessons to be drawn from the global balance of forces and what is the appropriate response to such global developments and dynamics?
CENTRALITY OF SOCIAL AGENCY: THE MOTIVE FORCES OF THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
56. Social change requires social agency. This applies more so to the fundamental transformation of an oppressive social system and the construction of a new equitable order.
57. The political act of transfer of power requires the action of social groups that stand to benefit from such change. The construction of a new system, however, is not always a consequence of conscious action. In history, there have been instances in which the change in social relations developed within the womb of the old system. The political revolution thus came about as a culmination of economic processes that had been under way. Under new political managers, new socio-economic system would evolve with time.
58. The National Democratic Revolution differs from this experience because the emergence of the new system, a National Democratic Society, starts with the attainment of political power. It is a conscious act of construction. The forces that coalesced to remove the old order must endure yet another protracted process of conscious action before their ideals are realised. Informed by a correct reading of the balance of forces, and optimally organised, they can move with speed towards their goal. But it is also possible that, by commission or omission, they can have missteps and thus delay or subvert the process of social transformation.
59. It is against this background that the notion of motive forces occupies an important place in the fashioning of strategy and tactics. As during the years of struggle, the ANC sees itself as the organised vanguard with the responsibility of educating, organising and mobilising these drivers of change to act in their profound self-interest. Because of the seamless continuity between the struggle against apartheid colonialism and the process of building a new society, activism among the motive forces – with new tasks under new conditions – is fundamental.
60. The system of racial oppression, class super- exploitation and patriarchal domination gave rise to resistance by Black people. They were denied political rights, economically marginalised and subjugated in the most brutal ways, and as women, subjected to triple oppression in terms of their race, social status and gender.
61. Historically, the ANC asserted that the motive forces of the revolution were Black people in general and Africans in particular. Why the distinction, the question is always asked. In simple terms, this is because in the cynical hierarchy of apartheid oppression, Africans occupied the lowest rung on the social ladder. They were therefore impelled to act more determinedly to change society. Their liberation, it can be argued, was and still is a condition for the liberation of all South Africans. In class terms, these motive forces were made up of Black workers and the rural poor, the middle strata, and real or aspirant capitalists.
62. The system, by definition, privileged and benefited the white community as a whole. The workers, middle strata and capitalists in this community in large measure united in its defence. Monopoly capital, made up of local and foreign corporations controlling large chunks of the economy, was identified as the primary enemy of the NDR.
63. It should be emphasised, though, that objectively having a particular social status and interests does not on its own translate into transformative consciousness. This should be cultivated through both education and actual involvement in the process of change. Thus, there were exceptions which, so to speak, proved the rule: in the form of collaborators from the Black community and white patriots who abandoned their socio-political station to take part in the struggle for freedom. Under
Colonialism of a Special Type, with a white settler community that had embraced South Africa as their (then exclusive) home, the liberation movement also argued that the long-term interests of the white community lay in the liberation of their Black country-men and women.
64. It stands to reason, therefore, that the forces which coalesced in the struggle for liberation need still to work together to eradicate this legacy. But they do so in an environment which is changing.
65. Black workers – employed and unemployed, urban and rural – remain the main motive force of the process of change. This is not an assertion of ideological preference; but a reflection of social reality. Because of their position in the economy and other social endeavours, the mass of the workers make society tick. In the mines, the factories, the banks, state-owned enterprises, the courts, public and private security agencies, government departments, parliament, private homes and so on, they carry the burdens of society. They have, over the years, developed a keen sense of their aspirations and those of broader society; and have organised and mobilised for thoroughgoing change.
66. Today, they are called upon to continue playing a leadership role. They have a responsibility keenly to understand the evolving environment, including technological and generational changes, and to develop organisational approaches that accord with this reality. Their tasks also include: advancing unity of the working class and gradually transcending racial divisions; pursuing decent work and a decent standard of living for all; ensuring a reasonable minimum wage; contributing to state transformation and efficient provision of services; promoting changes to the structure of the economy and advancing broad-based economic empowerment. To play this role, they need to have advanced theoretical and organisational capacity, clear articulation of ideals, and the ability to identify and pursue the common interests of broader society.
67. The rural poor form part of the working class. Many of them are vulnerable workers on farms, unemployed or engaged in survivalist economic activities. Through systematic dispossession, apartheid colonialism decimated the African peasantry, reducing vast rural settlements into sources of cheap labour. Their tasks include those of the working class in general; but they also must focus on land reform and restitution; protection of the constitutional rights of all, including women, in so-called communal areas; and implementation of targeted poverty-reduction programmes.
68. The rise of the Black middle strata is a positive development which accords with the broader objectives of social transformation. These strata include the intelligentsia, professionals and small business operators. Expansion of access to education, including post-school opportunities, and empowerment programmes across society, have seen to massive increases in their numbers.
69. Contradictory trends have played out in relation to this. Firstly, given that most of these strata are first-generation incumbents, their social position is tenuous, and this may subtract from their potential for social activism. Secondly, many within these strata are not dependent on state largesse; and so, act autonomously in relation to electoral politics: a fickleness that brings to the fore issues such as value systems and brand image. Thirdly, an element of these strata has emerged through the political arena, lending a desperation to political contestation that poses a mortal danger to social transformation.
70. Located in various areas of social endeavour, the middle strata have a critical role to play. Within the economy, they are meant to be a catalyst to the campaign for economic transformation in a manner that transcends the narrow self-interest of elite empowerment. They are critical to service provision. It is largely from within this sector that comprehensive analysis of society and creative ideas about change are meant to issue, through such platforms as the universities, the media and the arts. In this context, their ideological frames of reference should consciously disavow the colonial paradigm.
71. Compared to the period of the apartheid glass ceiling, the Black capitalist group has grown by leaps and bounds. This is an achievement of the programme of social transformation, reflecting progress – albeit slow and tentative – in de-racialisation of ownership of the means of production. The core interests of this group are keenly tied up to continuing social change. But it does also reflect some of the contradictory attributes outlined above in relation to the middle strata.
72. Further, some of these forces rely solely on the state procurement process for their sustenance. Many among these thus display attributes of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie, with corrupt practices including attempts to capture institutions of political and state authority for selfish ends. Yet others have risen with the largesse of the established white business community, and would thus evince comprador tendencies of dependence on and unthinking defence of the untransformed economic status quo.
73. The campaign for ‘radical’ economic transformation entails more than the narrow self-interest of this group to amass more wealth. It should encompass efforts to change the structure of the economy to advance manufacturing and beneficiation, investment of more resources in productive activities, and comprehensive broad-based economic empowerment. It therefore behoves the Black capitalist group to appreciate that their own narrow advancement in a manner that deepens social inequality will yield the same bitter fruit of social conflict.
74. Black women form an inseparable part of these drivers of change. Besides suffering intense privations, they are burdened with the responsibility to nurture families and carry out domestic unpaid labour. Their efforts to advance themselves contend with a triple glass ceiling of race, class and gender. They carry the responsibility to make the cause of social transformation more humane and more caring. As such, they should lead in educating and mobilising all of society against patriarchal power relations, which know no colour.
75. Young people, similarly, straddle these motive forces either in their own right or as part of families. The tonic of youth resides in their capacity to be a lightning rod for disruptive change. Their impatience, militancy and imprudence are a disadvantage if improperly deployed. But these attributes can also stand transforming societies in good stead especially during moments of inertia and excessive risk-aversion. They are expected to lend militancy to the various sites of struggle. But to do so in a meaningful way, they need to arm themselves with theoretical knowledge about the strategy and tactics of fundamental transformation, to eschew arrogance and to learn by doing.
76. This characterisation of the motive forces and their tasks proceeds from the perspective of the objective benefit that these forces derive from social transformation. If, as historically asserted, the long- term interests of the white community lie in the liberation of their Black fellow citizens, is this not starting to manifest, more than two decades into the democratic dispensation?
77. Unlike before, support for a non-racial constitutional order is shared across the racial divide. Many in the white community have come to appreciate that their interests are indeed intimately linked to the interests of their Black compatriots. Greater inter- racial interaction and processes of acculturation, the intersection of class interests across the racial divide especially among middle and upper strata, and the gradual impact of programmes of civic and formal education have seen to this.
78. However, the class interests of a community that historically enjoyed privileges which continue to advantage them across generations, does put a damper on this tendency. All manner of rationalisation is used to justify entitlement to historical privilege; and a trickle-down approach to change rather than actual transformation is punted. In voting patterns, virtually all white voters support parties that, in various historical periods, identified with variants of white privilege. Today, contestation around these issues takes place within the framework of the Constitution, and it forms part of legitimate political discourse. Further, in an attempt to fish from a bigger electoral pond, parties popular within these communities are repositioning themselves to embrace, or be seen to embrace, the basic ideas of change.
79. This happens in a period in which significant sections of the motive forces seem to have lost confidence in the capacity and will of the ANC to carry out the agenda of social transformation. As elaborated earlier, the 2016 election results do suggest that, through non-participation or a vote mainly for splinters from the ANC, electoral allegiances are shifting. This is a consequence mainly of subjective weaknesses within the ANC. An examination of the professed positions of the largest parties leads to the conclusion that these sections of the motive forces have not abandoned their support for fundamental change. In some instances, their electoral choices, however misplaced, reflect a sense of impatience and urgency. In other words, some among the motive forces contend that continuing social transformation does not necessarily require ANC leadership as such.
80. What about monopoly capital? The approach of the ANC on this issue remains unchanged. To quote from the 2007 Strategy and Tactics document: There are fundamental areas of divergence between the objectives and value systems of the ANC and those of monopoly capital. There is much in the nature and behaviour of private monopolies that has the effect of constraining higher rates of growth and skewing development. These include monopoly pricing and other forms of rent-seeking, selfish import parity pricing, barriers to entry in some industries and a value system based on greed and crass materialism.
The approach of the liberation movement to private capital, including monopoly capital, is informed by our understanding of the national democratic society as a system that encourages competition, promotes sustainable labour-absorbing activity, discourages rent-seeking in the form of super-profits arising from monopoly control and other selfish advantages and so on.
81. The relationship between the national democratic state and private capital in general is one of ‘unity and struggle’, co-operation and contestation. On the one hand, the democratic state has to create an environment conducive for private investments from which the investors can make reasonable returns, and through which employment and technological progress can be derived. On the other hand, through state- owned enterprises, effective regulation, taxation and other means, the state seeks to ensure redistribution of income, to direct investments into areas which will help national development, to play a central role in providing public goods and broadly to ensure social responsibility. The balance between ‘unity’ and ‘struggle’ will be dictated to by the strategic imperatives of the NDR.
