Tony Leon, the former Democratic Alliance leader, describes the ejection of Thabo Mbeki as ANC leader at Polokwane as a "bronze medal in the democratic Olympics." The gold medal, he comments, would have been a change of government. "The silver medal would have been a better choice than Zuma versus Mbeki. But a bronze medal is better than no prize at all." In an interview with Politicsweb Leon set out what he regarded as the potential upsides and downsides of the Polokwane revolution. As to how they will play themselves out in the end, he says, "only time will tell."

The positives

"It is rare in the world of developed democracies" Leon comments, "for the entire top leadership, including the party president, to be defenestrated in the manner Mbeki was." To the best of his knowledge, Leon states, "It is quite unheard of in the annals of any other nationalist party in Africa, or any party in Africa, except through a military coup. That it is has happened to the ANC at a time when it was facing no electoral peril made it even more extraordinary. One could make the comparison with Margaret Thatcher who was removed as leader of the Conservative party. But the Tories were in fact in deep trouble with the electorate over the poll tax. The ANC had no such constraint, unfortunately, coming from us or any other opposition force in South Africa. So, without being blind to the downside, that was remarkable and I think noteworthy."

"The second feature which was pleasing," Leon continues, "was that the normal staple of South African political debate and contestation - namely race - was utterly absent from the contest; of necessity, as both candidates were black. There was actually a contestation around a range of issues, including abuse of power, economic policy, and enrichment; all of which went beyond race for the first time really, in a major political contest in this country. So perhaps, and here I might be being a little optimistic, the debate has moved on beyond race. Proof of this can be found in the row about the Scorpions. There hasn't been the normal racial stuff. There has been a fight about it, but it has not resorted to race because there are people of different races on both sides of the issue."

The third positive feature Leon identifies is that the contest avoided descending into tribalism - Kenya being "a recent example of how close tribal politics is to the surface, and how pernicious it can be." He notes that many people said that the ANC was the Xhosa Nostra, and its top leadership a closed ethnic hierarchy. But in the event, "the Zulu-boy won, and he enjoyed very deep pockets of support in the Xhosa hinterland. So, I am not saying that tribalism has been slain - of course it hasn't - but I thought it was in that sense quite interesting and counter-intuitive."

The fourth positive, Leon says, "and here I put in a cautionary notice as it might very well be a Prague spring, is that because there has been such an open debate about so many things it is going to be difficult (but certainly not impossible) to close down the debate in a year's time when the South African presidency changes hands."

The negatives

The downsides for Leon are fairly self-evident. Firstly, "Mbeki did a pretty good job, all on his own, of disestablishing our independent institutions in this country. But leaving that to one side, every state institution is now being attacked which gets in the way of the Zuma ascendancy." Although Zuma is not without his good qualities, Leon notes, he fears "the damage that his determination to get the national presidency, as opposed to the party presidency, will do to key state institutions - which have already been run down by Mbeki's obsession with gaining party control."

The second downside "is that, to an extent, on every single major unconstitutional manoeuvre of Mbeki Zuma has been the willing accomplice. He headed the cadre redeployment desk of the ANC. Mbeki might have been the architect of that policy, along with Joel Netshitenzhe, but Zuma was the willing instrument. So people expecting a revolutionary change of a good kind might have pause to go back into the recent history of this country and wonder where Zuma has been all these years."

The third potential downside is the whole question of economic policy. "To say that Zuma is a socialist" Leon states, "is rubbish. He is nothing actually. He is almost a cargo ship without freight. Political victories come with a lot of IOUs, whether they are big victories or small victories. His victory was enormous and the number of IOUs he has accumulated has been equally large. What does that mean in terms of policy? Well, one doesn't know. There might be a business as usual attitude."

Incidentally, Leon adds, "I think there is a very good reason to change elements of marco-economic policy. I am not one of those subscribed and paid-up members of the view that everything Finance Minister Trevor Manuel has done is perfect. I think there are problems with South Africa's monetary policy. We have never been able to take advantage of the depreciation of the rand because of the collapse of the manufacturing export sector."

"There are a very respectable group of economists - the Harvard Centre for International Development led by Ricardo Hausmann - who say that what South Africa is needs is looser monetary policy and tighter fiscal policy. Manuel has taken one half of that which is tighter fiscal policy, which is why they have budgeted for a surplus, precisely so that they can keep it for the rainy days ahead."

Reserve Bank governor Tito Mboweni, Leon says, "has had a very unimaginative approach on monetary policy; which has been conventional but at great cost to the development of various export sectors. But no one in the world that I have come across has suggested that we have looser monetary and looser fiscal policy - which is what the Zuma-ites, or the people around him, are advocating. So they are half right and half wrong." If Cosatu manage to also force a crackdown on trade liberalisation as well, Leon states, then "bad days await South Africa in terms of the economic future."

The fourth and biggest negative for Leon is the election of a "a morally compromised, ethically challenged man charged with corruption" as ANC leader. "Quite aside from the criminal case, you are sending the most terrible message on accountability. I don't know why, if Zuma becomes president, anyone should obey the law in the future, because it doesn't seem to have consequences. This kind of exceptionalism which the ANC leadership applies to its most ethically challenged leaders is going to be death of the rule of law in this country."

The broader problem
Although it is understandable that people focus on personalities in politics, Leon states, his real critique is that South Africans seem to be, as Dostoevsky put it, "looking for the good Czar to lead us into a golden age." "If we had spent a little more attention and care defending our institutions we would be better able to withstand the best and the worst of future presidents. But because South Africa didn't guard the back door against encroachments on the independence of state institutions, we are now dependent on the calibre of the Czar."

Leon describes the decision to close down the Scorpions as being reflective of a "supreme arrogance". "It is the arrogance of a party which brought you the Eskom debacle and everything else, and which is manifesting itself here as well. It is the utter indifference. Without speaking party politics, it is an indifference you can afford if there are no electoral consequences for your misbehaviour. Then you can treat people with contempt, you can ignore public opinion, you can ride roughshod over parliamentary procedures. Unless and until the ANC is challenged at the polls you can expect this behaviour to continue. If there is no cost to your power base for grossly irresponsible misbehaviour what is the inducement good behaviour, other than some kind of improbable self-virtue? I think Zuma's election, despite everything, almost proves that there is very little cachet in the ANC for not being legally compromised."

On the opposition's prospects of correcting this
For the opposition, Leon states, these are the "most propitious and promising circumstances" since 1994. "The ANC's liberation credentials are very thin, and they are getting very elderly." If the opposition cannot "make very serious headway next year you must question whether it has a long term future and whether South Africa's multi-partyism is worth very much."

Still, the opposition does not have it all its own way at the moment. "With Zuma as its presidential candidate the ANC could devastate Inkatha's base in the traditional redoubts of KwaZulu Natal." Although it is making some gains among Coloured voters the DA's support base among the white community is being steadily eroded by emigration. Leon concludes:

"We are back to that Elephant in the room. Can the opposition make serious inroads into the black electorate in South Africa? You have got to hope that the obvious disaffection felt on the ground, at so many levels, will start to register at the polling places. But that greatly depends on whether of issues starts to trump the politics of identity. The signs so far have not been promising."