Lawrence Schlemmer, Survey on Race Relations and racism in South African everyday life, South African Institute of Race Relations, 2001

PART 1

September 2001

1 THE PURPOSE

Racism and inter-group relations are talking points in South Africa today. This is not surprising a brief seven years after the passing of apartheid. The salience of race issues has been amplified in recent months by more and more media reporting of instances of racial friction or conflict in various parts of the country and in a diversity of situations. So frequently do such reports appear that at times the society seems trapped in the old categories and attitudes of the apartheid years.

Is this the case, however? To what extent are the attitudes and interaction of people in the new South Africa still structured by racial definitions? Are racial patterns persisting or ameliorating? How do race-linked issues rank among the other very serious socio-economic problems that exist in our society?

These are all questions that are very germane to the mission of the South African Institute of Race Relations, which since 1929 has worked for harmony and a common prosperity in South Africa. This study is by way of a stocktaking of the state of inter-group relations in the society, as a basis for informed debate around social and economic policy at the present time.

In planning this study the author and the Institute of Race Relations have been fully mindful of the fact that the term ‘racism' has come to acquire a far wider and diffuse content than that embraced by issues of race relations or racial discrimination per se. As recently outlined by Dr Barney Pityana, chairman of the Human Rights Commission, ‘racism' is no longer restricted to issues of skin colour and has become ‘globalised' to include the unequal international division of power and prosperity, legalised and institutionalised discriminatory practices, ethnicity, religious intolerance and tribal identity (quoted by Adrian Lackay in Die Burger, August 16, 2001, p11).

While this elaboration of meaning and conceptual complexity makes for interesting debate, it takes the issue far beyond the grasp of ordinary people and their everyday experience. Therefore we have avoided imposing the categories of an arcane debate among mobilised lobbies on the ordinary respondents in this study. We have, however, allowed full scope for the people interviewed to introduce these more elaborated meanings of racism in open-ended questions allowing spontaneous answers.

The study therefore seeks to:

• assess the extent to which the regular reports of racism, discrimination or racial friction reflect everyday experience and reality in our country;
• explore the areas of interaction between groups that are critical to the development of trust and mutual acceptance;
• determine the extent to which attitudes of antipathy or hostility are based on real life experience as opposed to sentiments rooted in social or political interests and agendas; and
• allow representative opinion to define the content of racism and race relations as they have come to understand it in their everyday lives.

These results have become available at an auspicious time because of the United Nations World Conference Against Racism that is to open in Durban later this month. The South African Institute of Race Relations hopes that the findings will contribute to the judgements exercised during that important event.

2 THE STUDY: APPROACH, METHODS AND SCOPE

The survey on which these results are based has just come out of the field, and this report is a summary of major findings. A technical report on the methodology will be available for inspection in due course, and this summary will also be followed in due course by more detailed analysis.

The sampling, fieldwork and data-processing of the study was undertaken by MarkData (Pty) Ltd, an organisation of some 14 years' standing, specialising in strategic research for public, private and non-government organisations.

The survey has been based on personal, face-to-face home interviews among a fully representative sample of 2 144 South African residents aged 16 years and older. The interviewing was conducted by the established and experienced regional field teams, in the home languages or languages of choice of respondents.

The sample is a multi-stage stratified probability (random) sample of households, from each of which one respondent was selected randomly for interview. In order to ensure representative coverage households were selected within nine socio-economic categories or strata:

(1) Deep rural traditional areas

(2) Areas of informal (shack) housing

(3) Hostels and collective dwellings

(4) Former African low-cost housing areas (townships)

(5) Former coloured ‘group areas'

(6) Former Indian ‘group areas'

(7) All groups in suburbs and apartment house areas in towns of varying sizes

(8) All groups in suburbs and apartment house areas in metropolitan complexes

(9)  Rural commercial farming areas: workers, residents and farmers

The sample was not drawn according to race, but racial representation was ensured by the spread of interviewing. The sample consists of 1 466 Africans, 234 coloured people, 137 Indians, and 307 whites. This categorisation of respondents according to group was relevant only because of the purpose and subject matter of the study.

The design of the questionnaire was undertaken by the author in consultation with the Chief Executive of the Institute and MarkData itself. The categorisation of open-ended answers, coding, data-capturing and computerisation of results was undertaken by MarkData in consultation with the author.

The questionnaire used is available for inspection. The results that follow are presented in themes and not in the order of the questions. In this summary report it is mainly the overall results that are presented. The later analysis will explore variations according to gender, age, region, education, income and other biographical features.

Readers should note that we decided not to ask early questions directly about ‘racism' as it is portrayed in the media. Such questions can elicit conventional answers. They were asked later in the interviews, but in the initial questions we were concerned to find out whether problems of racism or strained relationships exist in the everyday lives and experience of people.

3 TRENDS IN RACE RELATIONS: THE CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN EXPERIENCE

Race relations as such

We asked the people interviewed whether they felt that ‘Over the past few years, relations between people of different races in South Africa had improved, stayed the same or become worse? The broad results were as follows:

TABLE 1: RACE RELATIONS: IMPROVED, STAYED THE SAME OR DETERIORATED?

From these results we see that Indians are most positive in their perceptions of race relations over the past few years, followed by Africans and English-speaking whites. The views of coloured people are less positive, and Afrikaans-speaking whites are least positive of all.

It is only among Indians, however, that a clear majority feels that race relations have improved. Clearly the reactions of Afrikaans-speaking whites and to a lesser extent coloured people suggest widespread negative feelings about the trends in inter-group relations in recent years.

Interpersonal interaction

Another probe focused on reactions to treatment by others: Think of the way that you are treated by others. Do you frequently have problems in the way that you are treated? This was followed by asking: Are these problems very serious, fairly serious or not really serious as far as you are concerned? In the results below (Table 2) we present only the proportions who experience problems in the way that they are treated and the proportions (of the total) who feel that the problems are very serious.