82. As such, the democratic state should have the strategic capacity and the instruments to deal with these negative tendencies, while at the same time mobilising private capital in general to partner it in increasing rates of investment and sustainable job- creation.
83. The organisation and mobilisation of these motive forces is fundamental to the current task of speeding up the process of social transformation. Beyond this, it is necessary to identify common interests among critical sectors of society, in the manner of shifting concentric circles of a broad front, to pursue the country’s long-term vision.
84. Did the forces of change accurately read the balance of forces; and have they responded appropriately to this balance? What is the assessment of progress made in changing South African society?
THE GENESIS OF ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL AND DESIGN IN THE ANC
85. The Mafikeng ANC National Conference recognized that whereas the 1994 breakthrough ushered a completely new environment in the entire existence of the ANC, it has taken the organization some time to determine how to operate within this new context. Conference went further to say “Though the democratic order has created opportunities for the organization that were barely considered possible five years ago, it has presented challenges for which many of the established practices and strategies seem inadequate.
86. The 1994 elections and the final adoption of a new constitution for South Africa in 1996 marked a historic watershed in the struggle for freedom as led by the ANC. As a result of this victory the conditions of our struggle changed radically. Accordingly, a qualitative step towards the total transformation of power from the hands of South
Africa’s white minority group into the hands of the people was accomplished, and for the first time in history, possibilities existed for the ANC to begin to practically change the conditions of the lives of our people.
87. This new opportunity represented by a democratic dispensation involving, among others, the holding of democratic elections and a democratic parliament, raised the need to re-fashion the ANC’s design to take full advantage of these vistas”.
88. This fundamental change is the mission of the ANC, from an extra parliamentary movement seeking the forceful overthrow of the apartheid regime to a political party that is part of a normalized political dispensation seeking to rebuild the socio-economic life of South Africa’s former oppressed majority, once again implied that the ANC had to redesign itself to function optimally for the attainment of the new mission. The Port Elizabeth National General Council observed that among the attributes that make the ANC unique as a political organization is its ability among others, to “internally renew and redefine itself when the situation so demands”.
89. One of the imperatives of proper management is to pay adequate attention to the suitability of an organizational structure for the attainment of the organization’s goals. Constrictions imposed by an inappropriate structure can be just as harmful to an organization as poorly conceived strategies. In its own history, the ANC has reputable lessons of creativity in crafting structures that promoted the attainment of its goals because they were in step with the movement’s goals and the environment within which the struggle was executed.
90. The measures taken since 1994 to ameliorate our structural weaknesses were helpful, but because they were not out of a comprehensive assessment of the implications of our strategy and tactics, they were piecemeal, induced by different factors and intended for different reasons in some cases. They include the changes at the ANC head office which resulted in the shrinking of previous capacities and their unintended location in government, the establishment of caucuses at various levels, the attempt to form governance committees in all our legislatures.
91. In contemplating the design of the ANC, three tenets of our strategy and tactics are instructive, viz. (i) the ANC’s strategic mission, (ii) the centers of power of our transformation that is the State, Civil Society, the Economy and the terrain of ideas and (iii) the motive forces of our struggle. These precepts of our Strategy and Tactics, must underpin what formation must the organisation assume and how must it discharge its duties. An outline of the above is dealt with under Part I of this paper. Secondly, the design must also flow from the mapping of core and support functions as enumerated under Part II of the document.
92. Another central challenge confronting us since 1994 is to creatively achieve an organic integration of the work and duties of elected public representatives of the ANC and party mobilization and organizational work. The inability to marry the two political lifelines of the organization is partly responsible for the continuous strain on the movement’s financial resources. Secondly the lack of this organic link has compelled us to device mechanical procedures to supervise and evaluate their work.
93. Without allowing party political life to be subsumed and dictated to by governance (the legislatures and the executive), the party machinery must be designed to sufficiently reflect the awareness that governance in the contemporary period of our existence, is the primary pillar of our struggle.
94. In recent history, the clarion call for organisational renewal was made at the National Conference in Polokwane after Conference observed the reality that we have been finding it difficult to comprehensively respond to the new conditions and challenges occasioned by the coming into power of the ANC as the leader of the democratic forces. It is back then in December 2007 Polokwane Conference that a ground-breaking resolution was adopted calling on the National Executive Committee to declare ‘a period of renewal’.
95. The 2010 National General Council (NGC) focused extensively on the tasks of organisational renewal and further resolved that decisive steps must be taken to reverse negative tendencies that are eroding the political integrity and moral standing of the ANC among our people. The NGC concluded that for renewal to succeed three conditions need to be met and these are: a resilient, courageous, principled and decisive leadership; a committed and conscious cadre ship; an active civil society and mobilised population.
96. The 53rd Conference of the ANC in Mangaung elaborated on the strengths and weakness of the movement, and arrived at the conclusion that there is a need for the movement to embark on organisational renewal. The Conference reaffirmed the emphasis of the 4th National Policy Conference on the urgent need for renewal, recognising that renewal is principally about building the ANC’s resilience, enhancing its transformative and governance capacity and its ability to adapt to changing situations so that it can continue to serve and lead the people.
97. The continuous renewal of the ANC over the century of its existence has been guided by the nature and content of the struggle against apartheid colonialism and its legacy as elaborated in its Strategy and Tactics. The ANC has always understood that to lead the national democratic revolution successfully, it should continuously renew itself so that it remains relevant to the changing conditions of the struggle both locally and internationally.
98. Having agreed that the second phase in our transition from apartheid colonialism to a national democratic society will be characterised by more radical policies and decisive action to give effect to thorough-going socio-economic and continued democratic transformation, Conference concluded that this will require a renewed, united and more vibrant ANC, the Alliance and broad democratic forces.
99. The Conference anticipated that this new phase will require maximum unity of the ANC and the Alliance, enabling us to sharpen our capacity to advance and defend the national democratic revolution. It would also require that we build maximum unity of South Africa’s people and the broadest range of sectors of our society around this programme, as a means and not end. Conference then agreed that we must continue to learn from the experiences of the past 100 years of selfless struggle, as well as the experiences of other progressive movements.
100. Conference attributed the survival of the ANC over the last hundred years to, among other traits: Our historical deep roots and connection with the people, our revolutionary internal democracy and collective leadership; the readiness and willingness our members to make sacrifices in pursuit of the cause of the people, our readiness to acknowledge our weaknesses and decisively address them to escalate and accelerate the people’s struggle, our ability to adapt to changing conditions and rise to the occasion at critical moments and our ability to uphold and build unity a cross section of South Africans and progressive forces in the world in pursuit of the cause of humanity;
101. In this regard, the movement’s strengths and weaknesses and priorities for organisational renewal were identified to reposition the ANC as we commence the revolutionary journey towards the second century. The 53rd National Conference discussed the recommendations of the 4th National Policy Conference and agreed with the overall thrust and made additional amendments for strengthening the organisational design in the areas to be discussed in next chapters.
102. Can structures of the movement justify the delayed or dereliction in the implementation of crucial resolutions and Programmes of Action of the Conference?
ORGANISATIONAL STRENGTHS MANIFEST THROUGH THE STATE
103. In treating the question of organisational renewal and design requires reflection on the original narrative before venturing into the new perspectives. It is in this context that the paper recognises the observations made by the 53rd Conference as politically correlate with the contemporary debates on the challenges facing South Africa - and the ANC - at the start of our transition in 1994 which are enormous. These challenges manifest themselves in the crafting of a new political dispensation and polity; ensuring political stability, reconciliation, de-racialisation, gender equality and nation-building; and tackling the all-pervasive legacy of triple oppression; in a global environment hostile to progressive national projects.
104. The 1994 breakthrough ushered in a new democratic dispensation in which the ANC was elected into power by the overwhelming majority of South Africans. After assuming power, the ANC focused on the new tasks of reconstruction, transformation and development. The movement deployed its most experienced cadres to various state institutions to carry out the transformation and construction of a democratic state, while at the same time recruiting and developing new members and setting up new structures to advance the cause of the NDR under new conditions.
105. Over the past 22 years, substantial progress has been made in improving the quality of life and laying a firm foundation for a national democratic society.
106. More than two decades into democracy, does this analysis still hold? As asserted in earlier Chapters of this document, our approach to transformation should be guided by macro social reality. To recapitulate: South Africans have attained political liberation with the principle of equal human rights guaranteed in the basic law of the land. Since 1994, the state has been gradually transformed to serve all the people.
Progress has been made in extending basic services to the majority; but the quality of services and working conditions remains poor, and apartheid spatial economic and settlement patterns largely remain. Poverty, in terms of income and assets, has been reduced; but Black people continue, disproportionately, to endure massive privations.
Inequality remains stubborn, and management and the professions particularly in the private sector, are dominated by white males. All this, and more, underline the fact that critical attributes of colonial social relations endure. South African society can thus be characterised as ‘racial capitalism’ or ‘neo-colonialism of a special type’. However, the resilient fault lines and legacy of apartheid socio- economic relations that still persist in the form of the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequalities are born mainly by the majority of Africans, women and youth.
107. It is important to underscore the fact that the ANC came to power in a period dominated by neo-liberalism. The 1990s and early 2000s was an era in which the progressive policies of the left-leaning governments and movements were under severe attack. The role of the state in socio- economic development was equally under attack as “market fundamentalism” took centre stage in public policy and general political discourse.
108. What are the key features of neo-liberalism? Neo-liberal ideology or policy proceeds from a premise that the market mechanism and market forces should be the basis for organising society. According to neoliberalism, all aspects of life and all human needs – food, water, healthcare, education, housing, culture, leisure, etc. – should be governed by the logic of the market and consequently, the profit motive and money. Everything should be left to the market. There should be no conscious human or state intervention to address the needs of humanity and society.
109. The role of the state is reduced to protecting and expanding the role of the market forces and the capitalist system, not human life and the common good. This also referred to as “market fundamentalism”. Lenin is sharply critical of this bourgeois economy as it gives way to ‘the monopolies’ capital domination and their possession or control of enormous resources the disparity between spheres of the economy, and intensifies the anarchy and crises”. [Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, VI Lenin, Collected Works, Vol.22, p202.]
110. The 2007 Strategy and Tactics outlines that the ANC’s ideological orientation and policy positions are diametrically opposed to neo-liberalism. The vision that the ANC pursues is informed by the morality of caring and human solidarity. The kind of revolutionary democracy our movement pursues leans towards the poor and it recognises the leading role of the working class in the current project of social transformation. It recognises the reality of unequal gender relations, and the fact that the majority of the poor are African women; hence the ANC pursues gender equality in all practical respects.
