Political issues, should, as a rule, be dealt with in political structures. But when those structures cease to function as they should, the courts may be the only remedy. History will judge whether the President of COPE and those who supported him were correct to go to court to stop the actions of the Shilowa faction in the party. Leaders must act when they see wrongdoing and especially injustice.
When political disputes arise in a party, over issues, leadership or any other matter, these are traditionally debated and then decided upon by a majority vote or by consensus. . But for that to happen, structures that deal with these issues must be democratic, transparent, act fairly, foster unity and be accountable.
Sadly, in COPE, except for the CNC and branches, no structures have been elected. They are all run by appointees, often self-appointed leaders at that. Some Congresses have taken place, such as in the Gauteng regions and province, the Cape Town Metro region and the Western Cape Province. The outcomes of these conferences however have been widely disputed; not all branches were represented, the voting and other democratic processes were dubious and there was great uncertainty about who paid for the costs. In addition, violence has been used on more than one occasion to force a particular outcome of Congress.
The Congress National and Working Committees consist of members elected by consensus at the Bloemfontein Inaugural Congress and those who serve as ex-officio from the provinces , youth and women's chapters. The ex-officio members are mostly interim leaders appointed to build those structures and take them to democratic electoral congresses. Apart from the disputed nature of the provincial congresses that have taken place, it is not even clear that these ex-officio structures should be allowed to vote on the CNC and CWC. A case may be made for them to gain voting power once they have held elective congresses, but they certainly should not have the vote if they are interim structures. Given the role of these structures in forcing to move the elective congress forward, it became clear that the CNC was being forced into taking decisions that were not for the good of the party but for partisan, factional and individual interest.
The link between these interests and funding patterns of patronage in the party became all the more clearer as time passed by. For instance, those provinces that are run by Shilowa supporters have had resources poured into them. Those who don't get nothing. Attempts to ensure accountability for how parliamentary funds were being utilised fell on deaf ears and this matter was systematically avoided by those responsible for those funds.
In some cases, the Eastern Cape being the most blatant, funds were distributed to all regions, except those who did not profess loyalty to the Shilowa faction, as in the Nelson Mandela Bay metro region. This region was also targeted, albeit unsuccessfully, to stop certain individuals from being elected. Two Congresses in Nelson Mandela Bay region were stopped by the Shilowa biased provincial leadership. In the run-up to the proposed elective congress it was crystal clear that funds had been channelled into 3 regions; Gauteng, the Eastern Cape and the Western Cape, to ensure that these had the majority of branches at the national congress. The audit process, which systematically excluded other provinces and regions where Shilowa was not supported, reinforced this.