TABLE 2: PROPORTIONS OF PEOPLE WITH PROBLEMS IN THE WAY THAT THEY ARE TREATED BY OTHERS AND THE PROPORTIONS WHO FEEL THAT THESE PROBLEMS ARE VERY SERIOUS

These results have to do with regular problems in inter-relationships and as we will see, these problems are not necessarily racially based.

Africans, coloured people and white Afrikaans-speakers are most likely to experience problems in inter-relationships and they are also most likely to feel that the problems are very serious. However, the people with these types of complaints are a relatively small minority of much less than one fifth.

We proceeded immediately to ask for examples of the problems of treatment by others in order to assess how salient the racial issue might be in interpersonal relations. The answers ranged across a huge range of types of interaction, much of it personal, domestic or neighbourly. People, however, also complained of rudeness in shops, in taxis, in government offices and in a large variety of institutional situations. In the main they did not link these experiences to race, and as many of the situations involved interaction between people of the same race as people of different races.

A proportion of the responses, however, did refer to inter-racial or racially coloured interaction, as follows:

TABLE 3: PROPORTION OF PROBLEMS IN THE WAY PEOPLE ARE TREATED THAT HAVE RACIAL INTENT OR CONTENT

In other words, issues of race and racial antipathy certainly do not dominate South Africans problems in social interaction. This is not surprising, given the fact that most interaction would not provide an opportunity for race issues to arise. It does show, however, that everyday experience in the country is not awash with racial friction.

Trust

Another question was about perceptions of trust among South Africans: ‘Compared with a few years ago, do you trust your fellow South Africans more, less or about the same? In the results below we give only those who claim to trust their fellow citizens more or less than they used to.

TABLE 4: TRUST FELLOW SOUTH AFRICANS MORE OR LESS THAN BEFORE

These results are not encouraging. The picture that emerges is one of suspicion and cynicism, and perhaps even threat. The question that arises immediately is whether or not the high levels of mistrust are related to race relations and racism.

We proceeded to ask for spontaneous reasons for their responses and the major factors that emerged were crime, corruption, political tensions and socio-economic or occupational concerns, with some family issues and neighbourhood dynamics thrown in. The issue of race in mistrust turned out to be fairly minor, as follows:

TABLE 5: THE LEVEL OF RACIAL FACTORS IN MISTRUST OF FELLOW SOUTH AFRICANS

It would seem as if South Africans are not at ease with each other, but the reasons are not dominantly racial. If all the race-linked reasons are added it is clear that not much more than 10% of South Africans have feelings of mistrust based on race.

4. SOCIO-ECONOMIC FACTORS, INEQUALITY AND THE RACE FACTOR

The issue of inequality is inextricably intertwined with racial privilege and disadvantage. As already stated in the introduction we cannot conflate the two problems but this study provided an opportunity to find out to what extent ordinary South Africans see racism in inequality and their socio-economic problems.

Unresolved problems in our society

At the outset of the interviews we raised the issue of ‘serious problems not yet resolved since 1994', and asked respondents to identify the most serious problems that they experienced. In the sample as a whole the following problems took pride of place:

MAJOR UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS ^a

a Proportions exceed 100% because more than one problem could be mentioned.

Dozens of other problems and issues received lower levels of mention than those listed above. We note, however, that when all issues of racial discrimination, including the discrimination that is perceived to exist in affirmative action, are combined into a single category, it enters the list of problems above in ninth place. We present these and related issues in the table below with the % levels of mention:

TABLE 6: MENTION OF RACE-RELATED ISSUES AMONG SERIOUS PROBLEMS NOT YET RESOLVED IN SOUTH AFRICA

From the point of view of the respondents themselves, whites, coloured people and Indians would seem to experience racial discrimination more than the majority of African people. This is at odds with conventional views of discrimination in South African society and many people will challenge the notion that whites, for example, could be victims of racism in South Africa. We acknowledge that the issue is complex, but these results should be debated.

Race and personal progress

We asked about levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with ‘opportunities for personal progress these days'. We also asked about the reasons for their reactions and among the reasons we isolated those that related to race or race discrimination. The results are presented in the table below:

TABLE 7: SATISFACTION WITH PERSONAL PROGRESS, AND THE PROPORTIONS MENTIONING RACE RELATED ISSUES AMONG THE REASONS

The results above show that Africans and coloured people are more likely to be dissatisfied with opportunities for personal progress than whites or Indians, but among those dissatisfied, whites, coloured people and Indians are much more likely to mention race discrimination as a factor. African people, for example, are much more likely to mention unemployment or skills as factors holding them back.

Afrikaans-speaking whites are more likely than any other group to identify race discrimination as the issue holding them back. Among all the minorities the issue of discrimination that dominated the answers was affirmative action and ‘equity policy'. We know that these policies were not designed as instruments of race discrimination, but this does not prevent their being seen as such by many members of minority groups.

The employment situation

As before we asked respondents (those employed) to indicate levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their employment situation, and asked them to identify reasons for the latter from a list of alternatives. The results were as follows:

TABLE 8: LEVELS OF SATISFACTION WITH EMPLOYMENT AND REASONS FOR THEIR RESPONSES

REASONS FOR DISSATISFACTION AMONG THE DISSATISFIED:

Here again we note much greater dissatisfaction with employment among African people than among others. The reasons for the responses did not mention race or race discrimination directly but the final reason (‘The way you as a person are treated by your employer') was a rough surrogate for discrimination. We note from the results that this reason is prominent only among coloured people, white English speakers, and, to a lesser extent, Indians.

Continuing in the context of employment, we asked What counts these days for a person trying to make progress in a career? and gave certain options. The results are given in the table below:

TABLE 9: WHAT COUNTS THESE DAYS FOR A PERSON TRYING TO MAKE PROGRESS IN A CAREER

Among Indians and white Afrikaans-speakers the perception of racial preference is the single most frequently mentioned factor in occupational progress, and it is a prominent reason among white English speakers as well. Among the traditional victims of race discrimination in employment, African and coloured people, the perception of racial disadvantage in employment is less-prominent - a notable turnaround.