111. In this context, it is a disciplined force of the left, organised to conduct a consistent struggle in pursuit of a caring society in which the well- being of the poor receives focused and consistent attention; What the ANC seeks to put in place approximates, in many respects, the best elements of a developmental state and social democracy.
112. Accordingly, the ANC contrasts its own positions with those of national liberation struggles which stalled at the stage of formal independence and achieved little in terms of changing colonial production relations and social conditions of the poor; with neo-liberalism which worships the market above all else and advocates rampant unregulated capitalism and minimalist approach to the role of the state and the public sphere in general; with ultra-leftism which advocates voluntaristic adventures including dangerous leaps towards a classless society ignoring objective tasks of the national democratic revolution.
113. The central thesis of this paper is that the subjective weaknesses of our movement are not unrelated to the influence of a neo-liberal ideological paradigm. The cumulative impact of all these weaknesses is the silent shift from transformative politics to palace politics wherein internal strife and factional battles over power and resources define the political life of the movement. In the South African context, neo-liberalism sought to weaken both the ANC’s progressive outlook and the capacity of the developmental state to carry out a thorough-going transformation agenda.
114. The erosion of the character and capacity of the movement and the hollowing out of the capacity of the democratic state must be reversed urgently and vigorously if we are to rapidly improve the pace and depth of transformation.
115. A weak ANC and a weak state are twin dangers that must be confronted if South Africa is to realise its full potential and know that the immediate objective of our opponents is to weaken both the ANC and the national democratic state in order to stop or slow down transformation. On our part, our immediate task is to strengthen the capacity of both the ANC-led democratic movement and the democratic state in order to deepen transformation and improve the quality of life of the masses of our people.
116. During the past 22 years, the ANC has continued to articulate its progressive policy positions and take resolutions that strive to maintain its character as a people’s movement. It has sought to use incumbency to push forward its transformation agenda. What are the decisive strengths and achievements as well as the weaknesses of our movement during the post-1994 period?
THE ORGANISATIONS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
117. The ANC remains a dominant political force in the development and the political landscape of our country. Consistently, more than 60% of South Africans have continued to vote for the ANC in national, provincial and local elections over the past 22 years. We dismiss the narrative, by our opponents and sections of the commentators that our support is misplaced loyalty and ignorance based on nothing else but race. Evidence from independent surveys and our direct interaction with communities explain the reasons why the overwhelming majority of South Africans continue to vote for the ANC in national, provincial and local elections.
118. The people appreciate the progress made in the democratisation of the political landscape in our country and restoring the dignity of millions of men and women who were dehumanized by colonialism, patriarchy and the apartheid system. Our people appreciate the historic role of the ANC in the struggle for freedom. Freedom is synonymous with the ANC brand!
119. However, as pointed out by one senior leader of the ANC that, “in South African politics, any political party of consequence must have the backing of the metropolitan municipalities. Out of the eight metros, the ANC secured a reduced majority in three: Mangaung, eThekwini and Buffalo City, and lost three metros to a coalition of opposition parties in Tshwane, Nelson Mandela Bay and Johannesburg”.
120. As indicated above, the discussion on Organisational Renewal is taking place in the aftermath of the local government elections in which the ANC lost its ruling party status in 3 major metros and obtained just 54,5% of the total national electoral votes. What do the numbers illustrated above signify? Are these indicators of an organisation that is losing the pulse of its organisational-base or is this a temporary setback?
2016 LG Election voter share
121. The question that the Policy Conference must examine is what does this phenomenon represents. This question requires deep introspection and learning from sister organisations such as Nicaragua, Zambia and India in view of their rise and decline as liberation movements and how they responded to their challenges over decades. The discussion paper postulates the views that movement has reached a defining moment since the democratic break through, which is to - adapt or die.
122. The prerequisite to adaptation is an honest voluntary collective admission that the movement is on the cusps of paralysis if it fails to embark on a path of radical re-orientation and modernisation phase henceforth. To this end our thesis is that it is in the interests of the movement to accept this reality and undergo a brutally frank process of introspecting and self-correction. A resolution to the affirmative on its own is not sufficient without an elaboration in a Minimum Plan or Recovery Plan and graduation by cadres from words to deeds.
123. As one of our forebears once pointed out:
“Every organisation engaged in national liberation constantly has to isolate, analyse and search for solutions crucial both to its continued existence and growth, and to the success of the struggle as a whole…In a certain sense, the story of our struggle is a story of problems arising and problems being overcome.” [Walter Sisulu, Reflections in Prison, 1976]
124. The ANC is the only organisation that has the vast organisational machinery to reach the majority of South Africans where they live. The ability of the ANC election campaign to articulate the core concerns of the majority of our people and sound the alarm bells about the danger of reversal is a crucial capacity that should be turned into our style of governance and continuous involvement of people in socio-economic development and transformation processes. It should not be limited to election campaigns. In fact, our people resent seeing ANC Leadership during election time.
125. The ANC has been growing in terms of its geographic reach of the country and size of membership. Since the unbanning in 1990, the organisation has been able to attract into its ranks new members and trained new leaders and organisers who are playing a critical role in its day- to-day work in communities and in all sectors of society. Among these are younger generations, women, workers, black professionals and business people and white compatriots. This is a major strength that should be harnessed through strategic sectoral work. There is however an emerging threat to the ANC’s influence and appeal to young intellectuals and black middle class. We must investigate the ambivalence of young people towards their recent reported apathy and distance.
126. Many citizens across the country continue to place hope on the ANC regarding their own progress. The ANC continues to have deep roots among the working class and poor across the length and breadth of our land, and is able to reach every sector of society. Even when workers and communities engage in protests, they do so as a way of communicating with the ANC so that it can rapidly address their aspirations, concerns and frustrations.
127. The ANC’s vision and national transformation programme cannot be matched by any opposition party. All the opposition is doing is to criticize our capacity to implement our vision. Lately, the opposition is also trying to appropriate our history, struggle symbols and galaxy of exceptionally talented and outstanding leaders produced over different periods.
128. What then should be the organisational expression of political leadership for fundamental change; and can the ANC still claim this mantle?
THE CHALLENGE OF THE COLONIAL LEGACY
“Many liberated countries are still feeling the effect of their colonial past. The rapid development of the national liberation and social emancipation of previous oppressed peoples has been impeding the methods of neo-colonialism and international capitals stepped up pressure”. [VI Lenin, collected works. Vol.22].
129. Our gains can often be overshadowed by the persistent and stubborn socio-economic legacy of colonialism of a special type expresses itself through the triple challenges of unemployment, poverty and inequalities. In our view, far more rapid progress can be achieved in the transformation and socio-economic development of our society if both the A NC and the democratic state have the requisite capacities and capabilities needed to drive the transformation agenda.
130. The pace and depth of socio-economic change has often been determined by three inter-related factors: a) the policy environment; b) institutional capacity and resources of the democratic state; and c) the purposefulness and cohesion of the governing party. The neo-liberal policy influences have impacted on how we have undertaken the tasks of state transformation, socio-economic development and movement-building.
131. Objective conditions of democracy and incumbency have given birth to new subjective weaknesses on the part of the ANC as the leader of the state and society in general.
THE DANGERS AND ORGANISATIONAL SHORTCOMINGS
132. In our view, there are three main organisational shortcomings and dangers that have that continue to bedevil the ANC post-1994 period:
133. Firstly, the challenges of governance and political management of state power have been impacting on the character and values of the ANC as the movement for transformation and servant of the people. Due to the preoccupation with managing internal conflicts, the movement has not been mitigating the ten dangers that any governing party has to contend with and manage: The danger of social distance and isolation of the party from the masses; The danger of state bureaucratic and demobilisation of the masses; The danger of corruption and sins of incumbency; The danger of institutionalized factionalism, ill-discipline and disunity fuelled and inspired by the battles over the control of state power and resources; The danger of using state institutions to settle inner-party differences;
The danger of neglecting cadre policy; what have we done 4 years since we resolved in 2012 on – A Decade of a Cadre? The danger of lack of capacity and capability to implement policies; the danger of gate-keeping and, bulk buying of membership; The danger of divisive slate electoral politics, wedge-drivers, ulk-buying of membership and The danger of character and political assassinations and so on.
134. Secondly, the political life of the organisation revolves around insidious internal strife and factional battles for power. This is a silent retreat from the mass line to palace politics of factionalism and perpetual in-fighting. The internal strife revolves around contestation for power and state resources, rather than differences on how to implement the policies of the movement. This situation has shifted the focus of the cadres and members of the movement away from societal concerns and people’s aspirations. These circumstances have produced a new type of ANC leader and member who sees ill-discipline, divisions, factionalism and in-fighting as normal practices and necessary forms of political survival. Drastic measures and consistent action against these negative tendencies are necessary to root out anarchy and decay.
135. Thirdly, the organisational capabilities – structure, systems and processes - do not match the tasks and demands of the current phase of the revolution. Although we have a presence of progressive policies and cadres in virtually all pillars of transformation, we are not deliberately building appropriate capabilities to mobilise, engage and lead the motive and progressive forces in these pillars, and therefore draw the linkages between pillar and sectoral processes and the overall national objective.
136. Unlike in the pre-1990 period, the ANC is not rapidly training and deliberately deploying competent cadres in accordance with the pillars of our current strategy and tactics. Equally, our current structures are designed to respond more to the financial constraints of the movement than to respond to our tasks and work among the motive forces and in the pillars of our transformation agenda. The grassroots structures reinforce the isolation of the masses rather than place them at the centre of our efforts to change our society fundamentally.
137. Necessarily, the aim of organisational renewal is to comprehensively address all the challenges faced by our movement as it begins its second centenary.
138. What are some of the major lessons from our history on matters pertaining to internal renew al, re-organisation and redesign of structures in response to changing conditions or the shifts in strategy and tactics of the revolution?
LESSONS FROM OUR HISTORY ON ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL, REDESIGN AND WATERSHED MOMENTS
139. “The African National Congress, or the South African National Native Congress, as it was first called, emerged from the crucible of the colonialism in the early years of the twentieth century. By then, European powers had been powers engaged in conquering and colonising large parts of the globe for almost five centuries. In the process, indigenous people had been subjugated, enslaved, deprived, of their land and freedom, even in places exterminated, all in the name of western civilisation and ‘progress’.” (Andre Odendaal.p3). This is elitist organisation formed by pioneering African intellectuals and chiefs as a consequence of pressure and response to colonialism after a series of what came to characterised as wars of resistance to colonial invasion and cultural subjugation.
140. In 1912, the ANC had a double-decker leadership structure of the upper and lower house in which the traditional leaders occupied a key role due to the imperatives of uniting Africans across tribal and ethnic lines. This kind of structure became irrelevant as new conditions ushered in new social forces due to the rapid urbanization and industrialisation in the late 1930s and early 1940s. The growth of the black industrial proletariat and an emergence of a new generation of educated young Africans and post-World War situation placed new demands on the ANC.
