The dust has now settled on this year's local government elections, allowing time to reflect on some of the deeper implications for municipal and, indeed, national governance in South Africa. One central theme is obvious. The election was overwhelming centred on service delivery with the two main contenders (the ANC and the DA) issuing claim and counterclaim over who delivers best. The Monty Python-esque focus on latrines notwithstanding, the matter is clearly a serious one in South Africa politics. But it has to be suggested that the term "delivery" and, perhaps more importantly, its systemic implications, have generally not been adequately explored.
Delivery means municipalities. Since the restructuring of local government in 1999, the huge reduction in the number of municipalities, and the passing over a battery of legislation prescribing structures, procedures and financial matters over the next couple of years, South Africa has had a system of what is officially referred to as "developmental" local government. In practice, "development" means delivery of services - water reticulation, electricity, sanitation, municipal roads and refuse removal. What is notable is that while these services are administered locally, they are funded primarily by central government grants, to the value of some R50bn (in 2009/10).
Conventional wisdom would have it that the stability of South Africa's relatively new democracy hinges on the success of this delivery process. Service protests are often cited as evidence that "delivery" has failed in the affected areas and thus that formal institutionalised politics has become unviable. But it is increasingly becoming apparent that this is too limited an understanding to be useful. What seems more likely is that it is service delivery protests that have become institutionalised. It is no coincidence that most of the 107 major protest incidents recorded by Municipal IQ in 2010, took place in Gauteng and the Western Cape, the provinces with the best record in service delivery.
It must be acknowledged that while much of local government looks somewhat tatty and that in certain localities, perhaps 30 or so, it has failed utterly, in the rest, service delivery is in fact happening. Official aggregate figures, from half a dozen reliable sources, for water reticulation, sanitation, electrification, new roads and refuse collection has steadily improved over the past half-decade. Over one million more households received free water and sanitation in 2009 than did 2006 (totalling 11 million). The proportion of households living in a formal dwelling has increased by 4,2 million (73%) since 1996.
It has thus become apparent that service delivery protests are driven by relative, not absolute deprivation. Moreover, it is precisely where conditions are improving that the relatively deprived attempt to move forward in the queue by marching, waving banners, even burning tyres and sometimes throwing stones. The argument here is that this is not an aberration. It is instead the way demands for delivery are brought to the attention of those who control the purse. Nor is it ineffective, from the perspective of the protesters for it often produces the goods. But from an overall perspective it has troubling implications.
The term that describes this system is clientelist; new delivery in South Africa happens overwhelmingly through clientelist relationships. Clientelism was once understood as a system in which "patrons" or local "big men" appropriated public goods for "their" local constituency in return for political support. This original definition revolved around the relationships between large scale land-owners and peasants in Latin America. Over the last 30 years, it has been extended to cover situations where the land-owner is effectively replaced by a political party. In modern democratic systems typical of developing countries, the ruling party has effectively become the "patron" and those who vote for it the "clients".