Inequality

Race and inequality have obviously been very closely associated throughout South Africa's history. Today some people still see the racial disadvantage as the critical factor in socio-economic inequality while others observe that the bases of inequality have shifted away from race towards other attributes, and that inequality is growing within race groups.

We asked the respondents whether in their perceptions, socio-economic social and economic inequality, in terms of living standards at the present time, is becoming less, staying the same or becoming worse. We followed that with a probe into the reasons for the trend as they saw them. From among the large number of reasons given spontaneously, we identified those answers that pointed to racial causes. The results are given in Table 10 below:

TABLE 10: PERCEPTIONS OF TRENDS IN INEQUALITY AND THE PRPORTIONS OF RESPONDENTS MENTIONING RACIAL FACTORS AMONG THE REASONS

The results show that there is a dominant perception among everyone that inequality is intensifying. But those who attribute the trend to inter-racial factors are a minority of between ten and twenty percent in most cases.

In addition to the results above we explored the perceived causes of inequality with the following question: There is still considerable inequality in South Africa - some people enjoy a much higher standard of living than others. What do you see as the two main causes of this inequality? In the sample as a whole the dominant reasons given were as follows:

DOMINANT CAUSES OF INEQUALITY:

A more detailed breakdown of the race-related responses appears in table 11.

TABLE 11: RACE-RELATED REASONS FOR THE PERSISTENCE OF INEQUALITY

We see here again that only a minority of respondents directly attribute inequality to race or racism, although further probing could very well have raised this level. It is also significant, however, that once again certain minority groups are more likely than the African majority to attribute the problem to racially-linked factors. In general these results confirm others we have presented to the effect that class and socio-economic factors and not racism in its specific meaning are seen as the causes of disadvantage and inequality.

5 RACISM EXPLORED IN ISOLATION

What the results have shown thus far is that while concern about racism and race discrimination is very significantly present in the consciousness of South Africans, it takes its place as a secondary factor in the popular explanations of social and economic differences and inequalities. Racism is also not of primary salience as a social issue - it is crowded out by the very serious problems of unemployment, crime and other social and economic concerns that are seen as having their own causes and dynamics.

When the issue of race and racism is raised as a topic in its own right, however, the surrounding context of other social and economic concerns falls away and the importance of racism expands. The following is a good example from our results.

We posed the question These days some people complain about racism that has continued despite the changes that have taken place in South Africa. How serious do you think this problem of racism actually is? The responses appear below:

TABLE 12: PERCEIVED SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM OF RACISM TODAY

We note immediately that when the issue is raised without a surrounding context of broader issues, the stated importance - seriousness - of racism rises. Nearly 60% of all respondents see it as a serious problem, which it obviously is.

It is interesting to note, however, that the minorities, particularly white Afrikaners, who are concerned less about the historical racism of white on African and more about the new ‘reverse racism' of transformation, take a more serious view of the issue than the victims of the older racism, the African majority.

6 POPULAR DEFINITIONS OF RACISM

Finally in this brief review of findings, it is necessary to look briefly at what the people interviewed understood as racism. Various questions were asked covering this but the following results are typical.

We asked the respondents to outline two ‘particular disadvantages they had suffered personally as a result of racism'. The answers not only provide insight into the popular understanding of the problem but also indicate the scope of its impact. The results follow below:

TABLE 13: EXAMPLES OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF RACISM ^a

a  Percentages exceed 100 because of multiple answers

The results above are rather meagre in a sample that was able to give a mass of abstract examples of racism not personally experienced. Most of the examples given as personal experiences are only able to be described as institutional racism and very few represent race affront or insult. More than 50% indicate that they have no personal examples to give. The incidents of raw racism that are quoted in the media from time to time may thus be exceptions to general experience.

Consciousness of racism thrives on word of mouth, in the abstract and in the constructions that people put on social problems and the consequences of history. It is also stimulated by projections on to situations. In some of the more general questions not analysed here the following types of examples of racism were given by people who in the results above could not provide concrete examples of racist experience:

• Around 5%-6% of the sample felt that racism was displayed in the way whites look at Africans;
• About a similar proportion feel that racism is displayed because whites have not lowered their lifestyles;
• A few individuals felt that racism was displayed when employers asked for records of experience in job applications; and
• Among whites substantial proportions seem to assume that certain jobs are not open to them, even though they may never have applied for such jobs.

A fuller analysis of the interpretations that people place on racism will be given in our later analysis. At this stage it is perhaps sufficient to say that between 5% and 7% of the sample gave responses that indicated that they endorse the concept of  institutional racism to the extent that they perceive responses to poverty, lack of education and various regulations that have an impact on the poor as examples of racism. The large majority in the sample, however, define racism in interpersonal terms but struggle to give personal examples of its impact.

7 BRIEF CONCLUSIONS AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The racial tension and discrimination that are regularly reported in the media are a tragic denial of everything that the new South Africa stands for and could place the future stability of our society at risk. The elimination of race discrimination demands a common commitment from all South Africans. Fortunately the evidence from the survey reported on here shows that race discrimination can be beaten. While serious, it does not dominate the experience of South Africans to the extent that the reported incidents would suggest. This representative survey among all South Africans has shown that:

• Around 48% of all adults, and 49% among Africans, feel that race relations have improved in recent years while only 25% feel that they have deteriorated. White Afrikaners are the least positive, among whom 44% feel that inter-group relations have deteriorated.
• Only some 27% of South Africans say they have problems in the way they are treated by others, and much the same proportion of Africans (29%) feel the same way. Around 14% of all adults feel that these problems are very serious. At the same time, however, among only 5% does the treatment have a racial character - the rest is personal, domestic, occupational and in the neighbourhood.
• In contrast to these rather positive trends, levels of trust in fellow South Africans have fallen. Some 65% of adults trust their compatriots less than they did a few years ago. Once again, however, only 10% link their mistrust to issues of race. Crime, corruption and politics take the blame.
• Racism does feature as one of the major unresolved problems in the new South Africa, but only some 8% of all adults give it priority compared with 55% as regards unemployment and 48% in the case of crime. Race issues are 9th in the list of major unresolved problems.
• Some 54% of all adults and 58% of African people are dissatisfied with opportunities for personal progress in their lives. However, only 11% (6% among Africans) see the impediments as due to racial factors or racism. Among minorities the proportions blaming race discrimination are higher, and as many as 40% of white Afrikaners feel their race is holding them back. A further question on occupational advancement gave much the same results.
• The people interviewed are concerned about growing inequality in the society, with some 65% seeing it as deepening. While most people know that there is inequality between races, only some 15% of South Africans see racism or race discrimination as the causes of the deterioration. Other factors like education and unemployment weigh far more heavily.