141. By 1941, there was a growing view that the 1919 ANC constitution needs to be amended. The Johannesburg Branch wrote to President Xuma “As a matter of fact, the whole constitution as it stands today is so antiquated that those of us who are charged with the administration of Congress are finding it hard to be guided by it”. This led to the adoption of the new ANC Constitution and new structure in 1943.
142. The ANC was re-organised to strengthen the authority of the NEC to take and implement decisions swiftly. Upper and lower houses were scrapped and individual members introduced, including women as full members. The NWC was introduced to carry out basic administrative duties and campaign work. The ANCYL was introduced and ANCWL revived. Provincial structures w ere streamlined to comply with the directives of the national body. The constitution was rewritten in simple language to clarify the aims and objectives, decision-making processes and organisational structure of the ANC.
143. The ANC was significantly re-organised after the adoption of the programme of action at the 1949 watershed conference. The turn to mass mobilisation as the principal form of struggle in the 1950s, required the movement to re-organise so as to concentrate on mass mobilisation and direct action. Campaign coordinating structures, joint action councils of the Alliance, full-time organisers and volunteers were introduced.
144. The introduction of the M-Plan strengthened the role of the ANC in communities and improved disciplined, political education and security consciousness in the midst of increasing state repression and banning orders. Confluence of watershed moments signifying an appreciation of the contours that defines society, as well as various strands or streams of struggle such as youth and gender. The tempo was quickening and propelled the movement to the 1955 Congress of the People that adopted the Freedom Charter, which was itself preceded by the African Claims document.
145. The formation of uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK), the Spear of the Nation, popularly known as the Peoples’ Army following the increased repression marked the beginning of a long journey to democracy in South Africa. The banning of the movement in 1960 and the turn to armed struggle in 1961rendered most of the previous structures inadequate and irrelevant for the new tasks and new conditions. Given this new situation, the 1962 Lobatse Conference decided to suspend the ANC constitution so that decisions could made without having to convene the type of conferences that were akin to the pre-1960s period.
146. The 1969 Morogoro Conference adopted a new strategy and tactics which clarified the centrality of mass mobilisation and internal reconstruction of ANC underground machinery and the primacy of the political over the military form of struggle. Between 1969 and 1990, the ANC organisational structure was changed profoundly to give effect to the new strategy and tactics. This was the period of discontent and threats of defection compounded by the rough terrain in which guerrilla warfare had to be executed and functioning as an underground organisation.
147. The NEC was reduced from 23 to 8 and the Revolutionary Council w as established to concentrate all efforts on the home front and reconstruct internal structures of the movement that can mobilise and lead the masses. These bold steps re-enforced by swelling of the ranks of MK by the 1976 generation of militant youth and combat inspired activists an off-shoot of the 1976 Student Uprising.
148. In the early 1980s, Politico-Military Councils were established at HQ and regions to direct the struggle in all the four pillars in line with the political direction determined by the NEC. Senior organs alongside politico-military machineries were also established in regions inside the country to direct political and military activities. These structural changes were meant to give provide an institutional firepower to the movement in line with the political line of the time.
149. The struggle for liberation reached a crescendo during the decade of the 1980’s as President OR Tambo called on the youth (Young Lions) to render the country ungovernable and the apartheid system unworkable. Organs of Peoples Power gained moment as the Mass Democratic Movement openly defied the apartheid junta and created alternative democratic structures in communities, workplace, schools, universities, sports, arts and culture and so on.
150. The UDF, COSATU amongst others played a pivotal role in ensuring that apartheid is dislodged from power. On this platform, the Mass Democratic Movement constructed the final assault and consolidated the machinery that broke the back of apartheid. The ANC survived banning, imprisonment, exile and massive repression.
151. In the aftermaths of the 1990’s political unbanning, the ANC faced challenge reconstituting itself and re-establishing Leagues in a new terrain of legality. This was to be more complex post 1994 when the ANC had to organise itself whilst simultaneously at the helm of power. Between 1990 and 1993, the ANC re-established itself as a legal mass-based organisation with political structures that operate above board, while retaining MK structures. The immediate focus of these structures was mass mobilisation and action in support of the negotiations, combating violence and promoting peace and preparations for the elections.
152. The 1994 democratic breakthrough ushered in a completely new situation in which the ANC, the leader of the Alliance and broad democratic forces became the leading party in a Government of National Unity. As indicated earlier, the priorities of the movement shifted completely from mobilising the masses and broad range of social forces to overthrow the apartheid the regime, to focus on spearheading the transformation, reconstruction and development of our society.
153. In the immediate aftermath of the democratic breakthrough, the transformation of the state became the main pre-occupation of the organisation. The ANC organisational structure was rationed and cut to size to leave minimum capacity which was mainly administrative rather than political and strategic. The most experienced cadres were deployed to the state institutions to push the agenda for transformation. The ANC became lean and mean organisational machinery, influenced by financial constraints in the same w ay that budgetary constraints drove the notion of a lean and mean state.
154. For almost two decades, organisation has been struggling, in varying degrees, to keep up with the demands and expectation of being a movement that is capable of mobilising the motive forces around the tasks of transformation while at the same time playing the role of a strategic centre of power that leads the state and the South African nation as a w hole in the national reconstruction, transformation and development agenda. In this paper, the point is made that the A NC is now here near its aspiration of becoming the strategic centre of power. Capacity is built consciously, step by step until the forces for change are in a hegemonic position in all centres of authority and influence.
155. The ANC and democratic movement have to renew their determination to transform South Africa into a united and truly non-racial, non- sexist, prosperous democracy. This will only happen if the ANC resist a drift away from transformative politics. The ANC has to operate as a vanguard movement with political, ideological and organisational capacity to direct the state and give leadership to the motive forces in all spheres of influence and pillars of our transformation.
156. The key lesson from our history is that structures should be established in line with the conditions and political line of each phase of the struggle. Principles are sacrosanct while strategy, tactics and structures have to adapt. In particular, watershed moments and major strategic shifts dictate a major redesign and new capacities and capabilities for cadres.
157. Our history teaches us that the struggle can be taken to a new level if the movement grasps the mood in society and seizes the moment decisively. This requires a careful assessment of the situation and the development of a correct political line - strategy and tactics - as well as the development and deployment of quality and quantity of cadres in appropriate structures to carry out the new political tasks to the fullest. In this regard, the ANC has changed its structure continuously to respond to changing conditions and new imperatives.
158. What are the challenges bedevilling the ANC that must be addressed in order to ensure the success of the OR&OD plan?
159. What is to be done to ensure that the ANC remains at the helm and achieve its organisational goals?
LESSONS FROM OTHER INTERNATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND CONTINENTAL POLITICAL PARTIES
160. In drawing lessons from the fraternal parties and organisations, we sought to understand and answer the question, how these selected parties reacted to social changes. What are advances have they made in adapting to these social challenges and what obstacles have they encountered. We further sought to understand the nature and the form of inter party democracy, how they manage inner party dynamics and factions, and most importantly how they interface with society.
161. We focused on the following parties, in part, because of their extended period of existence and the fortunate fact that they have been rooted within the democratic left traditions and have a track recorded of being rooted amongst the masses, the French Socialist Party, the Labour Party of Britain, the Indian Congress Party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany.
162. We deliberately included the Peoples’ Action Party of Singapore in our study, mindful of the fact that it was formed and was part of a resistance against British Imperialism, but over time has shifted ideologically to centre right and crushed communists and independent trade unionism over time. We paid attention to their renewal and modernisation process and sought to understand whether elements of their modernisation can be applied to our material conditions without being absorbed into their ideological conditions.
163. This document does not discuss the historic evolution and modernisation of each party, but focuses on selective themes/pillars which should form part of the organisational renewal strategy. In all these political parties, except People’s Action Party, there is a concerted effort to ensure that branches (local units) are basic structures of the political party which interface with communities on matters of issue based interest(s) and that these structures have a substantive influence on the political life of these organisations. Through the branches (local units) political leadership (MPs) interact with their constituencies and there is interface between governance issues and party political programme, especially in countries where the party is a majority party in governance.
164. This distinct, parallel and simultaneously integrated way of approach to constituency work, is evident especially in country where Members of Parliament are elected on the basis of proportional representation. There is a degree of relative autonomy, including expression of policy positions which are not essentially official positions of the party but are relevant to their constituency. This fluidity allows for greater participation of communities in influencing ruling party positions on various policy issues.
165. The approach of the Peoples’ Action Party is different from the rest. First and foremost, it is highly centralised and does not have provincial or regional structures. It is structured along the Central Committee, The Headquarters, Executive committee, government parliamentary committees and branches. The role of branches in PAP is limited to serving as sites for MPs to conduct their weekly meetings, the people sessions and Para state organisations are used to maintain contact with the populace and mobilise on the ground. Branches do not play a significant role in the life of this political party.
166. In the case of the Indian Congress Party, the remarkable shift has been ideological with the overall framework of development in the early 1990 from state regulated economy to a market one and an increasing role of religious politics. It remains a mass party. It remains controlled by “political Families”. A third of party MPs acquire their seats through family connections and lacks internal democracy. Although it has structure in all the states in India, it remains centralised with a top down approach, limiting the influence of local structure in the body politic of the party.
167. The matter that requires attention is what form should the ANC branches learn? What strategic role should they play in the context of the pursuit of socio – economic transformation in the second phase of the National Democratic Revolution? What is the appropriate balanced mix between ensuring that the branches continue to be the life blood of the organisation and equally master the art of involving and allowing communities to influence organisational processes instead of being excluded to decisions that are otherwise of national interest? What then is the desired model?
168. In dealing with some of the matters above, it is interesting to note that article 21 of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) stipulates that the internal organisation of parties has to conform to “democratic principles”. This implies that all party processes including the management of finances have to be democratic and transparent. The Social Democratic Party facilitate the participation of its members in decision making processes., including the election of party organs, codetermine policy and personnel issues through membership votes and non-members are offered guest membership and allow them to participate in the decision-making process. Interestingly, the party conference (Parteitag) elects an executive board (Parteivorstand), a control committee and federal arbitration committee.
169. The Control Committee is entrusted with checking the party leadership and dealing with complaints about party members from within the party. Neither members of the executive board, nor the arbitration committee are allowed on the control committee. Local branches, sub districts and districts are permitted to appoint investigative committee to get facts to settle disputed and the actual disputes are handled by arbitration committee. The question that then arises is what are the elements of this model which we may consider for strengthening accountability of those entrusted with leadership position to ensure that the organisation is not brought into disrepute through choices made by individual leaders? Do we have sufficient mechanisms in place to manage this risk and what have been the lessons learnt in our context?
