Speech by David Maynier, Shadow Minister of Defence and Military Veterans in the debate on the Budget Vote of the Department of Defence and Military Veterans, July 23 2014

Stop the creeping authoritarianism in the Defence Force

Our soldiers are now deployed in some of the most volatile conflict zones in the world. 

I would therefore like to begin by saluting our men and women in uniform serving on the "frontline".

Whether you are in the army, the air force, the navy or the health service, we say thank you for your service to our country.

I would also like to congratulate the minister on her re-appointment to the Cabinet. 

Since being appointed, the minister has experienced more "snakes down" than "ladders up". 

But the minister does deserve credit for two significant achievements: 

• firing the human wrecking ball, General "Mojo" Motau, as chairperson of Armscor; and 
• finally, after three years, tabling the "South African Defence Review 2014" in Parliament. 

The minister, I am sure we all agree, is a vast improvement on her ghastly predecessor who, like "Voldemort", I refer to as: "She Who Must Not Be Named". 

Now there is only one person her predecessor appears to dislike more than me, and that is the minister, evidenced by their hostile correspondence about what has now become known as "Gulfstreamgate".

This is, in my view, as you can all imagine, a "badge of honour" for the minister. 

In the end, however, we all hope that the minister will enjoy more "ladders up" than "snakes down" in the next five years.

Now we are supposed to be here to debate the appropriation of R42.8 billion for the Defence Force in 2014/15. 

But let's be honest: this is not a debate; this is a political farce dressed up as a debate.

Because the truth is: we know very little about what is really going on in the Defence Force. 

On 13 June 2013, 1345 of our soldiers were deployed as part of the United Nation's Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC.

They were not deployed on a peace keeping mission, they were deployed on peace enforcement mission to hunt and kill rebel forces in the DRC.

We had a duty, therefore, to ensure that our soldiers were properly supported to execute their mission. 

Because we have a duty to ensure that the tragic events in the CAR, which resulted in the loss of 15 of our soldiers, never happen again.

But despite numerous requests from myself, over a period of several months, we never received a briefing on the mission in the DRC.

We learned much later, almost accidently, that our soldiers did not, in fact, have the necessary logistical support to execute the mission.

Shortly after the deployment, the minister, we learned from court papers, claimed: 

"the biggest challenge that we have right now is that as we deploy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo our soldiers do not have tents ... [and] ... our soldiers have no parachute equipment."

So, if we join the dots, as we are forced to do, it is clear that we have a Defence Force in deep trouble. 

Now the Defence Force likes to displace blame for its troubles on the National Treasury.  

But the truth is: we have the Defence Force we deserve. Because we have the Defence Force we choose.

We have soldiers in barracks, not safeguarding our landward borders, because we choose not to prioritize border safeguarding.

We have aircraft in hangars, not protecting our airspace, because we choose not to prioritize airspace protection. 

And we have ships alongside, not protecting our maritime borders, because we choose not to prioritize maritime border protection.

Because in the end: we choose to prioritize spending on armed welfare rather than prioritize spending on military capability.

We have budgeted to spend 54.5 percent, or R 20.4 billion, on personnel in 2014/15. 

Now we hear there is a R 1.23 billion shortfall for personnel.

And this comes on the back of spending, and planning to spend, an additional R4.5 billion more on personnel between 2009/10 and 2014/15.

Put simply: we are spending too much on personnel; we are spending too little on operations; and we are spending much too little on capital acquisition.

We are, in other words, turning our Defence Force, which should be saving lives, into an armed welfare service, which is saving jobs.

We're heading down the same road as Nigeria, where, when they were finally faced with a "nail" in the form of Boko Haram, they found they had no "hammer".  

Because the Nigerian Armed Forces, are awash with big generals, with even bigger epaulets, but with no military expertise.

So our last best hope is the "South African Defence Review 2014", which has now been tabled in Parliament. 

There is much to recommend in the Defence Review, not least its brutally frank assessment that the Defence Force is "in a critical state of decline".

However, the Defence Review process was deeply flawed and is unlikely to reverse the critical state of decline in the Defence Force.

First, the Defence Review was not a Defence Review; the Defence Review was a review of Defence Policy.

Second, the Defence Review was carried out in a national security and foreign policy vacuum.

Third, the Defence Review does not contain a final force design, which must still be completed by the Chief of the Defence Force.

And finally, the budget for the Defence Review's proposed desired end-state has not been approved by the National Treasury.

It's staggering that of the 436 meetings conducted by the Defence Review Committee, not one appears to have been with the National Treasury.

In the end, the Defence Review was a political strategy to "outflank" the National Treasury.

But the Defence Review Committee does not seem to have understood the iron law of public policy-making, which is: "you cannot do what you cannot fund".

That's why the Defence Review's proposal to reshape the Defence Force to include: 189 000 personnel and 158 combat units, consuming R88 billion, or 2.4 percent of GDP, is doomed.

So now we have the minster scrambling to identify "quick wins", which can be implemented at little or no cost, to the Defence Force.

A Defence Review is about making hard choices about what stays, what goes and what is to be added, within a budget constraint.

But that's not what we got.

This is a classic case of a flawed process that is highly likely to lead to a flawed outcome.

The Defence Review has now landed, or more accurately, crash-landed in Parliament.

And now it seems it's going to be left to Parliament to rescue the Defence Review.

But that's going to be very difficult because, there has been a complete breakdown in the relationship between the defence department and Parliament.

In the past two years: 

the minister has never appeared before the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans and has appeared only once before the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. 

In the past five years: 

the Chief of the Defence Force has never, ever, appeared before the Portfolio Committee on Defence and Military Veterans and has never, ever, appeared before the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. 

And, for the past five years: 

we have never received a detailed briefing on military preparedness despite spending R 10.3 billion on force employment.

we have never received a detailed briefing on defence acquisition despite spending R3.6 billion on capital acquisition; and 

we have never received a detailed briefing on supposedly secret funds despite channeling R25.7 billion through the Special Defence Account. 

It's only through leaked documents that we discovered the defence department was secretly trying to purchase a brand new Boeing 777-LR VIP jet worth R 2 billion.

And it's only through leaked documents that we discovered the defence department secretly signed a deal to purchase 238 armoured infantry vehicles worth R 15 billion.

In the end, the fact is that the Defence Force has become a state-within-a-state beyond proper scrutiny and oversight by Parliament.

So I hope the Chief of the Defence Force, General Solly Shoke, will listen carefully when I say: 

"I am sure you are aware that, because of our history, you have a duty to ensure the Defence Force: 

recognizes the supremacy of the constitution;

is under civilian control, and 

is accountable to Parliament. 

However, with respect: you are failing in your duty. 

By resisting the authority of Parliament, you create the impression that the Defence Force is not accountable to Parliament. 

And worse, by resisting the authority of Parliament, you create the impression that the Defence Force does not respect Parliament. 

You are taking the Defence Force down a very dangerous road, away from the future, and back to the past.

I am therefore appealing to you directly: stop this dangerous creeping authoritarianism in the Defence Force.

Before it's too late.

Because, if you do not, I am going to submit a Private Members Bill forcing you to become accountable to Parliament."

Now I sincerely hope the minister, the Chief of the Defence Force, and the committee chairperson have listened carefully and will work together to reset the relationship between the defence department and Parliament. 

Because in the end we must work together, to achieve our common aim, which is to reverse the critical state of decline in the Defence Force. 

I thank you.

Issued by the DA, July 23 2014

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