Hence, while the survey has revealed deep concern among all South Africans about a number of socio-economic trends, the specific factors of race and race relations are not seen as dominant problems, or as the critical causes of the trends.

At the same time, however, consciousness of race and racism has not receded into the background. When we asked questions about racism and race relations in isolation from social and socio-economic factors, the issues assumed greater salience:

• Some 59% of all South Africans, and 54% of African people, see racism as a serious problem. This concern is greatest among minorities - between 67% among coloured people rising to a massive 87% among white Afrikaners see racism as a serious problem.
• While the problem is seen to be serious, it is often serious in abstract, as it were. Nearly 50% among all South Africans (46% among African people) could not specify direct personal experiences of racism, race discrimination or racial antipathy. The examples given by the remaining people who did specify examples were very often examples of social and economic disadvantage rather than racism of a core kind. We accept, however, that some of the examples were examples of ‘institutional racism'.

South Africa has many problems, and it is possible to put constructions on them that will link them, directly or indirectly, to racism or apartheid or the workings of the colonial and/or the global economy. At the same time, however, the causes of South Africa's problems are complex, because new layers of causes have accumulated over time.

The ordinary people surveyed in this study are deeply conscious of racism and the latter day consequences of apartheid, but they are also aware of the other factors in the complexity of causes of poverty and disadvantage. It is remarkable how little they have oversimplified these serious issues.

The issue of ‘racism' is made even more complex by the fact that we now have a newer perceived ‘racism' co-existing with the older form - what many of the respondents within minorities saw as the ‘reverse racism' of affirmative action and transformation.

The replies of the respondents suggested that they regard racism as a serious problem but most of them do not feel that racism is the immediate crisis in their lives. They might also feel that the complex problems that erode their trust in their fellow South Africans require much more than exhortations to end ‘racism'. The extent to which the action needed to build harmony and prosperity can be packaged within the concept of countering ‘racism' remains to be seen.

PART 2

Between a rainbow and a hard place: Threats and opportunities in racial reconciliation in South Africa

December 2001

1. LEGACIES AND RESIDUES OF RACE

Results presented in the first report were gratifying in that they did not mirror the impression of mounting racial tension in the media prior to the conference. In fact one major finding already reported is that twice as many South Africans feel that race relations have improved over the past five years as those who feel that they have deteriorated.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to believe that the issue of race is in retreat in our society. Our history has ensured the continuing resonance of race in the economic, social, and educational circumstances of the population. While no longer the dominant basis of income inequality, race is still very visibly correlated with unemployment, living standards, educational achievement, political affiliation, and vulnerability to social problems and disease. The surface patterns in our society project race as its persisting major feature.

Furthermore, South African society has so much social stress and material frustration that one cannot rule out a future search for scapegoats. ‘Racial blaming' is an ever-present possibility despite the progress towards reconciliation that has been made, and some of our most prominent political leaders seem to be leading the way in exploiting the symbolism of race.

How vulnerable are South Africans to racial re-mobilisation? How easily could parts of the South African population reactivate historic divisions and channel persisting socio-economic frustration back into race as the primary division in our society? In what areas of life is this most likely to occur? What forms do perceptions of racism take? Answers to such questions are essential if one is to protect our fragile reconciliation from the inroads of politics and frustrated expectations.

This fuller analysis of the survey results provides many of the answers.

2. PERCEIVED TARGETS OF RACISM

The impact of racial issues depends very much on who the perceived victims are. Specific insights are provided by answers to a question posed as follows: ‘Who suffers most as a consequence of racism these days?' The results are given in
Table 1.

We note in these results that among one-fifth of English-speaking whites there is a moderate tendency to express concern for Africans as victims of racism, and that substantial minorities of whites and Indians recognise that all groups can be victims. There is also considerable sympathy for poor people in all groups in this regard.

More generally, however, the tendency is for each group to regard itself as the victim - as shown by the results highlighted. Over five out of ten Africans and some four out of ten coloured people and Indians see themselves as the targets of racism, largely to the exclusion of each other. Except among whites, and to some extent Indians, concerns about racism are self-interested. Hence concerns about race tend to divide South Africans more than they create mutual sympathy.

3. WHERE RACISM IS SEEN TO OCCUR

South Africans are equally divided about the ways and places in which racism manifests itself. A variety of situations was read out to respondents and they were asked whether or not each was a situation in which ‘serious racism is found'.

In interpreting these results one has to bear in mind that many if not most of the answers are based on hearsay and media reporting. Few people know enough about all the situations to make objective judgements - results already reported showed that half of South Africans could not give examples of personal experience of racism. One must also note that respondents were simply asked to indicate whether or not they thought that serious racism is found in the situations. They were not asked to indicate whether the situations were completely or consistently ‘racist' , and the racism that they identify will often be the exception to the rule. They should not be understood as suggesting that everything about the situations is racist. For this reason the main utility of the items lies in comparing the situations against one another to see which of them are more or less likely to be seen to contain racism.

Therefore, in Graph 1 we present rankings of results based on the proportions within each group that think that a situation is likely to be characterised by racism.

The results compared show that Africans are far more likely than minorities to see the likelihood of racism in the various situations presented, with one major exception: the racism that whites perceive in affirmative action and empowerment policy. Even among Africans these policies are seen as having at least an element of racial discrimination by over 40%. This confirms research by the Helen Suzman Foundation some time ago that showed that affirmative action is not uncontroversial among Africans. They also tend to see or fear political favouritism or tribal bias in affirmative action in some cases.