170. The French Socialist Party was built by wide range of groups making up the French socialist tradition in the nineteen centuries and enriched in the twentieth century, the revolutionaries and the reformists, the Jacobins and Girondins Given its history there is plurality of thoughts and political beliefs within the party and thus has a rich history of debates. All party members are linked to one faction (courants) or another in the process leading up to a national conference. Conferences are built based on policy declarations. The votes on the declaration determines a majority leading to governing bodies established on the basis of these motions (policy declarations) This practice is similar to that of the Labour Party of Britain where consensus is built on the dominance of factions in policy fora resolutions rectified at a national conference.
171. In Zambia both the colonial and post-colonial political structures set the conditions for the defeat of the colonial power and that paved way for the leadership of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) led by Dr Kenneth Kaunda. During the colonial period both the state and economy were exclusionary and dependent due to its subordinate insertion into the global economy. Under colonialism, Zambia was a dominated copper-mining enclave owned by multinational companies under the British South African Company. Ownership in the manufacturing industry was vested in both white settlers and multinational companies. Commercial farming was also predominately in the hands of the white settlers
172. In 1958, the Northern Rhodesian ANC split into the Zambia African National Congress over the goals and strategy and tactics for the liberation of Africans in Northern Rhodesia. The ZANC wanted full national independence based on a universal franchise, whereas the Northern Rhodesian ANC (as its name suggests – Northern Rhodesian Congress) wanted incorporation into the colonial structure based on a qualified franchise.
173. Another split in the ZANC led to the formation of the UNIP over the degree of militancy and tactics. Dr Kenneth Kaunda became the UNIP President, and was largely influenced by the British Labour Party. Negotiations were held between UNIP, the ZANC, the ANC and the British colonial authorities at Lancaster House (London) over political independence. It was agreed that Dr Kaunda would be the Prime Minister from 1963, until the elections in 1964.
WHAT THE ZAMBIAN NATIONALISTS DID OR DID NOT DO TO OVERCOME EXCLUSIONARY COLONIAL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURES?
174. Upon election Dr Kaunda; and like all post-colonial countries, politically independent Zambia had to grapple with overcoming underdevelopment. The Zambian economy faced constraints such as concentration of the economy amongst a few, low levels of levels of industrialisation and reliance on copper; small market size, disruptions of supply routes due to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. However, Dr Kaunda inherited good foreign reserves due to the then high copper price which enabled the state to generate enough revenue to roll out social and economic infrastructure such as schools, health facilities, bridges and roads.
175. Despite nationalization of the key sectors of the economy, the post-colonial Zambian state failed to transform the Zambian exclusionary colonial industrial structure and its dependency, which manifested in high levels of imports of consumer and capital goods, and copper.
176. There had been failed attempts to diversify the economy to overcome reliance on copper through industrialization using the colonially inherited state owned Industrial Development Corporation (Indeco), which had 26 subsidiaries active in industries such as food processing, building supplies, metal products and chemicals. These attempts at state equity holding which enabled the multinational companies to continue to extract surplus through an outflow of profits, inflated transfer prices and payments for services as well as expatriate remittances.
177. The problem of relying on copper exports became evident during the fall of the copper price in 1975 and the rise in oil prices. In 1974 and 1975, a global economic crisis, led to a decline in demand for copper as well as its price. As a result, the cost of Zambia’s imports of consumer and capital goods increased, thus decreasing Zambian economic output. Zambia’s major industries depended on imported inputs and expatriate skills.
178. The government treated the fall in the copper price as a temporary occurrence hence it did not take decisive measures to diversify the economy, including failing to pay attention to the development of agriculture16. Part of the government’s response to the crisis was to borrow heavily from the IMF and the World Bank to maintain its public consumption of imported capital and consumer goods. The government’s fiscal position was maintained through borrowing. When it became evident that the economy was not recovering, the government had embraced the IMF and World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in which the government undertook free-market policies.
179. This included, but was not limited to, trade and investment liberalization through removing restrictions such as tariffs and price controls; low taxation as well as austerity measures; and devaluation of the currency with the hope that this would encourage exports and discourage imports of luxury goods.
180. The negative impact of the SAPs which also saw the first food riots in Zambian history persuaded the government to oppose the SAPs, and they demanded the renegotiation of the conditions of debt payments. The IMF and World Bank responded by withdrawing the loans and other forms of donor funding. In 1989, the government turned back to the IMF and World Bank for rescue. The re-implementation of SAPs further worsened the socio-economic conditions for the poor, and the government further entrenched its dependency position by accommodating the imposed external demands and conditions such as austerity budgeting and investment guarantees.
FRAGMENTATION OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT AND THE ELECTORAL DEFEAT OF KAUNDA’S UNIP
181. Whilst the struggle for access to the state and state- controlled economy set the conditions for intra- UNIP-State elite, the neo-liberal restructuring of the economy set the conditions for conflicts between the working class and, students on one side; and the state and UNIP on the other side. The workers used the economic crisis to demand multi-party democracy as a mechanism for political inclusion in Zambia. However, the conflict between the state and workers started shortly after political independence.
182. The fragmentation between nationalists and workers started when Dr Kaunda turned his focus on increasing labor productivity and moderating workers’ wages. In order to achieve worker discipline to increase labor productivity, UNIP and the government attempted to take control of the African Mine Workers’ Union through its candidates who were defeated in the miners’ union congress in 1966 and simply succeeded in settling for higher wages. In 1971, the government made strikes illegal, and only UNIP-dominated ZCTU had the power to call for a strike.
183. All trade unions, including the Mine Workers Union of Zambia (MUZ) were expected to be under the control of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) which was established in 1965. MUZ leadership was also incorporated into state owned companies, and UNIPs political affiliation was the pre-condition for their membership into state companies; the trade union leadership started to look at the wage demands and workers’ interests from a state elite’ perspective, and cracked down on its own militant rank and file who began to question the class logic of the union.
184. In the 1970s, there were wildcat strikes and dismissals of workers by the government. One hundred miners were arrested in 1971. Seventy- three per cent of the workers in 1969 were unhappy with the union. The workers used the political harassment and economic crisis to demand political change, including the restoration of the multi-party democracy.
185. UNIP members and leaders were not allowed to be in business, thus forcing them to be dependent on the state and party for their material reproduction. The Zambian economic structure prevented the emergence of an independent bourgeoisie; and to a certain extent an independent proletariat.
186. The state and economic structure, both centred around copper mining, set the basis for struggle amongst UNIP leaders over the distribution of resources, patronage and privileges associated with being part of the state. But they could not defeat Dr Kaunda. UNIP became more bureaucratized as increasingly, high ranking government officials became dominant within the Party to the extent that a number of the state officials were appointed to the Cabinet and Central Committee
187. These mass protests forced Dr Kaunda to sign legislation restoring multiparty democracy, which eventually led to a 1991 Constitution. The political opposition to Dr Kaunda was the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) whose class base was largely students and the trade union movement (ZCTU); and later Dr Kaunda’s political opponents and disenchanted aspirant business people.
188. The open opposition to Dr Kaunda came largely from students and organized workers in the mines. Workers were enabled by their structural position in the economy in that their possession of labour power provided them with the leverage to force both the state and business to make certain concessions. Students were enabled by the fact that they had no economic burdens associated with personal property ownership such as housing, which could have made them susceptible to co-option. Students, largely from the University of Zambia, affected by the effects of budget cuts opposed Kaunda’s government through the University of Zambia Student Union, the presence in Zambia of many liberation movements including the ANC of South Africa tended to radicalize students who identified largely with socialism.
189. In the 1991 national elections, Dr Kaunda was electorally defeated in the presidential contest by Fredrick Chiluba who obtained 76 per cent electoral support; and his MMD obtained 125 of the Parliament’s 150 seats. Between 1991 and 2011, Mr Chiluba became state president; and the Movement for multi-Party Democracy implemented neo-liberal economic policies, this also entailed the privatization of the state-owned mining company, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) and its ancillary companies in 1997, which was bought at a very low price amidst allegations of corruption and bribery.
190. The demand for copper in China associated with the rise in demand for Chinese electrical products saw the copper price rise again. The MMD won the elections again in 1996, but lost elections in 2011 to the Patriotic Front.
[ANC’s Declining Electoral Support: Lessons from Zambia and Nicaragua by David Masondo]
191. What are the lessons for our organisation and party from these experiences elaborated above? Where is the ANC at this juncture in its organisational development and what does the future hold after our comparison?
PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ORGANISATIONAL RENEWAL AND DESIGN
BUILDING A UNITED COHESIVE ANC TO ADVANCE SOCIO–ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN THE SECOND CENTURY
192. We argue that for the ANC remains the leader in the processes for social change as demonstrated by our delivery since 1994. That said, the ANC must retain its dual character as a liberation movement and a political party. In doing so, it needs to readjust its organisational machinery to be more responsive to the new demands of the current conjecture.
193. We are of the view that the ANC is capable of renewing itself without losing its traditional outlook. Organisations exist within a political and ideological context; there is an urgent need to strengthen the organisational machinery to achieve the ANC’s historic mission.
194. Whatever direction organisational renewal or modernisation takes, it must be borne in mind
that there is no neat-formula. For purposes of discussions wemust imagine variables and scenarios that transcend our historical characterisation of the ANC as a liberation movement and a party in government. Let us imagine a multi-faceted ANC with its ideology and values embedded in societal institution, and that is hegemonic in all social classes and strata.
Public perceptions about the ANC
195. From the above, we are attempting to make sense of how the people view and perceive the ANC as organisation. For purpose of debate we highlighting below the possible characterisation of the ANC in terms of the likely assumptions made,
a) A Political Party that must retain and attract new Voters, a political party that is responsive to the needs of the people.
b) An Organisation with Members, Structures and Allies, an organisation that is hegemonic and that shapes public opinion;
c) A Ruling Party with Legislatures, Government and Service Delivery Agencies for the people;
d) A Social or Mass Democratic Movement with Social Partners (Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) Civil Society,
Supporters and friends, etc.); and
e) A Liberation Movement with Freedom Fighters, Revolutionaries Stalwarts, Political Philosophers and Social Activists.
196. By way of example, the ANC, as a Political Party is responsible for Voter mobilisation and should by the nature of this very Function be organised and structured differently, in line with its function, in order to be effective in its mandate. Modern organisational design principles dictate that old organisations falter and die because they cannot adapt (change its structures to fulfil a new function) and not agile enough to perform functions demanded by capricious changes in society and the world the organisation has no control over.
