The intensity of debate around the Russian/Ukrainian conflict in South Africa is surprising. The past weeks have seen the publication of a number of articles with those emanating from the Left often reflecting a sympathy for the Russian position and sometimes parroting its depiction of the new Kiev regime as virtually fascist or driven by American imperialist manipulation. Until now Russia occupied a pretty modest place on South Africa's media horizon, mostly in connection with BRICS, and Ukraine hardly existed at all. So why this sudden interest?
It would seem that for those whose lives were dedicated to the anti-apartheid struggle the Russia-Ukraine conflict recreated many of the realities of the cold war era, which was the international context in which the anti-apartheid struggle developed. The Socialist USSR against the imperialist West, NATO against the Warsaw Pact, capitalism against socialism, national liberation and other progressive forces. And this has been echoed by a wider international Left, far beyond South Africa's shores.
For, despite the disintegration of the Communist movement, there still exists a network of NGOs, trade unions and intellectuals which seems to yearn for the good old days. The world seemed simpler then, despite the fact that it was teetering on the brink of war: everybody knew who was a friend, and who was the enemy.
Of course, conflicts among friends (the Sino-Soviet conflict, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict etc.) also occurred, but the overall global dispensation was clear to all true believers: the forces of progress, led by the USSR, against the imperialist forces of darkness, led by the USA. No doubt, some, both in the West and in the East (and, of course, in South Africa too) would like to revive the sheer clarity of this dichotomy. Events in Ukraine offered a convenient opportunity to do so.
Together with its BRICS partners South Africa abstained during the vote in the UN General Assembly which affirmed the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The only official BRICS statement on the crisis, issued on 28th March, called on both sides to resolve the confrontation by peaceful means. Even so Mikhail Petrakov, Russia's ambassador to South Africa, thanked Pretoria for its "balanced" position.
But in fact there are not a few in South Africa who would like their government to take a clearer pro-Russian stand. The position of the South African Communist Party which denounced ‘imperialist meddling in Ukraine', was supported by many on the left, and Isaak Mpho Mogotsi, Executive Chairman of the Centre for Economic Diplomacy in Africa, suggested that various South African media outlets should interview South African and Russian communists on the matter (with a list supplied).
There is a logic to the pro-Putin position. Those taking this stand point to American and/or NATO's interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Serbia and Syria and to the enlargement of NATO and the European Union which brought both of these organizations right up to Russia's borders, with all the echoes of the old ‘capitalist encirclement'. Serbia, in particular, where NATO intervened without any UN mandate, touched Russia's raw nerve. When Kosovo, with strong Western backing, proclaimed its independence in February 2008, Russia took this as an act of straightforward Western aggression against its Slavic neighbour and ally.
Kosovo was not incorporated into any other state, nor was it admitted to NATO or the EU, but the Russian Foreign Ministry furiously declared that Kosovo's independence "violated the sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia, the Charter of the United Nations, UNSCR 1244, the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, Kosovo's Constitutional Framework and the high-level Contact Group accords". Russia fully supported Serbia's territorial integrity and said that it expected both the UN and NATO to take immediate action to support it too. It warned that "those who are considering supporting separatism should understand what dangerous consequences their actions threaten for world order, international stability and the authority of the UN Security Council's decisions that took decades to build".
Vladimir Putin too spoke of the recognition of Kosovo's independence by several major world powers as "a terrible precedent, which will de facto blow apart the whole system of international relations, developed not over decades, but over centuries". "At the end of the day", he added, "it is a two-ended stick and the second end will come back and hit them in the face". There is no doubt that Putin - and many other Russians - believe that this is exactly what has just happened with Russian's incorporation of the Crimea.
But if supporting separatists was so dangerous then, why does Russia support them now? In Moscow many come up with the easy answer: "If the Americans can do this, why can't we?" The answer is, obviously, exactly the same: because it is so dangerous. It is particularly dangerous for Russia because it is a multi-ethnic state, because some of its neighbours see it as a former colonial power and do not trust it, and because its economy is in a very poor state. It cannot afford risky adventures.
Moscow has to decide, finally, whether it recognizes the fact of the collapse of the Soviet Union and thus the independence and territorial integrity of Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and all the other former Soviet republics, or it does not. With the incorporation of the Crimea, it looks very much as if it does not and that Russia's president is on a crusade to reverse what he famously called "the greatest tragedy of the 20th century" - the collapse of the USSR. If so, then we are in a different world and none of Russia's neighbours is safe, and nor is Russia itself.