The results in the graphs are made complex by the fact that in some cases the groups think of their own group as victims of racism but in other cases they think of other groups. It is unlikely, for example, that English-speaking whites perceive much racism against themselves in shops and banks or on farms - they are thinking more of black South Africans (cost considerations prevented the questions being repeated for race groups separately).

In the main, however, the members of different groups structure their answers around the racial discrimination that they perceive to be directed at their own groups. As a consequence, the mental ‘maps' that South Africans in the different racial groups have of racism at work are quite dramatically different.

There is most agreement among different groups of South Africans about the likelihood of racism in shops, offices, treatment by the police, employment and farm employment situations, but in other respects their perceptions are sharply opposed. For example, housing policy is relatively low on the scale of racial bias for Africans but high for white Afrikaners, who see racial bias in the large-scale subsidisation of houses for Africans.

Racial bias in the media is clearly not a popular concern among ordinary Africans but rather a concern among opinion-leaders, the intelligentsia, and some African politicians, whose perceptions ironically converge with those of whites but for opposite reasons. Whites see pro-African bias, political bias, or ‘political correctness', whereas the African intelligentsia sees pro-white, pro-capitalist, or Eurocentric bias.

Results not presented in table form for reasons of space show that among the African elite in the highest lifestyle category (LSM 8), 48% detect racism in the media compared with the average of 36% that appears in the graph. Among largely unionised blue-collar workers it is even higher at 58%. Among Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters it is 57%, largely because they detect an anti-Inkatha bias in newspapers.

The African intelligentsia differs from the rank and file quite markedly in one other respect. As already mentioned, as many as 41% of Africans see racism as a possibility in employment equity policy, but the proportion falls to only 16% of Africans in the highest lifestyle categories (LSM7/8) and to 25% among African professionals, managers, and other high level occupations. In other words 75%-85% of African elite groups see no racism in employment equity or affirmative action. Whether so intended or not, employment equity policy seems to have the image of benefiting the new middle class, and the new middle class seem to realise it full well. IFP supporters seem to be particularly sensitive to this elite bias - some 70% see ‘racism' in the policy, probably because they fear or detect elite or pro-African National Congress bias in the way that it is applied.

The results, for all these reasons, are only to some extent a barometer of racism in an objective sense. Some of the situations are clearly signalled as problem areas about which all South Africans should be actively concerned. These situations would include farmers' treatment of farm-workers, employer-employee relations generally, treatment by the police, and that in shops and offices. Needless to say, had we asked a question about farm murders, these would undoubtedly have been added to the list of likely racist situations by white respondents.

4. POSSIBLE RACISM IN POLITICAL OPPOSITION

One of the very special situations about which accusations of racism have flown fast and furious in recent months, concerns the style and content of political opposition, particularly that emanating from the Democratic Party/Democratic Alliance (DP/DA). Following long-standing African National Congress (ANC) accusations, the leader of the New National Party (NNP), Marthinus van Schalkwyk, having newly separated himself from the DA, made this accusation again in Parliament on 31st October. Some of the media have taken up the refrain.

Weeks before these events, this issue was approached quite directly with the question: ‘When opposition political parties, like the DP or now the DA, criticise government, it is seen by some as racist. It is racism or is it simply political opposition? The responses to the question in Graph 2 show that the stereotype of the allegedly sharp opposition style adopted by the DP leadership as ‘racist' is hardly widespread in the electorate as a whole.

Graph 2 shows that Africans are around three times more likely to see opposition politics as racist as is the case among minorities, but even so the level of this perception among the dominantly ANC-supporting majority is scarcely above one-third.

There are categories among Africans in which the perception is more marked. Results not presented in table form show that among the highest lifestyle category (LSM 8), some 43% perceive the politics of the DA/DP as racist and 45% of largely unionised African blue-collar workers have the same view.

While ANC supporters do not deviate from the average in the graph, nearly 50% of United Democratic Movement (UDM) supporters, over 60% of IFP supporters and 85% of former Bophuthatswana leader Lucas Mangope's United Christian Democratic Party supporters see the DP as racist. This could be because they see their own parties as being in competition with the DP/DA and they have an interest in discrediting their rival. By and large, however, virtually all members of minorities and two-thirds of Africans in general do not share the sensitivity of some politicians and analysts to the style of official opposition politics. The results suggest that the majority of rank-and-file voters have not fallen for even their own political leaders' attempts to challenge the legitimacy of opposition by calling it racist.

5. INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION: THE IDEOLOGIES OF UNITY AND DIVISION

The study then proceeded to explore a range of attitudes to issues focused on race and related themes. Statements, some controversial, were read to respondents and they were asked how strongly they agreed or disagreed with the sentiment expressed. The responses to these statements will be analysed in categories of similar content before drawing overall conclusions. For brevity only the level of agreement, with strong and partial agreement combined, will be analysed.

The responses to the statements in Graph 3 appear to signal some very tough implications for racial reconciliation in South Africa. The general message might seem to be that the prospects of reconciliation without more redistribution and more far-reaching transformation are remote. Although the proportions vary between statements, even among whites themselves there are substantial minorities who, under the pressure of the mobilisation of public sentiment around the national project of transformation, have adopted an attitude of resignation or perhaps limp agreement and acceptance. The second last statement, however - one that signals lethal envy of possessions and wealth - tends to frighten large majorities of whites and Indians into rejection.

The last statement suggests that under the political cloak of nation-building and national unity, a very basic commitment to racial and ethnic exclusivity or solidarity is widespread, particularly among whites and Indians, but with Africans not far behind. Coloured people are closer to the colour-blind ideals embodied in much of the new South Africa rhetoric than anyone else.

At the same time, however, as the graphs imply, there are majorities of whites and also very substantial minorities of Africans and coloured people who feel uncomfortable about, and even appalled by, the implications of ‘transformatory' policy and politics. They are clearly unhappy about the mutual alienation that it could cause. The first statement in the graph illustrates this very clearly - 52% of Africans may endorse the notion of a new second class of citizenship for whites, but 48% either disagree in part or disagree very strongly.