197. A second example is that the change driver to attract voters will be the Political Party formation of the ANC. This Political Party formation, must essentially be a modern media organisation with a scientific communication strategy and public relations plan with the types of “voices” and persona that are attractive to diverse groupings in society e.g.
- How does the ANC communicate with its middle-class young adults? What is the character and persona of the media personnel of the ANC that will attract and idealised this cohort?
- How does the ANC communicate with middle-class, academically realised groups and how does it show such groups that it respects and embraces their place in society and that they too have a place in the movement?
- How does the ANC communicate with disaffected and youth and how does it show this desperate part of society that it cares for their plight in what it is doing to do to uplift them form their plight of poverty, joblessness and inequality?
198. It cannot be the same message from the same person at the same time. The target audience is way too diverse and have very different aspirations of their futures. By recreating structures and systems to give a NEW VOICE to the marginalise people and organisations that were traditionally aligned to the movement.
199. This will allow the ANC to automatically organise at multiple levels and through various organisational formations. It will, for instance, be able to rely on an ANC policy-aligned Education NGO to counter balance the liberal forces in largely White and privileged NGOs that are well funded and have been strategically established to dismantle the ANC and create a trust deficit in schools, amongst teachers, among parents and educationists
200. In the ANC formation as a Confederation of Social Movements, the ANC can draw on vast organisational and intellectual resources to reclaim its space as the voice of the people for the people and counter the neo- liberal forces through action on the ground via NGO where the state is less effective with its programmes and service delivery.
PILLAR I:
THE CHARACTER OF THE ANC
201. The ANC seeks to build a democracy with social content. Informed by our own concrete conditions and experiences, this will, in some respects, reflect elements of the best traditions of social democracy, which include: a system which places the needs of the poor and social issues such as healthcare, education and a social security net at the top of the national agenda; intensify the role of the state in economic life; pursuit of full employment; quest for equality; strong partnership with the trade union movement, business and other motive; and promotion of international solidarity.
202. Arising from this characterisation of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR), in the strategy and tactics document therefore the question must be answered, “What organisational form must the African National Congress take to execute its historic mission as articulated above”? An organisational renewal of the African National Congress must be based on the following key cornerstones. The African National Congress remain the vehicle that is the helm of society and whose strategic objective remains the realisation of a non – racial, non- sexist, democratic and prosperous South Africa. The ANC should political imperative remains the total liberation of blacks in general and Africans, in particular within the context of creating a socially cohesive South Africa united in diversity, its endeavour to accelerate and deepen socio –economic transformation – its policies and political programme will be biased towards the working class and the poor and the downtrodden, and elevate the interest of these classes to assume a status of hegemony in society and public policy.
203. That it enhances mobilisation and encourages popular participation of the masses of the people in governance and decisions-making, foster cooperation between labour, business, civil society and communities to unite around the National Development Plan (NDP) for attainment of higher economic growth, shared participation and redistribution. That it forges cooperation with the disciplined forces of the left in the region, the continent and in the world to build a better Africa and the world and build a network of solidarity amongst the people to create a caring and peaceful world.
204. Flowing from these cornerstones therefore a need for an African National Congress that has the following characteristics. The ANC remains essentially a liberation movement seized with the primary task of the progressive realisation of a non- racial, non-sexist, democratic, united and egalitarian society.
205. As a liberation movement, how does is stay rooted amongst the people of South Africa and ensures that the aspiration of the masses of the people find expression in the political programmes of the movement and in turn the ANC must provide political guidance and leadership in the quest for realisation of the aspirations of the masses of people? As the vanguard in the struggle for total liberation of the people, how does it t mobilise the motive forces of the revolution and ensure that they take their rightful place in the reconstruction and development of our country and its economy?
206. As the ruling party, the ANC needs to continue to ensure that transformative legislation and government developmental programmes are an expression of the – and the progressive realisation of the – aspirations of the people for accelerated socio-economic transformation. How is this to be achieved?
PILLAR II:
THE STRUCTURES OF THE ANC
STRATEGIC ROLE OF ANC BRANCHES
207. As we move to the second centenary, we need the kind of ANC that is enduring and ‘built to last’, a transformative movement that will remain a powerful for progressive change right into the next century and beyond. We will draw inspiration from our forebears while at the same time acknowledging that some of the challenges we face are unique to our time and imposed by circumstances of being a governing party. The role of the Branch remains as stated in the branch manual as an agent of change that has ensure that the ANC lives and leads transformation in every community. Of necessity, we reaffirm the Branch as the basic unit of the African National Congress.
208. This basic unit becomes the primary site for sustained political and ideological work and building a new layer of leadership capable of taking ANC to new heights. In the final analysis, a better appreciation and understanding of the political and ideological orientation of the ANC is acquired through the unity of theory and practice. This praxis must resonate in the work in branches.
209. There must be a strategic shift from evaluating the performance of the branches based on the number of ‘new members ‘acquired (quantity) to the ability of the branch to be able to do political and ideological work, including implementation of organisational programmes in a manner that attracts the progressive and potentially talented members of new layer of activists that can be transformed into ANC cadres.
210. Such a shift , therefore , will have to take into consideration that the one size fits all in constituting the branch of the ANC does not apply, as experience has shown that this practice has only served to alienate segments of our society (like the progressive intelligentsia) who are loyal to the ANC but their location is as such that it becomes practically impossible for them to have a branches as has been traditionally defined, and thus driving them away from the constitutional structures of the movement. In this connection, National Policy Conference must express itself to the poignant question of what is magical about the 100 members’ quorum in all circumstances.
211. A closer examination of the rationale of limiting the size and shape of the branch is warranted.
212. Looking ahead, it unlikely that in some areas, huge branches with no decision-making powers will be able to sustain the movement. There is a school of thought that posits the view that no party can speak for the people unless the people speak for themselves.
213. In reviewing our organisational architecture, the fundamental dilemma posed by the alignment of ANC branches to the demarcation of municipal boundaries must be resolved to allow for penetration into all sections of society the ANC has been struggling to reach.
214. The complexity posed by rural versus urban dynamics needs to be debated in order arrive at policy position on whether the ANC adopt a hybrid model that accommodates rural and urban communities with each according to its dynamics. These must be established by the REC where it is deemed viable. These could cover places of big population concentration where individuals (voters) share common interests or peculiar traits; exclusive communities such as university campuses and huge workplaces (corporate institutions, parastatals, etc).
215. The new approach to organisational work at a branch level will create a conducive environment which will advance the revolution through the continual production of a contingent of cadres who have attributes that accord with the tasks of the national democratic revolution in this second phase of the National Democratic Revolution.
216. The National Policy Conference would have fallen short in its review if it does not address the question of how best the ANC can and must serve is ordinary supporters who may not be card carrying members of the organisation.
THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AND PROVINCIAL STRUCTURES IN SUPPORTING COMMUNITY WORK AND
GOVERNMENT WORK PROGRAMMES
217. The regional and provincial structure of the ANC should support, resource and monitor branch and regional work and help develop Programme of Action and strategy for comprehensive sectoral and community work. It is in the interest of the ANC for the regional and provincial structures to set up set minimum of what a Branch should achieve, set performance indicators, manage and monitor and evaluate, implement corrective measures when needed, also monitor and direct work in government.
218. It is incumbent upon the regional and provincial to ensure that political induction and ideological training is provided as part of the reception and on- going training of the ANC cadres. The NEC must ensure that the content, method and procedure for delivering political education is uniform in its application all the structures. The regions and provinces should monitor the implementation and delivery of political education.
219. Provision should be made for alternative delivery mechanisms such as study groups and distant learning with internet or DVDs and should be rolled out from 2017 to encourage study groups in branches and caucuses and provide universal access. Regions/sub-regions should have as one of their primary tasks the engagement of civil society, the state and business in their domains. Again this will ensure that the organisation looks after all centers of power and is geared to engage all motive forces. This is the ideal level/sphere for driving programmes of the tripartite alliance.
NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
220. The National Executive Committee remains an important structure that oversees the organisational work and political programme work of the African National Congress in- between congresses. It provides an overall political and strategic direction in ensuring that conference resolutions are implemented. The current number of NEC members does not augur well with a necessity to have well oiled organisational machinery capable of providing the required strategic political direction.
221. The extent to which the NEC is able to discharge its responsibilities depends less on the large quantity of warm bodies serving, but on the quality of discussions and the resolutions at its seating. For a better focused NEC, it is proposed that the number of leaders constituting it be reduced significantly and that those leaders be more visible in provinces, regions and branches. This will ensure that quality cadres are spread evenly in all levels/spheres of the organisation. We must debate whether the reduction can also be implanted in the Provincial Executive Committees as well.
222. In consolidating and building the capacity of the ANC it is of cardinal importance that the most capable cadres of the ANC are not over-burdened with state responsibilities. They must be deployed in our National and Provincial Headquarters to focus on political and organisational programmes of the ANC.
223. It is further proposed that a maximum target of 65% National Executive Committee members be allowed to serve in the country’s Cabinet. This institutional arrangement will allow the organisation to have an objective view and influence on developments in government, civil society, the economy and international arena. The organisation can intervene strategically to any challenges. This should allow the NEC to be a balance mix of cadres in government and those engaged in civil society and business.
224. In addition to the Political Tasks the National Policy Conference should discuss the capacity required at Head Office, Provincial Offices, Regional and Branch Offices.
225. The related question will be in respect of the efficacy and effectiveness of the current subcommittees in driving the work of the organisation.
ELECTIONS AND ORGANISATIONAL PROCESSES
226. The starting point is the debate on the electoral process is the implementation of the NGC 2015 resolutions on the never-ending ending manipulation of elections and strengthening the Integrity Commission and internal dispute resolution mechanisms. In this connection, the movement require additional methods for proactively ending factions. This important task must be internalised as part of our collective leadership responsibility and practice.
227. For these conditions to exist there is a need for a review of the organisational processes, timing of the auditing, the pressures arising from closely knitted timeframes for Branch General Meetings (BGMs), Regional, provincial and national conferences, the list processes towards local and national elections. The experience since the 1994 democratic breakthrough thought us that organisational work has been biased on these processes to the detriment of the political and ideological work that must be undertaken. This reality has resulted into the manipulation of branch processes to be geared towards achieving pre-determined outcome in terms of the elections of leadership in various conferences.
228. The resolution on the establishment of the Revolutionary Electoral Commission must be invoked and implemented. This process must be guided by the Through the eye of the needle policy document in order to ensure that the ANC structures prepares, produce and present to South Africa the best cadres from its ranks. It is recommended that critical aspects of the through The Eye of a Needle Policy Document should be incorporated into the Constitution.
229. The ANC nominations and election processes must be reviewed to allow for open contestation with provisions for the membership to engage the candidates.
