The African National Congress, having exchanged the monastic Thabo Mbeki for the celebrity Jacob Zuma, will romp home to victory in Wednesday's general elections, although the edge will be taken off the triumph by expected reduced ANC majorities (except in KwaZulu-Natal where Jacob Zuma has diverted the Zulus from the Inkatha Freedom Party into the ANC). However, whatever the outcome, Zuma's spin doctors will claim an "overwhelming" victory, which is what the lavishly funded ANC campaigned for (donations by courtesy of Libya, China, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and numerous businessmen).
Seeing that the ANC already has 296 (74%) of the 400 National Assembly seats (this includes the 2005 and 2007 floor-crossers), an "overwhelming" victory means bringing the parliamentary opposition as close to extinction as possible.
Still, the ANC's pursuit of a two-thirds majority is a bit odd. Already, it has a two-thirds majority and can change the constitution when it likes. Why does it wait? And why does it want a change? This makes one think that Wednesday's elections are not particularly important- that the tectonic plates moved at Polokwane in last December and that what is left now is certification of the shift - and confirmation that black politics have reduced themselves to an in-house brawl in which power and greed provide the momentum. Policies will come later.
In Business Day (16 April), Professor Susan Booysen of Witwatersrand University, in an otherwise acutely perceptive article, suggests "a post-election ceasefire while troops regroup for the 2012 ANC succession battle." This is when the ANC re-elects a new leader. The idea of a ceasefire is attractive to a warring nation, but the scramble for top jobs clearly will intensify after the elections, not subside. As Professor Booysen points out the state institutions in South Africa are "the trenches of the ANC's raging civil war of 2005-09". She mentions in particular the extension of "state subjugation" among "the judiciary, the Cabinet, premiers and mayors, directors-general, ministerial advisers and lower-ranking public servants, parastatals, parliament, provincial legislatures and municipalities, the security apparatus, the state bureaucracy and the Presidency". The whole tutti-frutti.
The scramble for power in the ANC will be even more bruising than those that started in the 1994 elections. Thabo Mbeki "deployed" his cronies widely and in key positions. This was resented and caused him to be ousted from office. The scramble that is taking place now could last for months and maybe even for much of the new five-year term of office, and it will be brutal. ANC "loyalists" have been embedded in their comfortable jobs for such a long time that they will be spitting venom when they are turfed out. Booysen says that in a decade-plus of cadre deployment (jobs for cronies) Mbeki created an almost impenetrable institutional fortress. Zuma's gang intends to demonstrate just how penetrable this fortress is.
Booysens touches on another point: the centralisation of power under the presidency. In Mbeki's case, he was the feared and undisputed puppeteer. Zuma is not within reach of this power. The present ANC leadership are a floppy lot. They appear to lack coherence; analysts are not sure in which direction they will pull once they take cabinet office. For example, only last week one of the more respected leaders, Mathews Phosa, said he had rushed to ask Zuma what he meant by his remark that the Constitutional Court judges are not "gods." Zuma gave the usual vague denial. Contemptuous remarks, too, have been made of Zuma by the secretary general of his most important backer, Cosatu. One wonders how long Zuma (and his promises) will last.