In other words, their argued moral legitimacy notwithstanding, some issues of ‘transformation', with their implications of restitution and perhaps even retribution, polarise our society. The divisions created penetrate all groups, but there are substantial minorities of Africans and other Africans who rise above self-interest and reject policies that could further alienate some of their fellow South Africans.

6. CROSS-CUTTING, AMELIORATING AND CONFUSING ISSUES

Furthermore, the edges of a stark polarisation of people into groups of differing entitlement are blurred by some cross-cutting cultural and language commitments within races. The extent of this is presented in Graph 4.

Not surprisingly, white Afrikaners are the most conscious of their ethnic identity, but their commitments resonate among over two-thirds of Africans as well. Over past decades governments in virtually the whole of post-liberation Africa have attempted to counteract ethnic and ‘tribal' commitments in the search for national integration and coherence, but often to no avail. The white Afrikaners to some extent demonstrate that the suppression of ethnicity can be unnecessary: notwithstanding their high levels of ethnic sentiment they join with others in at least a verbal commitment to national reconciliation and unity, as we will see in due course. Ethnicity can divide people but if meaningfully accommodated in society it can be a bridge to a broader unity.

The responses to all the statements reviewed are valid and real, but unlike ideologues, most people in any society are aware that social realities place limits on or qualify what they might like to believe in. Some perceptions that blur and complicate the commitments that respondents have expressed up to now can be seen in Graph 5.

One sees in these responses a healthy level of cynicism and an awareness of realities that complicate social beliefs. There are also other levels of awareness and commitment that can deflect racial and ideological definitions of our society, as we see in Graph 6.

The range of responses that have been presented in Graphs 3 to 6 might seem like a confusing mishmash of contradictions, but these very contradictions are in the nature of social reality. Unlike highly politicised ideologues, ordinary people are ambivalent about many major social issues and they express their ambivalence by subscribing to different objectives at different times. The results above show that most Africans want more transformation and redistribution but they also believe in other goals as well, and they would hesitate to press their demands to the point of creating social conflict. They will in the end endorse a balance between their claims and those of their compatriots, in the interests of harmony and co-operation.

The strength of this latter goal is illustrated by the results in Graph 7.

Reviewing these responses suggests a miracle of reconciliation in a formerly divided society - a veritable feast of goodwill and a mutual embrace across the divides of history. Needless to say it is partly too good to be true. The responses are valid reflections of sentiments but the sentiments are to some extent a product of a superficial verbal political culture in which many social realities are repressed. It is after all demanded of everyone to make politically correct noises. Even 56% of white Afrikaners are prepared to volunteer to be ‘less concerned about their own language and culture' in order to embrace the new nation building.

But whether phoney or not, the kind of public sentiment expressed in the results in Graph 7 tempers the passions of entitlement among Africans and the hostile defensiveness among minorities that earlier graphs reflected.

One ends this section with the conclusion that the both the sentiments that unite and those that divide South Africans must not be over-interpreted. People are not necessarily fully convinced of either their own or their political leaders' aspirations.

More broadly, the whole range of results in this section is reassuring to the extent that it shows that while ordinary people have their socially abrasive commitments, these are counterbalanced by alternative commitments, by an awareness of social and economic realities, by religious commitments, sometimes by a healthy level of cynicism and most often by an awareness of our ultimate interdependence.

7. HOW RACISM IS PERCEIVED AND DEFINED

Racism is difficult enough to combat when it arises in visible behaviour and interaction. It becomes hugely more difficult to address when, as our politicians are sometimes inclined to do, it is defined as part of deeply imbedded and historical social structures and institutions that require decades to change. How do South Africans at large define it?

Various questions were asked, one being: ‘What is racism? Describe it in your own words? The widely varying spontaneous responses to this open-ended question were categorised and the results appear in Table 2.

Apart from the first and the last three categories in the table, the responses refer to more tangible and visible current problems. ‘Apartheid' is ambiguous. It could be simply a reference to discrimination in the past or it could refer to consequences of apartheid in the present, which is more complex. Generally it was not a frequent response among the better-educated respondents and it is therefore probably an illustrative reference to the past.

Results not tabulated show that among African respondents with better education and high socio-economic status, the tendency was to emphasise psychological and attitudinal aspects - antipathy, hostility, and hatred (20%) but also wealth and capitalism (16%). Here we begin to see a rather different mind-set among the African middle class and elite.

The issue was further explored with the question ‘In what two ways do you notice or experience racism?' Here again the spontaneous replies were coded and categorised for tabulation in Table 3.

In these results the more complex and intractable dimensions of perceived racism are more prominent than in the results of some earlier questions, and have been categorised under ‘institutional'. Nonetheless, perceived racism in social interaction and social access still dominates. Among minorities perceptions of ‘reverse racism' are in second place.

One might have expected the more complex institutional forms to be mentioned particularly by more politicised people in the African middle classes and elite. Not so - among post-matric Africans institutional racism is mentioned by a below-average 22% and among the top lifestyle category (LSM 8) by only 9%.

Among LSM 8 Africans, attitudinal factors are mentioned by a very high 27%, indicating a pronounced sensitivity to white attitudes. Interestingly, racism in the treatment of foreigners is noted by 30% in LSM 8, possibly indicating a high proportion of business people from elsewhere in Africa in the sample.

8. THE TAILS THAT WAG THE DOG: SUBGROUPS WITHIN RACIAL CATEGORIES

It is very seldom in society that ordinary people drive racial or social tensions to breaking point. They normally require to be mobilised for good or bad causes. The more extreme views of mobilising leaders do not surface in representative surveys, but the social sub-categories from which leaders and opinion-leaders are drawn can be identified. In the summary of results below one can detect the divergent views of some of the more visible and articulate sub-categories in the population. These results have not been tabulated here for reasons of brevity but can be furnished and will be published in due course.