DEPLOYMENT OF ANC MEMBERS TO STRATEGIC LEVERS OF POWER
230. This document reaffirms the correctness of the 53rd conference resolution on organisational renewal which argues that ‘in the new phase of the NDR, deployment should always be preceded by systematic intellectual, ideological and ethical training and political preparation. Aligned to this should a a rigorous system of monitoring and evaluation of cadres deployed and elected to leadership positions.
231. The point is made that not all those who join the ANC are ready to lead. The first consideration must be to serve, ideological development and political training. Leading must be reserved for the best cadres and well trained combatants amongst us.
232. It is therefore proposed that a process of screening potential deployees to strategic lever of state institutions, business, civic society and international arena be put in place.
233. The screening process must be complemented by canvassing the views of communities on proposed candidates before the deployment is finalised. Effectively, the election of leadership and deployment must not only be an enclave of branches, but should include community participation as is the case with the election of councillors and mayoral candidates. This new approach therefore will result in the withering away of membership bulk buying and manipulation of branches and for the ANC to reconnect with the masses of our people.
REAFFIRMING THE LEAGUES OF THE ANC
234. An organisational renewal process guided by this perspective will be incomplete if no attention is given to the Leagues of the African National Congress. The Youth League must continue to be a political preparatory school for young cadres to play an important role in the body politic of the African National Congress. Appropriate support should be given to this structure to ensure that it retains its mass character and that it reconnects and channels the energies of young people into a purposeful effort of building a national democratic society.
235. The League must be measured on the extent to which they exist in institutions of learning and in communities mobilising and organising both in school and out of school youth. Young intellectual, academics, entrepreneurs, sports and cultural activists should must swell the ANCYL ranks and reside in it as their natural political home.
236. The legacy of triple oppression of women cannot be meaningfully addressed without the participation of women in shaping the policy and political programmes of the organisation to address this challenge.
237. Collaboration and solidarity with sister organisations such as COSAS, SASCO, Young Communist League should be an intrinsic part of the ANCYL Political Programme of Action.
238. The document re- affirms the resolution to revive and re-establish Young Pioneers and volunteer corps. The National Policy Conference must cause the ANCYL to put a programme in place to address the implementation of the resolution.
239. The YL must galvanise the youth to participate in clubs and societies, sports bodies, religious bodies and cultural bodies.
240. Retaining of the mass character of the Women’s League is a pre-requisite for the ANC to be able to accelerate struggles towards women emancipation. The Women’s League should be in the forefront of clubs and societies, community initiatives social forces that promote women emancipation and overall support to family unit and economic champions.
241. The Leagues must be in the forefront of progressive and social programmes aimed at combating drug abuse, HIV/AIDS, early pregnancy, early exit from school, financial and academic exclusions, domestic violence and child and senior citizens abuse.
242. The Veterans League remains a reservoir of wisdom and knowledge gained through historical conjectures in the struggle against apartheid colonialism. They are custodians of revolutionary conscience and morality and add value in ensuring that the African National Congress continues to remain focussed on its historic mission of building a non- racial, non-sexist, democratic and prosperous society.
243. Efforts should be made to strengthen the Veterans League and ensure that they become the lifeblood of the African National Congress. Twenty years into the new democracy, the ANC we have not adequately taken care of the plight of the veterans of uMkhonto We Sizwe. A majority of these former combatants have been relegated to margins of society, trapped in a vicious circle of unemployment and poverty.
244. Our revolutionary conscience dictate that the ANC redouble its efforts to restore the dignity of former combatants and ensure that they too are in the forefront of defending the gains of the democratic breakthrough and benefit from opportunities arising from positive change in our society. The strengthening of uMkhonto We Sizwe Military Veterans League remains an important strategic task.
ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP
245. This document takes its line from the discussion document titled “the eye of the needle” in validating the nature and the character of an ANC leader. The document takes the view that the election of ANC leaders is matter of societal interests as they are entrusted with a responsibility of leading, not only the ANC, but the society as a whole. As argued, elsewhere in the document, efforts should be made to canvass communities view on those cadres who make themselves available for leadership position, and whom, by virtue of their position are likely to serve in the leadership positions in government (e.g. Mayors, MEC’s, Ministers Premiers and President).
246. It is proposed that we look at possibilities of a more professional Revolutionary Electoral Commission screen candidates. If this approach is used, the final choice forward candidate should be explained to and ratified by the Branch and presented to the community. The Revolutionary Election Commission should have a dynamic relationship with the Deployment Committee. This new Committee will be composed of time tested cadres who are objective, and will screen those candidates making themselves available for elections using set criteria that will be consistent with the eye of the needle document. Working with branches, community meetings will be convened to solicit views to enable such a committee to make recommendations to be presented at a conference for formal decision. The process will be less depended on votes and more focused on the attributes of a cadre and society’s view.
247. We re-iterate the point that not all those who join the ANC are ready to lead. The first consideration must be to serve, ideological development and political training. Leading must be reserved for the best cadres and well trained combatants amongst us.
LOBBYING AND INTEREST GROUPS
248. The extent to which lobbying has been tolerated in the ANC has only been through conference sessions. What has been proven to be a challenge is the lobbying process engineered by clandestine factionalism which destabilizes the organisation. The perception that lobbying is prohibited creates favourable grounds for destructive factionalism. Factionalism has become an integral part of the organisational culture. Its clandestine nature makes it a parallel activity that is beyond reproach. Efforts should be made at regularizing lobby or interest groups activity within the organisation. There is a need for formalisation and transparent processes in managing lobby groups activities. Drawing from the experiences of Social Democratic and left leaning parties, the African National Congress has to develop guidelines to formalise and manage various interest groups within its ranks.
POLICY FORA
249. The African National Congress has historically managed to engage the mass democratic movement, civil society, academia and business on policy discourse in South Africa. This rich experience waned as the social distance between the organisation and the masses of our people widened. As the movement doubles its efforts to engage society, conscious efforts should be made to reconnect with the progressive intelligentsia and engage them on developmental trajectories and strategic policy choices that the ANC with which the ANC is contending.
250. It is proposed that policy forums have a constitutional status and are formalised within the African National Congress structures. Recommendations to the National Policy Conferences should be influenced by perspectives arising from consultation in these structures. These forums should be localised and exist alongside with branches to allow maximum civil society participation in influencing policy choices of the ANC.
ENHANCEMENT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE
251. A one stop ANC portal infrastructure should be rolled out to reconnect ANC to the people and membership. It must contain all relevant policy and other documents/ It should have a page where members, cadres and supporters and can advise or express their views on various matters. It must have a team of dedicated administrators who can provide a personalised service to those who want to keep in contact with the ANC. Such a portal should be designed in a manner that membership application can be processed and confirmed instantly, and have automated sms system that facilitates communication between ANC and its members and supporters.
252. The ANC should have a fully automated electronic recruitment and membership management system. This system should be centrally commanded from the National office but provide visibility and dashboard to the branches, regions and provincial structures of the African National Congress.
253. The use of technology in the elections process requires advancement of codification using tools like the ANC cloud for effective monitoring of the election processes.
PILLAR III:
THE TYPE AND QUALITY OF AN ANC CADRE
A NEW ANC CADRE IN THE SECOND PHASE OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
254. This document reaffirms the correctness of the “Through the Eye of the Needle” outlining the type, the nature and the character of the leadership required to lead the movement in all levels of the organisation. This document further suggest that those attributes should be possessed by all cadres of the movement, ultimately as the ANC navigates a turbulent historical conjecture toward the realisation of socio – economic transformation, which is a strategic focus for the realisation of non– racial, non-sexist and democratic South Africa. The following attributes are required to ensure that the ANC is able to discharge its historic mission.
AN INFORMED AND IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDED ANC CADRE
255. We are 4 years into the period declared as ‘A Decade of a Cadre’ with very little progress on the by way of political and academic programmes to show any results. What are the challenges impeding progress? Do we have a plan and a champion?
256. The new cadre should be able to understand and appreciate the ideological orientation, policies and political programmes of the African National Congress. This new cadre should be able, at all times, to understand, and interpret the changing nature of global balance of forces, social and economic trends in society and have a strategic and farsighted approach to challenges of “modern day” society.
A CADRE ROOTED AMONGST THE
PEOPLE AND SERVING THE PEOPLE.
257. The envisaged new cadre trait must include appreciating and internalising a mind set and a behaviour that acknowledges that s\he exist and so is the organisation, to first and foremost serve the people. She/he, through the organisation, becomes the totality and the embodiment of the general interest of the masses of the people, and therefore the individual and the collective choices made are as such that they advance the interests of the masses of the people of South Africa. Such a cadre must be rooted amongst the masses, and yet, the lifestyle and the intellectual depth must serve as an inspiration to the masses of the people that s\he, through the ANC, represents a better future for the country. Such a cadre must earn a respect of the community as a leader of society. His outlook and lifestyle choices must represent the values of the African National Congress at all times.
EVERY ANC CADRE – AN ANC ORGANISER AND A TEACHER
258. It thus imperative that over and above the requirement that ANC cadres have to live an exemplary and inspiring lifestyle choices, that this cadre has to be a magnet for new members of the organisation. Such a cadre must also have a foresight, of identifying new members in community and recruit them. Within the organisation, such a cadre needs to create an empowering environment for political nurturing of the new members.
A LOYAL AND DISCIPLINED CADRE
259. The envisaged cadre will at all times subject himself to the collective decision of the organisation. This cadre must be bold enough to express his/her view without fear or favour. In doing so, he must remain disciplined at all times, and ensuring that those views only serves the general interests of the organisation and ultimately society. When such a view is defeated, such cadre must adhere at all times to the collective decision of the organisation. He\ she will pursue the implementation of any decision with vigour and commitment, even though, he may have held a dissenting voice. Where there are threats or challenges in the implementation of whatever decision, that cadre should have courage to advise the collective, without apportion blame to those comrades whom he differed with. The cadre will desist and exposed negative traits of nepotism, factionalism and pursuit of material interests at the expense of the organisation.
AN ANTI-CORRUPTION AND ANTI-CRIME CADRE
260. The new cadre must the first point of call in the fight against corruption and that those who engage in this conduct are brought to book. The cadre must instil in his belief that corruption is ultimately looting, a behaviour undertaken by lumpens with a sole purpose of stealing public resources and thus subjecting our people to the vicious cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. It thus requires such a cadre to have a principled approach to fighting corruption in the same vein as fighting poverty and under development.