Russia could react to the enlargement of both the EU and NATO to its borders in several different ways. It could have decided to seek membership or cooperation with these organizations as a partner. Or it could take a more arms' length approach and simply attempt to negotiate with and influence these organizations as their powerful neighbour. This was the path which most Western states assumed Russia had chosen. Or it could define these organizations as a threat to its own "legitimate" sphere of influence and choose to confront and oppose them.
It is now clear that Putin has chosen this latter path. Moscow now sees its putative Eurasian Union as a counterweight to the EU, and Ukraine is crucial to such plans. This is why Russia viewed the emergence of a strongly pro-EU faction in Kiev as an affront to itself. The (deeply unwise and soon rescinded) attempt by Ukrainian law-makers to lower the status of the Russian language, even in the regions where Russians are in the majority, further inflamed Russian opinion. It also gave Russia the perfect excuse to speak on behalf of Ukrainian Russians. It feels that it is certainly within its rights to organise its own "regime change" wherever it finds this useful and possible.
It is worth noting that Russia now treats Ukraine in a far worse fashion than the West treated Russia, when it was "on its knees" in the Yeltsin period of the early 1990s. Moscow government refuses to speak to Ukraine's new leaders at all, saying that they came to power as a result of a ‘fascist coup'. It has also put Ukraine under enormous economic pressure in order to make it ‘behave' politically. And with the willing assistance of Ukrainian Russian-speakers (the absolute majority of whom, by the way, voted for Ukraine's independence from Russia in 1991) it has occupied and incorporated a huge chunk of Ukraine's territory and now threatens Eastern Ukraine as well.
What of the alleged "fascist" nature of the forces in Kiev? Ukrainian nationalists may have played an important role in the stand-off on the Maidan in the centre of Kiev, but the polls give the Right Sector - Ukrainian militant nationalists - just 2 percent, and Dmytro Yarosh, their notorious and often quoted leader, 1,4 percent. Another nationalist party, Svoboda (Freedom), scores 5.9 percent, just 0,9 percent more than the Communists, and much less than 10 percent that Svoboda got at the last elections which brought it to the Supreme Rada, the Ukrainian Parliament. So the vast bulk of Ukrainian opinion is free of any "fascist" influence.
As to the place of the Crimea in Russian history, this is no greater, than, say, Scotland's place in British history. Of course, both Crimea and Scotland have the right to their independence referenda, but in the case of the Crimea the divorce and re-marriage happened with indecent haste and certainly without due divorce procedures and without taking the interests of all sides into consideration.
Ukraine is going through a revolution, and there is no way of knowing where that will take it. I am a Russian and I wish it well, whatever its future choices turn out to be. After all, it is in Russia's interests to have strong, stable and prosperous neighbours. But I am worried about my own country. It has stepped onto the path of supporting separatisms, about the dangers of which it had so intensely warned its Western partners.
Russia now demands that Ukraine should undertake an in-depth structural reform, turning itself into a ‘proper federation' with elected regional leaders. But no such reform in Russia itself is in sight. It seeks to dictate another country's political arrangements - even when it doesn't practise itself what it preaches. Such behaviour is not good for keeping even the most loyal of friends.
Russia's economy has been in a bad shape for some while now and it is not clear that it will bear the huge extra price for its new acquisition. The Crimea will cost it dearly in direct payments, but even more in an accelerated brain drain, capital outflows, the downgrading of its investment ranking, and, doubtless, an increase in its military budget.
On top of which Moscow has now given all of Western Europe a very strong incentive to reduce its dependence on Russian oil and gas. True, the man in the street does not consider such things when national pride is at stake. Putin's ratings sky-rocketed after the Crimea. But the man in the street will feel the difference in his pocket soon enough - and the mood will then sour. What will Putin do then? Blame it on Western sanctions, like Robert Mugabe? Or simply send troops to another part of the former Soviet Union?
The Cold War led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The miniature Cold War which is now being attempted in replica will not make Russia stronger. On the contrary, it has the capacity to inflict the same sort of collapse on Russia itself. Surely those progressives in South Africa and the rest of the world, who still nourish a nostalgia for the old USSR, would not wish to visit this same fate on Russia?
Irina Filatova is Professor Emeritus, UKZN. This article first appeared in the Daily Dispatch.
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