Patterns among socio-economic sub-categories

AFRICANS

One of the surprises in the results is that Africans who support parties regarded as ‘white'- or minority-oriented (sometimes the NNP, sometimes the DP or the DA, and often all these parties) have harsher racial attitudes than average and are more inclined to see themselves as victims. For example they are more likely than average to:

• see liberation as a failure without equality;
• resent white wealth;
• be dissatisfied with personal progress, their employment, and treatment generally;
• trust others less;
• see race relations as deteriorating;
• see inequality as deepening;
• see their race as holding them back;
• regard racism as very serious;
• see opposition criticism of government as racist;
• doubt that equality is possible;
• believe that races do not need each other; and
• be less concerned with racial unity and more with own identity.

Yet they are less likely to support forcing whites to make sacrifices for African progress, or to regard whites as second class citizens, and they are more likely to see politicians as the causes of racial tension.

Africans who support the IFP have similar attitudes, also often project an image of victimisation, and also want more affirmative action, but their hostility is as frequently directed at the government as at whites.

Zulu and Xhosa-speakers are generally more likely than other Africans to be nationalistic and in-group oriented, and their core cultural populations in KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape are more inclined than average to be dissatisfied with their circumstances, resent white wealth, believe that whites have to be forced into make greater sacrifices for black progress, and see whites as second class citizens. Some of these attitudes wash over into the Western Cape with migration from the Eastern Cape.

The African elite (variously identified as those with post-matric qualifications, the highest lifestyle categories (LSM7/8), professionals, and/or higher income or suburban residents) tends to reflect contradictory trends. One of more of these groupings, and sometimes all of them, are more inclined than average to:

• see South Africa as a country for Africans, with whites as second class citizens;
• see race as a factor in low trust;
• see racism as very serious;
• see race relations as deteriorating;
• see inequality as worsening;
• feel that race is holding them back;
• deny that employment equity and affirmative action are racist;
• see the way that news is reported as racist;
• regard opposition criticism of government as racist;
• see educational differences as institutional racism; and
• deny that black inequality is as wide as white-black inequality.

On the other hand, particular categories within the elite are more likely than average to feel that the races need each other and that race relations have improved. While some of these higher socio-economic groupings believe that South Africa is a country for Africans as the primary citizens, others are more inclined than average to accept whites as equal citizens.

They tend to believe more than the average that merit counts and that racial inequality could be eliminated with education and opportunity. They are also more critical of government and political nepotism, and they are not unduly inclined to see white criticism of government as racist. They are less inclined than average to want to force whites to make sacrifices and they show a measure of class solidarity with whites, being more likely than average to accept white relative wealth.

Production workers in the formal sector are more inclined than average to see racism as serious, to see racism in the workplace, to believe racial inequality overshadows inequality among Africans, to resent white lifestyles, and to be pessimistic about educational opportunity reducing race inequality. However, they are more inclined to see race relations as having improved and less inclined to see their liberation as a failure because of inequality. The influence of the labour movement is powerful in the attitudes of this category.

One of the economic minorities displaying the greatest frustration in respect of race is people working in the informal sector. They are far more inclined than the substantially unionised production workers to have aggravated racial feelings and to be hyper conscious of racism and inequality. Not being part of the formal economy they have few bridges of understanding into the white community.

In general, the underlying trend is for the many race attitudes to ameliorate with higher income and socio-economic levels.

Very young African people in school (16-17 years) are more inclined than average to see race relations as having deteriorated but the next age category (up to 24 years) is more positive than average. Our township schools are not the most favourable places for fostering harmony in South Africa.

WHITES

Among whites, as among all other groups, ethnic commitments tend to weaken with improved socio-economic status, except that among the highly educated a core of ethnic commitment co-exists with non-racial idealism.

Younger whites are most inclined to feel that race relations have improved over recent years.

The better-educated and wealthier whites also have the most positive attitudes to race relations. Among the lifestyle category just below the top, however, perceptions of race relations are relatively negative.

The mood in small towns and rural areas is most negative of all, particularly in the Free State.

The few supporters of the NNP left at the time of the survey had the most negative race attitudes of all, while supporters of the DA/DP are around the average.

The dominant concern among whites is with what is perceived as the reverse racism of affirmative action and black empowerment. These perceptions do not ameliorate with higher education and income, and there are no significant differences between political parties on this score. The consensus among whites that these policies are racist is as complete as the consensus among Africans opposing apartheid in the past.

COLOURED PEOPLE

As among whites, the perceptions of race relations tend to become more positive at higher levels of education and socio-economic status.

Similarly, among coloured people, ethnic (language) commitments tend to weaken with improved education although a core of commitment persists at the higher levels alongside non-racial idealism.

ANC supporters among coloured people tend to have somewhat more pronounced ethnic concerns than average.

Except among a small minority of highly educated people, the perception of affirmative action as racist is as complete as it is among whites - a near consensus issue.

Among ANC supporters only some 25% see the policy as anything other than a new form of racism, but among DP/DA/NNP supporters virtually everyone thinks that it is a racist policy. Among the ANC supporters there are people who would like more affirmative action (for coloured people?) despite its being perceived as racist.

Among coloured people negative attitudes to whites tend to occur mainly in the middle to lower ranges of income and socio-economic status and among ANC supporters, although there is a small core of more highly educated people who are also highly politicised and have fairly radical attitudes to white wealth.

INDIANS

Among Indians there are no significant differences between income and educational levels in perceptions of race relations.

Among ANC supporters, however, people are far more likely than average to perceive an improvement in race relations in recent years.

There are few internal differences in the way that employment equity policy is perceived. It is dominantly seen as racist and even among ANC supporters, three-quarters see it that way - as a matter of fact they are even more critical of the policy than DA supporters.

As among coloured people, the attitudes of Indians are shaped by the fact that they are caught between an African majority and a relatively wealthy white minority. They experience residues of white racial prejudice but at the same time are not comfortable with the accommodation of minorities by the government. In general their attitudes seem to be converging quite rapidly with those of whites.

There are still attitudes of hostility to whites, but these relate more to lifestyle and political party support than to education or income in general. The Indians are a complex group and one requires a larger sample than we had to provide a precise breakdown of political ideology.