PILLAR IV:
THE MINIMUM PROGRAMME OR RECOVERY PLAN
261. Elements of the Minimum Programme or Recovery Plan are highlighted and embedded in the preceding three pillars. We are making an appeal and strong recommendation that the organisation should revisit resolution on the Decade Long Programme of Action. The ANC should avoid short-term planning as this practice is unsustainable and devoid of strategic thinking. Building and capacitating the organisation is a long-term consistent process punctuated by campaigns, organising and mobilising along the way and. In broad terms, we are proposing that the organisation, consider the following generic recommendations for discussions at the National Policy Conference and consideration for approval at the National Conference:
GENERIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DISCUSSIONS AND FINAL RESOLUTION FOR IMPLEMENTATION
262. That a detailed cadre policy that is underscored by organisational ethical and moral values be prepared for adoption at congress. The policy must after adoption be infused or attached to the Code of Conduct of the organisation.
263. That the ANC election process be reviewed in order allow for open contest and transparency. Cadres who make themselves available for public office or are nominated must be prepared for their names and manifestos to be subjected to the scrutiny of the ANC structures and their constituencies.
264. The ANC must conduct a massive SKILLS AUDIT at all levels amongst its employees and cadres with an objective of assessing who has what skills and/or competencies. Subsequent to this, a comprehensive training and development programme must be design to build the intellectual capital of the ANC beurocratic structures at all levels (branch, region, province and national
265. That at the level /sphere of the NEC, PECs and RECs, the organisation needs to be populated by strong leadership as sign of the ideological and political maturity and rigour of our incubation and training organisational institutions (i.e. The Political Education Schools and support to cadres for academic achievement and intellectual pursuit). The discussion on the size and composition of the NEC should include a discussion on ensuring that ANC leaders are found in all sectors of society; i.e. civil society, business sector, academia and others. This will assist the organisation in developing and maintaining its position as leader of society. In this connection we are recommending that the organisation should take a firm decision that NOT more the 65% of NEC Members should serve in the Cabinet and Provincial Legislature.
266. That the establishment of the Integrity Committee is welcome. However, there must be a distinction between the Integrity Committee and the Revolutionary Electoral Commission that we are recommending. That the Revolutionary Electoral Commission that must be established post Conference as per our previous resolution will ensure the screening of cadres and recommending to the Deployment Committee ideologically grounded and intellectually developed cadres for servicing the people of South Africa.
267. That a careful balance or combination of experience of tried and tested, on the one hand and bright young minds, on the other, will bring dynamism and nurture the new cadre
268. That the Veterans League should be positioned as a Council of elders whose pre-occupation is to provide advice and counsel to the structures and leadership of the ANC. Is therefore follows that due to the special place the veterans occupy in the ANC, the veterans should not contest leadership positions within the ANC.
269. That the ANC must of necessity consider the reviewing the current branch system and allow for the establishment of branches or constitutionally recognised units at institutions of higher learning and training, work place and gated communities. The current demarcation is stunting organisational growth and limiting contact and influence
270. That the branches, it is recommended that while the current territorially based branches (ward based) will remain the main form of ANC branch organisation, allowance be made for another form of branches namely “sectoral or institutional branches”. These must be established by the REC where it is deemed viable. These could cover places of big population concentration where individuals (voters) share common interests or peculiar traits; exclusive communities such as university campuses and huge workplaces (corporate institutions, parastatals, etc.)
271. Regions and sub-regions do not co-exist, that there is one or the other as part of an attempt to delayer the organisation. The problem with having a region where there is already a sub-region is that the objective of the region then simply becomes the coordination of sub-regions. This would simply become an added layer of bureaucracy between branch and the province.
272. Regions/sub-regions should have as one of their primary tasks the engagement of civil society in their domains. This will ensure that the organisation looks after all centres of power and is geared to engage all motive forces. Previously, this would have been the ideal level for driving programmes of the tripartite alliance.
273. In view of the above, it is pertinent to consider allocating original powers and administrative resources to this level, so it can act as an effective centre for branches; an administrative “warehouse” for all branches.
274. Provinces must focus on the centres of power and all the motive forces. The province must establish sector committees and support centres of power consciously. This is important because whatever is not done at this level is unlikely to happen at any other level. Provincial offices should mirror the structural reorganization that will be effected by head office.
275. That in terms of the Head Office major weakness which the ANC must overcome to be equal to the challenge at hand, is to radically grow a host of capacities that we do not have today at head office.
276. Secondly, head office must strengthen the organizing department in order to establish sector mobilisation sections, paying particular attention to labour and business under the mobilisation department. The mobilisation department must conduct a review of youth and women organisational work together with the youth and women’s leagues. An NEC member must be mandated to focus on providing political leadership of the organizing department, whilst full time personnel handle the day-to-day function.
277. That the office of the Secretary General is the engine of the organization, focusing on managing the core function of the organization. For this office to perform this crucial task effectively, it will have to employ a highly skilled person with managerial skills, to coordinate the overall functioning of this office. This will also include coordinating the programmes performed by all the departments and units under the office of the Secretary General.
278. That another important area of focus is policy. The need to map policy processes cannot be over- emphasized. It is recommended that the NEC policy sub-committees must be linked to the policy institute as a feeder. Furthermore, head office staff that is responsible for policy and other policy functions such as research, should be incorporated into the policy institute.
279. An operational level, all ANC offices at all levels must be structured along the following departments, namely legislature and governance, Economy, Mobilisation/Organising, Social Transformation, Media and Communication, International Affairs, Political education and ideological work.
280. NEC sub committees NEC policy sub-committees and other sub-committees must serve as interface nodes of the organisation with broader public in order to bring their political and technical competencies to bear in the sectors of their work.
281. A question is posed whether the proposals on size and composition (specifically the proposal to reduce the size of the NEC) will also apply to the size and composition of provincial and regional executives.
282. Whether the discussion on the size and composition of the NEC should include a discussion on ensuring that ANC leaders are found in all sectors of society; i.e. civil society, business sector, academia and others. This will assist the organisation in developing and maintaining its position as leader of society
283. The NEC must be reduced to a sizeable NEC comprising of tried and tested cadres of the movement, balanced by youth and women activists. These are cadres who will be selected on the strength of their political, ideological and academic development and in order make a meaningful contribution to the implementation of ANC policies.
284. That the executives of the ANC at all levels from branch to province, must be structured in accordance with their responsibility to intervene and provide leadership to all centres of power, viz. the state, civil society, the economy, the battle for ideas and the continental and global arena.
285. That the department that is responsible for work within civil society (presently our organising department) must be broken down into targeted sections dealing with different sectors and segments of our motive forces e.g. labour, Youth, Business. In other words, the organizing department must as a matter of principle have sectoral work as one of its core-mandate. The implications of this are that units such as the religious desk must no longer operate as separate entities but should be incorporated to the organizing department.
286. That the question National Policy Conference must answer is how ANC members can hold the cadres accountable for the implementation of Conference resolutions and Programme of Action (PoA). What mechanisms and systems should the Conference introduce in order to monitor implementation and outcomes? In our considered view, there must be consequences for dereliction of duty or failure to execute by cadres and members of the organisation. A related question is how do we build a culture of urgency wherein deployees take initiative and spearhead transformation without being reminded or monitored?
287. Regional and provincial structures of the ANC have a pivotal role play in supporting progressive community initiatives and government programmes. Support by way of resources and monitoring branch and regional work and help develop Programmes of Action and strategies for pertinent sectoral and community work. Setting minimum standards of what a branch should achieve. Setting performance indicators manage and monitor, implement corrective measures when needed, also monitor and direct work in government.
288. That all levels of the leadership organs of the ANC must accommodate core and support functions / processes in their structures
289. That in terms of the the ANC Caucuses, Parliamentary, Legislative and Council possibly the biggest challenge of our review is to design an appropriate structure for the management of both government and legislature work, an area which did not exist before 1994 in our work but has today become our main pre-occupation, the premier pillar of our struggle.
290. ANC exists and functions in an environment that demands instant decision-making, in this context integration, inculcating a culture of a learning organisation and information sharing is imperative. The practice of designating a function and issuing mandates without consideration to human resources and financial implication is contributing to organisational and administrative paralysis. The National Policy Conference must pronounce on possible revenue streams that are sustainable. It therefore follows that form must follow content in that size must be determined by objective conditions and the stage at which the structure and cadres are operating in relation to the ideological dexterity and political development.
291. Membership development and management is at the centre of the existence of any political organisation or party. This is more so in electoral politics. This particular aspect or our operations has literally wreaked havoc in our organisation over the last ten years
292. It is not an exaggeration to say some of the weaknesses which emanated from the inability to devise appropriate administrative procedures transcended into political difficulties for the organisation.
293. That the implementation of an electronic membership management system be fast-tracked.
294. That a policy on how the ANC relates to social media and related aspects of be developed by our communication cadres for approval at the Conference.
295. That at the level /sphere of the NEC, PECs and RECs, the organisation needs to be populated by strong leadership as sign of the ideological and political maturity and rigour of our incubation and training organisational institutions.
296. Hence it is proposed that the Political Education Schools and support to cadres for intellectual development and ideological training be implemented.
297. We end by proposing that the Department of Organising and Mobilisation should drive the Organisational Renewal and Organisational Design plan and directly report to the Secretary- General’s Office.
CONCLUSION
298. We conclude by emphasising the point that organisations are synonymous with living organisms, form and content. They metamorphose, punctuated by change as a permanent constant in life, from coming into being, growing, maturing and decaying. Throughout this process organisations contend and must adapt to ever- changing conditions to avoid stagnation, political irrelevance and death. Organisations operate within a social milieu and are impacted by the local and global balances of forces that are a function of subjective and objective conditions. The human anatomy is an example that best describes the interdependences’, connectedness and inseparability of the body organs from one another. Like all species, organisations exist in a niche, within an ecology wherein the struggle for sustenance and survival are the order of the day.
299. It is this changing environment that the ANC must respond to intuitively and understand to remain true to its ability and character of adapting to new conditions and continue to be a leader of society. In the journey to national democratic society the ANC, has at all material times sought to clarify opportunities and constraints. It has thus far avoided paralysis dictated by overestimation of the difficulties, or voluntarist adventurism based on our own exaggeration of our own power. The ANC’s history has been the history of ‘problems identified and problems solved’ – as Walter Sisulu once pointed out. Hence the ANC’s has hitherto had it within itself the ability to self-correct and unique innate resilience.
300. In the aftermaths of the local government elections, having lost 3 major metros and obtaining 54.4% the total national electoral tally is a challenge that must force us to think politically and historically to appreciate the dynamics and the shifts in the political landscape. Thinking historically about the present, means locating ourselves- as individual members and citizens within our history of resilience in the national democratic revolution, retracing our steps with a view to draw from the lessons of previous generations and chart a new path forward in the second transition to the National Democratic Society.
Issued by the ANC, 12 March 2017