9. THE PROSPECTS FOR ONGOING RECONCILIATION

In assessing the implications of the survey for reconciliation, the full range of results must be reviewed, including those already published. While it is unnecessary to repeat them in detail, they provide insight into the extent to which race, as defined by the respondents themselves, is the dominant factor in popular consciousness. We may summarise and combine these results as follows in Graph 8.

As already concluded, the results summarised above, which are largely based on spontaneous responses, reflect evidence of racism as a significant social problem but they do not add up to a national crisis. The perceptions that assume crisis proportions are around issues of unemployment, crime, and social provision (housing services etc), each of which were spontaneously mentioned as unresolved problems by around 50% of South Africans.

The results that have been reviewed in the full body of evidence in this report contain some very challenging attitudes to race policy and expectations. There is no doubt that South Africa has a racial agenda that it has to deal with. Many of the expectations expressed have the potential to divide and polarise the public almost to the same extent as under apartheid. In some of their attitudes and fears, members of minority groups sound like the oppressed majority during apartheid.

At the same time, however, direct and specific frustrations in everyday race interaction are very much a minority phenomenon. There is also an overwhelming commitment to inter-group co-operation and reconciliation, even among the people who feel most aggrieved or entitled to redress. The results, furthermore, reflect a remarkable degree of perspective, in the sense that all the tough expectations and reactions among both Africans and minorities are balanced by other commitments that soften the boundaries of our racially defined population blocs.

Public statements are often made in South Africa that make the prospects of race reconciliation seem remote. At the time that these results were being analysed in the run-up to the United Nations World Conference against Racism, some high level political and other commentators dismissed the reported survey evidence that race relations were improving. They argued that South Africa's educational and employment inequality points to the persistence of racism of an institutional kind, inherited from the apartheid past.

Institutional racism exists and it would be absurd to deny its effects. But ‘institutional racism' can be defined either very broadly or more precisely. A more precise definition would be when some rule, regulation, policy, pattern of interaction, or historical legacy in any institution has the intended or unintended effect of placing members of any race group at a disadvantage because of their race. In categorising the responses of people in the survey it seems as if around 24% to 26% of South Africans detect or feel that they experience this type of institutional racism. This is a significant issue and it deserves the most urgent attention, but once again, it is not a national crisis.

This more precise definition is challenged by some people on two grounds. One challenge is that the effects of institutional racism in the past should count as institutional racism for the present as well. Another basis would be that even if the rule or pattern has a legitimate purpose and members of certain race groups are disadvantaged, not because of their race, but because of some attribute that happens to be correlated with race, it should also be regarded as institutional racism. Such definitions of the problem are so broad that they could encompass most of the inequality within and between nations in the world today.

Institutional racism has to be combated. If, however, it is defined so broadly that it has to cover the effects of history or the effects of legitimate rules that place some people at a disadvantage inadvertently, and not because of their race, then one has defined problems in such a way that they are too large or complex to solve.

Fortunately this survey shows that most South Africans have defined the serious problems of racism and race discrimination in ways that relate to visible current social interaction, and this can be addressed. Even the more sophisticated and better-educated among former victims of apartheid are no more inclined than others to have developed ideologies based on abstract ideologies of institutional racism. This, coupled with the fact that they are more positive than negative about trends in race relations, are major grounds for optimism.

Another ground for optimism is that only a third of South Africans, and about a third among Africans as well, see tough political opposition as racist. Now that the NNP has joined the ANC in depicting the major opposition party as racially exclusive or racist, this popular judgement will be tested, but South Africans seem to understand that political opposition in a democracy should not be hobbled by political correctness.

One must be cautious in two respects, however. Among the more articulate middle classes and elite among Africans, there appears to be relatively great sensitivity about real or imagined hostility on the side of whites. These attitudes and feelings can be like a Rorschach inkblot - one sees what one likes to see or fears most. A great deal has still to be done to interpret people's attitudes and feelings to one another in South Africa.

The second ground for caution lies in the apparent determination of some of our political leaders and many analysts to re-politicise race. If they work at it hard enough they may succeed. Expectations and perceptions can be activated by constant promotion of an idea or a goal in political communication. As an example of this we offer the following comparison of two nearly identical sets of survey results ten years apart, the one from the current survey and the other one conducted by the same author using the same sampling design in 1991 (see Table 4).

There are three major conclusions to be drawn from this comparison. The first is that the major national issue of unemployment has become significantly more prominent in the consciousness of Africans (crime and violence is fairly static but this is due to the fact that while crime has become more serious there is less political violence). The second conclusion is that issues relating to race relations and racism have tended to decline in significance, as our other results have already suggested.

Most significantly, however, is the dramatic rise in the level of concern with service delivery and housing. There is no doubt that the performance of government in these respects has improved since 1991 (in housing delivery hugely so), but the issues are now much more likely to be articulated as ‘unresolved problems'. Clearly expectations have been created and sentiments aroused that are beyond the capacity of government to match. The government, in talking constantly about service delivery from the RDP period onwards (without emphasising with equal vigour that services have to be paid for), has created a problem for itself that it cannot solve.

The question is whether political leadership will do the same thing in respect of race and racism. Since 1991 popular concerns about racism have subsided, which is heartening news in a formerly deeply divided society. Since around 1997 political leadership has tried to put racism back on the popular agenda by labelling more and more of what it does not like as ‘racist' - the most recent being criticism of the investigation into irregularities in the massive arms deal. For this leadership's own sake it is to be hoped that it will not succeed.

Happily the results of this survey suggest that the population will not fall for the use of race as a constant scapegoat. In fact most people, even government supporters, dismiss the accusations of racist motives as transparent excuses.

The very varied results of this survey, if read in relationship to one another, show that far fewer than one-third of the population, among the majority and minorities alike, has a consistent, politicised, and unyielding commitment to racially-based objectives. If the genuine problems of discrimination that this survey has revealed are taken seriously by government and civil society, and if politicians of all varieties will allow it to happen, South Africa can continue its progress towards the reconciliation that the people deserve.

Source: South African Institute of Race Relations, September and December 2001

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